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This essay is a preliminary study of the Philippines' foreign policy towards China under President Rodrigo Roa Duterte. It will examine China's economic statecraft as the sender country towards the Philippines as the target country. The ultimate goal of China's economic policies is to foster a submissive response from the Philippines over their territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This paper applies the theoretical model proposed by Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman (2008 and 2013) to study the political theory of economic statecraft, as applied by the sender and target countries. Blanchard and Ripsman argue that domestic factors serve as significant intervening variables in the strategy of the target country's leaders towards the sender country. Thus, the target country's leaders will view the sender country's economic sanctions or economic inducements differently, depending on the domestic socioeconomic situation. By looking at the Duterte administration in the Philippines, this paper intends to expand upon the research agenda of the theory on economic statecraft and international relations. It will shine a light on the puzzling flip-flop of the Philippines' foreign policy strategy. It shows that Blanchard and Ripsman's "stateness" conditionalist approach provides a plausible explanation of the Filipino response to China's economic statecraft. Instead of relying on conventional neo-realist, economic liberalist, or regime-type conditionalist arguments, this paper will focus on the control of leaders over the decision-making environment. However, it does acknowledge that stateness does not fully explain the Philippines' strategic adjustment towards China, as international variables could have affected the Philippines' policy response to China's economic statecraft. This paper, therefore, argues that domestic and international factors play vital roles in affecting the dynamics in the target state and the effectiveness of the sender state's economic statecraft. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are we to understand China's decades-long sovereignty claim over Taiwan? One assumption upheld by many international relations scholars is that state behaviour will change according to a variance of polarity in the international system. Yet while China can flexibly manage its territorial issues elsewhere, its goal of unification with Taiwan has not changed despite multiple structural changes in the international system over the decades. This paper argues that historical and nationalist approaches alone do not explain China's unswaying obsession with this island. Geopolitics plays a far more prominent role in the minds of Chinese leaders than scholars have previously acknowledged. Since 1949, China has viewed Taiwan as a geopolitical buffer protecting the security of Chinese coastal areas. China's buffer thinking towards Taiwan was a significant factor in China's decisions to launch military action against Taiwan in 1954, 1958, and 1996. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's growing influence in the Indian Ocean cannot be gainsaid as the East Asian economic powerhouse engages in a series of activities to secure maritime routes for energy supplies; to guarantee its trade routes; and to exercise increased maritime influence on the sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Since the beginning of the 21st century, Beijing has enhanced its presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) through construction of ports, increased Chinese naval presence, participation in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, construction of a military base in Djibouti, One belt One road initiative and 21st century Maritime Silk Road. While China reassures of its peaceful development, critics contend that Beijing's military-strategic intentions are aimed at dominance in the Indian Ocean. Countries of the IOR are a home to 2.5 billion people. About 80 percent of the world's maritime oil trade flows through three chokepoints in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, Indian Ocean is emerging as a pivotal zone due to fast growing economies in the region. Due to its geostrategic significance, the Indian Ocean is expected to play a considerable role in the development of East African littoral states including Kenya. This paper analyzes the growing presence of China in IOR and how Nairobi's engagement with Beijing could enable Kenya to realize its geostrategic interests in the Indian Ocean. The paper recommends that Kenya needs to have effective strategies to maximize the potential from its exclusive economic zone and secure its national interests as a littoral state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008, a negative image of China has prevailed in Europe, leading to the country's image crisis in the region. The state has implemented several policies to improve such a perception. This paper aims to examine the major tools of China's attempts at influence in Europe, targeting the media and public opinion. Applying the concept of soft power and public diplomacy, we analyse the tools China uses to modify and shape public opinion about itself in Europe. The research framework comprises secondary resources on China's foreign policy, soft power, public diplomacy and media strategy in Europe. We distinguish four primary influence tools: China buys European media outlets to prevent negative information about itself; it pays for inserts in leading European newspapers; it signs cooperation agreements with media organisations and holds media forums; and it limits access to its market to affect media, film and academic content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China–Africa relations have been a topic of huge interest in international relations, as well as the subject of wide scepticism and criticism. Drummond and Liu (2013) observe that more than half of sub-Saharan African countries have a trade deficit with China and that China remains a dominant actor in China–Africa relations. However, is this so? Are African states mere spectators in China–Africa relations or do they also have a strategy to gain something from the engagement? This study examines the role that African agency plays in Sino-African relations under the FOCAC framework. It highlights the main features of Sino-African relations and specifically assesses why China is important to African states. It examines FOCAC objectives for Africa, FOCAC conferences, the decisions adopted and their impact on Sino-African relations. The paper offers recommendations that will allow African states to better leverage their relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information related to China and Arctic International Law. Topics include to utilise multilateral institutions and international law as a platform to allow them to interact in a more equal fashion in the international system; the policy elaborates China's position as an important stakeholder in the Arctic and country's main policy goals such as deepening exploration and understanding of the Arctic, protecting the eco-environment of the Arctic and addressing climate change.

