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This article discusses the relationship between gendered inclusion in peace processes and Track Two peacemaking. It responds to recent policy discourse that explicitly associates linking Track Two to Track One negotiations as a way to increase the inclusion of people identifying as women (United Nations Women 2015). However, the mechanisms through which Track Two leads to more “inclusive” outcomes is complex and unclear. To understand what these mechanisms are and how they can be studied, this article draws from existing theories on transfer in Track Two and inclusion literature in peace and conflict studies to present a novel conceptual model of “linkage.” This model explores the micro-dynamics of gendered inclusivity between different tracks of dialogue engagement and how transfer is facilitated between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2020, the European Parliament (ep) issued a resolution calling for all European Union (EU) Member States to adopt feminist foreign and security policies, and for a gender-transformative vision in the EU’s own external policy. Drawing on the literatures on negotiations and norm contestation, this article3 asks why the resolution was so progressive. It also asks how we can characterize and explain the nature of the negotiations leading to the resolution. The findings demonstrate a low level of contestation and negotiations mainly characterized by integrative strategies and solutions. The main opponents to the resolution, the populist radical right groups, were more or less absent from the negotiations but opposed by verbal contestation in plenum and through amendments to the text. We find that individual- and organizational level factors have high explanatory power: the gender equality-friendly institutional culture in the ep was further strengthened by the entrepreneurship of two committed rapporteurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Releasing the full potential of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) also requires concluding agreements – and an understanding of the dynamics behind reaching agreement. Legal reasoning in negotiations is not divorced from judicial reasoning. Justification by drawing upon the latter may be required in the fundamental process of overcoming disagreement. Jurisprudence may provide arguments of acceptability for negotiating States. Moreover, negotiations should not merely be dismissed as 'bargaining under the shadow of the Convention'. Rather, they may be part of a broader interaction with contributions of the judiciary and indicate future paths for the Convention's implementation. Furthermore, this may give rise to reflections on the roles of heuristics for negotiators and for policy- and decision-makers. This suggests revisiting the notion of legal policies of States – including how States should define unresolved issues and decide on the best timing and means for their effective resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the passage of UNSCR 1325, women's formal inclusion in peace negotiations has been advocated as a means to pursue gender equality and improve peace outcomes. A narrow focus on inclusion and the embodied presence of women, however, does not address the gendered hierarchies embedded within negotiations. This article highlights how gender functions as a power structure that normalizes masculinity as the operating standard within the practice of peace negotiations. By focusing on the centrality of militarization and masculinity to liberal peacebuilding, I suggest three ways negotiations function as patriarchal institutions: the issues centered as essential peace components; the types of violence that "count" as conflict-related; and the actors deemed legitimate for inclusion. While inclusion is a critical aspect of improving gendered peace outcomes, attention to gendered bodies must include recognition of gender as an analytical category that shapes not just who is included but how the process is built. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sanctions and mediation are often applied simultaneously by the UN, but there has been little systematic exploration of their interrelationships. Drawing on research from the Sanctions and Mediation Project (SMP), both complications and complementarities can be identified. Sanctions can complicate mediation by fostering exclusion, emboldening nonsanctioned parties, closing mediation space, undercutting mediator impartiality, and forcing premature agreements. At the same time, sanctions can complement mediation by deterring spoilers, breaking stalemates, incentivizing cooperation, modifying cost-benefit calculations, ensuring broad participation in talks, and facilitating the onset of talks. The conditions under which complementarity can be enhanced include UN Security Council unity, focus and coherence of mandates, and regional cooperation. This article concludes with policy recommendations for different institutional actors and some suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With rising levels of food and livelihood insecurity among poor farmers, many developing members at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are demanding a special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for shielding their agriculture from import surges and price declines. Similar to special agricultural safeguards (SSGs) which are available only to some members, SSM seeks to provide flexibility to developing members to breach the bound tariff in special cases of import surges and price dips. In this context, this study identifies the agricultural products facing import surges in eight selected developing members. The study evaluates the policy space available to selected members in terms of tariff overhang under their existing schedules as well as proposed tariff reductions under agriculture negotiations. Besides this, it critically scrutinizes various issues such as cross-check conditions, triggers and remedies in order to highlight the sensitivities of developing members in accessibility, effectiveness, and other technical aspects of SSM. