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This article defends an analytical framework based on systems theory, reflexive law, and Teubner’s regulatory trilemma. J v B exemplifies the numerous overlapping social relations, and forms a case study on the relationship between the State, community, and minority religious individuals, and on how this relationship can break down from the systems theoretical perspective. The article uses this case as a testing ground for a modified systems theoretical approach, treating this conflict between family law and religion as a regulatory problem. Although it centers on English family law, the article should be read as a piece of normative legal theory of general application. In the final section, it explores reflexive secularity and how this may apply in cases where law and religion interact, such as J v B.

This article explores new ways of looking at qualitative data in the study of religion. I call them the interstitial, inverted, and dialogical approaches. The interstitial approach provides an alternative to traditional triangulation by treating discrepancies between, say, self-reporting and observation of religious attendance not as a problem, but as an interstice where new information can be found. The inverted approach examines how discourses about “the other” – the other’s religion, in this case – enable researchers to analyze positive self-identifications, even when those are left unarticulated. Finally, the dialogical approach responds to a recurrent problem in qualitative religion research: researchers often assume that they ways in which people talk about religion have particular consequences. The dialogical approach enables researchers to demonstrate whether and how this is indeed so. The three approaches show how epistemological reframing – all three are, in different ways, constructionist approaches – enables novel thinking about “religion.”

This paper introduces a tool designed to mitigate a longstanding challenge to developing social anthropological theories of ritual – how to generate enough comparable case studies for rigorously testing the predictive strength and generalizability of the theory under scrutiny. Our “constitutive relevance of models” (CRoM) test identifies structural continuities between anthropological and psychological theoretical models of ritual phenomena that would justify sharing some analytical tools between models. With this test, anthropologists can in certain cases draw on a psychological theory construct’s superior empirical tractability to more efficiently identify instances of ritual phenomena that are suitable for developing and testing their own anthropological models. To demonstrate, we apply a CRoM test to validate the use of a construct developed under a psychological theory of ritual, Lawson and McCauley’s “ritual form hypothesis,” to search for case studies suitable for assessing the theoretical claims that anthropologist Roy Rappaport made for “highly sacred” rituals.

This Introduction provides an overview of a cognitive-narratological approach to characters and characterization in New Testament narratives. We begin by comparing conventional and cognitive approaches to New Testament characters and characterization, and delineating a practical methodology designed to sensitize readers to a variety of interpretative possibilities that arise from the cognitive turn within narratology. Afterwards, we apply that methodology in three ways. First, we acquaint readers with the prospect of tracing characters within one New Testament narrative. Then, we hint at the analysis of character migration, that is, a character’s development across more than one narrative. Finally, we provide insight into the analysis of character emotions and the readers’ empathy with characters. To illustrate these aspects, we focus on examples from the Gospel of Mark.

Comparison is a fundamental operation in the milieu of the remarkable abilities of human beings to transcend themselves in acts of perception and the accumulation of knowledge. Comparison is holding together things that are at once the same and different. The very possibility of the copresence of same and different, of is and is not, is a gift of human biology and evolution. Humans compare because it is our distinctive nature to do so. Academics have the added responsibility of being self-aware, self-reflective, and articulate when comparing. This article develops a rich theory of comparison in conjunction with detailed reflections on late nineteenth century encounters of European-Australians and Aborigines in Central Australia. The intent is to advance our understanding of comparison and also to articulate in the practical terms of method what is involved in comparison, arguing most generally that comparison is of the fabric of any proper study of religion.

Two main elements pervade the argument. First, we argue that both ‘populism” and ‘the people’ are precarious concepts that can neither easily be defined, nor easily be claimed by any representative. We hold this to be true both in political and in theological terms, empirically referring to the civil and the religious population and their construction as ‘a people’, respectively. Second, in view of a common disregard for the people, namely as plebs, we reaffirm the importance of participatory popular subjects as a necessary part of both the political system and Christian communities. This bibliographical and conceptual essay contextualizes and explains the precariousness of realities and concepts, then analyses the concepts of populism and ‘people’. It seeks to deepen the discussion of populism by means of dialogue with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and then through a theological reflection by way of a public theology.

