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Venus and Vulcan, Venus and Aeneas, Pallas and Aeneas, Aeneas and Evander, Evander and Pallas: all of these pairs are seen embracing one another in Aeneid 8. Alongside these emotive scenes of embrace, the book is peppered with embrace-related vocabulary, imagery, and metaphor, often in surprising contexts. This article weaves together these embraces in Aeneid 8 in relation to the thematics of the book as a whole. It is proposed that, when read together, the embraces in Aeneid 8 tell a story about the possibilities of knowledge in relation to the senses. Vision is the supreme sense-modality of truth in epic, as embodied in the shield of Aeneas; and yet, in book 8, embrace emerges as a way of knowing that runs counter to optical discourses of knowledge. This leads to an exploratory reconsideration of hermeneutic principles in light of Aeneas’ much-puzzled-over response to the shield.

These are the replies to critics on my book Pragmatism and the wide view of democracy.

We argue in this article that Marx’s scientific method coupled with his analysis of the phenomenological consciousness of agents trapped within the capitalist mode of production provides a sufficient solution to the transformation problem. That is, Marx needs no amending – mathematical, philosophical, or otherwise – and the tools he uses to demonstrate and resolve the problem – science and phenomenology – were already clearly spelled out in his texts. Critics of Marx either fail to understand his scientific method, or are themselves trapped within a non-scientific capitalist phenomenology. Similarly, Marxists that mathematically resolve the transformation problem fail to realise that Marx’s scientific analysis alone demonstrates that a mathematical solution to the transformation problem is a misapprehension of the relation between Marx’s abstract theory and concrete phenomena. Consequently, we also criticise the monetary theorists who try to dismiss the problem as pointless by claiming that Marx was not a pre-monetary theorist.

This article defends an analytical framework based on systems theory, reflexive law, and Teubner’s regulatory trilemma. J v B exemplifies the numerous overlapping social relations, and forms a case study on the relationship between the State, community, and minority religious individuals, and on how this relationship can break down from the systems theoretical perspective. The article uses this case as a testing ground for a modified systems theoretical approach, treating this conflict between family law and religion as a regulatory problem. Although it centers on English family law, the article should be read as a piece of normative legal theory of general application. In the final section, it explores reflexive secularity and how this may apply in cases where law and religion interact, such as J v B.

Philosophers often make exotic-sounding modal claims, such as: “A timeless world is impossible”, “The laws of physics could have been different from what they are”, “There could have been an additional phenomenal colour”. Otherwise popular empiricist modal epistemologies in the contemporary literature cannot account for whatever epistemic justification we might have for making such modal claims. Those who do not, as a result of this, endorse scepticism with respect to their epistemic status typically suggest that they can be justified but have yet to develop some distinct, workable theory of how. That is, they endorse a form of non-uniformism about the epistemology of modality, according to which claims about philosophically interesting modal matters need to be justified differently from e.g. everyday or scientific modal claims, but they fail to provide any more detail. This article aims to fill this gap by outlining how such a non-uniformist view could be spelled out and what story about philosophically interesting modal justification it could contain.

This essay outlines a certain 20th century Oxonian tradition in epistemology, contrasting it with another line of thought set out by Michael Ayers. The tradition begins with Cook Wilson and the idea that knowing is never having evidence, no matter how strong. It takes a turn in J.L. Austin, introducing two ideas into philosophy: disjunctivism and occasion-sensitivity. The last section considers whether either can really live without the other. The first part of the essay is a general consideration of the relation between two forms of awareness: perceptual, and ‘propositional’ (awareness-that), and of how the first may furnish proof of the second. The second part considers Ayers’ view of the relation, particularly as expressed in his idea of primary and secondary knowledge, and its relation to disjunctivism about knowledge.

What is dialectic and what is it for, in Aristotle? Aristotle’s answer in Topics 1.2 seems surprisingly lacking in unity. He seems to imply that insofar as dialectic is an expertise (τέχνη), it is a disposition to three (possibly four) different kinds of productive achievement. Insofar as dialectic is a method, it is one whose use is seemingly subject to multiple, differing standards of evaluation. The goal of the paper is to resist this problematic “multi-tool” view of Aristotelian dialectic, by explaining how dialectic’s contributions to training, encounters, and the philosophical sciences are of the same kind. What unifies them, I argue, is the kind of reasoning that improves the epistemic position of the person that engages with it. The kind of reasoning-based practices in which dialectic is the expertise are, at heart, tools of inquiry, tools for improving people’s understanding. This is why dialectic is beneficial for persuasive encounters: it is an expertise that enables its possessor to persuade by improving the understanding of their participants.

