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The effectiveness of negative interest rates as a monetary policy tool depends importantly on the response of the banking sector. This paper offers unique new insights for U.S. banks by using supervisory data to examine bank-level expectations regarding the impact of negative rates on profitability through net interest margins. The main results show that the largest U.S. banks differ significantly in how they respond to negative interest rates. The most significant channel of adverse exposure comes from the pass-through of the negative policy rate to interest rates on short-term liquid assets held on the balance sheet. At the same time, on the liability side, banks that rely more heavily on short-term wholesale funding, including financing through the repo market, may benefit through a reduction in funding costs. In the aggregate, these effects likely wash out as liquidity provision is sufficiently well diversified across the banking sector as a whole.

We develop an incomplete-markets heterogeneous agent New-Keynesian (HANK) model in which households are allowed to lend and borrow, subject to a borrowing constraint. We show that, in this framework, forward guidance, that is the promise by the central bank to lower future interest rates, can be a powerful policy tool, especially when the economy is in a liquidity trap. In our model, the power of forward guidance is amplified by three redistributive channels, absent in a representative agent new- Keynesian model (RANK) or in a HANK model without private debt. First, expected lower rates imply a future transfer of wealth from savers to borrowers, reducing precautionary motives and stimulating current demand and inflation. Second, higher initial inflation lowers the path of the real rate increasing the wealth of borrowers, who have a higher marginal propensity to consume (MPC). Third, if debt is nominal, debt deflation generates also a wealth transfer towards high-MPC borrowing-constrained agents, further increasing aggregate consumption and inflation. These channels amplify each other in a liquidity trap, and can make forward guidance more powerful in a HANK model than in a RANK framework. These results contrast with previous research on HANK models, which focused on frameworks where agents were not allowed to borrow, and which found negligible effects of forward guidance.

We study optimal time-consistent monetary and fiscal policy in a New Keynesian model where occasional declines in agents’ confidence give rise to persistent liquidity trap episodes. Insights from widely studied fundamental-driven liquidity traps are not a useful guide for enhancing welfare in this model. Raising the inflation target, appointing an inflation-conservative central banker, or allowing for the use of government spending as an additional stabilization tool can exacerbate deflationary pressures and demand deficiencies during the liquidity trap episodes. However, appointing a policy-maker who is sufficiently less concerned with government spending stabilization than society eliminates expectations-driven liquidity traps. (JEL E31, E52, E61, E62, E63)

In expectations-driven liquidity traps, a higher inflation target is associated with lower inflation and consumption. As a result, introducing the possibility of expectations-driven liquidity traps to an otherwise standard model lowers the optimal inflation target. Using a calibrated New Keynesian model with an effective lower bound (ELB) constraint on nominal interest rates, we find that even a very small probability of falling into an expectations-driven liquidity trap lowers the optimal inflation target nontrivially. Our analysis provides a reason to be cautious about the argument that central banks should raise their inflation targets in light of a higher likelihood of hitting the ELB.

In a two-country DSGE model, the effects of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified if the home economy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates. This result applies even to countries that are relatively closed to trade such as the United States. Departing from many of the existing closed-economy models, the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously. Adverse foreign shocks can extend the duration of the trap, implying more contractionary effects for the home country. The home economy is more vulnerable to adverse foreign shocks if the neutral rate is low – consistent with "secular stagnation" – and trade openness is high.

This paper draws from Japan’s recent monetary experiment to examine the effects of an increase in the inflation target during a liquidity trap. We review Japanese data and examine through a VAR model how macroeconomic variables respond to an identified inflation target shock. We apply these findings to calibrate the effect of a shock to the inflation target in a new-Keynesian DSGE model of the Japanese economy. We argue that imperfect observability of the inflation target and a separate exchange rate shock are needed to successfully account for the behavior of nominal and real variables in Japan since late 2012. Our analysis indicates that Japan has made some progress towards overcoming deflation, but further measures are needed to raise inflation to 2 percent in a stable manner.