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are conflicts in which the opposing sides perceive and define their adversary as a "non-partner" with whom they are unable or unwilling to negotiate. However, notwithstanding this reciprocal mistrust, negotiate they do. This research fills a theoretical gap in the study of negotiations by mapping five distinct practices of negotiations with a so-called non-partner: firstly, negotiate while claiming that no negotiations are taking place; secondly, use third parties as mediators or what I term "mediators+"; thirdly, negotiate agreements "over the head" of the so-called non-partner; fourthly, act unilaterally; and fifthly, negotiate relatively minor issues. Two alternative negotiation practices are also discussed: one is to negotiate agreements in non-related conflicts that may eventually influence the conflict actually on the table, and the other is to negotiate within the ingroup on the nature of negotiations should they take place. This study uses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a test case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under Article 27.3(b) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), all members are required to extend private property rights to life forms. Using official WTO documents, this article analyzes the negotiating positions of WTO members on life patents during a review of Article 27.3(b) which commenced in 1999 and is currently ongoing. Initially, developing countries raised serious ethical concerns regarding life patents, creating a clear North-South divide. However, over time the position of Brazil and India moved away from the ethics of life patents to the prevention of bio-piracy, a position supported by China. Russia too is supportive of life patents. A group of small developing countries have, however, continued to question the morality of life patents despite this "BRIC wall," changing the dynamics of the negotiations from a North-South divide to one which now includes a South-South divide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negotiations aimed at resolving international disputes often end in deadlock. In the current article, we focus on deadlocks triggered by missed opportunities. The consequences of missing an advantageous opportunity have been studied extensively in the field of psychology within the context of the inaction inertia effect. The concept was recently introduced into the negotiation literature. Forgoing an attractive action opportunity creates vulnerability to regret and increases the likelihood of forgoing subsequent inferior opportunities, even if they still have positive value. The current article deepens the applicability of inaction inertia to international negotiations, by adopting a new multi-step multi-issue paradigm, which better approximates real-life negotiations. Using the new platform, we demonstrate the inaction inertia effect in a dynamic negotiation setting and link an individual's inertia mindset to the experience of regret. The methodology and analysis presented will help researchers and practitioners explain inertia-induced deadlocks, and facilitate interventions that expedite successful resolutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Track Two processes were developed to facilitate movement in difficult international conflicts. Since Montville first coined the term, Track Two processes have considered deliberate and strategic ways to bring together adversaries in unofficial, private face-to-face interactions that allow for joint analysis and mutual learning. Such processes create the conditions for more nuanced problem definition and solution exploration. Ideally, these insights are then transferred into official peace processes, policymaking and decision-making. Transfer acknowledges a strategic dimension to planning for change; Track Two approaches abridge and accelerate the long-term accumulation approach by the strategic choice of participants, agenda and goals. This article reviews and summarizes our knowledge to date about how best to encourage Track Two inputs into negotiation and other Track One diplomatic efforts. It then offers a checklist for designing initiatives to best promote both intergroup learning and timely transfer to generate effective change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is religion the main reason why negotiations with Islamists fail? Contemporary international relations literature views compromise over religious claims as being particularly difficult compared to other types of claims. Religious conflicts are understood as unique phenomena. Do religious factors explain why successful conflict resolution attempts with Islamists are more difficult to achieve than with other insurgent groups who pursue non-religious claims? This article examines the case of the Pakistani Taliban and the types of demands they have made during peace talks and in their communications. The role of religion is examined in this article and, specifically, theories of scarce resources, indivisibility and securitization are analyzed to explain the difficulties of negotiating with Islamists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why are armed conflicts involving warring parties with an Islamist agenda more difficult to resolve through negotiations? In previous research, two main explanations have been put forward; one that highlight the religious element of the parties' conflict issue and one that emphasis the organizational character of these conflicts, in particular their transnational nature. Yet we still do not know which of these explanations that carry the most explanatory power. The purpose of this article is to test the empirical relevance of these theories through an in-depth study of five negotiation attempts between the government of Nigeria and the group known as Boko Haram during the time period 2011 to 2016. By doing so, this article both addresses one of the key theoretical debates in the scholarly field of religious conflicts and conflict resolution, and presents novel empirical material on a case not well covered in previous negotiation literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits ripeness theory and examines whether conflicts with armed Islamist groups can also be ripe for negotiation. The article argues that armed Islamist organizations can be willing to negotiate and demobilize, but talks are particularly vulnerable to spoilers and public backlash. To examine these dynamics, the article investigates the case of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in Egypt. Relying on a variety of primary and secondary