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When Right Makes Might: Rising Powers and World Order. By Stacie Goddard. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018. Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment. By Paul MacDonald and [...]

We describe an emerging research practice that we call Large-N Qualitative Analysis (LNQA), outline its core components and codify best practice. LNQA starts with hypothesized regularities and causal mechanisms. Regularities take two basic forms: Y generalizations (if Y then X) or X generalizations (if X then Y), albeit with more complex variants. To establish a causal generalization requires defining its scope. The strength of the regularity is simply the percentage of cases conforming with the causal claim. The causal force of LNQA, however, comes from within-case causal inference, which demonstrates the presence and operation of the postulated mechanisms in all cases in the scope. The method thus partly obviates problems arising from case selection in qualitative and multimethod work. We also identify a multimethod variant (M-LNQA), which combines LNQA with experimental, quasi-experimental, or observational statistical analysis. An appendix introduces over fifty examples of the method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The return of authoritarian great powers, the slowing of the democratic wave, and outright reversion to authoritarian rule pose important questions for international theory. What are the implications of an international system populated with more autocracies? This question was posed by a diverse array of social scientists, public intellectuals, and policy analysts in response to the autocratic wave in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. We show that a series of conversations emanating from quite diverse intellectual priors – from Christian realists to international lawyers and disaffected Marxists – converged on the risks these autocratic regimes posed to democratic regimes and the international order they sought to forge. These risks included unconstrained rulers, an inability to sustain international commitments and political processes that undermined rational deliberation at home and spread disinformation abroad. The reading of this work suggests an under-appreciated strand of liberal international relations theory, and these debates have direct implications for liberal arguments about the democratic peace. Rather than theorizing why democracies avoid war, they underscore the importance of understanding why authoritarian and democratic countries are particularly prone to conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2020.13, published by Cambridge University Press, 19 August 2020. In the initial publication of the introduction to this review roundtable (Shifrinson and Haggard 2020), the name of scholar Yan Xuetong [...]

The end of the Cold War has given rise to a wide-ranging debate about the future of international relations in the Asia-Pacific. This debate has been difficult to assess in [...]

By Alice H. Amsden and Wan-wen Chu. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003. 248 pp. Everything that Alice Amsden writes is worth reading, and this short book on Taiwan with Wan-wen Chu [...]

We explore what can be learned from authoritarian backsliding in middle income countries about the threats to American democracy posed by the election of Donald Trump. We develop some causal hunches and an empirical baseline by considering the rise of elected autocrats in Venezuela, Turkey, and Hungary. Although American political institutions may forestall a reversion to electoral autocracy, we see some striking parallels in terms of democratic dysfunction, polarization, the nature of autocratic appeals, and the processes through which autocratic incumbents sought to exploit elected office. These processes could generate a diminished democratic system in which electoral competition survives, but within a political space that is narrowed by weakened horizontal checks on executive power and rule of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last two decades, the non-discrimination norm has come under challenge from bilateralism, regionalism, and conditional most-favored nation agreements. Under what conditions are these arrangements discriminatory or liberalizing? Working [...]

In the last two decades, the non-discrimination norm has come under challenge from bilateralism, regionalism, and conditional most-favored nation agreements. Under what conditions are these arrangements discriminatory or liberalizing? Working [...]

Rapid growth in the East Asian newly industrializing countries depended on institutional innovation. Authoritarian governments like Taiwan faced a dilemma: how to assure investors in a policymaking environment that made commitments difficult to sustain? In contrast to both the early developmental state literature and the new literature on authoritarian institutions, this article shows that 'small' institutions have had an effect on both the credibility of commitments and the composition of the firms that the Taiwanese state sought to assure. In the 1950-1960s, insulated decision-making bodies with strong participation by foreigners and export-processing zones signaled government intent to both foreign and domestic firms. In the 1970-1980s, democratic decision-making structures were more decentralized and state interventions shifted in a more market-oriented direction. Even so, the Taiwanese government continued to use institutions such as the Hsinchu Science Park to extend assurances to domestic investors engaged in risky high-technology ventures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent work by Carles Boix and Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson has focused on the role of inequality and distributive conflict in transitions to and from democratic rule. We assess these claims through causal process observation, using an original qualitative dataset on democratic transitions and reversions during the “third wave” from 1980 to 2000. We show that distributive conflict, a key causal mechanism in these theories, is present in just over half of all transition cases. Against theoretical expectations, a substantial number of these transitions occur in countries with high levels of inequality. Less than a third of all reversions are driven by distributive conflicts between elites and masses. We suggest a variety of alternative causal pathways to both transitions and reversions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Looks at the decentralization of government in Latin America. Empirical patterns of decentralization in Latin America; Political economy of centralization; Power of subnational politicians.