These responses are replies to the contributions to a book symposium devoted to my book Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism (2019), held at the University of Vienna in February 2020.

The author raises a puzzle about the compatibility of the two features which, according to Ayers, jointly characterize paradigmatic cases of seeing, viz. ‘perspicuity’ and ‘immediacy’. In Section 1, the author explains why Ayers’s explanation of these two features suggests an inconsistent combination of reflexivity and realism about sense experience. Some of Ayers’s comments about our awareness of causation suggest a way of giving up on reflexivity. In Section 2, the author uses a thought-experiment to support the view that realism rather than reflexivity ought to be given up. In Section 3, the author gives a further reason for Ayers to take this option: it furnishes a response to a troublesome challenge concerning the epistemic significance of consciousness, a challenge which Ayers himself anticipates at the end of Chapter 2 of Knowing and Seeing but does not fully resolve.

This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.

The essay imagines a dialogic interlocution that features the points of convergence and divergence between Hans-Georg Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Chung-ying Cheng’s onto-hermeneutics, taking note of the fact the latter is an ongoing response to and revision of the former, to the extent it seeks to construct a theory of reading that takes into account both the phenomenological and ontological dimensions of interpretation and understanding. The essay furthers identifies Cheng’s theory as a Eurotropic construct that sensitively represents the Chinese philosophical worldview while strategically employing appropriate western analytical apparatuses.

In Nicomachean Ethics III.5, Aristotle argues that virtue and vice are “up to us and voluntary.” Readers have long struggled to make sense of Aristotle’s arguments in this chapter and to explain how they cohere with the rest of his ethical project. Among the most influential lines of complaint is that the argument of III.5 appears to contradict his emphasis elsewhere on the power of upbringing to shape character, beginning in childhood. Scholars have developed two main interpretive approaches to III.5, which I label “libertarian” and “compatibilist.” I argue that neither approach succeeds in removing the appearance of contradiction. I develop an alternative interpretation that reveals the coherence of Aristotle’s commitments, showing that for him the voluntariness of character and the power of upbringing are in reality two sides of the same philosophical coin. Both are grounded in his fundamental idea that virtue and vice are acquired by practice.

This essay presents the normative foundation of W.E.B. Du Bois’s constructivist theory of justice in three steps. First, I show that for Du Bois the public sphere in Anglo-European modern states consists of a dialectical interplay between reasonable persons and illiberal rogues. Second, under these nonideal circumstances, the democratic ideal of autonomy grounds reasonable persons’ deliberative openness, an attitude of public moral regard for others which is necessary to construct the terms of political rule. Though deliberative openness is the essential vehicle of construction, reasonable persons only have a pragmatic political obligation to forge ties of deliberative reciprocity with likeminded persons whom they trust will listen and not harm them. Finally, I present Du Bois’s defense of black suffragists’ support of the 19th Amendment to illustrate pragmatic political obligation in action. I sketch successful democratic engagement that reconstitutes a nonideal public sphere.

Since the political upheavals in Mongolia in 1989, the traditional Tibetan-Mongolian protective deity Dorj-Shugden has been rediscovered. Today the Buddhist monasteries Delgeriin khiid, Amarbayasgalant Monastery and Tögsbayasgalant töv venerate him. This paper analyses the role of this deity with particular emphasis on Gungaachoilinig datsan in Gandandegchilin and the Amarbayasgalant Monastery in Mongolia, based on ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews with monks from six monasteries and visitors of Amarbayasgalant conducted in 2016, 2019 and 2020. The paper also outlines the current state of research, including recent Mongolian literature. Finally, it presents findings about him sourced from social media. By exploring pro- and anti-Shugden religious practices, this article sheds some light on the Shugden controversy in contemporary Mongolian Buddhism.

In the 2020 Thailand’s protests, the spirit of democracy humiliated over the past six years has been restored. Like a wave of the never-failing stream, Thai people, including myself young and old, demanded a change in Thai politics.

