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We use large-scale panel data from linked decadal censuses in England and Wales to study the responses of both individuals and their partners to rising Chinese import competition in the 2000s. We test whether partners provide insurance against lost household earnings by increasing labour supply. We find that both own and partner responses to the shock vary significantly by gender. Men in households exposed to import competition respond by increasing labour force participation at older ages, and by moving into solo self-employment. This is true both in response to their own trade exposure, and as an 'added worker effect' when their partner is exposed to the shock. By contrast, we find no such response for women, who do not increase labour supply if their male partners were initially employed in exposed industries. In general, self-employment appears to act as an employment buffer for men but not women. The impacts of import competition on partnering and family dissolution also differ according to the gender of those affected: for women below 45, but not men, exposure to the trade shock reduces the likelihood of divorce and of living with a new partner. Overall, our findings underscore the importance of investigating household responses, and the self-employment margin, to fully understand the effects of trade shocks.

Does higher import competition increase formalization and aggregate productivity? Exploiting plausibly exogenous variation from Chinese imports, we provide empirical causal evidence that higher imports increases the share of formal manufacturing enterprise employment in India. This formal share increase is both due to the rise in formal-enterprise employment driven by the high productivity firms, and a fall in informal-enterprise employment. The labor reallocation is enabled by the formal firms' hiring of contract workers, who do not carry stringent string costs. Overall, Chinese import competition increased formal sector employment share by 3.7 percentage points, and aggregate labor productivity by 2.87%, between 2000-2001 and 2005-2006.

This paper examines the link between trade-induced changes in local labor market opportunities and English language fluency rates among low-skilled immigrants in the United States. Many of the production-based manufacturing jobs lost in recent years due to Chinese import competition did not require strong English-speaking skills while many of the jobs in expanding industries, mostly in the service sector, did. Consistent with responses to these changing labor market opportunities, we find that a $1,000 increase in import exposure per worker in a local area led to an increase in the share of low-skilled immigrants speaking English very well in that area by about half a percentage point. As evidence that at least part of this is a result of actual improvements in English language speaking abilities, we show that low-skilled immigrants in trade-impacted areas became especially likely to be enrolled in school compared to similarly low-skilled natives. However, while we find little support for selective domestic migration in response to trade shocks, we present evidence suggesting that new immigrants arriving from abroad choose where to settle based either on their English fluency or their ability to learn English. Regardless of whether low-skilled immigrants respond to trade shocks via actual improvements in English fluency or migration choices, our results suggest that immigrants help to equilibrate labor markets, an implication we find evidence for in the data.

Before the recent rebound due to the US–China trade war, tariffs on international trade were being progressively reduced over the last decades and advanced countries increasingly relied on non-tariff measures (NTMs) to protect their industries from foreign competition. In this paper, we exploit a novel database on NTMs to test their role in shaping the labour market effects of exposure to Chinese import competition over the 2000–2015 period. We relate changes in manufacturing employment to the share of employed workers protected by NTMs across US local labour markets and we instrument NTMs using the industry share of employment in swing states during presidential elections. Our results indicate that NTMs mitigate the negative employment effect of exposure to Chinese imports and have a positive effect on manufacturing wages (especially for the unskilled).

Has rising import competition contributed to the polarization of U.S. politics? Analyzing multiple measures of political expression and results of congressional and presidential elections spanning the period 2000 through 2016, we find strong though not definitive evidence of an ideological realignment in trade-exposed local labor markets that commences prior to the divisive 2016 U.S. presidential election. Exploiting the exogenous component of rising import competition by China, we find that trade exposed electoral districts simultaneously exhibit growing ideological polarization in some domains – meaning expanding support for both strong-left and strong-right views – and pure rightward shifts in others. Specifically, trade-impacted commuting zones or districts saw an increasing market share for the FOX News channel (a rightward shift), stronger ideological polarization in campaign contributions (a polarized shift), and a relative rise in the likelihood of electing a Republican to Congress (a rightward shift). Trade-exposed counties with an initial majority white population became more likely to elect a GOP conservative, while trade-exposed counties with an initial majority-minority population become more likely to elect a liberal Democrat, where in both sets of counties, these gains came at the expense of moderate Democrats (a polarized shift). In presidential elections, counties with greater trade exposure shifted towards the Republican candidate (a rightward shift). These results broadly support an emerging political economy literature that connects adverse economic shocks to sharp ideological realignments that cleave along racial and ethnic lines and induce discrete shifts in political preferences and economic policy.

We study gender differences in the labor market reallocation of Peruvian workers in response to trade liberalization. The empirical strategy relies on variation in import competition across local labor markets based on their industrial composition before China entered the global market in 2001. In contrast to much of the existing literature, we find that import competition did not have persistent negative employment effects on men or led them to sort into the non-tradable or informal sectors. The adverse effects on the employment of low-educated women in the tradable sector, however, persist over time leading them to sort into the non-tradable sector or out of the labor force. The results are consistent with a mechanism in which gender occupational and industrial segregation leads to a widening of the gender gap in employment.

This paper assesses the effect of import competition on the labor market and health outcomes of US workers. We first show that import shocks affect employment and income, but only in areas where jobs are more intense in routine tasks. Exploiting over 40 million individual observations on health and mortality, we find that import had a detrimental effect on physical and mental health that is concentrated in those areas and exhibits strong persistence. It decreased health care utilisation and increased hospitalisation for a large set of conditions, more difficult to treat. The mortality hazard of workers in manufacturing increased by up to 6 percent per billion dollar import increase.

Many of the positive economic trends coming out of the Civil Rights Era for black men stagnated or reversed during the late 1970s and early 1980s. These changes were concurrent with a rapid rise in import competition from Japan. We assess the impact of this trade shock on racial disparities using commuting zone level variation in exposure. We find it decreased black manufacturing employment, labor force participation, and median earnings, and increased public assistance recipiency. However these manufacturing losses for blacks were offset by increased white manufacturing employment. This compositional shift appears to have been caused by skill upgrading in the manufacturing sector. Losses were concentrated among black high school dropouts and gains among college educated whites. We also see a shifting of manufacturing employment towards professionals, engineers, and college educated production workers. We find no evidence the heterogeneous effects of import competition can be explained by unionization, prejudice, or changes in spatial mismatch. Our results can explain 66-86% of the relative decrease in black manufacturing employment, 17-23% of the relative rise in black non-labor force participation, and 34-44% of the relative decline in black median male earnings from 1970-1990.

We analyze the effects of the increase in China's import competition on Mexican domestic and international migration. We exploit the variation in exposure to competition from China, following its accession to the WTO in 2001, across Mexican municipalities and estimate the effect of international competition on the individual decision to migrate. Controlling for individual and municipality features, we find that individuals living in municipalities more exposed to Chinese import competition are more likely to migrate to other municipalities within Mexico, while a negative effect is found on the decision to migrate to the US. In particular, we find that Chinese import competition reduces migrants' negative self- selection: the rising international competition lowers the likelihood of low-educated, low-income people to migrate to the US, by making them more financially constrained. We do not find any evidence that changes in demand for Mexican workers in the US drive our results.