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As the UK left the European Union, a new body of UK law, labelled 'retained EU law', was introduced to save and convert certain parts of EU law into UK statutes. This paper explores the impact of Brexit on statutory interpretation in the UK in the context of VAT. In particular, it looks at whether, and the manner in which, UK courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will move in different directions when interpreting what is essentially the same law. The paper predicts the post-Brexit evolution of statutory interpretation in UK courts based on an empirical study of cases concerning VAT referred by UK courts to the CJEU between 1973 and 2020, augmented by a doctrinal analysis of selected cases. The methodology is built on the premise that past case decisions may provide an indication of the nature of possible future divergence. A case study of VAT may offer wider implications as to departure from the CJEU jurisprudence in other legal areas in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nancy Cartwright's 1983 book How the Laws of Physics Lie argued that theories of physics often make use of idealisations, and that as a result many of these theories were not true. The present paper looks at idealisation in logic and argues that, at least sometimes, the laws of logic fail to be true. That might be taken as a kind of skepticism, but I argue rather that idealisation is a legitimate tool in logic, just as in physics, and recognising this frees logicians up to use false laws where these are helpful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2022, the Camden Coalition Medical-Legal Partnership began providing civil and criminal legal services to substance use disorder patients at Cooper University Health Care's Center for Healing. This paper discusses early findings from the program's first year on the efficacy of the provision of criminal-legal representation, which is uncommon among MLPs and critical for this patient population. The paper concludes with takeaways for other programs providing legal services in an addiction medicine setting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carl Schmitt and AV Dicey are two of history's most influential constitutional theorists, and they offer two of history's most influential accounts of referendums. In most respects, their approaches to referendums are in direct opposition to each other. On Schmitt's view, the purpose of referendums is to acclaim executive actors. On Dicey's view, the role of referendums is to constrain them. Despite disagreeing about whether referendums should acclaim or constrain the executive, Schmitt and Dicey agree that an agenda-setting role for representatives in referendums is inevitable. This paper argues that, in the UK context, if Schmitt and Dicey are right about the necessary agenda-setting power of representatives in referendums, then the accounts of referendums they each offer must be two sides of the same coin. Given the dominance of the executive over the legislature in the UK and the uncodified nature of the constitution, referendums are processes that necessarily both acclaim and limit the executive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates the transformation within a specific branch of German Salafism from a publicly-assertive da'wa (proselytizing) to a politically accommodating and legal advocacy movement. In doing so, a process analysis that focuses on internal and reflexive narrations among Salafi leaders and lay members, through a three year-long mosque-based ethnography (2018–2021) and textual analysis (2008–2022), is employed. Previous studies focused predominately on the "Salafi growth phase" (2005–2015) in Germany that is associated with the attraction of exclusive group boundaries, flat hierarchies and informal networks. Less research exists on the current "decline phase", which has commenced a re-orientation and critical reflection on past strategies and new ways of civic engagement and legal pragmatism. By exploring this new phase, the article integrates a longitudinal dimension into conventional research protocols on contemporary Salafism. The paper concludes with a discussion on the converging struggles for recognition among Muslim and other religious minorities in Europe, while linking these transformations to domestic opportunity structures rather than transnational reconfigurations of so-called "global Salafism". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper makes a conceptual prescription: it argues that judges and lawyers should adopt a positivist concept of law, on normative grounds. The positivist view, I will argue, is more consistent with reasonable disagreement and majority rule than nonpositivist views, offers a better view of law's moral standing, and is more consistent with what Dworkin called 'integrity' than non-positivism. As the paper explains, this is an argument about what I call the 'operative' concept of law. As such, the argument avoids potential problems for conceptual prescription, and shows why even those who adopt non-positivist views about the nature of law might accept it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first recapitulates the objections by H.L.A. Hart to the ways in which John Austin's command model of law obfuscated the importance and the very existence of power-conferring laws. Although those objections are familiar in the world of contemporary legal philosophy, their insightfulness is highlighted here because they contrast so sharply with Hart's own neglect of power-conferring laws at some key junctures in his theorizing. In the second half of this paper, I ponder a few of the junctures where Hart failed to heed the admonitions which he had so deftly leveled against Austin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK Supreme Court took the opportunity in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd t/a Crockfords [2017] UKSC 67 to reverse the long-standing, but