This article examines how three leading exegetes of the Muʿtazilite school tradition – ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), Jishumī (d. 494/1101), and Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) – conceptualized the Qurʾānic idea of covenant in divergent ways. It also illustrates how they related the idea of covenant to their broader thought world to forge an interpretation of the meaning of human history and salvation. It argues that these three commentators, although they are linked to one another by a loose form of teacher-student discipleship, share only basic ideas and applied hermeneutical devices and interpretive principles in considerably different ways. It is unlikely that they relied on one another when they composed their commentaries.

The article raises the question of how the multiplication of topics, turns, and perspectives in the currents of the study of religions can be explained. After the concept of a paradigm shift (Thomas Kuhn) is introduced, the study examines the epistemological consequences of the question What is religion? It is based on analyzing the practice of defining “religion” in German-language encyclopedias of the past three centuries. Surprisingly, the structure of these articles is largely persistent throughout this long period and consists mainly of etymology, definition (Wesensbestimmung), and a typology of “religion.” From this, an Aristotelian paradigm can be deduced. The claim for universality entailed in this paradigm ultimately led to a crisis and since the 1960s the study of religions has developed alternative approaches that emphasize aspects of human interaction, communication, and reciprocal relationships. I propose to subsume these new perspectives under the term “a relational paradigm.” Examples and consequences for this paradigm are offered in the conclusion.

The concept or notion of ‘digital religion’ has gained traction in recent years in the study of the intersection of media and religion. In this paper, I argue that this concept tends to reify ‘religion’ as a unique, sui generis phenomenon, disregarding decades-long debates about the idea of ‘religion’ in the study of religion. After deconstructing the notion of ‘digital religion’, as put forward in an essay by Stewart Hoover and Nabil Echchaibi (2014), I propose a social theory perspective of (digital) space, drawing mainly from the sociology of space and taking into account affordances and the citational nature of signifying practices. In the final section, I apply this approach to data I gathered during fieldwork online and offline among Salafi Muslims in the Netherlands and Germany from 2008 until 2015; this will showcase the potential not only for abstaining from ‘religionizing’ social phenomena but also of a social theory approach to the production of digital spaces.

The contemporary context creates complexities for the young person. These include the political and socio-economic realities of African states, the cultural renaissance of Africanism and the reality of postmodernity. From both a practical theological perspective as well as experience in higher education, the author claims that ministers in the Presbyterian Church lack a missional perspective to the contemporary African (Kenyan) youth. The author proposes that theological education in Kenya must seriously consider youth ministry education. Second, Presbyterian ecclesiology must be missional minded by moving from an inward posture to a missional posture that considers the African (Kenyan) youth. This reflection will engage practical ministry and higher education experience, as well as an inter-disciplinary literature survey, to offer a missional perspective for the church and theological education.

This article presents the theory of sainthood found in the writings of Dāwūd al-Qayṣarī (d. 751/1350), a major commentator on the Sufi thought of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). Building on previous philosophical interpretations of Ibn ʿArabī’s thought to systematize the worldview now known as the “Oneness of Being” (waḥdat al-wujūd), Qayṣarī also developed a sophisticated theory of sainthood that not only described, but explained in detail what a saint was, how to become one, and what made the methods for doing so effective. After a historical introduction, I examine the principles of Qayṣarī’s hagiology in the broader context of his worldview, with special attention to his innovative use of philosophical language. Finally, my analysis of the spiritual path in Qayṣarī’s writings shows the consistency with which his account of Sufi wayfaring reflects these principles, according to which the acquisition of sainthood was a journey from the particular to the universal.

