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This paper develops a semi-structural model to jointly estimate "stars" - long-run levels of output (its growth rate), the unemployment rate, the real interest rate, productivity growth, price inflation, and wage inflation. It features links between survey expectations and stars, time-variation in macroeconomic relationships, and stochastic volatility. Survey data help discipline stars' estimates and have been crucial in estimating a high-dimensional model since the pandemic. The model has desirable real-time properties, competitive forecasting performance, and superior fit to the data compared to variants without the empirical features mentioned above. The by-products are estimates of various objects of great interest to the broader profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the predictive relationship between the distribution of realized inflation in the US and measures of inflation expectations from households, firms, financial markets, and professional forecasters. To allow for nonlinearities in the predictive relationship we use quantile regression methods. We find that the ability of households to predict future inflation, relative to that of professionals, firms, and the market, increases with inflation. While professional forecasters are more accurate in the middle of the inflation density, households' expectations are more useful in the upper tail. The predictive ability of measures of inflation expectations is greatest when combined. We show that it is helpful to let the combination weights on different agents' expectations of inflation vary by quantile when assessing inflationary pressures probabilistically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past 15 years have been eventful. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) reminded us of the importance of a stable financial system to a well-functioning economy, one with low and stable inflation and maximum employment. Given the recent banking stress, we ponder this issue again. The pandemic was a huge shock surrounded by much uncertainty, making precise forecasts within traditional models difficult. And more recently, there has been continuous talk of a soft landing and recession risks. In this paper, I focus on some of the lessons we have learned over the years: (i) uncertainty and tail risk have cyclical variation; (ii) financial shocks can have a significant effect on macroeconomic outcomes; (iii) the impact of shocks is stronger in periods of high volatility. These lessons have important implications for policymakers in today's environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the forecasting efficacy and implications of the recently popular breakdown of core inflation into three components: goods excluding food and energy, services excluding energy and housing, and housing. A comprehensive historical evaluation of the accuracy of point and density forecasts from a range of models and approaches shows that a BVAR with stochastic volatility in aggregate core inflation, its three components, and wage growth is an effective tool for forecasting inflation’s components as well as aggregate core inflation. Looking ahead, the model’s baseline projection puts core inflation at 2.6 percent in 2026, well below its 2023 level but still elevated relative to the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent objective. The probability that core inflation will return to 2 percent or less is much higher when conditioning on goods or non-housing services inflation slowing to pre-pandemic levels than when conditioning on these components remaining above the same thresholds. Scenario analysis indicates that slower wage growth will likely be associated with reduced inflation in all three components, especially goods and non-housing services, helping to return core inflation to near the 2 percent target by 2026. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We show that inflation expectations are heterogeneous and depend on past individual experiences. We propose a diagnostic expectations-augmented Kalman filter to represent consumers' heterogeneous inflation expectations-formation process, where heterogeneity comes from an anchoring-to-the-past mechanism. We estimate the diagnosticity parameter that governs the inflation expectations-formation process and show that the model can replicate systematic differences in inflation expectations across cohorts in the US. We introduce this mechanism into a New Keynesian model and find that heterogeneous expectations anchor aggregate responses to the agents' memory, making shocks more persistent. Central banks should be more active to prevent agents from remembering current shocks far into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper considers a New Keynesian framework in which agents form expectations based on a combination of mis-specified forecasts and myopia. The proposed expectations formation process is found to be consistent with all three empirical facts on consensus inflation forecasts, namely, that forecasters under-react to ex-ante forecast revisions, that forecasters over-react to recent events, and that the response of forecast errors to a shock initially under-shoots but then over-shoots. The paper then derives the general equilibrium solution consistent with the proposed expectations formation process and estimates the model with likelihood-based Bayesian methods, yielding three novel results: (i) The data strongly prefer the combination of autoregressive mis-specified forecasting rules and myopia over other alternatives; (ii) The best fitting expectations formation process for both