unpopular, test for dishonesty in R v Ghosh. It reduced the relevance of subjectivity in the test of dishonesty, and brought the civil and the criminal law approaches to dishonesty into line by adopting the test as laid down in Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan. This paper employs extensive legal historical research to demonstrate that the Supreme Court in Ivey was too quick to dismiss the significance of the historical roots of dishonesty. Through an innovative and comprehensive historical framework of fraud, this paper demonstrates that dishonesty has long been a central pillar of the actus reus of deceptive offences. The recognition of such significance permits us to situate the role of dishonesty in contemporary criminal property offences. This historical analysis further demonstrates that the Justices erroneously overlooked centuries of jurisprudence in their haste to unite civil and criminal law tests for dishonesty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twenty years after the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force, where are we in our understanding of the relationship between tort and human rights? This paper argues that we are not as far along in our understanding as we could be. The reason for that has been the methodology we used to understand the relationship, focused as it was around remedies, limitation and causation. This paper proposes a new approach, based around the right rather than the remedy. It aims to theorise one particular cause of action – the duty in Osman v United Kingdom – to exemplify this approach. For English lawyers, who have historically used the framework of the forms of action to understand our own law, it is argued that this a good way to comprehend the European jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Decisional privacy offers individuals the freedom to act and to make important decisions about how they live their lives, without unjustifiable interference from other individuals or the state. Children's perceived vulnerability, incapacity for rational decision-making and dependence on adults have been used to justify depriving children of decisional privacy rights and subjecting them to the exercise of adult power over the conditions of their lives. The aim of this paper is to articulate a theory of children's decisional privacy. It is argued that decisional privacy is valued as a condition that enables individual autonomy. A relational, gradual conception of autonomy is advanced, to explain how children can be recognised as having the capacity for autonomy, and in some circumstances, actual autonomy. This paper presents four fundamental principles of a children's rights approach to decisional privacy, which collectively serve to enhance children's meaningful participation in decision-making about their best interests, consistently with children's evolving capacities and the receipt of appropriate parental direction and guidance. The theory developed in this paper presents an opportunity for adult decision-makers to reflect upon how they make decisions for and about children, and how children can play a meaningful role in those decision-making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper summarizes key shifts in judicial decisions relating to public health powers during the pandemic and the implications of those decisions for public health practice. Then, it gives a preview and call for partnership in developing a legal framework for authority that guides public health to better activities, processes, and accountability in service of the public's health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal norms serve as practical standards for individuals and officials. While this 'normative aspect' of law is widely acknowledged, its significance for theories of law remains contested. In this paper, I examine three views on the matter. First, that we should explain legal norms as reason-giving. Second, that we should explain legal discourse as being about reasons for action. Third, that we should explain law as capable of being reason-giving. I survey some challenges associated with each of these views. What they have in common is an implicit assumption about the form that normative explanation must take: that it must be a linear, non-reductive explanation. There is an alternative model for normative explanation available, however. That model explains normative notions in terms of the practices and attitudes involved in recognizing, offering, and demanding them. I highlight the potentials, and limitations, of this practice-centered alternative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper builds on the work of several exceptional scholars from the disciplines of philosophy, law, and history. My central aim is to introduce and explicate an idea closely related to (and derivative of) the concept of rights talk, a concept I call 'constitutional emotivism'. By drawing upon scholars including Mary Ann Glendon, Jamal Greene, A.J. Ayer, and Alasdair MacIntyre, I aim to gather the conceptual threads that I trace through their work which together form the idea of constitutional emotivism. In a sentence, constitutional emotivism is the conflation of moral disagreements with constitutional rights grievances. When this conflation occurs, rights conflicts that never needed to occur in the first place reinforce rights talk and its uncompromising nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a taxonomy of the different kinds of theory that may be offered of an area of law. We distinguish two basic types of philosophical accounts in special jurisprudence: nonnormative accounts and normative accounts. Section II explains the two central subspecies of nonnormative accounts of areas of law: (i) conceptual and ontological theories and (ii) reason-tracking causal theories. Section III explores normative theories of areas of law. Normative accounts subdivide into detached and committed normative accounts. Detached or committed normative