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This book demolishes the widely held view that the phrase 'medieval business' is an oxymoron. The authors review the entire range of business in medieval western Europe, probing its Roman and Christian heritage to discover the economic and political forces that shaped the organization of agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining, transportation and marketing. Businessmen's responses to the devastating plagues, famines, and warfare that beset Europe in the late Middle Ages are equally well covered. Medieval businessmen's remarkable success in coping with this hostile new environment was 'a harvest of adversity' that prepared the way for the economic expansion of the sixteenth century. Two main themes run through this book. First, the force and direction of business development in this period stemmed primarily from the demands of the elite. Second, the lasting legacy of medieval businessmen was less their skillful adaptations of imported inventions than their brilliant innovations in business organization.

The news of the death of Bonifazio reached the company's head-quarters in Florence on October 25. On the following day, those shareholders resident in Florence met and agreed to appoint as chairman Bonifazio's brother, Pacino di Tommaso, changing the name of the company for the third time in four years. Pacino faced the unenviable task of taking charge of a company that was fighting for its very survival. The new chairman was a very different type of leader from his brother. Unlike Bonifazio, who was inclined to take bold initiatives and whose interests lay abroad, Pacino appeared to be cast in the conservative mold of his father Tommaso. His were the “ink-stained fingers” that compiled the Assets and Secret Books of the Sixth Company. His preoccupations were with local politics rather than foreign ventures, and he showed no interest in rushing to England to take up where Bonifazio left off. Thus, for the second time in succession, the appointment of a new chairman was accompanied by a sharp change in the direction of company policy. The effect of the new management priorities was promptly felt in England, although the London branch headed by Giovanni Baroncelli continued to do its utmost to maintain the company's position there. For the first time, the Peruzzi began to back out of its obligations. Following England's truce with France, the Bardi and Peruzzi agreed to secure the release of the earls of Derby and Northampton within fifteen days of the receipt of 500 sacks of wool promised by the king's council.

The Peruzzi Company has often been cited in the long-standing controversy over the origin of double-entry accounting, and because of this it is worthwhile to digress briefly to review medieval bookkeeping systems and their relevance to the business world in which the Peruzzi and other companies operated. This review will not attempt to deal with the arcane arguments of Weber, Sombart, Schumpeter, et al. regarding the role of systematic bookkeeping in defining profit and depersonalizing business, thereby creating the essential ingredients of capitalism. These concepts not only are outside the scope of this study, but also relate to developments largely beyond the era of the super-companies. Nor will it delve into disputes, such as that between Lane and Yamey, over the influence of double-entry accounting on the transition of merchant-entrepreneurs from an itinerant to a sedentary mode of operation. The super-companies were rooted firmly in Florence as far back as can be determined and do not appear to have passed through an itinerant phase. Yet, although the importance of evolving accounting systems may have been exaggerated by some authors, the invention of a number of new techniques did take piace in the period of the super-companies and undeniably helped them evaluate and control their businesses. Early in their histories, before the companies grew large enough to need a comprehensive system for accounting, they would have already encountered single-entry bookkeeping, also known as charge and discharge or stewardship accounting.

Much of the literature on Florentine economic history of the first half of the fourteenth century has focused on the very large companies, especially those of the Bardi and Peruzzi, perhaps leaving the impression that they were representative of business organizations during this period. Nothing could be further from the truth. The number of companies operating in Florence in the 1330s and 1340s ran to many hundreds. Hundreds more flourished in the numerous commercial centers in Italy and northwestern Europe. But the term “company” encompassed a broad range of enterprises of differing magnitude and complexity, the preponderance of which were small and simple businesses. Some were in manufacturing, others in merchandise trading, others in banking and money changing, and still others in combinations of these activities. Only a few companies, however, embraced the entire spectrum. Of these, most formed relatively modest-sized organizations, with a small number of partners and limited capital. To be sure, there were many Italian companies of significant size during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, such as the Ricciardi of Lucca, the Bonsignori of Siena, and the Frescobaldi and Scali of Florence. And of the important non-Italian businesses, William de la Pole's had attained a size that made it a formidable competitor of the Italians in England and northern Europe. But there were a few international companies of such extraordinary dimensions that they deserve to be singled out with the special descriptive term “super-companies.”

This 1994 book presents a detailed description and history of one of the most famous companies of the early fourteenth century. This analysis of the Peruzzi Company produces a radical reassessment of what made the Florentine 'super-companies' so exceptional: commodity trading, especially in grain, which required heavy capital, sophisticated organisation, and an international network. But the book also exposes the limitations of their financial power, and explodes the myth that the collapse of the Peruzzi and its joint-venture partner, the Bardi, was caused by bad loans to Edward III made to finance his invasions of France.