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Umbrella clauses have sparked one of the great debates in international investment law as regards their proper construction. This article argues that a particular line of reasoning and interpretation appears to be unduly focusing on the effects of such clauses in the process of construing them. In other words, what seems to occur in the interpretation of umbrella clauses is that some tribunals, frightened by the far-reaching consequences, construe such clauses more narrowly. I call this phenomenon ‘adverse effects analysis’ and demonstrate that it is inconsistent with the proper construction of umbrella clauses in accordance with the rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). In this course, the effects of umbrella clauses in practice are also put forward along with an analysis of them under ‘manifest absurdity or unreasonableness test’ pursuant to Article 32(b) of VCLT.

In view of the questionability of the concept “religion” as an analytical category for the investigation of pre-modern, non-Western cultures, how can one still pursue the history of religion or historical sociology of religion? Roughly speaking, scholars of religion can be placed between two poles with regard to this question: (1) those who reject the cross-cultural use of “religion” as a comparative concept and (2) those who believe they cannot do without it. We propose an approach that acknowledges the cultural dependence and historicity of concepts such as “religion” and the “secular,” while still conducting historical research on pre-colonial non-Western societies relevant to the study of both. Our approach aims to investigate the emergence of social and epistemic structures in various cultures—forms of differentiation and distinction—that have enabled the reorganisation of socio-cultural formations into religions and thus facilitated the formation of “multiple secularities” in global modernity.

Our study focuses on Islamophobia and the power of facts versus the power of a narrative in shaping individual opinion toward Muslims. We utilise an experimental design to explore three research questions: (1) Is Islamophobia and anti-Muslim sentiment lowered in narrative or factual treatments?; (2) What are the differential effects of the treatments by ideological orientation?; and (3) Is Islamophobia a predictor of policy stances? We find that neither the narrative or factual treatments lowered Islamophobia or anti-Muslim sentiment. However, moderates were significantly influenced by the Facts Treatment, expressing lower levels of anti-Muslim sentiment. Finally, the treatments significantly influenced policy positions for individuals in the Facts Treatment group, who were less likely to support funding increases for border security than subjects in the narrative treatment. Our findings have implications for understanding persuasion, identity protection cognition, and the persistence of Islamophobia within the context of the power of narrative.

In his insightful essay »Prophetic Religion and the Future of Capitalist Civilization« Cornel West fervently addressed a question of our abilities to imagine a more empathetic, more compassionate, and also more hospitable world, in which we could foresee, or perhaps already lay ground for a future community where the word religion would simply mean that we live our lives in the consciousness of our finitude and thus in an existential and cognitive humility. This kind of religion (not far from Dewey’s or Rorty’s ideals) would enable us to see beyond the margins of any narrow-minded religious ideology or any violent incarnation of religion. Based on these initial thoughts, we first wish to discuss two basic concepts of contemporary political theology – community and vulnerability. We shall argue that we need to offer in contemporary political theology a basic ethico-democratic response, infused with our imaginative capacity for remembrance (Benjamin, Metz) and future hope (West, Dewey, Unger). We will argue with Unger (The Religion of the Future) that we need to live through accepting an enhanced vulnerability, being shared in our democratic (and) religious communities. From this view any loss of human life and its potentials is a sign of a grave injustice, and a catastrophe from an ethical point of view. Finally, we will propose the so called reverse thesis on religion – namely that today, perhaps, we should first look at religion in its radicalized ethico-political form which only later enables us to think about its various variations and incarnations within different traditions and cultures. We will argue that it is within this newly acquired temporality of religion and its inherent ontologico-political paradox, that it is possible to imagine a future place where recurrent hope for a life is reborn and nurtured within future pluralistic / inclusivistic / democratic / post-Christian communities, based on compassion and shared vulnerability, and not any more on power, or any other form of violence.