This article examines Roman-era oaths invoking nondeities, especially persons. It argues that rather than invoking quasi-deities or persons to be punished by the gods in case of perjury, as usually understood in the past, these invocations could have two concurrent functions: honoring the invoked persons and affirming a statement. Though such invocations had limited legal power, they were commonly practiced throughout the period, as demonstrated in various textual genres, including Latin poetry and rhetoric, texts of the Second Sophistic, Jewish rabbinical writings, and 5th-century Christian sermons. Furthermore, nondivine invocations were frequently combined and mingled with divine invocations, with only theologically inclined authors attempting to define them clearly as a separate category. This interpretation has significance for understanding some equivocal oaths, such as the oath by the emperor, as well as for our perception of oaths in general as a speech act with functions going beyond the affirmation of a statement.

Orthodox theology teaches that people may participate in the fruits of Jesus Christ’s mediation between God and humankind. The Holy Spirit enables people to become radiant with the divine energies as they embrace Christ’s fulfillment of the human person in the likeness of God. The Theotokos, the saints, and spiritual elders play particular roles in interceding for people to share more fully in the life of Christ. The eucharistic worship of the church, marriage and the other sacraments, the prayer of the heart, ministry to the poor, and forgiveness of enemies provide opportunities for people to be transformed by the grace mediated to humanity by Jesus Christ. Such mediation extends to every dimension of the human person, including the physical body, as indicated by veneration of the relics of the saints and the sacramental nature of Orthodox worship.

In this article, I test out Hans Blumenberg’s understanding of consolation as a pattern to interpret Rosenzweig’s “new thinking.” Drawing on Blumenberg’s philosophical anthropology, I explore the connection between the concept of redemption as consolation and the image of the human being that it presupposes. I further examine the function of consolation in concepts and non-conceptual images through a comparison of redemptive consolation in the respective thought of Luther and Rosenzweig.

Rosenzweig’s pathos with respect to an ultimate redemption raises the question of the desirability of a state in which so much has to be undone in order to retain nothing but the One, the All, the Eternal, and the True. Similar doubts arise concerning Rosenzweig’s portrayal of the ways that this state of redemption is anticipated in life: through prayer, love of neighbor, the communal hymn of the We. How accessible are these to “the human being” as such? Rather than arguing against what appears as a grand remnant of the urge for totality, I invoke here two figures whose concepts of redemption partly resemble Rosenzweig’s, but depart from him in ways that make all the difference: Benjamin and Kafka.

According to James K.A. Smith, contemporary epistemology is overly focused on the noetic. Smith offers a counter-epistemology drawn from pentecostal spirituality that is narrative, affective, and embodied. Richard Davis and Paul Franks criticize this model and argue that it succumbs to story-relativism and arbitrariness. This article defends Smith against their critiques through three steps. First, it exposits Smith’s narrative, affective epistemology in order to identify areas that are relevant to their critiques. Second, it outlines and analyzes their critiques, reveals areas in which they fundamentally misunderstand Smith, and presents their commitment to epistemological objectivism. Finally, utilizing Alvin Plantinga’s externalist warrant model, it argues that Plantinga’s Reformed epistemology can assist Smith’s epistemology in consistent ways. If the following argument is successful, then Smith’s postmodern pentecostal epistemology can be reimagined as an externalist epistemology that overcomes the charges of relativism and arbitrariness.

Contemporary Islamic legal studies – both inside and outside the Muslim world – commonly relies upon a secular distortion of law. In this article, I use translation as a metonym for secular transformations and, accordingly, I will demonstrate how secular ideology translates the Islamic tradition. A secular translation converts the Islamic tradition into “religion” (the non-secular) and Islamic law into “sharia” – a term intended to represent the English mispronunciation of the Arabic word شريعة (sharīʿah). I explore the differences between historical Islamic terms and secular terms in order to demonstrate that coloniality generates religion and religious law; in turn, these two notions convert شريعة (sharīʿah) into “sharia” in both Arabic and non-Arabic languages. Consequently, the notion of “sharia” is part of a colonial system of meaning.