accounts can be subdivided further into the following cross-cutting categories: (i) pro tanto or all-things-considered, (ii) hyper-reformist or practice-dependent, (iii) taxonomical or substantive. Section IV shows that our taxonomy does not presume a prior commitment to any particular school in general jurisprudence. This paper clarifies methodological confusion that exists in theorizing about areas of law, and contributes to the subfield of thinking generally about special jurisprudence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a historical contextual pedagogy for private international, which helps students reflect on the impact of the field's legal techniques in different historical contexts. To emphasise the richness of a historical lens, the paper reflects on the development and use of private international law tort rules in a colonial, intellectual and gender historical context. By taking Phillips v. Eyre as a reference, the goal is to illustrate how the canonical cases in private international law can serve as entry points towards a broader historical contextualisation of private international law, beyond the doctrine, though inspired by it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Members of the senior judiciary have expressed concern about the 'over-judicialisation' of welfare in the context of homelessness decision-making and adjudication. This paper examines how those fears have been manifested and makes a link with the concept of proportionate dispute resolution (PDR). It argues that the statutory scheme incorporates elements of PDR and judges should therefore refrain from introducing additional layers. The courts' denial of the application of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the homelessness context is disputed, and the paper makes the case for continuing rigorous judicial oversight of front-line decision-making, recommending that attention is focused on assessing procedural safeguards rather than disputing the ambit of Article 6. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What role does the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) play in holding European Union (EU) regulatory science, ie the science underpinning public regulation, to account for its epistemic quality? Since Pfizer, CJEU case law has strengthened the role of science in both EU risk regulation and litigation, whilst intensifying judicial scrutiny of scientific reasoning based on procedural standards. Scholars often welcome this approach as striking an adequate balance between effective judicial protection and institutional competence. Some praise the Court as an 'information catalyst' promoting procedures, in which epistemic quality is ensured through diligent consideration of and deliberation among all relevant voices. These debates, however, overlook the role of economic actors as information providers, in and challengers of EU risk regulation. This paper re-evaluates the modern post-Pfizer approach from a new, socio-legal perspective by studying, for the first time, the interactions between judicial review and the epistemic power of economic actors, ie their relative ability to influence what EU regulators know at the expense of other actors. We combine an epistemologically informed comparative institutional analysis with doctrinal critique of CJEU case law. Our findings show the need to rethink both legal standing and procedural review in EU risk regulation. Instead of catalysing inclusive procedures that open regulatory science to public scrutiny, the modern approach fosters an exclusive bilateral information exchange between the administration and the regulated industry. The Court reduces the function of process values, such as duty of care and reason-giving, to the protection of a small circle of actors, neglecting the public interest dimension of such values. Thus, the modern approach fails to address, and instead further entrenches the epistemic power imbalances inherent in EU risk regulation. We end by sketching out a normative and doctrinally sound vision of how CJEU review could contribute to EU expert accountability in a more publicly oriented way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers Douglass C. North's 'puzzle' concerning China's household responsibility system (HRS) and offers a possible solution. China's HRS, which has evolved over the past four decades to become its dominant form of rural land ownership, has stimulated spectacular economic growth and poverty reduction; however, it is based on a type of ownership which is far removed from the property rights regime which North regarded as essential. Two features of the HRS merit attention. The first is 'split ownership': this refers to the allocation of different aspects of ownership, including rights of access, use, management, exclusion and alienation, to a range of individual and collective actors with interests in the land in question. The second is polycentric governance: rules governing land use are derived in part from community-level action and in part from state intervention. We argue that in explaining the functioning of the HRS we need to move beyond the narrow conception of legally enforced private property rights on which North relied. We should instead embrace understandings of ownership as an emergent, diverse and complex institution, of the kind emphasized by A.M. Honoré's legal theory of ownership and Elinor Ostrom's theories of the common-pool resource and polycentric governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that legal systems conditionally threaten citizens is taken by most legal and political philosophers as 'reasonably uncontroversial,' 'obvious,' or as portraying 'a large part of how law operates.' This paper clarifies and ultimately rejects this idea: our legal systems, it is argued, rarely address citizens via conditional threats. If correct, the conclusion defended in this paper might force us to re-examine core debates in legal and political philosophy that rely on the assumption