households and firms is characterized by high degrees of myopia and simple AR(1) forecasting rules; (iii) Frictions such as habit in consumption, which are typically necessary for models with Full-information Rational Expectations, are significantly less important, because the proposed expectations generate substantial internal persistence and amplification to exogenous shocks. Simulated inflation expectations data from the estimated general equilibrium model reflect the three empirical facts on forecasting data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is inflation (still) a global phenomenon? We study the international co-movement of inflation based on a dynamic factor model and in a sample spanning up to 56 countries during the 1960-2023 period. Over the entire period, a first global factor explains approximately 58% of the variation in headline inflation across all countries and over 72% in OECD economies. The explanatory power of global inflation is equally high in a shorter sample spanning the time since 2000. Core inflation is also remarkably global, with 53% of its variation attributable to a first global factor. The explanatory power of a second global factor is lower, except for select emerging economies. Variables such as a broad dollar index, the US federal funds rate, and a measure of commodity prices positively correlate with the first global factor. This global factor is also correlated with US inflation during the 70s, 80s, the GFC, and COVID. However, it lags these variables during the post-COVID period. Country-level integration in global value chains accounts for a significant proportion of the share of both local headline and core inflation dynamics explained by global factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I review the history of "core" PCE inflation and its rationale: remove volatile items with transitory shocks to better highlight the trend in inflation. Structural changes in the inflation process imply that, on a "reducing volatility" basis, the list of items excluded from the "core" inflation basket (aside from gasoline) is far from optimal. This is true whether one assesses volatility on the basis of a weighted component monthly, or an index monthly, or a 12-month index, or a 5-year index. In addition, I demonstrate other deficiencies of exclusion indexes. Excluded items do not just experience transitory shocks, but also have persistent trends; thus excluding them imparts a significant timevarying bias to core inflation. Meanwhile, items that are not excluded can experience volatility and moreover can cause core inflation to depart notably from trend inflation, sometimes at crucial moments. Two other prominent trend inflation measures, trimmed mean PCE inflation and median PCE inflation, gracefully address these issues, but themselves have notable time-varying bias. I discuss the source of the bias in these other measures and how to correct for bias in real time. I then summarize and extend a wide variety of evidence comparing these three trend measures. I conclude that, for a variety of considerations that are relevant for monetary policy deliberations and communication, either trimmed mean PCE inflation or median PCE inflation are superior measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRBC) has produced median and trimmed-mean consumer price index (CPI) measures. These have proven useful in various contexts, such as forecasting and understanding post-COVID inflation dynamics. Revisions to the FRBC methodology have historically involved increasing the level of disaggregation in the CPI components, which has improved accuracy. Thus, it may seem logical that further disaggregation would continue to enhance its accuracy. However, we theoretically demonstrate that this may not necessarily be the case. We then explore the empirical impact of further disaggregation along two dimensions: shelter and non-shelter components. We find that significantly increasing the disaggregation in the shelter indexes, when combined with only a slight increase in non-shelter disaggregation, improves the ability of the median and trimmed-mean CPI to track the medium-term trend in CPI inflation and marginally increases predictive power over future movements in CPI inflation. Finally, we examine the practical implications of our preferred degree of disaggregation. Our preferred measure of the median CPI suggests that trend inflation was lower pre-pandemic, while both our preferred median and trimmed-mean measures suggest a faster acceleration in trend inflation in 2021. We also find that higher disaggregation marginally weakens the Phillips curve relationship between median CPI inflation and the unemployment gap, though it remains statistically significant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consumers purchase energy in many forms. Sometimes energy goods are consumed directly, for instance, in the form of gasoline used to operate a vehicle, electricity to light a home, or natural gas to heat a home. At other times, the cost of energy is embodied in the prices of goods and services that consumers buy, say when purchasing an airline ticket or when buying online garden furniture made from plastic to be delivered by mail. Previous research has focused on quantifying the pass-through of the price of crude oil or the price of motor gasoline to U.S. inflation. Neither approach accounts for the fact that percent changes in refined product prices need not be proportionate to the percent change in the price of oil, that not all energy is derived from oil, and that the correlation of price shocks across energy markets is far from one. This paper develops a