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According to federal law in 2012, employers can take a credit of up to $5.13 for tips received by workers in satisfying the minimum wage requirement of $7.25. This study uses interstate variation in laws regarding tip credits and minimum wages to identify the effects of reducing or eliminating the tip credit on employment and earnings in the U.S. restaurant industry. Using data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages and the Current Population Survey, we find that a reduction in the tip credit increases weekly earnings but reduces employment in the full services restaurant industry and for tipped workers. The results are robust to controls for spatial heterogeneity in employment trends and are supported by a series of falsification tests.

This study argues that the promotion of union goals could have positive, negative, or neutral effects on risk adjusted return performance. Moreover, the union's ability and incentive to use pension assets to promote union goals will vary with the design of the pension. Using panel data on over 36,000 pension plans drawn from IRS Form 5500 filings, we empirically estimate the effects of unions on risk adjusted returns and find that the union effect on performance varies in ways that are consistent with our priors. In particular, unions have the largest negative effect among multi-employer defined contribution plans and the negative effect of unions can be eliminated by a switch to participant direction. Also, we find that unions improve performance for single employer defined contribution plans.

Since 1990, most pension plans have shifted the responsibility for directing pension assets to the employee. This study summarizes some of the possible explanations for this rapid shift toward participant direction and uses IRS Form 5500 data to investigate the effect of worker and plan characteristics on the likelihood of making a switch. The study also estimates the effect of a switch to participant direction on employee contribution and asset allocation behavior. The analysis reveals that collective bargaining and pension investments in employer stock reduce the chance of a switch to participant direction, whereas below average return performance increases the chance. Also, a switch to participant direction increases employee contributions to the pension and reduces the share of assets invested in employer securities.

This study shows that the wage premium paid by large firms fell over the past 20 years and that the decline in the size premium has been most pronounced among the least educated work force. Empirical evidence supports several explanations for the decline in the size premium. First, there has been a convergence in the returns to worker characteristics at large and small firms over time. Second, there has been a convergence in the types of workers employed at small and large firms. Particularly important have been changes in the distribution of workers across industries and the greater rate of decline in unionism at large firms.

Many workers reveal a preference for a gradual reduction in work hours as they approach retirement (?phased retirement?), rather than a sudden change from full-time work to full-time retirement. Pension regulations may impede phased retirement without a switch of employers by prohibiting access to pension assets. This study uses Health and Retirement Survey data to investigate the extent to which a gradual reduction in work hours is made difficult by pensions, particularly defined benefit plans. The study also explores other possible impediments to phased retirement.