sources, including organizational documents and testimonies by the leaders, the analysis shows that the absence of ripeness can indeed explain some of the failures of negotiations. However, when the conflict was finally ripe, talks broke down because of elite divisions and public backlash. The case reveals that there is a dark side to ripeness: the conditions that lead to a mutually hurting stalemate can also lead to public outrage, elite divisions, and opposition to negotiations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When bringing armed conflicts to a peaceful end, the inclusion of civil society in peacemaking is a vital task. However, whereas previous research on civil society inclusion has made significant advancements, surprisingly little attention has been paid to analyzing how civil resistance and mass action may interact with more elite-driven approaches during peace processes. This study addresses this research gap by examining the interplay between elite and mass-based civil society approaches in three different peace processes in civil wars in Africa in the post-Cold War period: Liberia, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Burundi. We advance the literature by developing a framework that focuses on coordination of these different efforts and we explore this interplay empirically. With this study, we aim to broaden the research agenda, allowing for future synergies at the research frontier of mass action and the inclusion of civil society in peace processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the role of NGOs in the decision-making process of EU legislation on asylum and migration. It shows that during the first phase NGOs struggled to benefit from the Europeanisation of migration policy. The Commission and European Parliament were the most receptive to the lobbying activities of NGOs but they had only little influence themselves. NGOs faced many difficulties in being able to follow and influence the Council negotiations. As the institutional context of that time had made the Council extremely powerful, the final outcome of the NGO lobbying was close to zero. Their shift towards outsider tactics by using their moral authority did not mobilise the public either. The Europeanisation of asylum and migration nevertheless provides NGOs with additional avenues to use their expert and logistical authority. The current institutional context has strengthened their possibilities, though the political climate and the revival of intergovernmental methods constrain their success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Who gets what in high-level European Union (EU) negotiations and how? This study draws on data concerning stakeholder preferences during heated negotiations leading to the EU’s 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework. It tests the explanatory values of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Large member states were key (LI). However, coordinated groups of member states, bound by specific common interests, also played crucial roles. ACF explains the 2030 Framework only if: a) the decisive coalitions consisted of the EU’s supranational institutions, the coordinated groups of member states and long-term advocacy coalitions in the interest group community; b) coalition members held comparatively similar views; and c) coalition members adjusted their strategies mutually and/or shared information. The European Commission set the agenda (HI). The analysis demonstrates that LI, HI and ACF may be used as complementary analytical tools, filling several of each other’s gaps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even if beastly iconography has been pervasive in international politics, the study of diplomacy has traditionally focused solely on man as a political animal. Animals in diplomacy have been treated as a curiosity. This article stakes a claim for a more serious engagement with beastly diplomacy, arguing that animals matter through their ontic status; by representing states; as diplomatic subjects; and as objects of diplomacy. The article places particular emphasis on how animals are a special kind of diplomatic gift, with a variety of meanings and functions. Taking animals seriously implies a rethinking of both the process and the outcomes of diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Lisbon Treaty increased the legal role of the European Parliament (EP) in EU trade policy, there has been a debate about the extent to which these legal competencies have translated into actual influence over the content and outcome of EU trade negotiations. Using the trade negotiations between the EU and India as a case study, this article argues that the impact of the EP has indeed been significant. Through two-level game analysis, which extends its domestic focus to include the EP as a domestic constituent, it demonstrates how the EP has affected the EU win-set in ways that have both hindered and facilitated agreement at the international level between the EU and India. It also shows how the EP has affected the negotiating dynamics and how the EU negotiators have had their preferences somewhat compromised by the EP in their attempt at reaching an agreement with India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International norms are central to world politics and they set boundaries for what is deemed commonly accepted behavior. The literature has not effectively explained the rise of new norms through negotiation and how actors from the Global South have played active roles, especially in the complex areas of developing security norms. This article argues that norm-making is not a unidirectional movement or phenomenon, but rather a highly circuitous process. The circuitous norm building model accounts for an increasing connectedness among domestic and regional/international levels in norm building in Global South and North countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political groups permeate the diplomatic process across the United Nations (UN) system, from conference diplomacy to annual sessions of the deliberative bodies, yet they remain poorly understood and under-appreciated. This article approaches groups from a conceptual and theoretical perspective, providing a typology to differentiate clearly the various groups that are active in UN processes, from electoral groups to regional organizations and single-issue