This article explores new ways of looking at qualitative data in the study of religion. I call them the interstitial, inverted, and dialogical approaches. The interstitial approach provides an alternative to traditional triangulation by treating discrepancies between, say, self-reporting and observation of religious attendance not as a problem, but as an interstice where new information can be found. The inverted approach examines how discourses about “the other” – the other’s religion, in this case – enable researchers to analyze positive self-identifications, even when those are left unarticulated. Finally, the dialogical approach responds to a recurrent problem in qualitative religion research: researchers often assume that they ways in which people talk about religion have particular consequences. The dialogical approach enables researchers to demonstrate whether and how this is indeed so. The three approaches show how epistemological reframing – all three are, in different ways, constructionist approaches – enables novel thinking about “religion.”

This paper introduces a tool designed to mitigate a longstanding challenge to developing social anthropological theories of ritual – how to generate enough comparable case studies for rigorously testing the predictive strength and generalizability of the theory under scrutiny. Our “constitutive relevance of models” (CRoM) test identifies structural continuities between anthropological and psychological theoretical models of ritual phenomena that would justify sharing some analytical tools between models. With this test, anthropologists can in certain cases draw on a psychological theory construct’s superior empirical tractability to more efficiently identify instances of ritual phenomena that are suitable for developing and testing their own anthropological models. To demonstrate, we apply a CRoM test to validate the use of a construct developed under a psychological theory of ritual, Lawson and McCauley’s “ritual form hypothesis,” to search for case studies suitable for assessing the theoretical claims that anthropologist Roy Rappaport made for “highly sacred” rituals.

This Introduction provides an overview of a cognitive-narratological approach to characters and characterization in New Testament narratives. We begin by comparing conventional and cognitive approaches to New Testament characters and characterization, and delineating a practical methodology designed to sensitize readers to a variety of interpretative possibilities that arise from the cognitive turn within narratology. Afterwards, we apply that methodology in three ways. First, we acquaint readers with the prospect of tracing characters within one New Testament narrative. Then, we hint at the analysis of character migration, that is, a character’s development across more than one narrative. Finally, we provide insight into the analysis of character emotions and the readers’ empathy with characters. To illustrate these aspects, we focus on examples from the Gospel of Mark.

Comparison is a fundamental operation in the milieu of the remarkable abilities of human beings to transcend themselves in acts of perception and the accumulation of knowledge. Comparison is holding together things that are at once the same and different. The very possibility of the copresence of same and different, of is and is not, is a gift of human biology and evolution. Humans compare because it is our distinctive nature to do so. Academics have the added responsibility of being self-aware, self-reflective, and articulate when comparing. This article develops a rich theory of comparison in conjunction with detailed reflections on late nineteenth century encounters of European-Australians and Aborigines in Central Australia. The intent is to advance our understanding of comparison and also to articulate in the practical terms of method what is involved in comparison, arguing most generally that comparison is of the fabric of any proper study of religion.

This paper argues that mechanism, occasionalism and finality (the acceptance of final causes) can be and were de facto integrated into a coherent system of natural philosophy by Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703). Previous scholarship has left the relation between these three elements understudied. According to Sturm, mechanism, occasionalism and finality can count as explanatorily useful elements of natural philosophy, and they might go some way to dealing with the problem of living beings. Occasionalism, in particular, serves a unifying ground: It will be shown that occasionalism can account for the problems of the source and transmission of motion that mechanism faces, while at the same time explaining the finality of non-rational living beings as designed by God.

In The Practice of Political Theory, Clayton Chin puts Richard Rorty’s pragmatism in dialogue with a range of contemporary political theorists, particularly focusing on how his notion of cultural politics can speak to the ontological turn in political theory. This article focuses on Chin’s claim that Rorty’s cultural politics provides an ethos of inclusive and tolerant political engagement. After exploring the basis for Chin’s interpretation, it identifies three tensions in this ethos, in relation to character of its demandingness, the fissure between ethnocentric and egalitarian engagement, and the relationship of this ethos to the virtues and procedures of democratic citizenship.

This paper concerns the way that phenomenal consciousness helps us to know things about the world. Most discussions of how consciousness contributes to our store of knowledge focus on propositional knowledge. In this paper, I recast the problem in terms of practical knowledge by reconstructing some neglected strands of argument in William James’s analyses of bodily affect and habitual action in The Principles of Psychology (1890/1950). I will argue that my reading of James’s view provides a plausible account of how phenomenally conscious states feed practical knowledge. I will also show that my reconstruction of James view harmonizes well with recent empirical findings.