Over the years, many scholars have focused on the hierarchical and overpowering influence of Martin Heidegger upon Hannah Arendt’s thought. This view follows the stereotype concerning philosophical influence in which an all-knowing teacher affects the thought of the student, particularly if the student is a woman. In this paper, I argue that the story of philosophical influence is more complicated. In this case, the biographical archive establishes how Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, and Hannah Arendt mutually influenced one another throughout their lives and careers. This evidence contests the typical view of philosophical influence which is hierarchical and often gendered and suggests a new model for understanding philosophical influences as dynamic and reciprocal.

In this paper, I use Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of noesis and noema to investigate the connection between experience and place, a relation which I call “geographical experience,” using a term coined by Edward Relph. Following the correlative structure of lived experience, geographical experience is enabled by the lived body as the noetic part and place as the respective noematic part. Both parts belong together necessarily. However, in this experiential field, distortions and an eluding aspect of place appear in the relationship between body and place. These distortions point to an aspect of geographical experience that cannot be fully grasped by the noetic-noematic structure of experience. They indicate that the reality of place is not completely constituted by this correlative structure but nevertheless becomes apparent in and through it.

In this essay I trace the relationship between philosophy and politics in Hannah Arendt’s work, with specific reference to the tension between her Socratic commitments and her appeal to “common sense” or sensus communis. I argue Arendt’s idea of a “common sense of the world” gives rise to a conception of the public realm that has too much shape and integrity to fit the often misty and particulate nature of contemporary reality. This is not the familiar critique of Arendt as a nostalgic Grecophile. Rather, it is a critique aimed at the phenomenological concept of “world” underlying her analysis. This concept—derived, but notably different, from Husserl’s and Heidegger’s respective conceptions—relies on background practices and understandings that are thick enough to sustain both a common public culture and a shared “sense of the world.” I suggest that Arendt’s appeal to a sensus communis runs aground of the moral and value pluralism that both Weber and Berlin have suggested are constitutive features of modernity. I conclude with some remarks on the relationship between Arendt’s critique of modernity and Socratic philosophical critique (on the one hand) and Frankfurt School Critical Theory (on the other).

The scientific study of nonreligion has been described as being ‘under the spell’ of religion because the vast majority of research investigates nonbelief in respect to belief. This has resulted in a number of problematic theories, including the leading cognitive science of religion (CSR) theory that claims that religious belief is innate, and so to be a nonbeliever is to violate cognitive predispositions. This article critically analyzes innateness theories and encourages the development of further theories that incorporate social, adaptive, cultural, evolutionary, and biological factors in addition to cognitive contributors. This article details the roles of adaptive and functional aspects of nonbelief, the influence of credibility enhancing displays (CRED s), and the influence of cultural context on nonbelief as they are not sufficiently explained by CSR theories. It is proposed that future theories study nonreligion in its own right, instead of respective to religion, so that a broader range of unique characteristics can be accounted for without inaccurately and inadequately phrasing theories in terms of naturalness.

Fumie Taniguchi was a nihonga painter whose modern portraits of women enjoyed widespread acclaim within art circles during the 1930s. Although she moved to America shortly after Japan lost the war and spent the latter half of her life there, her existence was suddenly forgotten. There are almost no extant examples of Taniguchi’s paintings from her American period, however, her autobiographical novels that appeared in Japanese American fanzines provide significant clues that help to trace her life. Through these publications and oral interviews with her family members, this article seeks to introduce readers to the painterly practice and life of Taniguchi, and make clear what exactly was distinctive and unique about her life and practice. For a woman who continued to struggle against the patriarchal gaze both in Japan and the Japanese American community, what did the notion of transcending borders mean?

In some of Plato’s early dialogues we find a concern with correctly ascertaining the contents of a particular kind of one’s own psychological states, cognitive states. Indeed, one of the achievements of the elenctic method is to facilitate cognitive self-knowledge. In the Alcibiades, moreover, Plato interprets the Delphic injunction, ‘know yourself’, as crucially requiring cognitive self-knowledge, and ending in knowing oneself as subject to particular epistemic norms. Epistemic authority for self-knowledge is, for Plato, conferred on the basis of correct application of norms to cognitive self-ascriptions, and not confined to the first-personal perspective. This implies first-personal plural epistemic authority for self-knowledge.