coalitions. The article also examines how theories of multilateralism, global governance and international negotiation largely exclude group and inter-group dynamics. Theories of global governance and multilateralism operate at the systemic level of analysis, while theories of negotiation and coalitions reflect assumptions of individual agency; both levels of analysis obscure the operation of political groups and group politics in UN multilateralism. The emerging theories of diplomatic practice provide a meso-level approach that reveals the pervasive practice of group politics and politicized diplomacy in UN multilateralism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Management of a multilateral negotiation has frequently played a crucial role in developing global regimes but is often ignored in International Relations theory. The longawaited UN climate summit in Copenhagen, for example, broke down in 2009 but negotiations reached agreement one year later in Cancun. This article argues that power and interests remained largely constant between Copenhagen and Cancun, and that significantly altered negotiation management by the host government and the U N explains much of the difference. An analytical framework is presented to address whether and how the management of a multilateral negotiation by the organizers increases or decreases the probability of agreement. The empirical focus is on the Danish and Mexican Presidencies of climate negotiations, with extensive evidence from participant observation and 55 interviews with senior negotiators, high-level UN officials, and lead organizers. The argument adds to the scholarship on regime development by complementing structural with process analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the role of justice claims for issues of global governance. Conflicting justice convictions held by states can become considerable stumbling blocks for multilateral negotiations. Normative claims which call for strengthening individual rights, such as human rights or human security, often collide with statist sovereignty convictions, such as the right of non-intervention, territorial integrity and non- interference. Conflicts between negotiating parties also occur on questions of distribution, recognition and procedural justice. The article argues that such justice conflicts affect the outcome of negotiations. Two recent negotiation processes and governance efforts at the United Nations are examined: the Responsibility to Protect (2005) and the Arms Trade Treaty (2013). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current research suggests that negotiations which are more inclusive are more likely to achieve durable peace since they speak to the entire population. One way to ensure public support is through the inclusion of civil society groups, either directly at the negotiation table or indirectly in supportive roles. It is argued that through their inclusion there is a positive effect on the legitimacy of negotiations which in turn leads to more durable peace. Nonetheless, the reasons why and how involving civil society groups improves the legitimacy of negotiations remains little understood. This article considers the gap in research by using original empirical data to look at the peace negotiations held in Liberia in 2003 and Kenya in early 2008. A theoretical model of legitimate negotiations will be used to show in what ways the involvement of civil society groups can in fact make the conduct of negotiations and the outcome of an agreement more legitimate for the aggrieved population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the rule of prior exhaustion of negotiations is found in certain treaties as a condition governing the jurisdiction of an international tribunal, it hardly makes its presence felt in general international law, given that its customary nature is doubtful. Although in a number of cases the ICJ has refused to accept the requirement, it is presently taking this condition governing its own jurisdiction more seriously when it is established through conventional clauses. This contrasts with the doctrine established by a sectorial jurisdiction like the itlos, which has the exchange of views provided for in article 283 UNCLOS. The travaux preparatoires of this Convention show that the exchange of views was introduced with the intention of preventing States from having the surprise of an unexpected application before the itlos. Although it is true that this exchange of views constitutes a laxer compromise than preliminary negotiations, in any case it has to be addressed, otherwise the conditions governing itlos jurisdiction would not have been fulfilled. However, it would seem that neither in the mv "Louisa" or in the Arctic Sunrise cases there had been any serious attempt to exchange views regarding the settlement of the dispute between the two States by negotiations or other peaceful means. In spite of that, itlos limited itself to reiterating that a State Party is not obliged to pursue procedures under Part XV, section 1, of the Convention when it concludes that the possibilities of settlement have been exhausted. As a result, it would seem sufficient that the applicant limits itself to informing the other party to the dispute of its intention to submit a case to judicial settlement. However, taking into account the recent ICJ jurisprudence, it seems that there should exist, at the very least, a preliminary exchange of views about the most appropriate way to settle the dispute. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The World Trade Organization's primary purpose is to promote trade liberalization for the benefit of all its members. Being a self-enforcing trading system, the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) is its central pillar. Despite critics praising the DSM for its efficiency, the aim of this article is to demonstrate that litigation is not always an option for the WTO's least- developed members. Through a case study of the cotton issue this article will analyze the efficiency of the WTO for its least-developed members. Part I of the article will set out why the issue of cotton is the perfect paradigm to examine how the WTO's agriculture trade liberalization can benefit its least-developed members. Part II will examine the Brazil-US Upland Cotton Dispute and shed light on its repercussions on a group called Cotton-4. Part III will discuss how Cotton-4 has tried to resolve the cotton issue through negotiations. Finally, part IV will provide least-developed members, such as Cotton-4, with ways around the power inequalities that limit them from fully benefiting from the WTO's agriculture trade liberalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United Nations General Assembly is the International Organization (10) with the broadest worldwide membership. While regional organizations are not members themselves, they can and often do become active through their own member states. This article addresses two questions: Do regional organizations differ in their ability to speak with one voice in IOs and, if so, why? Are some regional organizations more successful than others and, if so, why? Based on liberal theory and a mixed-methods approach, the research suggests, firstly, that regional organizations are in a better position to engage in collective action in IOs if they can develop group positions for a broad range of items. This is easier the greater the capacities and the stronger the incentives of the member states, the smaller the number of actors participating in regional organizations' coordination meetings, and the more homogenous groups are. Secondly, regional organizations are especially successful in IOs if they have common positions that their experienced and knowledgeable member states can push via argumentative strategies and if regional organizations can rely on the larger membership when it comes to playing two-level games in UNGA negotiations (tied-hands strategy) and when it comes to voting in IOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks into the formal and informal facets of inter-state deliberation and negotiation among the 27 member states of the European Union. Its aim is twofold: on one hand to capture and consolidate the view of the 'Brussels' inter-state negotiation routine; on the other, to anticipate the evolution of the negotiation modes among member states in their daily collective decision-making. The article reviews some of the essential trends and occurrences that feature the multilateral processes of negotiation in the Council of the EU. With the support of negotiation literature, it derives from these trends a few pat-terns to help predict whether the culture of negotiation among the 27 member states will be positively impacted or impinged by the latest EU Treaty, which was signed in Lisbon in December 2007. The article frames and qualifies the EU culture of negotiation, while also offering a predictive lens on the future practice of negotiations among member states, which is absent from the traditional theoretical perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract What happens after the International Court of Justice releases a pronouncement? This article attempts to answer this question by reviewing the diplomatic initiatives taken by States as well as by other members of the Court's 'audience', such as international organizations. Both judgments and advisory opinions are covered. This allows comparing the relational dynamics afferent to each type of the Court's jurisdiction. Endorsing a broad definition of 'follow-up', the analysis aims at enhancing awareness as to the panoply of diplomatic initiatives that can be taken following a pronouncement of the Court as well as to the complexity of the implementation process at large. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most effective means for re-establishing trust in negotiations and disputes is by making an apology. However, the function and meaning of an apology (and thus its effectiveness for negotiators) may differ across cultures. We hypothesized that people from an individual-agency culture (such as the United States) understand apologies as analytic mechanisms for assigning blame and re-establishing personal credibility. In contrast, apologies in collective-agency cultures (such as Japan) are understood to be general expressions of remorse rather than a means to assign culpability. A survey of Japanese and Americans found that, compared to Americans, Japanese apologized more often and were more likely to apologize for actions in which they were not involved; on the other hand, Americans were more likely than Japanese to equate apologizing with personal blame. A subsequent experimental study showed that these cultural differences in the function and meaning of apologies have implications for trust repair in disputes: apologies for integrity violations led to greater trust repair for Japanese than for Americans, but apologies for competence violations were somewhat more effective for Americans than Japanese. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International alliance negotiations are now a pervasive feature of the contemporary global economy. As the alliancing firms cross national boundaries to forge cooperative partnerships they face the inevitable necessity of bridging the cultural divide to ensure successful negotiation. Existing research has focused primarily on the impact of national cultural differences in shaping negotiating strategies and ensuing outcomes. Less attention has been paid to how negotiators from different cultures understand and manage the ambiguity of international alliance negotiations. We employ the theoretical lens of sensemaking to understand how negotiators embedded in different cultures manage simultaneously the task and cultural related ambiguity that they are confronted with. This perspective suggests the critical role that 'tertius iungens' (the 'third who joins') plays in facilitating the negotiation process. The 'tertius iungens' represents a form of intermediation that acts as a catalyst in the negotiation process. We propose three alternative types of intermediation, namely, cognitive, affective, and holistic and provide illustrative examples of these types of intermediation. We conclude by highlighting the theoretical and managerial significance of our framework and by suggesting future directions for research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The under-investigation in diplomatic studies of processes of persuasion in explaining diplomatic outcomes needs to be addressed in the interests of better scholarly explanations and diplomatic practice. Although such processes are implicit in nearly all concepts and practice of diplomacy, neither scholars