The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund (2017) argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. (Eklund calls this referential normativity.) In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts.

Two main elements pervade the argument. First, we argue that both ‘populism” and ‘the people’ are precarious concepts that can neither easily be defined, nor easily be claimed by any representative. We hold this to be true both in political and in theological terms, empirically referring to the civil and the religious population and their construction as ‘a people’, respectively. Second, in view of a common disregard for the people, namely as plebs, we reaffirm the importance of participatory popular subjects as a necessary part of both the political system and Christian communities. This bibliographical and conceptual essay contextualizes and explains the precariousness of realities and concepts, then analyses the concepts of populism and ‘people’. It seeks to deepen the discussion of populism by means of dialogue with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and then through a theological reflection by way of a public theology.

Luigi Bonanate’s book “Costituzione italiana: articolo 11” analyses Article 11 of the Italian Constitution through the prism of its application. Bonanate provides the reader, in a clear and compelling style, with a complete interpretation of Article 11, combining the analysis of the preparatory work in the Constituent Assembly with its doctrinal interpretation and political application. The book does not only analyse the drafting of this article, but also focuses on the “political history of Article 11”, on the contemporary debate by the scientific community and, finally, on its relations with the international legal system.

Metacognitive abilities are considered as a hallmark of advanced human cognition. Existing empirical studies have exclusively focused on populations from Western and industrialized societies. Little is known about young children’s metacognitive abilities in other societal and cultural contexts. Here we tested 4-year-old Yucatec Mayan (a rural native population from Mexico) by adopting a metacognitive task in which children’s explicit assessment of their own knowledge states about the hidden content of a container and their informing judgments (whether or not to inform an ignorant person about the hidden contents of a container) were assessed. Similar to previous studies, we found that Yucatec Mayan children overestimated their knowledge states in the explicit metacognitive task. However, in contrast with studies on Western children, we did not find the facilitating effect of the implicit informing task over the explicit task. These findings suggest that the early development of metacognition combines universal and culture-sensitive features.

In many judicial systems, confessions are a requirement for criminal conviction. Even if confessions are intrinsically convincing, this might not entirely explain why they play such a paramount role. In addition, it has been suggested that confessions owe their importance to their legitimizing role, explaining why they could be required even when other evidence has convinced a judge. But why would confessions be particularly suited to justify verdicts? One possibility is that they can be more easily transmitted from one individual to the next, and thus spread in the population without losing their convincingness. 360 English-speaking participants were asked to evaluate the convincingness of one of three justifications for a verdict, grounded either in a confession, eyewitnesses, or circumstantial evidence, and to pass on that justification to another participant, who performed the same task. Then, 240 English-speaking participants evaluated the convincingness of some of the justifications produced by the first group of participants. Compared to the other justifications, justifications based on confessions lost less of their convincingness in the transmission process (small to medium effect sizes). Modeling pointed to the most common forms the justifications would take as they are transmitted, and results showed that the most common variant of the justification based on a confession was more convincing (small to medium effect sizes).

The present study addressed two related problems: The status of the concept of the soul in folk psychological conceptualizations across cultures, and the nature of mind-body dualism within Chinese folk psychology. We compared folk intuitions about three concepts – mind, body, and soul – among adults from China (N=257) and Poland (N=225). The questionnaire study comprised of questions about the functional and ontological nature of the three entities. The results show that the mind and soul are conceptualized differently in the two countries: The Chinese appear to think of the soul similarly to how they view the mind (importantly, they still seem to see it as separate from the body), while Poles differentiate it both in ontological and functional respects. The study provides important insights into cross-cultural differences in conceptualizing the soul as well as into the nature of Chinese mind-body dualism.

Concepts are an important element of the way international lawyers think and talk about international law. They materialise as conceptual terms, such as ‘jurisdiction’, ‘self-defence’ and ‘abuse of rights’. To enable a critical evaluation of international law and legal discourse, it is important that single instances of use of such terms be fully understood. This task presupposes a full recognition of the social meaning of legal utterances. Conceptual terms are uttered not only to describe the law, but also to affect the beliefs, attitudes and behaviour of readers and listeners. International lawyers are acquainted with this social side of legal meaning but lack a theory firmly grounded in pragmatic research that can help them systematically describe and investigate it. This article provides precisely such a theory. Crucially, it also explains how the suggested theory of meaning may promote the rationality of international legal discourse and the work of legal scholars.