The purpose of this article is to explore an understanding of hope that seeks to bridge the gap between a contemplative and action-oriented approach to hope. The argument is based in particular on an extensive study of the literature concerning the work of Jonathan Sacks. His reading of hope reaches back to the narrative of the Exodus and highlights several key assumptions to do with the principle of radical uncertainty. The intention is to situate these assumptions within the context of climate change. Most notably, Sacks’ concept of hope reveals a transformative response to climate change in which people gradually change their identity. For Sacks the key instrument of transformation for both religious and secular is a public Sabbath. An example of such is provided and Sacks’ thinking is set alongside the work of some leading theologians.

Following the literal interpretation of ribā, jurists have agreed that muḍārabah and mušārakah are legitimate modes of financing. As both arrangements are highly risky to manage in practice, murābaḥah has been introduced as an alternate mode of financing. Despite its extraordinary success, murābaḥah has led to moral hazard in the form of frequent delays in payments and defaults for which Islamic scholars have introduced a penalty clause as discouragement. Examination of the murābaḥah penalty clause instrument suggests that it is ribā, prohibited when interpreted literally. Moreover, the penalty clause has never been enforced in Pakistani courts. This article suggests that the literal interpretation based on the objectives of Sharīʿah (substantial interpretation) will prevent loopholes such as the abuse of the murābaḥah instrument and consequently the penalty clause as well and will lead to substantial compliance with the principles of Islamic finance.

The work of Jerzy Wróblewski has had a huge impact not only on the theory and philosophy of law, both in Poland and internationally, but also on the whole of ​​jurisprudence, especially the fields of doctrinal legal research and the practical application of the law (in particular on adjudication). The aim of this study is to present one of Wróblewski’s most influential concepts, namely the theoretical model of judicial interpretation, from the point of view of axiology and epistemology in the field of jurisprudence.

How do people perceive their own religious, spiritual or atheist biography? This is a question that our research team has been focusing on for nearly two decades. Our developmental perspective critically, but constructively relates to Fowler’s (1981) Faith Development Theory, as described in Streib’s (2001) approach of religious styles, paying tribute to the fact that development is not, in most cases, a linear upward process. By combining Fowler’s structural evaluation method with approaches to content analyses, this paper will show the merit of these qualitative methods when looking at (religious) development in different surroundings. For that purpose, we present case studies with different cultural backgrounds. Their different trajectories and possible commonalities will be shown on a structural as well as on a content level. This approach enables us to reconstruct movement within the religious field and will show how this is displayed on a subjective, biographical level.

As it appears, the back and forth between CSR and critical theory pays a great deal of attention to religion as a classificatory and explanatory object but has thus far left alone another category—that of the human. Scholars in other fields, however, have long demonstrated the human subject to be a slippery trope all its own whose rhetorical and analytical value is not at all a given. It is on the evolution and contemporary state of this vein of criticism that I will focus, then, in an attempt to shift the register of the current conversation about CSR.

Genia Schönbaumsfeld argues that Cartesian skepticism is an illusion induced by the “Cartesian Picture” of perceptual knowledge, in which knowledge of the “external world” depends on an inference from how things subjectively seem to one to how they actually are. To show its incoherence, she draws on the work of John McDowell, which she sees as elaborating a central theme from Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. I argue that Cartesian skepticism is not an illusion, as Schönbaumsfeld understands ‘illusion’, and that McDowell’s account of perceptual knowledge is both untenable and incompatible with Wittgenstein’s ideas about knowledge. Schönbaumsfeld thinks that, to understand how perception can engender knowledge of the world, we need a non-Cartesian account of perceptual reasons. Wittgenstein offers a much more radical break with the Cartesian Picture: an account of knowledge without ‘experience’.