vector autoregressive model that quantifies the joint impact of shocks to several energy prices on headline and core CPI inflation. Our analysis confirms that focusing on gasoline price shocks alone will underestimate the inflationary pressures emanating from the energy sector, but not enough to overturn the conclusion that much of the observed increase in headline inflation in 2021 and 2022 reflected non-energy price shocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a new approach to combining the information in point and density forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and assesses the incremental value of the density forecasts. Our starting point is a model, developed in companion work, that constructs quarterly term structures of expectations and uncertainty from SPF point forecasts for quarterly fixed horizons and annual fixed events. We then employ entropic tilting to bring the density forecast information contained in the SPF's probability bins to bear on the model estimates. In a novel application of entropic tilting, we let the resulting predictive densities exactly replicate the SPF's probability bins. Our empirical analysis of SPF forecasts of GDP growth and inflation shows that tilting to the SPF's probability bins can visibly affect our model-based predictive distributions. Yet in historical evaluations, tilting does not offer consistent benefits to forecast accuracy relative to the model-based densities that are centered on the SPF's point forecasts and reflect the historical behavior of SPF forecast errors. That said, there can be periods in which tilting to the bin information helps forecast accuracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several Phillips curves based on sticky information and sticky prices are estimated and compared using Bayesian VAR-GMM. This method derives expectations in each Phillips curve from a VAR and estimates the Phillips curve parameters and the VAR coefficients simultaneously. Quasi-marginal likelihood-based model comparison selects a dual stickiness Phillips curve in which, each period, some prices remain unchanged, consistent with micro evidence. Moreover, sticky information is a more plausible source of inflation inertia in the Phillips curve than other sources proposed in previous studies. Sticky information, sticky prices, and unchanged prices in each period are all needed to better describe inflation dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes new measures of the effectiveness of inflation targeting (IT) and evaluates its main drivers in a (large) sample of advanced economies (AEs) and emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). Using synthetic control methods, we find that IT has heterogeneous effects on inflation across countries. The gains shifting the level of inflation (generally downwards) are modest and smaller in AEs than are those in EMDEs. All such gains are statistically significant in one out of three economies approximately. Second, statistically significant differences in keeping inflation close to target under IT (compared with estimated counterfactuals) can be detected more broadly in nearly half of the economies. Third, IT can be a source of economic resilience that helped cushion inflation fluctuations during the 2007-09 Global Financial Crisis with statistically significant gains mostly found among EMDEs (in two out of three of these economies). Finally, we find that IT effectiveness-measured by the dynamic treatment effect and the absolute deviations of both observed and synthetic inflation from target-is significantly correlated with indices of exchange rate stability and monetary policy independence, especially among EMDEs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The provision of bank credit to firms and households affects macroeconomic performance. We use survey measures of changes in bank lending standards, disaggregated by loan category, to quantify the effect of changes in banks’ attitudes toward lending on aggregate output, inflation, and interest rates. Bank lending to businesses is particularly important for macroeconomic outcomes, with peak effects on output of around half a percentage point after four quarters of the initial shock. These effects depend on the stage of the business cycle and the proximity of the short-term interest rate to its effective lower bound. The effects are larger when output is growing below trend and when the interest rate is away from its lower bound. We also find that the response of the economy to lending-standards shocks is asymmetric, with tightening shocks having larger effects on output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the developments in the global financial sector, particularly in the U.S. He examines the performance of the Globalization and Monetary Policy Institute that was created by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2008. He focuses on the effects of globalization on such financial factors as inflation and standards of living.