Since establishing diplomatic relations in October 1949, North Korea and China have forged a complex alliance characterized by both firm solidarity and mutual distrust. This paper analyzes the ups and downs of their alliance relationship by examining the "Northeast Rear Doctrine" (NRD) suggested by Mao Zedong in the early 1960s, which proposed that North Korea could utilize China's Northeast region as its rear base in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula. Mao's proposal represents the apex of the Sino-North Korean alliance, implying China's temporary concession of its sovereignty over the northeastern territory to North Korea. However, when China and South Korea established diplomatic relations in 1992, the NRD policy was virtually abolished, thereby significantly affecting Sino-North Korean relations. First, it exacerbated security threats to North Korea's regime as Northeast China, which once served as Pyongyang's rear base, was transformed into Seoul's outpost for infiltration into North Korea. Second, it deepened North Korea's distrust of China and served as a catalyst for transforming Sino-North Korean relations into normal state-to-state dynamics, rather than the traditional party-to-party relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine the potential economic benefits the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project under Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may bring to Kenya. This will contribute to the ongoing debate on whether Chinese investments on BRI infrastructure projects in Africa are mutually beneficial or not. The key issues discussed include the economic benefits of SGR in Kenya, the economic risks or challenges of SGR given the emergent issues of debt burden in Kenya and how China and Kenya would engage in the future to deepen Sino-Africa relations in BRI projects especially transport infrastructure. The paper relies on secondary information from available published literature on railway transport infrastructure in Africa with specific reference to SGR in Kenya. Information from key informants drawn from the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure and the United States University based in Nairobi was used to enrich literature review. The main findings of the paper are: (1) SGR will lead to socio-economic development of the country (2) it will contribute revenue to the Government through the railway development levy levied on containerized transportation from the port of Mombasa, and (3) will boost trade and regional integration through better rail connectivity. To make BRI projects more transparent, it is recommended that there is need for more stakeholder engagement in these projects. It is also recommended that the funding mechanism should be reviewed to make borrowing more affordable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Even though many African and Asian countries share a common history of European colonialism and thus a model of economic development shaped within the aegis of center-periphery analysis, many Asian countries have been able to ride through the burden of center-periphery economics and built more successful political economies than most African countries. This state of affairs has often led many African analysts to point to Asian success stories like China and South Korea for comparative analysis and often see these Asian countries as models of socio-economic and socio-cultural success to emulate. In particular, Africans in the Diaspora, especially Africans in China, tend to compare very frequently the socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions of their host countries with those of their source countries. This paper outlines and discusses how a group of Africans living in Hong Kong and other parts of Asia see Korea and Korean culture through the prism of Korean television dramas, which constitute a popular cultural phenomenon among Hong Kong/Asian youths. Through qualitative and quantitative survey methods, participant-observation, and questionnaire surveys, the paper reports on how African community members of Hong Kong and others think of Koreans. We show that Africans draw a lot of comparisons between Korean and African ways of conceptualizing the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's need to ensure food sufficiency for its people is nothing new. What is new is the country's recent active search for food from around the world, including small states in Africa and Latin America. The country has begun to acquire food of a high quality, in competition with other countries. China can make use of its politico-economic power to influence the behaviour of others to achieve food security, thereby highlighting a puzzling question: How does China balance its national interests against its global responsibility? China competes with other countries for a steady supply of food at an affordable price, while at the same time it wants to be seen as a peaceful country and a responsible member of the international community. As the largest developing country in the world, how does China see its role in the global management of food security, and how do others see China in this role? In addressing these questions, this paper argues that China begins to shoulder greater responsibility globally in this area, based on its bilateral and multilateral engagements, especially with small states, in a win-win way. The paper concludes that China has to do more to allay the fears of the outside world and to clear the suspicions harboured by others about its intentions and behaviour, a lesson which carries wide implications for China's global governance in other issue areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the place of non-economic drivers in China–Africa relations. While existing studies are hinged on economic relations between Beijing and the continent, this study focuses on non-economic aspects that underlie Africa's relations with China. Taking the soft power approach, the paper illuminates on the salience of attractiveness in international politics and interrogates sources of China's attractiveness in the continent and compares China's actions with those of traditional actors for broader empirical coverage and methodological rigour. The authors argue that while economic drivers are an important basis for understanding China–Africa relations, several fundamental features beyond the economic relations supplement the growing relations between Beijing and Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Soft power has traditionally been viewed by China’s leaders as a fulcrum of international competition. The foundations were laid in the 1990s by Jiang Zemin’s Going Out Strategy (Chinese: 走出去战略; pinyin: Zǒuchūqū Zhànlüè) which encouraged Chinese enterprises to venture overseas to capture