This article discusses the application of the Avicennan theory of demonstrative science on taṣawwuf, or the Divine Science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī), by members of the Akbarian tradition, particularly Ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) stepson and most influential disciple, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), and his commentators, among whom the most prominent was Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 1431). It aims to find out what kind of relationship was developed between Avicennan logic and Sufism by the two members of the Akbarian school in the post-classical Islamic thought. It also seeks to show that the convergence between different currents of Islamic thought—Sufism and philosophy in this case—led to some adaptation problems and internal inconsistencies for these currents.

This article explores a novel approach to the analysis of the external world in postclassical Ashʿarite kalām. While discussions of physical reality and its fundamental constituents in the classical period of Islamic thought turned chiefly on the opposing views of kalām atomism and Aristotelian hylomorphism, in the postclassical period kalām thinkers in the Ashʿarite tradition forge a new frame of inquiry. Beginning most earnestly with the philosophical works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a critical approach is developed addressing received views in ontology, including the relation of substance to accident, the status of Aristotelian form and matter, and part-to-whole relations. Drawing on Rāzī’s al-Mulakhkhaṣ and al-Mabāḥith, kalām thinkers develop several concepts to distinguish arbitrary or mind-dependent (iʿtibārī) composites (‘man-plus-stone’) from non-arbitrary composites (e.g., tree, paste, and house). Most notably, they adopt a substance-plus-accident ontology in opposition to the Aristotelian hylomorphism of falsafa. The mutakallimūn will conceive of composites as possessing ‘real unity’ (ḥaqīqa muttaḥida) while dispensing with the explanatory and causal role of Aristotelian substantial forms.

The objective of this article is twofold. First, it investigates mereology in medieval Islamic theology, particularly the theologians’ claim that the whole is identical to its parts and accordingly that at least some attributes common to the parts must by extension be attributed of the whole. This claim was refuted by philosophers and, from the eleventh century onwards, an increasing number of theologians. Second, it offers a new interpretation of the standard theological proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo, to which this problem was central. A wide range of early, classical and later theological and philosophical sources are consulted.

The separated intellects play a crucial but notoriously controversial role within the Neoplatonic systems of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. While both thinkers provide an array of proofs to support the existence of such immaterial substances, the most enduring of these is based on a metaphysical rule of Avicenna’s metaphysics known as the “rule of one” (qāʿidat al-wāḥid): that from the One, only one proceeds (lā yaṣdur ʿan l-wāḥid illā l-wāḥid). The following paper explores the various ways in which Avicenna defended this principle and traces their reception in the post-classical period, thereby showing how vigorously the question of emanation was debated among scholars of the later medieval period.

Does the moral badness of pain depend on who feels it? A common, but generally only implicitly stated view, is that it does not. This view, ‘unitarianism’, maintains that the same interests of different beings should count equally in our moral calculus. Shelly Kagan’s project in How to Count Animals, more or less (2019) is to reject this common view, and develop an alternative to it: a hierarchical view of moral status, on which the badness of pain does depend on who feels it. In this review essay, we critically examine Kagan’s argument for status hierarchy. In particular, we reject two of the central premises in his argument: that (1) moral standing is ultimately grounded in agency and (2) that unitarianism is overdemanding. We conclude that moral status may, despite Kagan’s compelling argument to the contrary, not be hierarchical.

A contentious feature in the thought of Arthur Schopenhauer is his account of the Platonic Ideas. This is no doubt evidenced by the scholarly literature where various difficulties have been identified in regards to this introduction, and often varying positions maintained. Within this essay, I offer a survey of the major debates surrounding this issue. Following this, I turn to a specific question related to Schopenhauer’s claim that his own account of the Platonic Ideas is authentic to the original views of Plato himself. I show that, excepting minor points of similarity, Schopenhauer’s account is quite inauthentic to that of Plato. Still more, drawing upon his distinction between abstract and intuitive knowledge, I offer an interpretation of the relationship between Genius and contemplation employing the concept of a “circle of signification”. Finally, I identify some difficulties in relation to Schopenhauer’s views.