nor practitioners explicitly investigate them. Yet other related fields of study and disciplines examine persuasion and demonstrate its explanatory value. Drawing on this literature, but also bearing in mind the nature of outcomes that diplomatic studies seeks to understand, this article offers a model of processes of persuasion and illustrates its potential for explaining a 2003 peace process negotiation in the Solomon Islands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that under certain conditions the United States can play an important role in peacefully resolving a conflict involving an ally and a nationalist terrorist organization (NTO) by engaging the NTO. An American policy of engagement can bring both parties to the table by convincing them that they are trapped in a mutually hurting stalemate and that negotiations offer the only way out of this situation. In addition, engagement provides the U.S. with significant leverage over both of the disputants, enabling it to push both parties to make the concessions necessary to realize a settlement. However, engagement can only have these effects if the U.S. bias towards its ally is tempered and if its policy is serious, sustained, and conditional. For these conditions to hold, there must be significant domestic support within the United States for a policy of engagement. These arguments are illustrated with case studies of the U.S. engagement of Sinn Fein between 1994 and 2005 and the U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization between 1988 and 1990. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Third-party actors who mediate or monitor peace often strive to uphold an image of neutrality. Yet, they commonly face accusations of partiality. The Nordic engagement in the Sri Lankan peace process is an illustration of this puzzle: despite the efforts to uphold an image of being neutral mediators and monitors, they have been seen as favoring one side or the other. This article suggests that part of the explanation for their failure to be seen as neutral lies in the fact that armed conflicts are characterized by certain asymmetries between the main antagonists – in capabilities, status and behavior. These imbalances pose particular challenges to the third party aspiring to act in a neutral manner. We suggest that third parties have two strategies available to deal with imbalances in the relationship between the contenders: 1) they can choose to disregard the asymmetrical relationship and act in an even-handed manner or 2) they can seek to counterbalance the lopsidedness. This article explores the dynamics of these strategies by analyzing the Nordic involvement in Sri Lanka's peace process that began in 2002. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article argues that bargaining over how the gains from cooperation in the WTO should be shared between governments constitutes a major obstacle to multilateral liberalization. Since each government is uncertain about how other governments evaluate possible WTO agreements and their best alternatives to a negotiated agreement, it has an incentive to engage in aggressive gain claiming, hoping to shape the resulting agreement in its own favor. However, aggressive gain claiming may result in delay and reduced ambition of an agreement, it may damage states' systemic interest in the effective and stable functioning of the WTO, and it may provoke peer pressure. How governments frame these benefits and costs and how they coordinate their negotiating positions in bargaining coalitions also shapes their gain claiming strategies. The hypotheses about the determinants of gain claiming submitted in this article are based on a series of interviews conducted with members of national delegations and WTO employees, as well as on a survey of national delegations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even in foreign services that, like Germany's Auswärtiges Amt, follow a generalist principle in their human resources' management, individual careers are shaped by specific experiences. The author uses his own curriculum vitae as a case in point: he served many years in Press and Public Affairs at the German Embassy in Washington DC and as Foreign Office Spokesman in Bonn; he also acquired solid expertise in Personnel and Administration and headed the German Foreign Ministry's Central Department. He was later selected for an assignment as the United Nations' Inspector-General. Paschke feels that interaction with the media, administrative matters and oversight in international organizations are as challenging and attractive as any other diplomatic activity. His professional expertise continues to be in demand even after his retirement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers bargaining strategies used by government negotiators in the context of bilateral trade disputes. I argue that trade officials reach the most durable agreements by using an integrative, or value-creating, strategy and avoiding the use of threats. By contrast, a highly distributive, value-claiming strategy coupled with loud public threats is unlikely to result in a durable agreement and frequently leads to deadlocked negotiations. The irony, however, is that American officials use the latter approach more frequently than the former in bilateral trade disputes. These strategies are usually chosen unconsciously in response to perceptions of losses that drive negotiators to select risky approaches to resolve disputes. By examining bargaining strategies in the U.S. disputes with Japan and South Korea over automobiles and auto parts in the 1990s, this article identifies shifts in negotiation strategies. These shifts in approach closely track the outcomes in these two deeply contentious disputes. After protracted and contentious negotiations with Japan, the final outcome represented a failure to achieve the Americans' most important goals. A less confrontational strategy with South Korea ultimately resulted in greater market opening. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decolonization process that led to Angola's independence in November 1975 is instructive in the annals of colonial bargains for African independence. The coincidence of domestic turmoil in Portugal following the collapse of the dictatorship in April 1974 and the fragmentation of the Angolan nationalist movements created a context that precluded an orderly transition. Weak and indecisive leadership in Lisbon contributed to the crafting and implementation of the equally weak Alvor Accords. Lessons from Angola's decolonization, however, continue to inform international efforts to build effective mechanisms for implementing peace agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an insider's observation of negotiations with terrorists, in particular, the negotiation process carried out by Israel and armed Palestinians who were barricaded in the Church of Nativity in Bethlehem. By applying various negotiation methodologies, the author describes the challenges, strategies and methods used by the military Crisis Negotiation Unit to manage and resolve this international crisis, and draws general lessons for future negotiation situations developed within the modern counter-terrorism arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the initial stages of organizing a data generation effort it is useful to think through the theoretical foundations for the data and the range of questions to which the data could be brought to bear. There are four areas where data on diplomatic interventions should prove particularly fruitful: (1) the notion of “ripe moments,” (2) sequencing of escalation and deescalation, (3) differing ideas about the outcome of diplomatic efforts, and (4) capturing the process of negotiation. A theoretical construct is discussed that can guide the generation of data on negotiations and point toward operational indicators of negotiation consistent with these constructs. Of particular importance, moreover, is a coherent focus on the outcome of the process to be recorded. There is considerable merit in designing a data set that allows testing of ideas about how diplomacy works. In effect, organizing a data generation effort in a manner that captures the essence of the bargaining process (concessions, ideal points, reservation points, etc.) can greatly enhance our knowledge of conflict management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hydropolitics is a relatively new addition to the field of international security and negotiation studies. This article analyzes water, conflict and cooperation in general terms and then examines the case studies presented in this issue within the context of international relations and negotiation studies. In so doing, the article offers a framework in which to consider hydropolitics. This framework supports a process-oriented approach that emphasizes the international context, the regional context and its politics, pertinent intervening variables and the interactions among the parties within their respective negotiations. It demonstrates the necessity of such an integrated approach when analyzing hydropolitical relations among states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews and analyzes the process associated with the water conflict between Jordan and Israel. It starts with the attempts made by the United States between 1953 and 1955 to work out a Unified Plan (The Johnston Plan) for the development of the Jordan Valley. The Plan was expected to forge tacit cooperation in the utilization of the Jordan River waters among Israel and the Arab riparian parties (then at a state of war with Israel). The efforts culminated in an agreement on the technical side, but approval on the political side was postponed and never materialized. The article then turns to the direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel. This process was conducted through the Middle East Peace Process which was launched in Madrid in 1991. The article focuses only on the water negotiations while reviewing the bilateral negotiations and the basis of the resolution over water. The negotiated resolution of 1994 is compared with Johnston's Unified Plan of 1955, with further attention to the status of the implementation of the water agreement since 1994. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article begins with the historical perspective of the Indo-Bangladesh negotiations over common water-related issues in the GBM system. It presents a complete account of the common waters-related issues that exist between India and Bangladesh. It critically examines the genesis and performance of the institutional mechanisms that have evolved over time, particularly the scope and limitations of the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC). The role of JRC is examined in the context of the treaties and MOUs signed between India and Bangladesh for sharing the Ganges at various times. Lessons learned from these and other international negotiations are compiled to make the JRC more effective and efficient. The potential role of third party mediation in the GBM system is discussed along with the role of multi-track diplomacy. Some pertinent theoretical issues are raised regarding the narrow and ambiguous definitions of ``benefit'' and ``equity'' as mentioned in the statues of the JRC. The difficulty of setting a baseline for water sharing is discussed. Finally, it is recommended that the JRC should be expanded into the JWC (Joint Waters Commission) to allow for incorporation of other water-related issues such as watershed management, water quality and coastal ecosystem management. It is emphasized that political willingness has been the single most important factor in determining the success of bilateral negotiations in the GBM system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the initiation of major development projects, riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river system, namely Turkey, Syria and Iraq, have begun utilizing those water resources under conditions of complex interdependence. A number of crises have occurred in the basin due to the lack of regularized consultation mechanisms among the riparians. Nevertheless, there have been notable efforts to build up a negotiation framework for data sharing and project coordination. The article describes the negotiation mechanisms and processes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq, as well as the bottlenecks and opportunities that exist over utilizing the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Negotiations over the water issues involved, both at the technical level and higher levels, have been suspended since the mid-1990s. The article asserts that there is a need to revitalize these negotiations. A clear understanding of