Search

This paper introduces the two factors of temporality and interaction, which are not well-researched within the Turkey-EU relationship. I suggest that these two factors are important for understanding the process of Europeanization in Turkey and explaining the ups and downs in the long-lasting relationship. After briefly examining the two historical periods of the Turkey-EU relationship -- that is, from 1959 to 1970 and from 1970 to 1999 -- the paper mainly focuses on the more recent period following the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and shows how the factors of temporality and interaction operated differently between 1999 and 2004, and after 2004, turning from positive to negative. Having presented the historical evidence, the paper concludes by emphasizing the close interaction between the factors of temporality, interaction and the process of Europeanization in the Turkish context and suggesting that the analysis of these two factors opens up new possibilities for comparative research on other accession and candidate countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been some controversy recently over the identity of the first mayor of Nicosia during British rule. This paper seeks to clarify the issue by putting it into context. What was Nicosia like between 1878 and 1882? What exactly do we mean by the words 'mayor' and 'municipal council'? How was the town administered then and how and to what extent did municipal procedures change in the subsequent years? The material researched suggests that the unusual circumstances of the occupation created a prolonged period of transition during which basic municipal functions were essentially directed by British officials. It was not until 1882 that a substantial shift from an Ottoman to a more British colonial form of administration took place. The resulting reforms provided the islanders with a judiciary independent of the executive, and a partially elected legislature. Nicosia was, on the whole, slower than the coastal towns to make the most of the opportunity for municipal self-government that the new legislation also offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years. Turkey has initiated a proactive, multi-dimensional and constructive foreign policy in many areas, ranging from contributing to peace and stability in the Middle East, to playing an active role in countering terrorism and extremism, from becoming a new "energy hub" to acting as one of the architects of "the inter-civilization dialogue initiative" aiming at producing a vision of the world, based on dialogue, tolerance and living together. Thus, there has been an upsurge of interest in, and a global attraction to, Turkey and its contemporary history. Moreover, the global attraction to Turkey has stemmed not only from the geopolitical identity of Turkey, as a strong state with the capacity to function as a "geopolitical security hinge" in the intersection of the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasian regions, but also from its cultural identity as a modern national formation with parliamentary democratic governance, secular constitutional structure and mainly Muslim population. Furthermore, as the world has become more globalized, more interdependent and more risky, this new foreign policy identity entailed the employment of not only geopolitics but also identity and economy. Thus, geopolitics, modernity and democracy have become the constitutive dimensions of Turkish foreign policy today This paper explores the ways in which the increasing role and visibility of "soft power" in Turkish foreign policy operates, and suggests that to be sustainable, Turkish foreign policy, relying on soft power, should go hand in hand with the process of the consolidation of Turkish democracy, and also accept and put into practice Turkey-EU relations as the main axis of proactiveness and constructiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the discursive reasons behind the paradoxes in Turkey’s foreign policy since the onset of the Syria crisis. By looking at representation of Turkey’s Syria policy in two prominent pro-government newspapers, Star and Yeni Şafak, the authors highlight the significance of the February 2012 episode, after which Ankara experienced deep discursive dilemmas for three reasons: the uncertain portrayal of the dyadic context, the ambiguous framing of third-party roles, and ambivalent agenda building. Despite the shadow of imminent civil war, Turkey’s foreign policy elite refrained from framing the real risks arising within Syria. Idealistic-normative calls appealed to massacre rhetoric in order to legitimize humanitarian intervention. However, the geopolitical framing of third-party roles did not assist in the building of diplomatic ground for international intervention. Quite the contrary, it led to the shaping of public opinion toward realistic-utilitarian interference. Swinging between intervention and interference, Ankara pushed itself toward a liminal position. Even though the Turkish government’s rhetorical ambivalence helped to sway anti-war domestic public opinion, it did not help to control the spiraling of Syria into civil war. That is to say, the ambivalent agenda building in the critical February 2012 episode perpetuated paradoxes in Turkey’s Syria policy and left lingering implications for the transformation of the Syrian crisis in the years to come. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As part of on-going multidimensional foreign policy changes in recent years, there has been since 1998 a revival in Turkey's relations with Africa. Initially rather passive, after 2005 this became a massive effort to develop relations with the whole continent. However, Turkey's Africa policy is unique in Turkish foreign policy, since for the first time it is driven and complemented by the activities of civil society organisations in and about Africa. Conceptualisation of Africa in Turkish society has changed dramatically in less than a decade, and the recent Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit should be seen as part of this trend. Turkey's opening to Africa is not a short-term inclination, but is likely to develop and deepen in coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractTwice since the Cold War ended in 1990, Turkey has been with roughly the same dilemma: a US-led multinational force requested Turkey?s cooperation in launching a military attack against Iraq, ostensibly to enforce UN resolutions. Public and elite opinion was largely against Turkish involvement in both 1990 and 2003, and when Turkey did cooperate with the US-led coalition during the former, it was almost entirely due to efforts of then Turkish President Turgut ?zal. In many ways, the dilemma faced by Turkey during these two Gulf Wars finds a fascinating parallel to the situation it faced with the Korean War half a century before. At that time, Turkey had to decide whether to join the US-led multinational force that had been authorised by the UN to reverse North Korea?s unprovoked attack on its southern neighbour. Turkey in 1950, however, was much more eager to play an active role than in 1990 or 2003 ? to the point where it eagerly committed significant ground forces, despite the fact that the war in question did not directly threaten Turkey?s security interests. This article examines the forces that motivated Turkey to send nearly 5,000 troops almost 5,000 miles away from home, and concludes with thoughts on the implications for alliance theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article attempts to analyze the impact of the World War I on the Zionist movement and particularly on the relations between the Zionist movement and Turkey and Germany. It notes that one of the many explanations offered regarding the origins of the Balfour Declaration is that the Declaration was adopted in order to win the support of world Jewish opinion. The analysis provides a basis for challenging the validity of that theory concerning the origins of the Declaration.