Although many new agers believe that enlightenment is the end goal of spiritual development, the importance of this concept has largely been overlooked by scholars until now. This article contextualizes the concept of enlightenment historically. After a detailed description of what the new age concept of enlightenment entails, it traces the origin of the concept to the late 19th-century “Oriental reaction” to Theosophy, when “missionaries from the East” like Vivekananda and Suzuki drew on transcendentalism, Theosophy, and recent innovations in psychology to articulate a paradigmatic expression of Asian soteriology. It highlights the importance of models of enlightenment in the transmission of Asian ideas and follows the trajectory that starts with Vivekananda and Suzuki to figures and currents like Aldous Huxley, 1960s counterculture, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, and neo-advaita. Thereby, it provides an account of the formation of the new age concept of enlightenment.

Behind its theoretical and scientific ambition, Pascal Boyer’s work mobilizes several ideas and notions (starting with that of “religion”) that belong to the old Western cultural tradition. It is precisely this ideological substratum and its indispensable cognitive “crutches” that this article seeks to identify.

Inductive Metaphysics (IM) combines an anti-aprioristic emphasis on an empirical and scientific basis for metaphysics with an insistence on a specifically philosophical abductive theory-building. Since the latter specifically philosophical work is not empirical itself, it may in a liberal sense be called apriori. This paper highlights this apriori dimension within IM by a case study on Structuralism, the view that fundamental reality consists of a network of relations (and properties), which a number of philosophers consider to be suggested by modern physics. Focussing on Dasgupta’s algebraic Generalism, the author argues that Structuralism suffers from a severe entailment problem, because the relations-spanning apparatus must stand for metaphysically fundamental forms. Schaffer’s contention that there are no entailment problems is rejected. Advocates of IM are well advised to take seriously their own insistence on metaphysical abduction and not to one-sidedly emphasise the empirical input: the elaboration of exact metaphysical theories and the apriori evaluation of their inherent tenability is a constituent of IM no less important than the consideration of scientific input. More traditional ways of metaphysical reasoning inevitably survive as an essential dimension within IM.

Like scientific theories, metaphysical theories can and should be justified by the inference of creative abduction (sec. 1–2). Two rationality conditions are proposed that distinguish scientific from speculative abductions: achievement of unification and independent testability (sec. 3). Particularly important in science is common cause abduction (sec. 4). The justification of metaphysical realism is structurally similar to scientific abductions: external objects are justified as common causes of perceptual experiences (sec. 6). While the reliability of common cause abduction is entailed by a principle of (Markov) causality (sec. 5), the latter principle has an abductive justification based on statistical phenomena (sec. 7).

We might say that children’s play is the foundation of all learning. Often play is recognized as integral to childhood, but children’s abilities to engage in play are complex and these complexities can be easily overlooked. This paper elevates children’s play as critical for their learning, particularly in support of their sense of belonging. The paper argues for an openness to the complexities of children’s play as a crucial practice of their cultural identity, through a critical conceptualization of some of the nuances and uncertainties of children’s subject formation. Drawing on concerns of cultural difference in early childhood education, Julia Kristeva’s foreigner lens and her theory on the subject in process are used to theorise children’s play as an ongoing process of belonging. Through the notions of the semiotic, abjection, love and revolt, the notion of the subject in process is elaborated to reconceptualize play as also in-process and ongoing. Rethinking play as a vital process within the sometimes difficult, often unpredictable experiences of becoming part of a centre community is elevated as crucial for a sense of belonging in early childhood education.

This article argues for two inter-related theses keyed to Plato’s Gorgias. (I) Callicles does not represent a constitutional form, but political participation itself, characterised by ambition, competition among political candidates, and the psychological and ethical mechanisms entailed in the process of gaining political recognition. (II) According to Socrates’s understanding, the political leader’s mirroring and internalisation of dominant character traits, held amongst those individuals transferring power, is decisive to the approval bestowed upon the political leader in question. This reading supplements that of Ober, who has claimed that the would-be political leader’s conformity with the demos’ ideology is decisive. This article argues that Socrates’ point is that a would-be political leader needs to mirror the character traits of those exercising power in specific civic institutions, implying a more pluralistic and context-determined approach. Moreover, this reading connects Socrates’ notion of recognition with that of moral psychology.