that legal systems often threaten citizens: debates about the justification of the state, global justice, and the coerciveness of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distributed ledger technology (DLT) is regarded as a revolutionary solution that offers immutability, transparency, trust, and efficiency while 'transcending law and regulation'. One of the potential applications of DLT is in the securities market. Share registration, settlement, regulatory compliance, information disclosure, payment systems, and market service requirements can be redesigned with the use of DLT. This paper will examine the impact that such changes will have on legal theories and governance, while also discussing the effects on enforcement techniques. In addition, general blockchain-legal issues will be critically analyzed in the context of securities markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the tension between law's opportunity to deliver social transformation and the normative limitations that shape its effectiveness as a tool of social struggle. The role of law's normative limitations on legal mobilisation strategies, or the effect of entrenched social interests on permissible legal claims, has not been properly conceptualised in legal mobilisation scholarship. In response, this paper presents a conceptual framework that comprehends the opportunity and limitation of legal mobilisation as caught in the tension between the interpretive opportunity to redetermine legal meaning and the normative deficit inherent to this task. By re-engaging with the theoretical underpinnings of legal mobilisation, we will evaluate the potential for certain types of social transformation using law and revisit the rationale for strategic legal action. We will bring together our conceptual treatment of legal mobilisation with a sobering analysis of the Argentinian factory recuperation movement's mobilisation of legal demands. The movement's relative success in confronting the legal system's commitment to private property rights and winning protections for worker co-operatives presents an opportunity to learn about the effective potential of legal strategy and the extent to which it can be used to confront the normative commitments of a legal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assesses the functioning of law and legal institutions in Palestine/Israel through the lens of settler colonialism by analysing two thematically interconnected decisions issued by the Supreme Court of Israel, the first involving the starvation of besieged Palestinian civilians and the second involving the force-feeding of Palestinian prisoners. Following a discussion regarding the role of law in settler colonialism, it proceeds to argue that the Court enabled, legitimised and legalised state-sanctioned violence that targeted the native Palestinian population by and through a jurisprudence of elimination in order to facilitate the attainment of Israeli settler-colonial objectives. By so doing, the paper provides further evidence in support of the appropriateness of settler colonialism as a theoretical framework for the case of Israel, including in legal matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is a critical legal analysis of the proposed TRIPS waiver under World Trade Organization (WTO) law. It reviews the existing TRIPS flexibilities and the "August 2003 TRIPS waiver", highlighting the obstacles to achieving the goals of these legal instruments. It demonstrates that numerous critical TRIPS flexibilities, notably TRIPS Article 31bis, are ineffective, prompting some countries to submit a new waiver proposal to the WTO. It highlights several WTO rules that are also quite ambiguous. This paper argues that a WTO clarification might be an alternative to the new TRIPS waiver proposal if it is ultimately rejected due to a lack of consensus among WTO members. Finally, this article emphasises the importance of adopting a balanced approach that may simplify complicated TRIPS rules, decrease the risk of trade-based retaliation and improve collaboration in knowledge transfer and scaling up the manufacture of and access to lifesaving vaccines, pharmaceuticals and healthcare equipment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that analytical jurisprudence has been insufficiently attentive to three significant puzzles highlighted by the legal pluralist tradition: the existence of commonalities between different types of law, the possibility of a distinction between law and non-law, and the explanatory centrality of the state. I further argue that the resolution of these questions sets the stage for a renewed agenda of analytical jurisprudence and has to be considered in attempts for reconciliation between the academic traditions of analytical jurisprudence and legal pluralism, often called "pluralist jurisprudence." I also argue that the resolution of these problems affects the empirical, doctrinal, and politico-moral inquiries about legal pluralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Annals of Criminology is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