new markets. Soft power, however, has much older traditions dating back to the Warring States (Chinese: 戰國時代; pinyin: Zhànguó Shídài, 475–220 BC). It is from this era that China draws its theory and praxis of soft power, which it frames as “Cultural Soft Power,” literally meaning “Civilizational Soft Power” (Chinese: 文化软实力; pinyin: wén huà ruǎn shí lì). Drawing mostly on Chinese philosophical and strategic thought, this paper discusses the conceptual bases of Chinese soft power, examines the values and tools that shape it, how they are applied in Africa, as well as their limitations. The study finds that “Cultural Soft Power” is the thrust behind China’s strategic engagements in Africa which aim to generate sustained African support for Beijing’s vision to transform global governance institutions and norms. The Confucian concepts of “appeal” and “attraction” are central to Chinese soft power thought which is premised on the assumed uniqueness of Chinese culture and civilization and therefore the Chinese development model. This lies at the heart of the ideological alternative China is promoting on the world stage and its approach to strategic competition. Africa is a vitally important foundation in this quest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to global development will be unprecedented and significant, and developmental impact evaluation is therefore central to understanding BRI projects and making informed decisions. Compared with evaluations of individual projects and programs, evaluation of large and mega infrastructure projects under the BRI is particularly challenging and complex in integrating stakeholder objectives, accounting for social benefit and costs, and tracking long-term project impact. In this paper, we summarize the key drawbacks of existing BRI evaluation frameworks, propose a systematic evaluation framework elicitation method based on the inputs from BRI subject matter experts and verified through stakeholder participation, and apply an interim evaluation framework in understanding the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway project in Kenya, as a proof of concept of a comprehensive evaluation framework. In doing so, we seek to provide a tool for BRI decision makers and stakeholders to assess these projects holistically at planning, construction and operation stages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the behaviour of emerging powers in relation to R2P has been understood as that of norm-shapers: states that seek to adjust the norm so that it conforms to their particular understandings. In this behaviour, respect for sovereignty is seen as a central concern. In the English School of International Relations, identification with the institution of sovereignty reflects an approach called pluralism. China's behaviour is consistent with a pluralist approach to international relations. This paper aims to examine the Chinese positions regarding R2P, in order to identify pluralist traits in them. The procedure was to raise, inductively, prescriptions made by China, associating them with theoretical categories. From an analysis of the Chinese positions, it can be demonstrated that China's behaviour reveals a paradigmatic case of a pluralist norm-shaper. Qualitative Content Analysis techniques were used as a methodological approach, while MAXQDAplus software was applied as a tool to aid in the coding of declarations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the 1980s, an interlocking complex of U.S. non-governmental organizations (the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Asia Society, and the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations) gradually built up contacts with Chinese elites. By mid-decade, the National Committee and the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs began a series of "U.S.-China Dialogues" in which influential figures from both sides met alternately in Beijing and the United States, supposedly informally, to discuss the state of Sino-American relations. Though the outcome of the protests at Tiananmen in June 1989 shocked them, American China-watchers consciously decided that contacts and efforts at communication and understanding must continue. At the Fourth U.S.-China Dialogue meeting in Beijing in early 1990, the American and Chinese participants assumed radically different positions, with the Chinese complaining bitterly about U.S. interference in China's internal affairs. However, as the meeting ended, both sides agreed that, while there had been little agreement, such contacts and dialogues were valuable and must continue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses fisheries co-operation between China and Vietnam for the Gulf of Tonkin. It first reviews their fisheries relations to illustrate how their overall political relations affected the management of their shared stocks and resulted in a negative impact on the progress that led to the conclusion of the Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement. It then analyses the management measures pertaining to the Agreed Zones under this Agreement, and emphasises the improvement of its co-operation mechanism for the long-term utilisation of shared resources. The paper highlights the achievements of the Agreement and pinpoints the crucial role of implementation to the success of the fisheries co-operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to analyze the asymmetric dilemma facing the Philippines and China in the South China Sea tensions. Among American East Asian allies, the Philippines seems to stand on the frontline between two rival powers, the United States and China. Since the US declared its Pivot to Asia policy, the Philippines' foreign policy towards China has become assertive and sometimes appears reckless with some military adventures against Chinese maritime patrols and naval ships, which also further forced China to take a tougher foreign policy against the Philippines. Considering the distinctive asymmetric indicators between China and the Philippines based on military forces, economic capacity, territorial size, and population, the aggressive policy behaviors that the Philippines and China have been displaying against each other cast an inquiry on what drives the two countries into head-to-head collision. While China as the larger power vis-à-vis the Philippines as the smaller power in the relationship has aimed for control and domination of their disputed territory, the Philippines' drastic defiance has also led to China's irritation and possible frustration. Furthermore, the US' renewed attention to Asia has caused shifts of asymmetric bilateral dilemma to triangular entanglement between the US-China-Philippines. It is vital therefore to pay attention to the asymmetric interaction of states and their varying