Since the discovery of the paradoxes of Zeno, the problem of infinity was dominated by the meaning of endlessness—a view also adhered to by Herman Dooyeweerd. Since Aristotle, philosophers and mathematicians distinguished between the potential infinite and the actual infinite. The main aim of this article is to highlight the strengths and limitations of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy for an understanding of the foundations of mathematics, including Dooyeweerd’s quasi-substantial view of the natural numbers and his view of the other types of numbers as functions of natural numbers. Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the actual infinite is turned upside down by the exploring of an alternative perspective on the interrelations between number and space in support of the idea of infinite totalities, or infinite wholes. No other trend has succeeded in justifying the mathematical use of the actual infinite on the basis of an analysis of the intermodal coherence between number and space.

Reflecting on thoughts by Talal Asad, this paper suggests an approach to theorizing Sunniyat – the approach to Islam taken by those commonly called “Barelvis” – in South Africa by focusing on sensibilities and dispositions. It specifically examines the kinds of sensibilities that are cultivated by adherents in their relationship to the Prophet as well as in their practice of everyday ethics. The aim is to shed light on the embodied nature of these sensibilities and not just their discursive context. In Asad’s work, both dimensions are important, but discourse is a prelude to embodiment, with the latter constituting one’s mode of being in the world. In thinking about Sunniyat in this way, the works of Abdulkader Tayob and Seraj Hendricks provide important precedents for navigating both discursiveness and embodiment in a South African Muslim context.

In the contemporary literature about the relationship between religion and COVID-19, vertical as well as horizontal responses can be distinguished. Much of the current literature is based on personal reflection or on quantitative research. This article adds a qualitative research perspective and offers a preliminary analysis of the religious frameworks used by pastors in the Reformed Church in Zambia. Although the pastors acknowledge the need for communal action, their livestreamed services show an emphasis on the vertical dimension, i.e., the relation with God. As this article argues, this can be understood from an African worldview. There is also evidence that the initial vertical dimension of the services shifts to more horizontal concerns as the pandemic progresses.

Eisenmann et al. developed a system consisting of forty-four categories to code the definitions of spirituality in samples from the USA and Germany. We tested this category system in a sample of seculars in Switzerland. All original categories were applicable to the individual understandings of spirituality in our sample. Only two additional categories of marginal relevance were formed. This result confirms the validity of the category system. Furthermore, the German and the Swiss samples both stress an understanding of spirituality as transcending without emphasizing transcendence. This concept should be used to construct spirituality scales for quantitative studies.

The orangutan, Sandra, has been legally granted the status of ‘non-human person.’ Although, a great victory for those who promote animal rights, this has raised questions about the contemporary approaches to personhood. Recent relational ontological shifts, evident in both secular and theological anthropology, risks unfortunate consequences. Like a snake eating its own tail, without proper circumspection, relational ontology is in danger of postulating a problematic circularity of persons creating persons out of nothing. This article explores these recent shifts, the possible pitfalls of relational ontology, and proposes certain theological desiderata.

Translation of “De vier religieuze grondthema’s in den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgeerig denken van het avondland” by Herman Dooyeweerd (1941), Philosophia Reformata 6 (4), pp. 161–179.

This article considers avenues for fruitful engagement between international relations and public theology in order to ask what an ethical Christian response to global conflict should entail. The process of mediating principles of biblical justice into a contemporary international context requires interpretation in a reality of territorial bounded states, with rules and norms governing international interactions that are unique to the present day. This article draws on two theologically oriented contributions to international relations, Christian realism and political reconciliation to probe the question as to how we conceptualise justice as a pursuit in international relations from a Christian worldview. It reflects on the contingencies of the present-day context of global conflict, and the implications for praxis from a public theology standpoint.