This paper examines some neglected Chrysippean fragments on insecure apprehension (κατάληψις). First, I present Chrysippus’ account of how non-Sages can begin to fortify their insecure apprehension and upgrade it into knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Next, I reconstruct Chrysippus’ explanation of how sophisms and counter-arguments lead one to abandon one’s insecure apprehension. One such counter-argument originates in the sceptical Academy and targets the Stoic claim that insecure apprehension can be acquired on the basis of custom (συνήθεια). I show how Chrysippus could defend the possibility of custom-based apprehension, while also denying that there is custom-based knowledge.

This article examines how three leading exegetes of the Muʿtazilite school tradition – ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), Jishumī (d. 494/1101), and Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) – conceptualized the Qurʾānic idea of covenant in divergent ways. It also illustrates how they related the idea of covenant to their broader thought world to forge an interpretation of the meaning of human history and salvation. It argues that these three commentators, although they are linked to one another by a loose form of teacher-student discipleship, share only basic ideas and applied hermeneutical devices and interpretive principles in considerably different ways. It is unlikely that they relied on one another when they composed their commentaries.

Knafo and Teschke’s surprisingly polemical critique of Brenner’s work is derived from earlier work which applies the same critique arising out of the agency/structure debate in International Relations theory. Casting Brenner’s work as increasingly structuralist over time and therefore increasingly prone to reify social relations, thereby suppressing or downplaying the role of agency, Knafo and Teschke ask their readers to take such claims at face value, offering no close textual reading of Brenner’s work. Focusing almost entirely on method rather than on substance and by framing their critique within the confines of the unending debate over structure and agency, Knafo and Teschke’s claim that Brenner’s work consistently reifies social relations – presuming but not demonstrating that this is his intent – obscures and fails to engage substantively with his powerful historical contributions, or to offer alternative definitions or historical theories.

In this article I argue not only for the value of hermeneutics today but also, and especially, how the crucial gesture of hermeneutics is that of changing the subject for the sake of our today. Surveying briefly the main lines of hermeneutical positions along its history and critiques, and connecting these critiques to the discrepancy between theory and practice, between interpretation and the need to change the world, the article proposes that our reality today, reshaped through globalization and the virtual, is performed as a hermeneutics of history. The challenge for today’s hermeneutics is to work out categories for understanding the present as on-going in a world that tends to capture and distort more and more the meaning of freedom of thought. In the final section, I propose a hermeneutics of the on-going, of gerundive time, partially under the inspiration of Paul Celan, as a response that develops the meaning of the freedom of thought. A defense of nearness and how to think in narrow nearness to the on-going is discussed.

Knafo and Teschke’s 2020 article, ‘Political Marxism and the Rules of Reproduction of Capitalism: A Historicist Critique’, is an important contribution to the debate between structuralist and historicist interpretations of Marxism. As such, it presents important implications for how Marxism is presented in broader academic debates. My aim is to highlight the contribution of its radical historicism and its methodological emphasis on agency for questioning Eurocentric macro-narratives, through an engagement with the ways in which Marxism (and the problem of Eurocentric structuralism) is presented in Post- and Decolonial traditions. I end by drawing briefly upon examples from my previous work on Brazilian state-formation and development.

This article examines historicism as the expansion of historiography beyond its bounds, analogous to Physicalism, Naturalism, Psychologism, and Scientism. Five senses of historicism are distinguished: Ontological Historicism claims ultimate reality is, and only is, historical. Idiographic historicism considers historiography an empirical science that results in observational descriptions of unique singular events. Introspective historicism considers the epistemology of historiography to be founded on self-knowledge. Scientistic historicism considers historiography an applied psychology or social science that can expand to overtake the social sciences. Methodological historicism extends the use of historiographic methodologies to unreliable or dependent evidence. The first four historicisms are inconsistent with historiography within bounds and implode. Methodological historicism describes proper historiographic methodologies that are applied out of their proper bounds, but are used in historiography based on the epistemology of testimony and the tracing of the transmission of information from historical event to historiographic evidence.