views in order to find possible solutions to the SCS tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The landscape of post-colonial development is marked by deepening dependency of the developing states on the core states consisted mainly of western developed countries. The continuous widening of the north-south divide is not surprising given that the discourse on international relations has been dominated by western ideologies of realism, liberalism and constructivism, resulting in an insufficient attempt to examine international relations from a non-Westphalian perspective. Through the implementation of the Washington Consensus, developing countries are being forced to follow the development model of liberal democracy designed by the West, for the benefit of the West. This paper attempts to investigate an alternative approach from a Chinese historical structural perspective. By highlighting the key tenets of Confucianism, this paper aims to contribute towards a non-Western international relations discourse that is based on moral values. Attempts by China to provide assistance to the "poor south" are marred by accusations of neo-colonialism. In order to fulfil its great power responsibility, China needs to incorporate these Confucian values into its Beijing Consensus so that the global south can abandon their dependency on the West and truly set the stage for south-south cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Initiated in 2008, the EU'S Arctic policy acknowledges the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region and intends to secure the EU'S trade and resource interests as new actors like China enter the Arctic arena. This paper shows that China's growing assertiveness in the Arctic has impacted upon both EU Arctic policy and EU foreign policy. The new China's trade interests in the Arctic, in particular the sensitive issue of rare earth elements, have triggered various moves in the EU in terms of trade and cooperation policies. The use of international law gives the EU some leeway to manage legal tensions with China which may still remain in some sectors, and which may also arise in connection with China's legitimate aspirations in terms of becoming a rule maker as well. On an institutional level, engaging in an ambitious agenda with China also proves that the European External Action Service has gained in efficiency and internal coherence. Finally, this article also shows that the increasing connection of the EU'S Arctic policy with major bilateral relations calls for strengthened EU diplomatic attention in order to respect the principles guiding the EU'S action on the international scene as stated in the Treaty of the European Union, and to avoid a Eurocentric attitude that could undermine the ability of the EU to be a global actor. EU-China cooperation on Arctic issues certainly relies on a strong potential for cooperation, but it also represents additional challenges for the integrated EU Arctic policy that is expected by the end of 2015. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme, China is unwilling to join the partially harsh anti-Iran rhetoric of the US and the EU3. China has averted the imposition of sanctions and only abstained from its veto power as a permanent UNSC member after considerable diplomatic persuasion by 'the West'. Beijing was cautious not to spoil its image as a 'responsible Great Power', walking a diplomatic tightrope in balancing a pragmatic-commercial approach to business in Iran and mollifying Western security concerns related to the Iranian nuclear programme, following the tradition of Deng Xiaoping's doctrine of 'maintaining a low profile'. Increasingly, however, China is conveying a more assertive foreign policy and is no longer hiding its strategic interests. This paper argues that with the EU3 being at the forefront of nuclear diplomacy with Iran, disagreements with China over the EU's recent sanctions policy against Iran can, but need not, be a step in the direction of EU-China strategic alienation in the search for long-term solutions to the Iranian nuclear stalemate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on African perceptions of the Chinese presence in Africa tends to present two different perspectives on this issue. The works based on opinion polls typically emphasize the positive nature of African views on China, whereas the qualitatively grounded research often point to the presence of both positive and negative perceptions in African discourses on China. Due to the traditional friendship between Beijing and Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea, the Equatoguinean people seemingly have a positive image of China, but the recent fast mounting Chinese presence in the country has started to raise mixed feelings among the bulk of the population. The local political and economic privileged classes who have benefitted most from the growing Chinese presence in Equatorial Guinea tend to be more supportive of this new phenomenon, whereas a minor group of small entrepreneurs and the main opposition parties are firmly critical of China. The present paper intends to shed some light on these contradictory views through a systematic study of the Equatoguinean people's attitudes towards China and the Chinese, which elucidate three independent variables as the basis of judgment: (1) the nature of the traditional relationship between Africa and China, (2) occupation, and (3) political affiliation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The papers in this special issue are the products of a conference, 'History and China's Foreign Relations: The Achievements and Contradictions of American Scholarship, ' held at the University of Southern California in February 2008. All of us, professors, policy advisors and policy-makers, think it would be helpful if there was more informed discussion among the general public of the challenges of China's rise in the world and our responses to it, but we all acknowledge that the American public sphere is a big mess, fragmented by the apparent riches of the Internet, dumbed down to the vanishing point in the major media. Can we as scholars make some beginnings in drawing on China's long and complex history of relations with other peoples to find generalizations and patterns that help to illuminate the present for the policy elite and for the concerned public? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses several toponyms in Chinese sources, which may possibly be identified with Armenia. First, Aman country, which can be found in the "History of the Later Han" (compiled 3rd–5th centuries) and in the "Account of the Wei Dynasty" (compiled between 239 and 265), is discussed, and it is suggested that there are reasons for an identification, though doubts remain. Armenia was well known by the Mongols and the "Korean Worldmap", which originates in Chinese geographical scholarship during the Mongol period and depicts possibly even Greater and Lesser Armenia. Another source of that period that mentions Armenia is "Muslim Prescriptions" (Huihui yaofang), which names Armenian materia medica known in China. Finally, two other Chinese geographical texts of the 16th and early 18th century that deal with Armenia and the Caucasus region are discussed. This paper shows that Armenia was described in Chinese texts since at least the Mongol period, and that China had a profound knowledge of the geographical situation in Western Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fifteenth century witnessed Ming China expanding its interactions with areas to the south—areas which we today refer to as Southeast Asia. This involved overland political expansion, the gradual incorporation of Tai polities, as well as their economic exploitation. The twenty-year incorporation of the Dai Viêt policy was also part of this process. In the maritime realm, following the early fifteenth-century sending of massive armadas in an attempt to achieve a pax Ming in the region, the Ming court made efforts to ban maritime commerce by non-state players. This paper examines the effects that these various Ming policies had on Southeast Asia in the political, economic, technological, and cultural spheres. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of proselytism as an active practice of shaping other people's identities. Specifically, it looks at the identity discourse promoted by ethnic Chinese evangelicals and compares it to that of Jehovah's Witnesses. Both Christian churches proselytise among contemporary transnational migrants from the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Europe, each making use of a sophisticated organisation adapted to the transnational practices of these migrants. Yet while evangelicals promote a transnational ethnic identity quite compatible with the secular discourse of the global Chinese migrant, Jehovah's Witnesses promote an anti-secular, non-ethnic cosmopolitanism. As a result, global Chinese evangelical ties more easily become part of global migratory and business networks. The paper is based on fieldwork among Chinese evangelical organisations and Jehovah's Witnesses in Italy, Hungary, Russia, and the United Kingdom, supplemented with interviews in the United States (the headquarters of many Chinese evangelical organisations) and a survey of printed and online resources used in proselytising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Participation by Chinese in Zambia's agriculture has involved three modes of engagement. Two of these, agro-socialist cooperation until the late 1980s and agro-capitalist “win-win," since the 1990s, can be examined. The third one, an “agro-imperialist" mode, is not an experience, but a speculation, one possible future based on the Chinese state's potential to allow firms from China to join in the large-scale, export-oriented “land grabs" by big transnational firms that have occurred since food crises in the developing world in the late 2000s. This paper analyzes all three modes of Chinese engagement, but necessarily concentrates on the second, present-day mode, agro-capitalism. We argue that the present Chinese engagement with Zambian agriculture makes small-scale positive contributions to the domestic food market in Zambia. At the same time, its agro-capitalist production involves the exploitation of farm workers that is typically at the core of commercial farming regardless of the national origins of farm owners. We also contend that while Chinese in Zambia and Africa are not carrying out agro-imperialism, they will likely do so if Chinese leaders decide that this practice represents an international standard. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's trade with Ethiopia currently at 1.3 billion USD annually is expected to rise to US$3 billion by 2015. This not only informs the level of bilateral trade ties that Ethiopia has had with China as compared to any other country in the region but also signifies the highest and the closest level of bilateral relations that Ethiopia has built upwith China over the past decade since the new government under Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took over power in 1991. There have been extensive debates on China's role in Africa - whether it could be viewed as a constructive partner or otherwise. This essay puts forward the argument that while trade ties as one important channel of bilateral relations that China has embarked with the outside world and particularly with Africa is uneven and lop-sided. This is true of the Ethiopian context as well particularly when we look at the economic capacity, balance of trade and at the two countries relations with international trade regimes. While China is a full member of WTO for over a decade Ethiopia on the other hand has been aspiring to become a member for some time now and hence one of the important aspect of Ethio-China trade relations is the heavy reliance on bilateral/international trade regimes. Therefore, this research is aimed at unraveling the dynamics in Sino-Ethiopia trade relations with emphasis on the economic capacity of the two countries, balance of trade and explore whether Ethiopia's attempts to join WTO would lead to a more predictable trade relations between the two countries. In this attempt the research would largely rely on the analysis of relevant archival resources and literatures directly relating to the themes in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2011, the United States of America (U.S.) adopted the "pivot to Asia" (also known as "return to Asia") foreign policy. In order to provide a critique of this apparent policy change, this paper has two aims. First, we will contextualize such policy agenda against the Anglo-American strategic culture of "containment" as a strand of geopolitical realism and a foreign policy practice against communism. Second, by providing a case study on the changing relations between the Union of Myanmar (Burma), the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, we will characterize U.S. containment and China's counter-containment strategies through the lens of Suntzu's Art of War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on the addition of f the Arctic Ocean to China's expanding Belt and Road trade networks, and the development of land and sea links between China and Europe via Siberia and the Russian Far East. Topics include that China is also factoring into greater questions involving Greenland's economic future, the island's complicated relations with Denmark; and discusses the possibility of increased foreign investment, including from Beijing, in Greenland mining ventures.