We implement a novel nonlinear structural model featuring an empirically-successful frequency-dependent and asymmetric Phillips curve; unemployment frequency components interact with three components of core PCE - core goods, housing, and core services ex-housing - and a variable capturing supply shocks. Forecast tests verify model's accuracy in its unemployment-inflation tradeoffs, crucial for monetary policy. Using this model, we assess the plausibility of the December 2022 Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). By 2025Q4, the SEP projects 2.1 percent inflation; however, conditional on the SEP unemployment path, we project inflation of 2.9 percent. A fairly deep recession delivers the SEP inflation path, but a simple welfare analysis rejects this outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we propose a hierarchical shrinkage approach for multi-country VAR models. In implementation, we consider three different scale mixtures of Normals priors -- specifically, Horseshoe, Normal-Gamma, and Normal-Gamma-Gamma priors. We provide new theoretical results for the Normal-Gamma prior. Empirically, we use a quarterly data set for the G7 economies to examine how model specifications and prior choices affect the forecasting performance for GDP growth, inflation, and a short-term interest rate. We find that hierarchical shrinkage, particularly as implemented with the Horseshoe prior, is very useful in forecasting inflation. It also has the best density forecast performance for output growth and the interest rate. Adding foreign information yields benefits, as multi-country models generally improve on the forecast accuracy of single-country models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We estimate the causal effects of a shift in the expected future exchange rate of a local currency against the US dollar on a representative sample of firms in an open economy. We survey a nationally representative sample of firms and provide the one-year-ahead nominal exchange rate forecast published by the local central bank to a random sub-sample of firm managers. The treatment is effective in shifting exchange rate and inflation expectations and perceptions. These effects are persistent and larger for non-exporting firms. Linking survey responses with administrative census data, we find that the treatment affects the dynamics of export and import quantities and prices at the firm level, with differential effects for exports to destination countries that use the US dollar as their currency. We instrument exchange rate expectations with the variation induced by the treatment and estimate a positive elasticity of a future expected depreciation in import expenditures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What drove inflation so high in 2022? Can it drop rapidly without a recession? The Phillips curve is central to the answers; its proper (nonlinear) specification reveals that the relationship is strong and frequency dependent, and inflation is very persistent. We embed this empirically successful Phillips curve -- incorporating a supply-shocks variable -- into a structural model. Identification is achieved using an underutilized data-dependent method. Despite imposing anchored inflation expectations and a rapid relaxation of supply-chain problems, we find that absent a recession, inflation will be more than 3 percent by the end of 2025. A simple welfare analysis supports a mild recession as preferred to an extended period of elevated inflation, under a typical loss function. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical studies have documented that the persistence of the gap between inflation and its trend declined after the Volcker disinflation. Previous research into the source of the decline has offered competing views while sidestepping the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. This paper examines the source by estimating a medium-scale DSGE model using a Bayesian method that allows for indeterminacy. The estimated model shows that the Fed's change from a passive to an active policy response to the inflation gap or a decrease in firms' probability of price change can fully account for the decline in inflation gap persistence by ruling out indeterminacy that induces persistent dynamics of the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we review the relationship between ination rates, nominal interest rates, and rates of growth of monetary aggregates for a large group of OECD coun- tries. We conclude that the low-frequency behavior of these series maintains a close relationship, as predicted by standard quantity theory models. In an estimated model, we show those relationships to be relatively invariant to alternative frictions that can deliver very different high-frequency dynamics. We argue that these relationships are useful for policy design aimed at controlling ination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Not in standard models. With conventional pricing frictions, imposing a flat Phillips curve also imposes a price level that is rigid with respect to supply shocks. In the New Keynesian model, price markup shocks need to be several orders of magnitude bigger than other shocks in order to fit the data, leading to unreasonable assessments of the magnitude of the increase in costs during inflationary episodes. To account for the facts, we propose a strategic microfoundation of shock-dependent price stickiness: prices are sticky with respect to demand shocks but flexible with respect to supply shocks. This friction is demand-intrinsic, in line with narrative accounts for the imperfect adjustment of prices. Firms can credibly justify a price increase due to a rise in costs, whereas it is harder to do so when demand increases. Inflation from supply shocks is efficient and does not justify a monetary policy response. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the implications of alternative methods of aggregating individual wage data for the behavior of economy-wide wage growth. The analysis is motivated by evidence of significant heterogeneity in individual wage growth and its cyclicality. Because of this heterogeneity, the choice of aggregation will affect the properties of economy-wide wage growth measures. To assess the importance of this consideration, we provide a decomposition of wage growth into aggregation effects and composition effects and use the decomposition to compare growth in an average wage--specifically average hourly earnings--to a measure of average wage growth from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. We find that aggregation effects largely account for average hourly earnings growth being persistently lower and less cyclical than average wage growth over the period 1990-2015, with these effects reflecting a disproportionate weighting of high-earning workers. The analysis also indicates that composition effects now play a more limited role in the cyclicality of wage growth compared to results reported in previous studies for earlier time periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using a novel experimental setup, we study the direction of causality between consumers' inflation expectations and their income growth expectations. In a large, nationally representative survey of US consumers, we find that the rate of passthrough from expected inflation to expected income growth is incomplete, on the order of 20 percent. There is no statistically significant effect going in the other direction. Passthrough varies systematically with demographic and socioeconomic factors, with greater passthrough for higher-income individuals than lower-income individuals, although it is still incomplete. Higher inflation expectations also cause consumers to report a higher probability that they will search for a new job that pays more. Using our survey findings to calibrate a search-and-matching model, we find that dampened responses of real wages to demand and supply shocks translate into greater fluctuations in output. Taken together, the survey results and model exercises provide a labor market channel to explain why people dislike inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we use a simple model of money demand to characterize the behavior of monetary aggregates in the United States from 1960 to 2016. We argue that the demand for the currency component of the monetary base has been remarkably stable during this period. We use the model to make projections of the nominal quantity of cash in circulation under alternative future paths for the federal funds rate. Our calculations suggest that if the federal funds rate is lifted up as suggested by the survey of economic projections made by the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), the fall in total currency demanded in the next two years ranges between 50 and 200 billion. Our discussion suggests that specific measures by the Federal Reserve to absorb that cash could be worth considering to make the future path of the price level consistent with the price stability mandate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I study how the informational effect of monetary policy changes the optimal conduct of monetary policy. In my model, the private sector extracts information about unobserved shocks from the central bank's interest rate decisions. The central bank optimally changes the informational effect of the interest rate by committing to a state-contingent policy rule, in which case the Phillips curve becomes endogenous. In a dynamic model, the optimal policy rule overshoots the natural-rate shock and gradually responds to the cost-push shock, which makes the interest rate change expected output growth but not expected inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical support for the long-run Fisher effect, a hypothesis that a permanent change in inflation leads to an equal change in the nominal interest rate, has been hard to come by. This paper provides a plausible explanation of why past studies have been unable to find support for the long-run Fisher effect. This paper argues that the necessary permanent change to the inflation rate following a monetary shock has not occurred in the industrialized countries of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Instead, this paper shows that inflation in these countries follows a mean-reverting, fractionally integrated, long-memory process, not the nonstationary inflation process that is integrated of order one or larger found in previous studies of the Fisher effect. Applying a bivariate maximum likelihood estimator to a fractionally integrated model of inflation and the nominal interest rate, the inflation rate in all seventeen countries is found to be a highly persistent, fractionally integrated process with a positive differencing parameter significantly less than one. Hence, in the long run, inflation in these countries will be unaffected by a monetary shock, and a test of the long-run Fisher effect will be invalid and uninformative as to the truthfulness of the long-run Fisher effect hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the model of Cogley and Sargent to incorporate stochastic volatility and then estimates it for post World War II U.S. data in order to shed light on the following questions. Have aggregate time series responded through time-invariant linear impulse response functions to possibly heteroskedastic shocks? Or is it more likely that the impulse responses to shocks themselves have evolved over time because of drifting coefficients or other nonlinearities? Evidence is presented that shock variances evolved systematically over time, and so did the autoregressive coefficients of VARS. The conclusion is that much of our earlier evidence for drifting coefficients survives after we take stochastic volatility into account. This paper accumulates evidence inside an atheoretical statistical model. The patterns of time variation used revolve around whether it was bad monetary policy or bad luck that made inflation-unemployment outcomes worse in the 1970's than before or after.