The doctrine of the pregivenness of the world features prominently in Husserl’s numerous phenomenological analyses and descriptions of the role the world plays in our experience. Properly evaluating its function within the overall system of transcendental phenomenology is, however, by no means a straightforward task, as evidenced by many manuscripts from the 1930s. These detail various epistemological and metaphysical difficulties and potential paradoxes encumbering the notion of the pre-given world. This paper contends that some of these difficulties can be alleviated by revisiting Husserl’s late concept of the earth and, more specifically, disclosing its transcendental function in the constitution of pregivenness. To test this claim, I turn to Husserl’s 1931 manuscript describing the paradox of “the originary acquisition of the world.” I argue that the paradox is dissolved by introducing the transcendental-phenomenological concept of the earth.

This article analyzes the complex relation of phenomenology and literature in the work of Husserl and Derrida. In the first part, I show that the limited ideality of the literary object necessarily situates it in a derivative region of phenomenology. In the second part, however, I problematize the regional status of literature by elaborating a brief but important footnote in which Husserl broadens the concept of literature to embrace all cultural products whatsoever. Yet, because even this broadened concept of literature ultimately remains secondary for the phenomenologist, it only redoubles and ratifies the submission of literature to the more ideal objectivities of mathematical disciplines like geometry. The third part, finally, mobilizes Derrida’s notion of “dissemination,” prepared in and unintelligible apart from his early engagement with Husserlian phenomenology, in order to broach a notion of literature that the phenomenologist can neither circumscribe nor describe.

This article addresses the problem represented by the state of imbalance in looking at the nature of the relationship between reason and the Prophetic Sunna. This relationship should be balanced between accepting the role of reason in dealing with the sunna according to many logical rules and principles or completely rejecting its role. Hence, this article aims to clarify the role of reason in dealing with the sunna: chain of narrators, text, and indication. It also aims to reach a state of balance in the relationship between reason and narrations in general, and the sunna in particular according to scientific methodologies. The article first explained the role of reason in dealing with sunna in relation to Isnād, therefore, it explained the role of reason in the science of ḥadīth proving that this science is based on logic, and that reason plays a role in proving whether the ḥadīth is continuous (muṭṭaṣil) or sectioned (munqaṭiʿ). Secondly, the article discussed the role of reason in dealing with the text of the ḥadīth (matn) in the followings: how to harmonize between contradictory ḥadīths, weighing between the texts, considering the implications of texts and deduction from them. Lastly, the author adopted the deductive approach, as he decided the rule or theory and then inferred from the texts and sources what it proves and indicates its validity. Moreover, he used the historical analytical method based on the analysis of texts from their sources and their use in arriving at specific results which are apparent in this article.

Both science and religion are human endeavours that recruit and modify pre-existing human capacity to engage in epistemic vigilance. However, while science relies upon a focus on content vigilance, religion focusses on source vigilance. This difference is due, in turn, to the function of religious claims not being connected to their accuracy – unlike the function of scientific claims. Understanding this difference helps to understand many aspects of scientific and religious institutions.

In this study, we examined the role of culture on early adolescents’ social reasoning about peer exclusion. A total of 80 U.S. and 149 Taiwanese early adolescents (U.S.: Mage = 11.00, SDage = 0.48; Taiwan: Mage = 10.45, SDage = 0.39) independently completed a social reasoning essay about peer exclusion. Analyses of the essays based on social-moral theories showed that U.S. students tended to reason about peer exclusion based on social conventional thinking whereas Taiwanese students were more attentive to personal and moral issues. Despite this difference, both groups of students referred to some common social-moral concepts while reasoning about peer exclusion, including consideration of personal benefit, harming others’ welfare, personal concern, and punishment. The use of social reasoning strategies was similar across the two groups of students except that Taiwanese students relied more on judgment (i.e., social-moral evaluation of someone’s social conduct) whereas U.S. students generated more alternative hypotheses (i.e., presenting new hypotheses or interpretations about the given issue).