The People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) engagement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) enables China to reassure the international community and change perceptions of its global intentions. Natural disasters are expected to increase worldwide, requiring greater PLA involvement in international HA/DR missions. However, maximising the public relations benefits of participating in such missions will require leadership to avoid short-term irritations and political speculation that often accompany China's foreign intervention, hampering Beijing's soft-power initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the intensity and the volume of financial and economic dimensions as it pertains to the relationship between China and various African countries since the end of the 1990s, the debate on these relations has just begun within a global context. The discussion on the nature of South-South relations, especially between a newly emerging industrial country, located in Asia, and the African countries, which represent the least industrialized area of the world, has more recently brought the subject of the unequal balance of power between the two regions under intellectual scrutiny. Several intellectual debates on China-Africa relations have been mostly reactive in the sense that many analyses have focused on Africa's past relations with the Global North. The existing literature on these relations has, to a large extent, not sufficiently located the discourse within the existing dominant ideologies, namely neo-imperialism and neo-liberalism. It is also important to localize these relations within the World Trade Organization's dogmas and practices, the United Nations Charter, and African Union Charter in order to assess whether or not they can be characterized as either neo-imperialist or neo-liberal. Furthermore, it is important to identify on which specific areas these economic relations have generally focused and in which specific African countries they have been dominant. How do the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party perceive and define them? How do the African Union and specific African countries perceive and define these relations? And what are the policy implications in China and in the African public sectors? The main objective of this paper is, using the data and figures from Chinese sectoral investments and export-import of China and specific African countries to make a critical evaluative analysis of these relations and determine if they are qualified to be called neo-imperialist or neo-liberal. The article is both an empirically-based analysis and a reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides requisite information on the thorny civil war and destructive situation in the Republic of Sudan, which has led to the indictment of the sitting Sudanese Head of State in 2009. This paper will provide an in depth discussion regarding increased weapons transfers and its adverse impact on the conflict in Sudan. Additionally, theoretical frameworks regarding the foreign policies of nation-states, power, and resource conflict will be utilized to analyze the Sudanese government's relationships with China, Russia and Iran as well as its relationship with the marginalized communities of the Sudan such as Darfur and the Nuba Mountains. Information has been provided to underscore the major players in the conflict, whereby Russia, Iran and China are considered culprits in the arms race in the area. Russia, China and Iran have continued to supply arms to Sudan despite the institution of a UN arms embargo in 2004. Although the weapons procurement chain in Sudan demands a comprehensive analysis of both state and non-state actors a close examination of its relationship with various nation-states such as China, Iran and Russia will provide a greater understanding of the economic and political environment that has contributed to the increase of weapons transfers which has adversely impacted internal and regional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The following paper examines the historical origins and development of China's advocacy of the principle of noninterference in its African foreign policy and suggests that in spite of its consistent rhetorical support for noninterference over the last fifty years, the relevance of the principle in shaping Beijing's foreign policy decisions has varied as its pragmatic interests have shifted. China's post-Maoist leadership, in the drive to win the African resources and markets needed to bolster its growing, export-driven economy, has utilized the practice of noninterference to win a foothold on the continent. As its level of investment in Africa and dependency on African energy resources and markets have expanded, however, Beijing has found limiting its actions vis-à-vis a policy of noninterference less tenable, and as recurrences of regional instability and anti-Chinese populism have threatened its interests, citizens, and assets on the continent, will likely take a more forceful role in its relations with partner states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the early 1970s, overseas Chinese students in the United States protested against Japan's claim to the Diaoyutai Islands. Emerging at a time when the rivalry between the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland to represent China was at a critical juncture, the movement soon found itself caught up in the struggle between the two sides. It was out of the Protect Diaoyutai Movement that a new ideological constituent of overseas Chinese nationalism came to light, looking to the PRC as the hope for a sovereign China. It became a predominant force among overseas Chinese activists and the movement changed its direction from defending Diaoyutai to seeking Taiwan's reunification with the mainland. The paper discusses the factors that shaped and eventually radicalized the movement. It asserts that the event was a turning point in the evolution of overseas Chinese nationalism which transformed an undercurrent into a surging tide that gave rise to a new Chinese national identity among overseas Chinese in America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I began my graduate studies at Harvard in September 1958. In the summer and fall of 1959, I started groping for ways to think about China in the seventeenth century, discovered that there had been some very interesting European eyewitnesses of the Ming-Qing wars, and wrote my first seminar paper for John King Fairbank on the first Dutch embassy, 1655.1657. The rest, shall we say, is history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes modern China's dilemma of how to deal with the legacy of its imperial past as the starting point for a discussion of the drawn-out re-creation of China in the twentieth century. The particular focus is on the important role of non-Han ethnic minorities in this process. It is pointed out that the non-recognition and forced assimilation of all such minorities, in favour of a unified citizenship on an imagined European, American or Japanese model, was actually considered as a serious alternative and