We construct a general equilibrium model in which income inequality results in insufficient aggregate demand, deflation pressure, and excessive credit growth by allocating income to agents featuring low marginal propensity to consume, and if excessive, can lead to an endogenous financial crisis. This economy generates distributions for equilibrium prices and quantities that are highly skewed to the downside due to financial crises and the liquidity trap. Consequently, symmetric monetary policy rules designed to minimize fluctuations around fixed means become inefficient. A simultaneous reduction in inflation volatility and mean unemployment rate is feasible when an asymmetric policy rule is adopted.

This paper uses the historical narrative record to determine whether inflation expectations shifted during the second quarter of 1933, precisely as the recovery from the Great Depression took hold. First, by examining the historical news record and the forecasts of contemporary business analysts, we show that inflation expectations increased dramatically. Second, using an event-studies approach, we identify the impact on financial markets of the key events that shifted inflation expectations. Third, we gather new evidence—both quantitative and narrative—that indicates that the shift in inflation expectations played a causal role in stimulating the recovery.

A number of prominent economists and policymakers have argued that money-financed fiscal programs (helicopter drops) could be efficacious in boosting output and inflation in economies facing persistent economic weakness, very low inflation, and significant fiscal strains. We employ a fairly conventional macroeconomic model to explore the possible effects of such policies. While we do find that money-financed fiscal programs, if communicated successfully and seen as credible by the public, could provide significant stimulus, we underscore the risks that would be associated with such a program. These risks include persistently high inflation if the central bank fully adhered to the program; or alternatively, that such a program would be ineffective in providing stimulus if the public doubted the central bank’s commitment to such an extreme strategy. We also highlight how more limited forms of monetary and fiscal cooperation – such as a promise by the central bank to be more accommodative than usual in response to fiscal stimulus – may be more credible and easier to communicate, and ultimately more effective in providing economic stimulus.

We develop a nonlinear dynamic general equilibrium model with a banking sector and use it to study the macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard for banks on top of existing capital adequacy requirements. The model generates a distribution of bank sizes arising from differences in banks' ability to generate revenue from loans and from occasionally binding capital and liquidity constraints. Under our baseline calibration, imposing a liquidity requirement would lead to a steady-state decrease of about 3 percent in the amount of loans made, an increase in banks' holdings of securities of at least 6 percent, a fall in the interest rate on securities of a few basis points, and a decline in output of about 0.3 percent. Our results are sensitive to the supply of safe assets: the larger the supply of such securities, the smaller the macroeconomic impact of introducing a minimum liquidity standard for banks, all else being equal. Finally, we show that relaxing the liquidity requirement under a situation of financial stress dampens the response of output to aggregate shocks.

This paper uses a two country DSGE model to examine the effects of tax-based versus expenditure-based fiscal consolidation in a currency union. We find three key results. First, given limited scope for monetary accommodation, tax-based consolidation tends to have smaller adverse effects on output than expenditure-based consolidation in the near-term, though is more costly in the longer-run. Second, a large expenditure-based consolidation may be counterproductive in the near-term if the zero lower bound is binding, reflecting that output losses rise at the margin. Third, a 'mixed strategy' that combines a sharp but temporary rise in taxes with gradual spending cuts may be desirable in minimizing the output costs of fiscal consolidation.

This paper investigates the impact of the asymmetric shocks within a currency union in a framework that takes account of the zero bound constraint on policy rates, and also allows for constraints on fiscal policy. In this environment, we document that the usual optimal currency argument showing that the effects of shocks are mitigated to the extent that they are common across member states can be reversed. Countries can be worse off when their neighbors experience similar shocks, including policy-driven reductions in government spending.

We study standard monetary-policy rules with inflation-rate targets and either interest-rate or money-supply instruments using a flexible-price, perfect-foresight model. We focus mainly on interest-rate rules, but the results for money-supply rules are analogous. A locally-unique target equilibrium always exists. There are also below-target equilibria (BTE) with inflation below target and constant or asymptotically approaching or eventually reaching a below-target value. Liquidity traps are neither necessary nor sufficient for BTE. Such equilibria can also arise if monetary policy keeps the interest rate above a lower bound. We construct monetary-policy rules that preclude BTE. All are non-monotonic and discontinuous in current inflation. Each implies a difference equation in inflation. Some of these difference equations are continuous, but others are not. They are all non-monotonic and non-differentiable at a point. We argue that Japan's difficulties in the 1990s were probably the result of a stabilization problem rather than an indeterminacy problem.