Richard A. Horsley’s work on Second Temple Judaism and early Christianity has been widely influential. In particular, his theorizing of the social world in which early Jews and Christians were embedded has significantly advanced biblical studies. This article engages with several of the most prominent analytical categories in his work (peasant, retainer, resistance, and renewal) with a view toward investigating their conceptual origins and probing their analytical utility.

This paper is about an unsuccessful scientific instrument. Since its conception, the four theodolites Portuguese naval officer, geographer, and later aviation pioneer Carlos Viegas Gago Coutinho (1869–1959) ordered from the Italian maker and engineer Angelo Salmoiraghi (1848–1939), which were used in surveying missions to the African colonies, caused problems and disagreements. From the user’s perspective, the instruments were poorly manufactured; from the maker’s perspective, the user’s incompetence was to blame. By focusing on a well-documented set of scientific instruments, I will analyse social features concerning scientific practice, material culture, and instrument trade. I will show how the meaning of an adapted and untrustworthy instrument changed during practice; how a crisis between distanced user and maker, concerning design, precision, and error, developed; and how a clash for scientific and professional authority intertwined moral and scientific attributes.

This paper argues that focusing on Aristotle’s theory of generation as primarily ‘hylomorphic’ can lead to difficulties. This is especially evident when interpreting the association between the male and sentient soul at GA 2.5. If the focus is on the male’s contribution as form and the female’s as matter, then soul becomes divided into nutritive from female and sentient from male which makes little sense in Aristotle’s biological ontology. In contrast, by seeing Aristotle’s theory as ‘archēkinētic’, a process initiated by the male, the development of nutritive and sentient capacities emerges as intertwined, neither capacity originating in only one sex.

This article explores some of the recent deliberations concerning the nature of networked church. According to earlier sociological theory, the usual trajectory for newly formed churches (and religious movements) is that they become denominations, particularly in the context of the transition to second-generation leadership. Recent history suggests that this is not an inevitable trajectory, as many churches founded in the middle of the twentieth century continue to exist in the form of networks. Theological and sociological factors are relevant to the question of whether these churches will eventually become denominations. This article summarizes different attempts to understand the nature of networks and suggests that it is possible to conceptualize a continuum from loose networks to highly centralized ecclesial bodies. This continuum indicates possible transitions from one type of structure to another, but such transitions are not inevitable, and network structures may prove to be enduring.

A largely overlooked and puzzling feature of morality is Moral Memory: apparent cases of directly memorising, remembering, and forgetting first-order moral propositions seem odd. To illustrate: consider someone apparently memorising that capital punishment is wrong, or acting as if they are remembering that euthanasia is permissible, or reporting that they have forgotten that torture is wrong. I here clarify Moral Memory and identify desiderata of good explanations. I then proceed to amend the only extant account, Bugeja’s (2016) Non-Cognitivist explanation, but show that it isn’t superior to a similar Cognitivist-friendly view, and that both explanations face a counterexample. Following this, I consider and reject a series of alternative Cognitivist-friendly explanations, suggesting that a Practicality-Character explanation that appeals to the connection between the practicality of moral attitude and character is superior. However, I conclude that support for this explanation should remain conditional and tentative.

This paper investigates the relation between what James Conant has called Kantian and Cartesian varieties of skepticism. It is argued that a solution to the most prominent example of a Kantian variety of skepticism, i.e. Kripkensteinian skepticism about rule-following and meaning, can be found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. It is then argued that, on the basis of that very same solution to the Kantian problematic of rule-following and meaning, a novel argument against external world skepticism can be formulated. This argument takes the shape of a transcendental argument, which is reminiscent of Hilary Putnam’s infamous argument against the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but is, as is argued, superior to it in certain respects.