favoured by many Chinese nation-builders in the wake of the overthrow of the last imperial dynasty in 1911. The article then proceeds to a discussion of why, on the contrary, ethnic minorities should instead have been formally identified and in some cases even actively organised as official minorities, recognised and incorporated into the state structure, as happened after 1949. Based on the formal and symbolic qualities of the constitution of these minorities, it is argued that new China is also a new formulation of the imperial Chinese model, which resurrects the corollary idea of civilisation as a transformative force that requires a primitive, backward periphery as its object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper casts light on the myth, current in China before the Opium War, that the Europeans could not survive without rhubarb. The myth has its roots in differences between pharmaceutical theories and material culture in the Chinese and Western traditions. In China, rhubarb was considered a drastic purgative, indicated only in case of grave illness. In the West, in consequence of a specific method of processing, it was regarded as a mild and gentle drug, albeit wonderfully effective in ridding the body of superfluous humoral substances. Thus the same herb acquired completely different images in China and in the West. An important factor that fostered the myth was the Russian government's termination of the rhubarb monopoly in the prelude to the Sino-Russian border conflict in the late eighteenth century. This gave rise to increased smuggling, which was misinterpreted in China as evidence that Russia stood in desperate need of rhubarb. When the border conflict came to an end in 1792, Russia's unusually submissive attitude tended to confirm this misapprehension. This article not only explains why the Qing government adopted an embargo on rhubarb; it also shows how differing pharmaceutical views influenced international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the legality of the peacetime military activities of the People's Republic of China in Taiwan's EEZ. Definition of the EEZ; Discussion of Taiwan's new EEZ law; Application of international law to cross-strait relations; Highlights of 1995-1996 military activities and their legality; Legality concerning foreign military activities conducted in a coastal state's EEZ; Legality concerning the PRC's peacetime military activities conducted in Japan's EEZ; Concluding remarks.

One of the EU's key foreign policy objectives is to promote the values enshrined in its treaties, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU's self-conception of being a "rule maker" rather than a "rule taker" in international relations, however, is increasingly contested both by internal (e.g., democratic backsliding or a general tendency towards nationalist politics) as well as external challenges (e.g., the return of bilateralism or the rise of new actors). China's Belt and Road Initiative (bri) is often understood as the most serious opposition on the external side to the EU's model of international cooperation and global governance, in that it promotes a pragmatic instead of a norm-based approach, at least at first glance. The Chinese foreign policy model that the bri reflects, explicitly favours open membership, flexibility and economic gains over multilateral institutions and norm-based action. By drawing on original interviews and analysing central policy documents, this article shows how the juxtaposition of normativity and pragmatism has shaped the political and academic discourse on the EU's foreign policy and idea of global governance. It argues that this duality of normativity versus pragmatism is misleading because it overlooks the fact that the EU and China both (a) constitute the framework for a certain practice and (b) are rooted in practice. Drawing on Kagan's cultural thesis of foreign policy, it questions the real meaning of this juxtaposition and applies a practice-based reading to the EU's and China's modes of foreign policy making. The article further shows that scrutinising foreign policy through the prism of practice can provide a more context-sensitive and encompassing understanding of how the EU and China construct their foreign policies as well as of possible conflicts that arise from them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: This article addresses the question of whether the emerging role of cities in diplomacy is a reflection of the diplomatic transformation in China, and what the distinctive features are of the diplomatic roles of cities within China's context. It argues that city diplomacy in China falls between club diplomacy and network diplomacy by exploring five aspects: the number of players, structures, forms, transparency and main purposes. Cities have developed their representation by serving as important agents in managing domestic and international situations, developed their communication channels by contributing in shaping China's neighbouring diplomacy and global partnerships, and developed their negotiation techniques by participating in reform of global governance system. The article concludes that the diplomatic role of cities in China is to consolidate the social foundation of relations between nations, promote the establishment of a new type of international relations, and promote a community of a shared future for mankind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The word trust is oftentimes used by leaders in the Forum on China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), and as the literature points out mainly to foster conditions for cooperation and mutual understanding. Studies in International Relations (IR), reveal that trust is an important tool to manage social behaviour in multilateral organizations by way of past and current interactions, learning and sharing and encapsulating common interests. Group meetings in the forum is the main form of interaction and ultimately aim to advance the collective interest, however, interpersonal contacts between leaders and officials also contribute to a common set of objectives. Trust is also an attribute in the establishment of Sino-African strategic partnerships that have increased in recent years. The argument is that concepts of trust in IR can provide answers to the following research question. What are the characteristics of trust-building in the forum and does it facilitate and enhance cooperation and understanding? This question is addressed along three main themes. China's role as initiator of trust building, the managing of relations between the members and a socio-psychological approach to create trust. An important finding is that interaction creates conditions for acquiring information about the interests of other members and the expected outcomes they want to achieve. In return, when members believe in the benefits of cooperation, they will behave in a trustworthy manner to build better relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China-Africa cooperation, is a story of many successes, while also raising many eyebrows, as the world comes into terms with the alternative