the respective rights and obligations of the three riparians as well as an objective definition of such needs are prerequisites for sustaining the negotiation process. The article concludes by elaborating on the modalities of institution building that would facilitate negotiations over the use of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study compares American and Russian patterns of conversational behaviors in the context of a simulated buyer-seller negotiation involving 60 American and 52 Russian businesspeople participating in intracultural, face-to-face bargaining sessions. Each session was tape-recorded, and the tapes were subsequently transcribed, translated, and coded for 20 content analysis categories. The behaviors of the Russians differed in some respects from the Americans, but overall we discovered surprising similarity in the patterns of bargaining behaviors. However, most importantly, the effects of those behaviors on negotiation outcomes (i.e., profits and satisfaction) were found to vary substantially across cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although international relations often involves a trade of favors or services, political scientists have not often used exchange theory. Social exchange is motivated by the prospect of mutual gain. The exercise of power entails exchange of needed resources for compliance with the influencer's wishes. The timing of repayment and explicitness of obligation are important dimensions of exchange that vary by issue area and relationship. In sequential exchange, the party that moves first risks being exploited and must therefore trust the other. The parties to an exchange may either leave open or specify what the other should do in return. Reciprocity refers to exchanges which are mutual and perceived by the parties as fair. It is difficult to determine whether exchanges are reciprocal without a common measure of value. Norms and customary expectations determine what is considered fair when there is no standardized measure of value. In negotiations, there are several competing principles of justice. Reciprocity requires that concessions be matched; it does not mean that their magnitude must be equal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on the use of simulations as a tool to teach students about international negotiations. The basic premise is that simulations can be an effective teaching tool because they engage students and make them active participants in the learning process. The objective of these simulations is not to train students to be professional negotiators, but rather to provide a solid grounding which will enable them to better understand the process of international negotiation. Although there can be problems associated with using simulations, I argue that the benefits far outweigh the drawbacks. In this article, ICONS, a computer-assisted simulation of international negotiation, is compared with different approaches to teaching about international negotiations, including other simulations which do not involve the use of technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first purpose of this article is to describe the steps for conducting a simple evaluation (usable in a variety of different types of courses and programs). The second purpose is to report results from an evaluation of the ICONS Computer-Assisted Simulation, designed to teach both international concepts and content (declarative knowledge) and negotiation strategies and skills (procedural knowledge) to university students. Several techniques are described, including rating scales, open-ended questions scored for elaboration, concept maps, and computer-assisted data collection. Two groups of students differing in type of participation were identified in the evaluation of the ICONS simulation. The first (and largest group) became highly involved in the program and valued learning from the innovative technology used; the second (and much smaller group) was less involved and preferred learning from traditional methods such as lectures and reading. Notes about tactics and decisions involved in planning and implementing the evaluation are included. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negotiations within the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are caught between the contrary directions of new independence and old interdependence, or disintegrationist vs. integrationist tendencies. They are necessary to distribute past assets and value, maintain relations and value, and build new value and institutions. Structurally, relations among the 12 states are asymmetrical around a still-dominant Russia. The negotiations follow one of three patterns: dominative, disintegrative, or integrative. However, disintegrative tendencies and structural suspicions tend to result in loose, weak and unenforced agreements, when indeed agreement is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The elements bearing on the prospects for a political settlement in Bosnia-Herzegovina came together in 1995 in a way that made peace possible. These included a forceful US lead in the negotiations, a protracted NATO air campaign, a shift in the local balance of power adverse to the Bosnian Serbs, expulsion of the Serbian population from Krajina, and a readiness of Serbian President Milosevic to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. These elements were not present in 1992-94 when two earlier mediation efforts collapsed before peace plans that had a measure of acceptance from the parties to the conflict could be put into effect. The particular internal features of the three plans and the distinctions between them did not cause two of them to fail and one to succeed. To conclude that the 1992-93 plans would have had a chance of succeeding if the United States or the Europeans had used military force to support them is probably not wrong but it misses an important point. There are moments in a dynamic situation when external inputs produce maximum effects while at other times the cost of intervention to achieve a given result is likely to be higher. In catastrophe theory, the condition when external input produces maximum effect within the system is called metastability. The author urges that in analyzing negotiating situations the notion of ripeness take into account the concept of metastability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]