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According to the new modal form of Meinongianism defended by, among others, Graham Priest in Towards Non-Being, the golden mountain is an object in every world, but only in certain worlds is this object golden and a mountain—and the actual world is not one of these worlds, since for something to be golden and a mountain it must exist. In this paper I show that a modal Meinongianism of this kind has some strikingly counterintuitive consequences. Among other things, it cannot even guarantee that the golden mountain doesn't exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of nothingness based on Immanuel Kant and Daoism. It mentions that the concept of nothingness provides a promising point of departure if one wants to depict the difference between Western and Eastern philosophy. It also provides Kant's critique of dogmatic metaphysics and comparing the conception of nothingness in Daoism.

The subject of this essay is the thing itself, examined through the fantastic character of phenomenality, that is, through the coming into being or opening up of the world. The world of appearance emerges from a simple, absolute nothing: there is nothing behind or before the world. There are right away many things, a world: one thing implies others, since for one to be it must distinguish itself from another. Thus, if 'to be' means 'to distinguish,' Being begins with the parting of things that makes their connection possible. Thus the thing in itself is straightaway the undergoing of its own parting; being is a passion. The Imago, then, is not a picture or figure, but the arriving in presence, which imagination elicits or welcomes by advancing in response. Imagination, then, is not first of all open to an image, but to world. It opens itself to the Thing, to the possibility of something, to parting, and in so doing brings itself toward creation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the meontology of early xuanxue, an intellectual movement in China, as espoused by Chinese philosophers, He Yan and Wang Bi. It says that Yan and Wang are considered initiators of metaphysics in China with their theory of wu (nothingness). It focuses on the meontology of Wang and Yan, and discusses how that Wang's conception of wu was not based on a theory of names, but was a form of existential phenomenology.

The article discusses the concept of infinity in Lévinas' philosophy. It lays the concept of existence or being in order to understand the concept of Levinas, and the concept of "there is" based on nothingness is established. It states the connection of the concept of infinity to the West God because only God has the power to create and give life to existence. It also notes that the concept involves the sense of transcendence and requires understandability.

The author comments on a plausible actualistic resolution of the paradox of nonbeing or non-existence. He distinguishes existence from being, and the paradox he discusses refers to existence rather than being. Moreover, the argument recognizes that being has its own distinct, though analogous, paradox.

This essay is divided into three parts. In the first, I develop a new interpretation of Sartre's notion of an original project, or original choice, by emending his initial position in Being and Nothingness, and by extrapolating from his autobiography and his psychobiographies on Baudelaire and Flaubert. In the second part, I examine the early and late Sartre's paradoxical commitment to self-analysis, and go on to draw taut the tension in the late Sartre between individual freedom and relations to others. I demonstrate that the tension in the thought of the late Sartre can be explained and resolved only with reference to Sartre's own original projects. The third part is devoted to briefly analyzing what combination of factors in Sartre's developmental history led to his original projects, in view of a possible psychobiography on Sartre. Nearly everything covered in this essay is an attempt by Sartre to appropriate Freud as an instrument in his own thought (Pontalis, 1986). In the third part, I also try to show that Freud resists Sartre's analysis, as it were, and that Sartre only proves Freud right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The so-called postmodern era is charactherised by attempts to formulate a new concept of difference. These attempts belong within the discourse of Nihilism. Nothingness is usually see as the negation of the one and only. But it can also refer to the one's transformation into many others. The way into nothingness then no longer falls into an abyss, but becomes the way into multiplicity without unity. Preliminary meaning replaces ultimate meaning. Difference is the many without unity. But the many are also one, many times one. Multiplicity does not equal chaos, the fertile mythological chaos that cannot be repeated. But the between-us can become a creative space in which we weave Lyotard's patchwork of minorities. This in-betweenity is the precondition for respect for the other, which is more than tolerance. Against this theoretical background, and in view of some insights from intercultural philosophy, the following issues are investigated: the equality of religions, universalism and relativism, and interreligious dialogues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]