I discuss three tiers of technological innovation: mild innovation, or the acceleration by technology of a human activity aimed at a good; moderate innovation, or the obviation by technology of an activity aimed at a good; and radical innovation, or the altering by technology of the human condition so as to change what counts as a good. I argue that it is impossible to morally assess proposed innovations within any of these three tiers unless we rehabilitate a natural-law ethical framework. And I offer some moral starting points within such a framework, in connection with innovations of each of the three types.

While a distinction should be made between wicked problems as first defined by Churchman (1967) and Rittel and Webber (1973) and problems that are merely challenging and difficult to solve, in this contribution, I argue that climate change and the resulting destruction of nature could be explained as a wicked problem. One of the proposed solutions to climate change, making use of synthetic biology for nature conservation, has the potential to be classified not only as a wicked solution but as a solution that spawns a number of other wicked problems. I will examine the ethical issues raised by synthetic biology as a wicked solution to this super wicked problem from the perspective of Christian ethics, drawing in particular on the resources available in Christian ecotheology and, specifically, notions of interdependence, relationality, responsible stewardship, and global justice.

In recent years, notions of space in biblical texts have been analyzed by means of sociological concepts of spatiality, primarily based on the works of Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja. This article explores the heuristic provided by spatial concepts for the understanding of Psalm 73 and the debated understanding of the expression “sanctuaries of God” (מִקְדְּשֵׁי־אֵל) in v. 17. The actions described in this psalm take place in social space that is constituted, endangered and renewed by the actions of the psalm’s protagonists.

Biblical scholars often disregard ecological hermeneutics too readily as a special interest approach that is incapable of contributing to wider interpretive and theological conversations. This essay offers a new approach, ecomimetic interpretation, as a reading strategy that can bridge the gap between ecological hermeneutics and other forms of hermeneutical inquiry. Ecomimetic interpretation requires the interpreter to identify with non-human characters in a given text and allow that identification to contribute to the questions and findings that other approaches raise. In doing so, it contributes to such disparate fields as historical critical studies, theology, ethics, and ecological hermeneutics. This essay first develops the method of ecomimetic interpretation, illustrating each step with a brief reading of Matt. 6:25–34, and then surveys the contributions that this reading strategy can make to a variety of disciplines.

This article considers the Spirit’s role in the interpretation of Scripture, otherwise known as pneumatic interpretation. It outlines that whilst we may approach scripture seeking to interpret its written truth, the Spirit’s concern is with so much more than just our minds. Thus, pneumatic interpretation is holistic and cannot be restricted to interpretation of the scriptural text. The Spirit always works through and beyond the written words, seeking to interpret and appropriate scriptural truth affectively, ethically, and cognitively in our lives in ways that align with Scripture and transform us holistically into knowledge of and relationship with God as Father, Son, and Spirit. However, within this lies a paradox that whilst the Holy Spirit of God is all-powerful, discernment and reception of truth brought by the Spirit through Scripture (or in ways leading towards Scripture) is either helped or hindered by ethical action and choice.

The emergence of the new comparative theology in the west has greatly benefitted from Indian Vedic texts and related ones. Despite their extensive use for western theological reflection, comparative theology, however, has not come to the limelight in India, since most of the western initiatives have been perceived to be camouflaged missionary efforts. This paper proposes the cognitive metaphor theory as a fitting supplement to comparative theology. I argue that combining both has much to offer to study, learn, and relate religions in the multi-religiously coexisting context of India. I explore its possibilities and challenges and address how new comparative theology stays distinct from its nineteenth-century efforts in terms of bridging religious traditions by learning from them. This paper draws much from my own experiences, insights, and studies as a native of Indian culture, brought up in Christian tradition. My studies and researches are focused on comparative theology developed through the lens of cognitive metaphor theory.

