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For almost a century, the Netherlands was marked by a large market for voluntary private health insurance alongside state-regulated social health insurance. Throughout this period, private health insurers tried to safeguard their position within an expanding welfare state. From an institutional logics perspective, we analyze how private health insurers tried to reconcile the tension between a competitive insurance market pressuring for selective underwriting and actuarially fair premiums (the insurance logic), and an upcoming welfare state pressuring for universal access and socially fair premiums (the welfare state logic). Based on primary sources and the extant historiography, we distinguish six periods in which the balance between both logics changed significantly. We identify various strategies employed by private insurers to reconcile the competing logics. Some of these were temporarily successful, but required measures that were incompatible with the idea of free entrepreneurship and consumer choice. We conclude that universal access can only be achieved in a competitive individual private health insurance market if this market is effectively regulated and mandatory cross-subsidies are effectively enforced. The Dutch case demonstrates that achieving universal access in a competitive private health insurance market is institutionally complex and requires broad political and societal support.

In many OECD countries, healthcare sectors have become increasingly concentrated as a result of mergers. However, detailed empirical insight into why healthcare providers merge is lacking. Also, we know little about the influence of national healthcare policies on mergers. We fill this gap in the literature by conducting a survey study on mergers among 848 Dutch healthcare executives, of which 35% responded (resulting in a study sample of 239 executives). A total of 65% of the respondents was involved in at least one merger between 2005 and 2012. During this period, Dutch healthcare providers faced a number of policy changes, including increasing competition, more pressure from purchasers, growing financial risks, de-institutionalisation of long-term care and decentralisation of healthcare services to municipalities. Our empirical study shows that healthcare providers predominantly merge to improve the provision of healthcare services and to strengthen their market position. Also efficiency and financial reasons are important drivers of merger activity in healthcare. We find that motives for merger are related to changes in health policies, in particular to the increasing pressure from competitors, insurers and municipalities.