The article raises the question of how the multiplication of topics, turns, and perspectives in the currents of the study of religions can be explained. After the concept of a paradigm shift (Thomas Kuhn) is introduced, the study examines the epistemological consequences of the question What is religion? It is based on analyzing the practice of defining “religion” in German-language encyclopedias of the past three centuries. Surprisingly, the structure of these articles is largely persistent throughout this long period and consists mainly of etymology, definition (Wesensbestimmung), and a typology of “religion.” From this, an Aristotelian paradigm can be deduced. The claim for universality entailed in this paradigm ultimately led to a crisis and since the 1960s the study of religions has developed alternative approaches that emphasize aspects of human interaction, communication, and reciprocal relationships. I propose to subsume these new perspectives under the term “a relational paradigm.” Examples and consequences for this paradigm are offered in the conclusion.

This contribution analyses the ancient Greek notion of eunomia in the philosophical prose literature of the fourth century BC. While the term eunomia is often translated as ‘good government’ or ‘good order’, such vague translations fail to capture the specifics of eunomia, and thus part of the philosophical debate about constitutions is lost. Closer inspection reveals that within the fourth-century constitutional debate, eunomia entails two distinct aspects: the excellence of the laws and their durability. These two aspects are predicated of various constitutions: the mixed constitution, of which Sparta and Crete are primary examples in the fourth century; the Athenian democracy as a paradigm of law-abidingness; and philosophical constitutions aiming at virtue. It is a hallmark of the last that such law codes start from marriage and childbirth and follow the course of human life.

As moral philosopher Zhu Xi (1130–1200) sought to nurture the autonomous moral self. In his pedagogical scheme, one ought to cultivate the innate goodness of the heart, investigate principles in things, and embody ethical standards in daily life. In Zhu Xi’s view, the ability to exercise moral autonomy is obtained through a long period of moral and ethical training under the close surveillance of one’s immediate surroundings since early childhood. For this reason, Zhu Xi emphasized the practice of social norms as well as the performance of mundane rituals as the preconditions for the development of the autonomous moral self. By combining the Lesser Learning (xiaoxue 小學) with the Great Learning (daxue 大學), Zhu Xi articulated an integrated vision of moral development from the heteronomous performing of ethical duties to the autonomous embodiment of moral principles.

Moral expertise requires a level of reliability in moral matters that is significantly higher than that of the average person. The author argues that this requirement of epistemic superiority in moral matters is sometimes fulfilled by our future selves and generally fulfilled by present moral philosophers. Our future selves are more reliable in answering moral questions than we are, when they have been prepared to answer those questions by various epistemic activities. But if our future selves are our epistemic superiors in such cases, moral philosophers are epistemic superiors in moral matters more generally since their epistemic advantages are even more significant. The author concludes by arguing that moral philosophers plausibly even qualify as moral experts.

Both Buddhist meditation and micro-phenomenology start from the observation that our experience escapes us, we don’t see it as it is. Both offer devices that allow us to become aware of it. But, surprisingly, the two approaches offer few precise descriptions of the processes which veil experience, and of those which make it possible to dissipate these veils. This article is an attempt to put in parentheses declarative writings on the veiling and unveiling processes and their epistemological background and to collect procedural descriptions of this veiling and unveiling processes. From written and oral meditation teachings on the one hand, micro-phenomenological interviews applied to meditative experience and to themselves on the other hand, we identified four types of veiling processes which contribute to screen what is there, and ultimately to generate the naïve belief in the existence of an external reality independent of the mind: attentional, emotional, intentional and cognitive veils. The first part of the article describes these veiling processes and the processes through which they dissipate. It leads to the identification of several “gestures” conducive to this unveiling. The second part describes the devices used by meditation and by micro-phenomenology to elicit these gestures.

In adapting Husserl’s philosophical phenomenological method to conduct research in psychology I included Husserl’s two methodical steps, the epochē and the reduction (sometimes combined), as part of the scientific procedure. Zahavi objected to my use of those steps. This article is a response to his objections and it is a reaffirmation of the necessity of the epochē and reduction for Husserlian phenomenological psychological research. A description of Husserl’s acknowledged types of psychology and a description of his transcendental phenomenology are also presented along with two outlines of how Husserlian phenomenological research could be conducted.