According to philosophical orthodoxy, the parties to moral or legal disputes genuinely disagree only if their uses of key normative terms in the dispute express the same meaning. Recently, however, this orthodoxy has been challenged. According to an influential alternative view, genuine moral and legal disagreements should be understood as metalinguistic negotiations over which meaning a given term should have. In this paper, we argue that the shared meaning view is motivated by much deeper considerations than its recent critics recognize, and that much would be lost in opting for the explanation of normative disputes as metalinguistic negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Law & Society/Revue Canadienne Droit et Societe (Cambridge University Press) is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the promise of pluralism in the realm of contract law. I begin by identifying and rejecting conceptual strategies adopted by monistic and dualistic approaches. Turning towards pluralism, I evaluate three versions in contemporary literature: pluralism across contracting spheres and types, pluralism through consensus and convergence, and pluralism through localised values-balancing and practical reasoning. I suggest embracing some pluralism about contract pluralism, by using these models to construct a framework of 'meta-pluralism', where at the macro-level, we are concerned with plural spheres of contracting activity; at the meso-level, a variety of trans-substantive interpretive concepts that receive some measure of juristic consensus; and at the micro-level, practical reasoning through particularistic analysis of case-specific considerations. I illustrate the meta-pluralistic framework through a case study on the varieties of specific performance, and explain how the proposed pluralistic framework enriches our understanding of the nature of contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious freedom is protected by section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Historically, the right has been understood in individual terms, though the courts have acknowledged a collective dimension to religion as expressed in a community of believers. Yet, the precise meaning of collective religious freedom has not been fully fleshed out. The current case law only encompasses a limited range of forms of collective religious expression and does not articulate a coherent theory as to why some collective 2(a) claims succeed while others fail. This paper draws on concepts from interpretive sociology to help clarify the existing jurisprudence and reveal a tension that is otherwise invisible over the status of volition/voluntariness in the collective religious freedom framework. Addressing this tension can help rationalize the Court's jurisprudence and give resources to critics looking to change how the law encompasses collective religious experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The EU Treaties oblige the EU institutions to take health objectives and concerns into account in all policy fields. Nevertheless, this obligation is only marginally honoured in many EU policy areas at best. One problem is the lack of enforcement options to pursue further implementation. This paper examines the obligation to 'mainstream' health in Article 168 TFEU and demonstrates the difficulties in enforcing the obligation in more detail. It then offers a new, deeper interpretation of the contents of the mainstreaming obligation and discusses how this definition may be used to facilitate better enforcement in the future.

Litigation cannot solve a public health crisis. But litigation can be an effective complementary tool to regulation by increasing the salience of a public health issue, eliciting closely guarded information to move public opinion, and prompting legislative action. From tobacco to opioids, litigants have successfully turned to courts for monetary relief, to initiate systemic change, and to hold industry accountableFor years, litigators have been trying to push firearm suits into their own litigation moment. But litigation against the gun industry poses special challenges. Not only has the regulatory regime failed to prevent a public safety hazard, Congress has consistently underfunded and understaffed the relevant regulatory actors. And in 2005 it legislatively immunized the gun industry from suit with the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (PLCAA).This paper surveys the field of litigation in response to gun violence, tracking the limited successes of victims and stakeholders suing the gun industry. We find that victories remain confined to individual actors and unlike high-impact public litigations in other areas, aggregate class actions and major public litigation led by state attorneys general are noticeably absent in the firearm context.

This paper discusses the possible use of functional magnetic-resonance imaging as potentially useful in jury selection. The author suggests that neuro-voir could provide greater impartiality of trials than the standard voir, while also preserving existing privacy protections for jurors. He predicts that ability to image and understand a wide range of brain activities, most notably bias-apprehension and lie detection, will render neuro-voir dire invaluable. However currently, such neuro-solutions remain preliminary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public order as a protectable interest is an important criterion for determining a consistent and rational scope of crimes against public order. From the specific perspective of everyday life, Feinberg's theory of minimum welfare interests neglects those kinds of interests that relate to a smooth or harmonious life. Socio-legal perspectives make it clear that safety interests, which directly concern basic living (bodily existence), do not include various kinds of order interests – and thus life order interests in convenience, comfort and peace, distinguishable from safety interests that are protected by English public order laws, can be construed as the public order interest. By critically adopting Feinberg's individualistic approach to analysing public interests in three types of case, the test of being public is further clarified. Typical categories of public order are socially and normatively identified before concluding with a discussion of the effects the identification made by the paper might make to the scope and nature of public order law and offences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the lawsuits brought by state and local government entities against prescription opioid producers and sellers. It examines their potential liability as well as some of the defenses they might raise. The paper also discusses multidistrict litigation and government lawsuits in state court. It concludes that litigation is not the best solution to the opioid crisis.