This article discusses Descartes’s preferred focus on morally and theologically neutral subjects and points out the impact of this focus on the scientific status of theology. It does so by linking Descartes’s method to his transformation of the notion of substance. Descartes’s Meditations centred around epistemological questions rather than non-human intelligences or the life of the mind beyond this world. Likewise, in his early works, Descartes consistently avoided referring to causal operators. Finally, having first redefined the notion of substance in the Principia, Descartes would completely abandon making use of this notion in his later years. Indeed, in contrast to many authors before and after him, Descartes never showed any interest in the long-established metaphysical interpretation of substances as being causal factors of natural change. With God, nature, and mind commonly serving as instances of substantial causality, Descartes’s philosophy had a huge impact on the place of God in science and discreetly excluded theology as a subject to which his method might be applied.

This paper presents Christian Wolff’s claim that philosophy, undertaken on the basis of a proper method, cannot contradict revealed religion. The paper first provides a context of Wolff’s banishment from Halle for holding views in conflict with religious doctrines. Next, it proceeds, on the basis of Wolff’s Discursus præliminaris de philosophia in genere prefixed to his 1728 Latin Logic, to explain the principles of Wolff’s method, and to show how his conception of method enables him to disallow the possibility of a genuine conflict between philosophical and religious dogmas. For Wolff, doctrinal conflicts between philosophy and revealed religion can only occur as a result of terminological disagreements, disagreements between dogmas and hypotheses, or disagreements between dogmas and theological misinterpretations. The actual conflict of dogmas, understood as religious or philosophical truths, Wolff holds to be impossible.

This paper contends that the methodological tool of comparative theology, arising from and developing in Euro-American academia, resonates strongly with the historical interreligious learning praxis of China. Attention to comparative theology may indeed help us rethink the formation of a Chinese cultural identity vis-à-vis its religious others. A malleable way of doing comparative theology may offer nothing less than the mutual transformation of the interreligious interlocutors in a way consonant with Chinese history. A historical review of the interaction between Chinese Buddhism and Daoism shows that the adoption of Daoist terminology and concepts facilitated the Buddhist entry into the local milieu, while medieval Chinese Buddhism became paradigmatic for the elaboration of Daoist doctrine. The Buddho-Daoist interaction coheres with the enterprise of comparative theology with respect to the nature of interaction between religious traditions, the appropriative yet distinctive religious self-identification, and the transformation of the self and the other.

The writings of ʿAyn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 525/1131) anticipate some of the major trends that characterize the post-Avicennan ḥikmat tradition. But modern scholarship has as of yet not completely come to grips with the far-reaching implications of ʿAyn al-Quḍāt’s teachings, many of which are framed in terms of the symbolic language and imagery of the Persian Sufi school of passionate love (madhhab-i ʿishq) and the defence of the devil’s monotheism (tawḥīd-i Iblīs). The focus in this article will be upon this latter aspect of ʿAyn al-Quḍāt’s Sufi doctrine. Upon closer inspection, his “Satanology” (for lack of a better term) turns out to not only be concerned with a defence of the devil as a tragic, fallen lover of God; it is also intimately related to our author’s robust theodicy, as well as his theory of human freedom and constraint. At the same time, ʿAyn al-Quḍāt’s defence of Iblis demonstrates his understanding of philosophical and theological discourse as themselves symbolic representations of another, higher form of being and knowing.

In view of the questionability of the concept “religion” as an analytical category for the investigation of pre-modern, non-Western cultures, how can one still pursue the history of religion or historical sociology of religion? Roughly speaking, scholars of religion can be placed between two poles with regard to this question: (1) those who reject the cross-cultural use of “religion” as a comparative concept and (2) those who believe they cannot do without it. We propose an approach that acknowledges the cultural dependence and historicity of concepts such as “religion” and the “secular,” while still conducting historical research on pre-colonial non-Western societies relevant to the study of both. Our approach aims to investigate the emergence of social and epistemic structures in various cultures—forms of differentiation and distinction—that have enabled the reorganisation of socio-cultural formations into religions and thus facilitated the formation of “multiple secularities” in global modernity.