approach to development aid. The indebted African countries, hitherto considered unsuitable for funding by the west have had a fall-back position with China and successfully applied for development funding to support mainly infrastructure projects. Livelihood sustainability (food security) is therefore neglected, herein referred to as the hanging and untapped 'win-win' opportunity for partnership. The article is based on secondary data and adopts the theories of human-ecological system model and the sustainable livelihoods approach. In the discussions, some of the global challenges in the Afro-China cooperation, besides food security, include climate change, trade imbalance, migration and deforestation, which require multidisciplinary approach to handle. The conclusions underlined prioritizing of food security by leveraging on synergies within sustainable development goals for sustainability. Careful evaluation of new future partnerships is recommended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews China's engagement in the Indian Ocean Region, implications for international trade and strategies to mitigate its vulnerabilities. Premised on maritime theory, it argues that China's interests in the Indian Ocean will influence its relations with India, extra-regional powers and African states. China is likely to leverage on its presence in the Indian Ocean to boost its levels of international trade volumes, while at the same time forge alternative strategies such as string of pearls, Maritime Silk Road and access through Myanmar to mitigate its vulnerabilities in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the early twentieth century, strong nationalistic ideas sprang up in Indonesia. Some Chinese elites in professional positions under the Dutch colonial government tended to side with the Dutch with the pro-Dutch attitude; some working for Chinese newspapers or agencies developed the pro-China stance; some supported and cooperated with the indigenous people with the pro-independence tendency; and others had their inclinations transformed over the course of time. After examining the life history of a few prominent Chinese figures, this article shows that three levels of factors—international politics in East Asia, local politics in the Dutch East Indies, and their life histories under Dutch rule (together with travel experience to China)—were critical for each Chinese person in establishing or transforming their often hybrid political orientations. The Chinese preference was neither monolithic nor settled, so the general assumption that "Chinese people are loyal to China" in Indonesian politics of the colonial era should be revised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will the rise of China, an authoritarian, party-state with a poor record of protecting its citizens' human rights, undermine humanitarian intervention? This question has been particularly pertinent since China's "assertive turn" in foreign policy. Drawing on the case of Chinese reactions to the humanitarian crisis in Syria, this article argues that China's attitude toward humanitarian intervention remains ambiguous and contradictory. While China has at times prevented the UN Security Council from threatening sanctions on Syria, it has not necessarily denied that a humanitarian crisis exists. The article shows that the People's Republic of China is beginning to act more as a norm maker than norm taker, and is offering its own vision of humanitarian intervention, coined as "responsible protection." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hua-Yi 華夷 system that spread in East Asia in the form of tribute relationships during the Ming dynasty [1368-1644] began as a system based on China's perceived cultural superiority, but slowly evolved into a system centered on nationalism. Accordingly, the kinship networks embedded in the Hua-Yi system were also continually evolving, breaking down, and reforming in a cycle that repeated itself multiple times. Amid this process, ethnocentrism [ zi minzu zhongxin zhuyi 自民族中心主義] and "interest centralism" [ liyi zhongxin zhuyi 利益中心主義] played key roles in the formation and eventual dissolution of the Hua-Yi system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's security concept is evolving, and its participation in Africa's Arab countries' peacekeeping is transforming itself from aloof bystander to active player, and from multilateralism to both multi- and unilateralism. The establishment of China's logistics base in Djibouti does not signify a sudden change in China's African foreign policy; instead, change has been gradual and tangible and began with the evolution of China's participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and engagement in Africa's infrastructure projects, in parallel with China's increasing global presence. The base serves as a logistics and support facility for Chinese peacekeepers, as well as a naval facility to support anti-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia as part of an international anti-piracy operation. Moreover, the base helps China to ensure its maritime and commercial interests and safeguard Chinese nationals in West Asia and the African continent. However, the United States and the West are concerned with the geopolitical and geoeconomic implications of China's logistics base in Djibouti. The geography of Djibouti has led to the rising of geopolitical rivalries between the great powers, which may intensify in the coming years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the reviews of articles published in various journals. Topics discussed include article "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power" by Jeffrey Legro published in the journal "The Perspectives on Politics;" "Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?" by William Callahan published in the journal "International Studies Review;" and "Better to Be Godzilla than Bambi" by Mearsheimer.

The continuity of stable peace in East Asia, especially Southeast Asia, since the end of the ColdWar raises onemajor question: why is there no apparent balancing behaviour against China, the emerging great power in East Asia? In response to this question, exceptionalists argue that there will be no balancing behaviour against China from Southeast Asian states, while soft balancing theorists argue that the balancing behaviour has already occurred in the form of institutional balancing. This article refutes those arguments andmaintains that balancing behaviour is not yet apparent in Southeast Asian balancing, yet it exists in an indirect form. In order to make this argument, this article examines the recentmilitary build-up among Southeast Asian states aswell as recent assessments of the ineffectiveness of the Southeast Asian regional security framework. The article also further analyses the conditions under which Southeast Asia's indirect balancing might turn into hard balancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Belarus–China relations which includes the articles hierarchy of Chinese diplomatic relations, the detail on Chinese commercial conditionality provided, and the geopolitical context modeled.