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This special issue aims at contributing simultaneously to two key literatures within analysis of the European Union (EU) which, until now, have developed in isolation of each other: one on differentiated integration, the other on defence policies in Europe. In so doing, it also brings together different theories of political economy and, thereby, more general analyses of politics and international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European defence policy clearly remains heavily dependent upon the equipment of the French and British armed forces. What remains largely unknown, however, is the extent of co-operation between these forces to maintain this equipment and thereby transform theoretical capacity into actual military capability. Drawn from a study of such bilateral cooperation over servicing the Atlas (A400M) airlifter, this article shows that modest levels of co-operation have developed but also that deeper collaboration continues to be blocked by unfavourable organisational and political structures. The first level of differentiation concerns contracting with the aircraft's manufacturer (Airbus): the British have delegated nearly all support activity to this firm, whereas the French have retained most of it 'in-house'. Secondly, the two countries' defence industrial policies continue to differ significantly. In the British case, defence industrial base concerns are now addressed on a bespoke basis centred upon market conditions in general, and competitiveness of supply in particular. Conversely, neo-dirigiste interventionist industrial policy still dominates French equipment support. Weak bilateral co-operation over supporting the Atlas is therefore best explained by using constructivist political economy to unpack the problem definitions and policy instruments it has entailed, together with the national hybrids it has bolstered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has European integration affected some of Europe's defence firms more than others? Specifically, what explains the co-existence of national, transnational and European champions in this industry? This article develops answers to this question from two complementary angles. First, through examining the business models and turnover of the four largest companies in Europe (BAe Systems, Airbus, Thales, and Leonardo), it shows that firms who mostly produce military goods are less likely to undergo strong European integration. Second, using an original database on the social backgrounds of these firms' board members, two further hypotheses are tested. Using data on higher education and careers, on the one hand we show that the relationship of board members to their respective state varies from close (Thales and to some extent Airbus) to distant (BAe Systems and Leonardo). On the other, our data reveals that when the careers of these actors are frequently internationalised, this correlates to either strong European integration at the level of the firm (Airbus and Thales) or, alternatively, strong Transatlanticism (BAe Systems or Leonardo). The article as a whole thus both opens up new avenues for research on the defence industry, whilst adding political economy and sociological dimensions to existing scholarship on differentiated European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]