The scientific study of nonreligion has been described as being ‘under the spell’ of religion because the vast majority of research investigates nonbelief in respect to belief. This has resulted in a number of problematic theories, including the leading cognitive science of religion (CSR) theory that claims that religious belief is innate, and so to be a nonbeliever is to violate cognitive predispositions. This article critically analyzes innateness theories and encourages the development of further theories that incorporate social, adaptive, cultural, evolutionary, and biological factors in addition to cognitive contributors. This article details the roles of adaptive and functional aspects of nonbelief, the influence of credibility enhancing displays (CRED s), and the influence of cultural context on nonbelief as they are not sufficiently explained by CSR theories. It is proposed that future theories study nonreligion in its own right, instead of respective to religion, so that a broader range of unique characteristics can be accounted for without inaccurately and inadequately phrasing theories in terms of naturalness.

The purpose of this article is to explore an understanding of hope that seeks to bridge the gap between a contemplative and action-oriented approach to hope. The argument is based in particular on an extensive study of the literature concerning the work of Jonathan Sacks. His reading of hope reaches back to the narrative of the Exodus and highlights several key assumptions to do with the principle of radical uncertainty. The intention is to situate these assumptions within the context of climate change. Most notably, Sacks’ concept of hope reveals a transformative response to climate change in which people gradually change their identity. For Sacks the key instrument of transformation for both religious and secular is a public Sabbath. An example of such is provided and Sacks’ thinking is set alongside the work of some leading theologians.

How do people perceive their own religious, spiritual or atheist biography? This is a question that our research team has been focusing on for nearly two decades. Our developmental perspective critically, but constructively relates to Fowler’s (1981) Faith Development Theory, as described in Streib’s (2001) approach of religious styles, paying tribute to the fact that development is not, in most cases, a linear upward process. By combining Fowler’s structural evaluation method with approaches to content analyses, this paper will show the merit of these qualitative methods when looking at (religious) development in different surroundings. For that purpose, we present case studies with different cultural backgrounds. Their different trajectories and possible commonalities will be shown on a structural as well as on a content level. This approach enables us to reconstruct movement within the religious field and will show how this is displayed on a subjective, biographical level.

As it appears, the back and forth between CSR and critical theory pays a great deal of attention to religion as a classificatory and explanatory object but has thus far left alone another category—that of the human. Scholars in other fields, however, have long demonstrated the human subject to be a slippery trope all its own whose rhetorical and analytical value is not at all a given. It is on the evolution and contemporary state of this vein of criticism that I will focus, then, in an attempt to shift the register of the current conversation about CSR.

This article discusses the application of the Avicennan theory of demonstrative science on taṣawwuf, or the Divine Science (al-ʿilm al-ilāhī), by members of the Akbarian tradition, particularly Ibn ʿArabī’s (d. 1240) stepson and most influential disciple, Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī (d. 1274), and his commentators, among whom the most prominent was Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī (d. 1431). It aims to find out what kind of relationship was developed between Avicennan logic and Sufism by the two members of the Akbarian school in the post-classical Islamic thought. It also seeks to show that the convergence between different currents of Islamic thought—Sufism and philosophy in this case—led to some adaptation problems and internal inconsistencies for these currents.

This article explores a novel approach to the analysis of the external world in postclassical Ashʿarite kalām. While discussions of physical reality and its fundamental constituents in the classical period of Islamic thought turned chiefly on the opposing views of kalām atomism and Aristotelian hylomorphism, in the postclassical period kalām thinkers in the Ashʿarite tradition forge a new frame of inquiry. Beginning most earnestly with the philosophical works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, a critical approach is developed addressing received views in ontology, including the relation of substance to accident, the status of Aristotelian form and matter, and part-to-whole relations. Drawing on Rāzī’s al-Mulakhkhaṣ and al-Mabāḥith, kalām thinkers develop several concepts to distinguish arbitrary or mind-dependent (iʿtibārī) composites (‘man-plus-stone’) from non-arbitrary composites (e.g., tree, paste, and house). Most notably, they adopt a substance-plus-accident ontology in opposition to the Aristotelian hylomorphism of falsafa. The mutakallimūn will conceive of composites as possessing ‘real unity’ (ḥaqīqa muttaḥida) while dispensing with the explanatory and causal role of Aristotelian substantial forms.