Using Michel Foucault's concept of modes of objectification, this paper argues that treaties, declarations, and agreements constitute international juridical forms that transform human beings into legal subjects. It retraces the objectification of "natives" in nineteenth-century colonial treaties that made human beings accessories to territories and transformed them into colonial subjects. This legal construct, the paper contends, was rendered unstable in the UN era when treaties re-objectified the "natives" into "peoples", thereby allowing colonial subjects to re-subjectify themselves into actors and re-describe themselves with an adjective, a nationality. The paper then brings the history to the twenty-first century and posits that ASEAN is now objectifying new trans-national subjects that are ontologically connected to the regional economy. This history of legal subjectivity reveals not only the power of international juridical forms as a mode of objectification, but also the trajectory of subject formation in Southeast Asia under the ASEAN Charter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the use of statistical data and statistical assumptions as evidence in criminal trials. It is suggested that a finding of guilt includes not only its main factual proposition but also additional propositions that support and affirm it. Specifically, it includes not only the proposition that the defendant committed the offence but also the additional affirming proposition that it is this defendant rather than any other potential defendant who committed the offence (the 'D rather than A' proposition). Some statistical generalisations provide reasons in defence of the main proposition but not in defence of the affirming proposition, which then remains random or arbitrary. Yet since criminal convictions include a moral judgement, they cannot be justified where some of their propositions are arbitrary. Accordingly, such statistical generalisations cannot justify a criminal conviction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are reasons to believe that conventional obligations are impossible. Thus, it could be argued that for me to have an obligation to Φ in virtue of the fact that a convention so requires, it must be the case that I have a convention-independent obligation to do something else such that, given the existence of the convention, Φing is a way of doing just that. But, then, my obligation to Φ would not really be conventional at all. On closer inspection, so-called conventional obligations turn out to be no more than a specification of what our nonconventional obligations require given the circumstances. In this paper, I shall argue that contra to what this argument suggests, there can be genuinely conventional obligations. To do so, I develop a second-personal account of conventional obligations, according to which obligations are grounded by conventions in virtue of an explanation that does not follow the indicated pattern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire ([2015] UKSC11) has been hailed as a landmark not least because the Court enshrines the doctrine of informed consent formally into English law for the first time in relation to medical treatment. This paper explores the decision in Montgomery. It examines what its implications may be in the future for the consent process in relation to health research and innovative treatment and whether it may prove a watershed moment leading to changing dialogues and expectations in relation to consent. First, the paper explores the concept of ‘informed consent’ in clinical research as seen through international, Council of Europe and EU instruments. Second, it considers how English law currently governs the provision of information to research participants in the context of clinical research. It questions whether such an approach will be sustainable in the future. Third, it discusses the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Montgomery v Lanarkshire and asks what might be the impact of this Supreme Court decision in the health research context. It asks whether Montgomery may result in new approaches to consent in health research and innovative treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper considers the impact of new media on freedom of expression and media freedom within the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence. Through comparative analysis of US jurisprudence and scholarship, this paper deals with the following three issues. First, it explores the traditional purpose of the media, and how media freedom, as opposed to freedom of expression, has been subject to privileged protection, within an ECHR context at least. Secondly, it considers the emergence of new media, and how it can be differentiated from the traditional media. Finally, it analyses the philosophical justifications for freedom of expression, and how they enable a workable definition of the media based upon the concept of the media-as-aconstitutional- component. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a rule's text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself covers a case. Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose -- the benevolent ends which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that both text and purpose guide people's reasoning about the scope of a rule. Overall, a rule's text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment, rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that vary within and across individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between law and justice has long been a concern of legal theory, but the gap of uncertainty, or aporia, between them has been a particular focus of recent jurisprudence. Some theorists, such as Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington, have focused on the cleavage between judgment and the aspiration to ethical justice to the Other, while others, such as Robert Cover, Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns, have worked on the gulf between law and justice in the face of violence and pain, within, caused by and before the law. This paper suggests that such theories are primarily concerned with problematised dislocation, as a critical technique and an observed state, which is also to be found in modernist fiction, especially in Joseph Conrad's Weltanschauung and literary style. It is argued that examining the disconnections that characterise Conrad's fiction, through engagement with his stories and secondary commentaries thereon, and combining that analysis with the study of dislocation in legal theory, permit the development of a richer picture of these shared concerns. On this basis, the paper constructs a distinct concept of ‘dislocation’ and suggests how it can supplement jurisprudential discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is