This inquiry illustrates how Peirce’s Energetic Interpretant facilitates consciousness-raising between sign users. Because it forces attention and progression of action, the Energetic Interpretant highlights perfective aspectual characteristics, namely atomistic/punctual cause-effect sign relations by featuring junctures between events: beginning, middle, end. For example, the stops and starts of events are influenced by the nature of the action, in addition to the agent’s idiosyncratic preferences and predilections. The Thirdness underlying it further perpetuates the punctual component (Vendler 1967) present in action relations, operational when effort produces resistance against an opposing force. Because effort can materialize physically, or internally, it demonstrates the continued primacy of Peirce’s categories in fostering certain consequences. Energetic Interpretants can inhibit (Secondness), i.e., attention to one stimulus, while ignoring another. Nonetheless, consciously inhibiting/resisting a force (via Energetic Interpretants) introduces control beyond the self—another’s reflections upon the conscious acts of an agent (ms 318). This influence between interlocutors satisfies Peirce’s maxim of a “common place to stand” (ms 614), demonstrating mutual comprehension of the sign’s proper effect (5.475). In fact, Energetic Interpretants may result in an effect of such proportion upon either or both interlocutors that a habit-change materializes. As such, Energetic Interpretants epitomize the perfectivity exercised by particular efforts, intimating the likelihood of their discursive success. Inherent in punctual events (versus dynamic ones) is the element of surprise, which ultimately hastens the kind of habit-change especially exhibited in Peirce’s double consciousness (5.53)—self talking to self or other.

A critical summary and reflective assessment of the Chinese account of the dialogue that occurred between Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and Chung-ying Cheng (1935-) in Heidelberg in May 2000 is presented for the first time in English within this article. It ends with an account of the ontological nature of Sprache/language as both philosophers deal with this key term in Gadamerian philosophic hermeneutics.

The concept or notion of ‘digital religion’ has gained traction in recent years in the study of the intersection of media and religion. In this paper, I argue that this concept tends to reify ‘religion’ as a unique, sui generis phenomenon, disregarding decades-long debates about the idea of ‘religion’ in the study of religion. After deconstructing the notion of ‘digital religion’, as put forward in an essay by Stewart Hoover and Nabil Echchaibi (2014), I propose a social theory perspective of (digital) space, drawing mainly from the sociology of space and taking into account affordances and the citational nature of signifying practices. In the final section, I apply this approach to data I gathered during fieldwork online and offline among Salafi Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany from 2008 until 2015; this will showcase the potential not only for abstaining from ‘religionizing’ social phenomena but also of a social theory approach to the production of digital spaces.

Drawing upon the critique of secularization theory, especially its lack of historical depth, this article outlines a research agenda that focuses on a specific – but fundamental – aspect of secularization: it aims at the historicization of conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations between the religious and the secular. The authors employ the heuristic concept of ‘secularity’ to refer to these demarcations, and argue that secularization studies should give due consideration to their historical predecessors in various world regions. This seems important against the background of enduring criticisms, which consider such distinctions and differentiations either as an exclusively Western achievement or as a colonial imposition on non-Western regions. Taking into account the development of different historical paths, the authors highlight the transcultural, but in its concrete shape nevertheless culturally specific emergence of distinctions and differentiations related to religion, and propose secularity as a tertium comparationis for comparative research in this field. The authors introduce two different religious and societal settings in the medieval period – Japanese Buddhism and Islam in the Middle East – in order to illustrate the divergent ideational and structural backgrounds to the development of relations between the religious and the secular.

Many people believe that animals possess moral status, but human beings possess higher moral status than animals. To try to identify a theoretical basis for this view, Robert Nozick proposed Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People. The present manuscript evaluates Nozick’s proposal by identifying the tradeoffs in welfare that it permits in medical research with animals and assessing whether those tradeoffs are indeed permissible. This analysis suggests that at least some deontological side constraints apply to the treatment of sentient animals, hence, Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People is mistaken. Because Nozick’s proposal represents a prominent attempt to provide a theoretical basis for the common belief that human beings possess higher moral status than animals, this conclusion is noteworthy in its own right. Moreover, by granting equal moral weight to the interests of animals, but reserving deontological side constraints for human beings, Utilitarianism for Animals, Kantianism for People offers one of the more plausible bases for the claim that there are degrees of moral status among those who matter morally. The manuscript thus ends by considering the implications of the present analysis for the possibility that moral status comes in degrees.