The objective of this article is twofold. First, it investigates mereology in medieval Islamic theology, particularly the theologians’ claim that the whole is identical to its parts and accordingly that at least some attributes common to the parts must by extension be attributed of the whole. This claim was refuted by philosophers and, from the eleventh century onwards, an increasing number of theologians. Second, it offers a new interpretation of the standard theological proof from accidents for creation ex nihilo, to which this problem was central. A wide range of early, classical and later theological and philosophical sources are consulted.

The separated intellects play a crucial but notoriously controversial role within the Neoplatonic systems of al-Fārābī and Avicenna. While both thinkers provide an array of proofs to support the existence of such immaterial substances, the most enduring of these is based on a metaphysical rule of Avicenna’s metaphysics known as the “rule of one” (qāʿidat al-wāḥid): that from the One, only one proceeds (lā yaṣdur ʿan l-wāḥid illā l-wāḥid). The following paper explores the various ways in which Avicenna defended this principle and traces their reception in the post-classical period, thereby showing how vigorously the question of emanation was debated among scholars of the later medieval period.

Although many new agers believe that enlightenment is the end goal of spiritual development, the importance of this concept has largely been overlooked by scholars until now. This article contextualizes the concept of enlightenment historically. After a detailed description of what the new age concept of enlightenment entails, it traces the origin of the concept to the late 19th-century “Oriental reaction” to Theosophy, when “missionaries from the East” like Vivekananda and Suzuki drew on transcendentalism, Theosophy, and recent innovations in psychology to articulate a paradigmatic expression of Asian soteriology. It highlights the importance of models of enlightenment in the transmission of Asian ideas and follows the trajectory that starts with Vivekananda and Suzuki to figures and currents like Aldous Huxley, 1960s counterculture, Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, and neo-advaita. Thereby, it provides an account of the formation of the new age concept of enlightenment.

Behind its theoretical and scientific ambition, Pascal Boyer’s work mobilizes several ideas and notions (starting with that of “religion”) that belong to the old Western cultural tradition. It is precisely this ideological substratum and its indispensable cognitive “crutches” that this article seeks to identify.

This article addresses the problem represented by the state of imbalance in looking at the nature of the relationship between reason and the Prophetic Sunna. This relationship should be balanced between accepting the role of reason in dealing with the sunna according to many logical rules and principles or completely rejecting its role. Hence, this article aims to clarify the role of reason in dealing with the sunna: chain of narrators, text, and indication. It also aims to reach a state of balance in the relationship between reason and narrations in general, and the sunna in particular according to scientific methodologies. The article first explained the role of reason in dealing with sunna in relation to Isnād, therefore, it explained the role of reason in the science of ḥadīth proving that this science is based on logic, and that reason plays a role in proving whether the ḥadīth is continuous (muṭṭaṣil) or sectioned (munqaṭiʿ). Secondly, the article discussed the role of reason in dealing with the text of the ḥadīth (matn) in the followings: how to harmonize between contradictory ḥadīths, weighing between the texts, considering the implications of texts and deduction from them. Lastly, the author adopted the deductive approach, as he decided the rule or theory and then inferred from the texts and sources what it proves and indicates its validity. Moreover, he used the historical analytical method based on the analysis of texts from their sources and their use in arriving at specific results which are apparent in this article.

Richard A. Horsley’s work on Second Temple Judaism and early Christianity has been widely influential. In particular, his theorizing of the social world in which early Jews and Christians were embedded has significantly advanced biblical studies. This article engages with several of the most prominent analytical categories in his work (peasant, retainer, resistance, and renewal) with a view toward investigating their conceptual origins and probing their analytical utility.