The recent report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life is intended to “offer a new and complementary lens with which to glean new insights into religion and public life”. The technique of cluster analysis was used on measures of religious and spiritual beliefs, yielding seven groups, two consisting primarily of nonreligious or secular individuals. There are “breadth-versus-depth” tradeoffs involved in this approach. A belief-based typology is an improvement upon a grouping that uses religious denomination, which undercounts secular individuals. But the theoretical implications of this typology for understanding secular individuals necessitate scrutiny, including how the use of meaning in life as a marker of well-being may be misleading in the case of the nonreligious.

Photovoice is a visual method that has attracted the attention of researchers in the field of education and social sciences in general. However, there are a number of methodological challenges in photovoice research and one of the challenges facing the researchers is the data analysis procedure. This article proposes a strategy for researchers to handle photovoice data analysis which consists of four stages, including a photograph analysis based on the researcher’s interpretations, a photograph analysis based on the participants’ interpretations, a cross-comparison, and theorization. According to the strategy, researchers should analyze both visual data (participants’ voice) and narrative data (interview data) based on their perspectives as well as those of participants in attempt to generate a more credible visual and narrative explanation and theorization of the phenomenon.

To oppose Secularism modern Christians depend on myths about the historical development of civilization. Such as the myth of a Christian America, imagining such things as that the United States Constitution was based on Biblical Christian principles. Parallel to this myth is another about science: that the Scientific Revolution, and therefore modern science, was based on Biblical Christian principles and could not have occurred (and therefore cannot continue) without them. Necessary to this are several false claims, most particularly that ancient pagans never did and never could have made any significant scientific progress, and that Christian theology was essential to doing so. These myths are here dispelled with recourse to a survey of the actual facts of the matter.

The collapse of the New Order ushered in what many had hoped would be a new era of openness and transparency for Indonesia. The loosening of laws pertaining to broadcast and print publication gave rise to a proliferation of new media and cultural production. This had a profound effect on everything, from politics, religion, and the economy to popular conceptions of romantic intimacy and personal accomplishment. The question is whether prevailing approaches to media and popular culture are adequate to the task of accounting for these oft-cited transformations in Indonesian public life. Focusing on issues of piety, class, and romance, this article examines a sequence of films, pop songs, and YouTube parody videos to offer a presuppositional critique of the current scholarship. Its central contention is that closer attention to pop culture as a form of ‘argument’ offers an important corrective to the reifying tendencies of prevailing approaches.

The scholarship on post-authoritarian Indonesia has taken a relatively passive attitude to theorizing popular culture—either presupposing the category absolutely, or invoking prior theorists as authorities without querying the coherence or applicability of their accounts and terminology. As the contributions to this special issue mean to suggest, the question of popular culture may require more careful consideration—not least given its alleged importance for our understanding of recent developments in politics, religion and the economy. This introductory essay provides a brief synopsis of the articles and a survey of the key issues addressed.

This article challenges the idea that Hobbes presents a negative anthropology and shows, to the contrary, that there is a thick web of social relations in his state of nature and laws of nature. It considers the contradiction between human natural equality claimed by Hobbes, and female subjection that de facto characterizes most of his passages on gender relations. The key to this puzzle is found in comparison of the notions of conquest and consent, and of acquisition and institution, comparisons that establish a similarity between paternal authority and despotic dominion. A step towards the solution is provided by the hypothesis that the divide between “vainglorious” and “moderate” is gendered, with women more disposed to moderation than men. This can be explained by the idea that, “for society’s sake,” women in the state of nature appreciate more the advantages of long-term cooperation, even at the price of some subordination.

Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal libertarianism and argues they all fail to show agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible. The first four objections fail outright. The fifth objection fails in a special way. Naturalistic agent-causal libertarian theories succumb to this fifth objection; theistic agent-causal libertarian theories do not. This entails that if agent-causal libertarianism is intelligible, then it is only so within theism.

In this paper I argue that Kant would have endorsed Clifford’s principle. The paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I review Kant’s argument for the practical postulates. In the second, I discuss a traditional objection to the style of argument Kant employs. In the third, I explain how Kant would respond to this objection and how this renders the practical postulates consistent with Clifford’s principle. In the fourth, I introduce positive grounds for thinking that Kant would have endorsed this principle.