an introduction to the Special Issue on 'Contextual Legal Pedagogy'. It introduces the themes of the Special Issue and offers summaries of the papers in the collection. The introduction considers whether, and how, contextual legal pedagogy can still be radical, and how addressing pedagogical issues also necessarily involves addressing vital theoretical issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Legal theory must not merely describe our world; it must also assist us acting in it. In this paper, I argue that teaching legal theory should show law students how to do things with legal theory. My pedagogical approach is contextual and historical. Students learn how to use theory by seeing how past jurists acted in their particular worlds by changing dominant concepts of law. Most introductory legal theory courses are organised by what I will call the usual story of jurisprudence. In this story, great thinkers in rival schools of legal thought attempt to answer perennial questions about the nature of (the concept of) law. In this story, the thick context of our world recedes beyond the horizon of theory. I argue that critical genealogy can let us critique this usual story and its unspoken assumptions of morality, politics and history. Amia Srinivasan's account of 'worldmaking' is especially compelling in its emphasis on critical genealogies' capacity to transform our representational practices (and thus open up new possibilities for action). Critical genealogy also has certain pedagogical 'uses and advantages' for teaching legal theory in law schools. Here, context is method. The teacher must defend their political choices of context – choices that are naturalised and so beyond critique in the usual story of jurisprudence. By making these choices explicit, students are invited to both challenge the teacher's choices of context and critique their own common law education. This pedagogical approach also encourages students to experiment in 'worldmaking' themselves, and so cultivate a creative capacity to use legal theory to change the world through transforming their representations of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the traditional distinctive notion of the common good against the claim that it is normatively redundant on the aggregative conception. The first two sections of the paper outline the different candidate conceptions of the common good and the normative role of the common good within natural law theories. The paper then considers some difficulties faced by the instrumental and aggregative conceptions, before developing an Aristotelian account of the distinctive conception of the common good and demonstrating its normative significance for a natural law account of political and legal authority. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Joining the dialogue on the relationship between the law and business ethics, Jeffrey Nesteruk and Eric W. Orts have offered conceptions of the law as a positive influence rather than a negative curb on corporate behavior. While these "legal optimists" pursue a noble end in promoting higher ethical standards for corporations through the law, they may be overly optimistic in their suggestion that these more skillfully wielded legal models will influence corporate behavior for the better. Reviewing the basic tenets of their two approaches, this paper uses corporate responses to environmental statutes to suggest that while legal optimism may offer hope for promoting corporate ethics, it has definite limitations in its current stage of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines judge Richard A Posner's "The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law," as well as a restatement of that position in The Problems of Jurisprudence, and argues that Judge Posner has mistakenly claimed Aristotle's notion of corrective justice as a significant component of the economic theory of law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rights, justice, and power raise many interesting questions. Why do such basic concepts as rights and justice have such different points of concern--equality, proportionality, medium rei (moderation or the middle of the thing itself without reference to the person using it)? Why are there such different perspectives in philosophy, theology, and law? Why is the notion of power in business ethics so isolated from the general discussion of applied justice in treatises on business contracts, employee relations, and in other related topics? Discussions of power seemed parallel with discussions of justice. The two did not seem to intersect. In this paper I shall argue that rights, power, and justice are interrelated. While natural rights are the basis for justice, rights cannot be realized nor justice become operative without power, I shall call this relationship and the theory underlying it "Transforming Justice." One of the basic concerns of this article is to notice the lack of interaction between rights and power in the traditional theories of justice. Granted that for many philosophers it is sufficient to determine what is just but the notion of justice as an active virtue that persons are to exercise in their dealings with others goes further. It touches the realities of life that every person experiences. Life does not separate rights from power. Reflection upon the current separation of rights from power both in theory and in action is analogous to the separation of the "sensory" from the "imaginative" in art and in life. The urge to devise a framework of justice that brings out the wholeness of its existential being is the underlying rationale for developing a theory of transforming justice. Another purpose for developing a theory of transforming justice is to suggest a conceptual framework of business ethics and corporate social responsibility that incorporates values, rights, power, and virtue. Authors and teachers approach these issues either from a value... [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following two theses seem both plausible and consistent: in cases where it is indeterminate whether the relevant legal language applies to the relevant set of facts, officials are not bound to decide the case one way rather than the other, but may reason either way; all reasons for action are—in some relevant sense—knowable. In this paper, I point out what I take to be a robust but unacknowledged tension between these two claims. The tension requires some careful teasing out, but the basic idea is that given certain further plausible assumptions concerning law, language, and normativity, the two claims turn out to be inconsistent. In addition to examining the sources of the tension in some detail, I also address several possible objections to my argument and discuss which of the many theses should be rejected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]