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Undersampling biases are common in the optimal stopping literature, especially for economic full choice problems. Among these kinds of number-based studies, the moments of the distribution of values that generates the options (i.e., the generating distribution) seem to influence participants’ sampling rate. However, a recent study reported an oversampling bias on a different kind of optimal stopping task: where participants chose potential romantic partners from images of faces (Furl et al., 2019). The authors hypothesised that this oversampling bias might be specific to mate choice. We preregistered this hypothesis and so, here, we test whether sampling rates across different image-based decision-making domains a) reflect different over- or undersampling biases, or b) depend on the moments of the generating distributions (as shown for economic number-based tasks). In two studies (N = 208 and N = 96), we found evidence against the preregistered hypothesis. Participants oversampled to the same degree across domains (compared to a Bayesian ideal observer model), while their sampling rates depended on the generating distribution mean and skewness in a similar way as number-based paradigms. Moreover, optimality model sampling to some extent depended on the the skewness of the generating distribution in a similar way to participants. We conclude that oversampling is not instigated by the mate choice domain and that sampling rate in image-based paradigms, like number-based paradigms, depends on the generating distribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The commentaries raise a host of challenging issues and reflect a broad range of views. Some commentators doubt that there is any convincing evidence for adaptive misbelief, and remain (in our view, unduly) wedded to our “default presumption” that misbelief is maladaptive. Others think that the evidence for adaptive misbelief is so obvious, and so widespread, that the label “default presumption” is disingenuous. We try to chart a careful course between these opposing perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From an evolutionary standpoint, a default presumption is that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs maladaptive. But if humans are biologically engineered to appraise the world accurately and to form true beliefs, how are we to explain the routine exceptions to this rule? How can we account for mistaken beliefs, bizarre delusions, and instances of self-deception? We explore this question in some detail. We begin by articulating a distinction between two general types of misbelief: those resulting from a breakdown in the normal functioning of the belief formation system (e.g., delusions) and those arising in the normal course of that system's operations (e.g., beliefs based on incomplete or inaccurate information). The former are instances of biological dysfunction or pathology, reflecting “culpable” limitations of evolutionary design. Although the latter category includes undesirable (but tolerable) by-products of “forgivably” limited design, our quarry is a contentious subclass of this category: misbeliefs best conceived as design features. Such misbeliefs, unlike occasional lucky falsehoods, would have been systematically adaptive in the evolutionary past. Such misbeliefs, furthermore, would not be reducible to judicious – but doxastically1 noncommittal – action policies. Finally, such misbeliefs would have been adaptive in themselves, constituting more than mere by-products of adaptively biased misbelief-producing systems. We explore a range of potential candidates for evolved misbelief, and conclude that, of those surveyed, only positive illusions meet our criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In his 2012 book Jussim argues that the self-fulfilling prophecy and expectancy effects of descriptive stereotypes are not potent shapers of social reality. However, his conclusion that descriptive stereotypes per se do not shape social reality is premature and overly reductionist. We review evidence that suggests descriptive stereotypes do have a substantial influence on social reality, by virtue of their influence on collective action. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

We show that Kurzban et al.'s approach illuminates the relationship between religion and self-control. Whereas resource- depletion theorists suggest religion replenishes self-control resources ("strength"), we submit that religious cues make people feel observed, giving them "reason" to persevere, and we describe an experiment that supports our interpretation. Finally, we question the claim that subjective fatigue is a signal to redeploy resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Von Hippel & Trivers (VH&T) propose that self-deception has evolved to facilitate the deception of others. However, they ignore the subjective moral costs of deception and the crucial issue of credibility in self-deceptive speech. A self-signaling interpretation can account for the ritualistic quality of some self-deceptive affirmations and for the often-noted gap between what self-deceivers say and what they truly believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term prosocial has often been taken to mean nice or neighbourly, but many acts that further in-group interests are hostile and aggressive towards out-groups. According to Norenzayan et al., religion's ability to foster social cohesion within religious groups has been a key factor in the human transition to complex societies. But what are the prospects for nonparochial “religious prosociality”? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mesoudi et al. overlook an illuminating parallel between cultural and biological evolution, namely, the existence in each realm of a continuum from intelligent, mindful evolution through to oblivious, mindless evolution. In addition, they underplay the independence of cultural fitness from biological fitness. The assumption that successful cultural traits enhance genetic fitness must be sidelined, as must the assumption that such traits will at least be considered worth having. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The current study argues that population prevalence estimates for mental health disorders, or changes in mean scores over time, may not adequately reflect the heterogeneity in mental health response to the COVID-19 pandemic within the population. Methods: The COVID-19 Psychological Research Consortium (C19PRC) Study is a longitudinal, nationally representative, online survey of UK adults. The current study analysed data from its first three waves of data collection: Wave 1 (March 2020, N = 2025), Wave 2 (April 2020, N = 1406) and Wave 3 (July 2020, N = 1166). Anxiety-depression was measured using the Patient Health Questionnaire Anxiety and Depression Scale (a composite measure of the PHQ-9 and GAD-7) and COVID-19-related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) with the International Trauma Questionnaire. Changes in mental health outcomes were modelled across the three waves. Latent class growth analysis was used to identify subgroups of individuals with different trajectories of change in anxiety-depression and COVID-19 PTSD. Latent class membership was regressed on baseline characteristics. Results: Overall prevalence of anxiety-depression remained stable, while COVID-19 PTSD reduced between Waves 2 and 3. Heterogeneity in mental health response was found, and hypothesised classes reflecting (i) stability, (ii) improvement and (iii) deterioration in mental health were identified. Psychological factors were most likely to differentiate the improving, deteriorating and high-stable classes from the low-stable mental health trajectories. Conclusions: A low-stable profile characterised by little-to-no psychological distress ('resilient' class) was the most common trajectory for both anxiety-depression and COVID-19 PTSD. Monitoring these trajectories is necessary moving forward, in particular for the ~30% of individuals with increasing anxiety-depression levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious belief is a topic of longstanding interest to psychological science, but the psychology of religious disbelief is a relative newcomer. One prominently discussed model is analytic atheism, wherein cognitive reflection, as measured with the Cognitive Reflection Test, overrides religious intuitions and instruction. Consistent with this model, performance-based measures of cognitive reflection predict religious disbelief in WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, & Democratic) samples. However, the generality of analytic atheism remains unknown. Drawing on a large global sample (N = 3461) from 13 religiously, demographically, and culturally diverse societies, we find that analytic atheism as usually assessed is in fact quite fickle cross-culturally, appearing robustly only in aggregate analyses and in three individual countries. The results provide additional evidence for culture's effects on core beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]