Athanasios Orphanides and John C. Williams' excellent conference paper, "Inflation Scares and Forecast-Based Monetary Policy," contributes importantly to the new and rapidly growing branch of the literature on bounded rationality and learning in macroeconomics. Their paper, like many others, derives interesting and useful theoretical results that show how the introduction of bounded rationality and learning impacts on the effects of monetary policy shocks and the characteristics of optimal monetary policy rules. This note suggests that some additional empirical work--some "irrational expectations econometrics," if you will-- might serve to make these purely theoretical results seem more relevant and convincing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The result of Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) is powerful because it relies only on three rather natural conditions: the Fisher equation, the convex Taylor rule, and the lower bound of the nominal interest rate. Their result is striking because the paper reveals the peril of the active Taylor rule, which has been shown to implement the target in a stable manner under various conditions. In a related paper, Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2002) proposed a number of policies designed to avoid the liquidity trap outcome. One is to link government's spending to the inflation rate. Subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, the government's taxation on the private sector decreases as the inflation rate drops, causing the budget of the private sector to increase. Consequent increases in aggregate demand and the price level push the economy away from the liquidity trap. This sort of fiscal policy is considered "active" in the sense that the policy can increase the government budget deficit, in contrast to the "passive" fiscal policy which is designed to maintain or lower the budget deficit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent papers have analyzed how adaptive agents may converge to and escape from self-confirming equilibria. All of these papers have imputed to agents a particular prior about drifting coefficients. In the context of a model of monetary policy, this paper analyzes dynamics that govern both convergence and escape under a more general class of priors for the government. The authors characterize how the shape of the prior influences the dynamics in important ways. There are priors for which the E-stability condition is not enough to assure local convergence to a self-confirming equilibrium. Their analysis also tracks down the source of differences in the sustainability of Ramsey inflation encountered in the analyses of Sims (1988) and Chung (1990), on the one hand, and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002), on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines forward guidance using a nonlinear New Keynesian model with a zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate. Forward guidance is modeled with news shocks to the monetary policy rule. The effectiveness of forward guidance depends on the state of the economy, the speed of the recovery, the ZLB constraint, the degree of uncertainty, the monetary response to inflation, the size of the news shocks, and the forward guidance horizon. Specifically, the stimulus from forward guidance falls as the economy deteriorates or as households expect a slower recovery. When the ZLB binds, less uncertainty about the economy or an expectation of a stronger response to inflation reduces the benefit of forward guidance. Forward guidance via a news shock is less stimulative than an unanticipated monetary policy shock around the steady state, but a news shock is more stimulative near the ZLB and always has a larger cumulative effect on output. When the central bank extends the forward guidance horizon, the cumulative effect initially increases but then decreases. These results indicate that there are limits to the stimulus forward guidance can provide, but that stimulus is largest when the news is communicated early in a recession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the importance of the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nom- inal interest rate by estimating three variants of a small-scale New Keynesian model: (1) a nonlinear model with an occassionally binding ZLB constraint; (2) a constrained linear model, which imposes the constraint in the filter but not the solution; and (3) an unconstrained linear model, which never imposes the constraint. The posterior distributions are similar, but impor- tant differences arise in their predictions at the ZLB. The nonlinear model ts the data better at the ZLB and primarily attributes the ZLB to a reduction in household demand due to discount factor shocks. In the linear models, the ZLB is due to large contractionary monetary policy shocks, which is at odds with the Fed's expansionary policy during the Great Recession. Pos- terior predictive analysis shows the nonlinear model is partially able to account for the increase in output volatility and the negative skewness in output and inflation that occurred during the ZLB period, whereas the linear models predict almost no changes in those statistics. We also compare the results from our nonlinear model to the quasi-linear solution based on OccBin. The quasi-linear model fits the data better than the linear models, but it still generate too little volatility at the ZLB and predicts that a large policy shock caused the ZLB to bind in 2008Q4. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accurate rent measurement is essential for constructing a consumer price index (CPI) and for measuring household welfare. Late payment fees and nonpayment of rent are common components of rental expenditures and thus belong in CPIs. Late payment fees are often excluded; we offer a novel critique. In the US CPI, nonpayment is ostensibly included, but, we show, severely undermeasured. Moreover, the manner of its inclusion renders the CPI extremely sensitive to nonpayment variations; we show how to fix this. Nonpayment undermeasurement suggests at least a +1 ppt overestimate in 2020 CPI shelter inflation. Timely nonpayment and late fee measurement is challenging; we offer a practical solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We develop a two-country macroeconomic model that we fit to a set of aggregate prices and quantities for the U.S. and the rest of the world. In addition to a standard array of shocks, the model includes time variation in agents' preference for safe bonds. We allow for a component of this time variation to be common across countries and biased toward dollar-denominated safe assets, and refer to this component as global flight to safety (GFS). We find that GFS shocks are the most important shocks driving world business cycles, and are also important drivers of activity in the U.S. and especially abroad. An adverse GFS shock lowers global GDP and inflation, widens global corporate credit spreads, and appreciates the dollar. These effects are very close to those obtained from a structural VAR which uses the excess bond premium (Gilchrist and Zakraj?sek, 2012) as proxy for global flight to safety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on a framework of memory and recall that accounts for social networks, we provide conditions under which social networks can amplify expectations. We provide evidence for several predictions of the model using a novel dataset on inflation expectations and social network connections: Inflation expectations in the social network are statistically significantly, positively associated with individual inflation expectations; the relationship is stronger for groups that share common demographic characteristics, such as gender, income, or political affiliation. An instrumental variable approach further establishes causality of these results while also showing that salient information transmits strongly through the network. Our estimates imply that the influence of the social network overall amplifies but does not destabilize inflation expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The historical analysis of FOMC behavior using estimated simple policy rules requires the specifi cation of either an estimated natural rate of unemployment or an output gap. But in the 1970s, neither output gap nor natural rate estimates appear to guide FOMC deliberations. This paper uses the data to identify the particular implicit unemployment rate gap (if any) that is consistent with FOMC behavior. While its ability appears to have improved over time, our results indicate that, both before the Volcker period and through the Bernanke period, the FOMC distinguished persistent movements in the unemployment rate from other movements; implicitly such movements were treated as an intermediate target, one that departs substantially from conventional estimates of the natural rate. We further investigate historical FOMC responses to infl ation fl uctuations. In this regard, FOMC behavior changed in the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke period: its response to the inflation rate became much stronger, and it focused more intensely on very persistent movements in this variable. Our results shed light on the "Great Infl ation" experience of the 1970s, and are consistent with the view that political pressures effectively limited the FOMC response to the buildup of inflation. They also suggest new directions for DSGE modeling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines point and density forecasts of real GDP growth, inflation and unemployment from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters. We present individual uncertainty measures and introduce individual point- and density-based measures of disagreement. The data indicate substantial heterogeneity and persistence in respondents' uncertainty and disagreement, with uncertainty associated with prominent respondent effects and disagreement associated with prominent time effects. We also examine the co-movement between uncertainty and disagreement and find an economically insignificant relationship that is robust to changes in the volatility of the forecasting environment. This provides further evidence that disagreement is not a reliable proxy for uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate the macroeconomic effects of changes in extreme weather in the United States over the past sixty years by incorporating the Actuaries Climate Index (ACI) into a smooth transition vector autoregressive analysis of the United States economy. The ACI tracks changes in the distribution of extreme temperatures, heavy rainfall, drought, high wind, and sea level. While the effects of extreme weather events are negligible at the beginning of the sample, they become more significant later: An increase in the index now persistently reduces the growth rate of industrial production while raising the unemployment rate and inflation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite growing interest in the impact of oil and other energy price shocks on inflation and inflation expectations, until recently this question has not received much attention. This survey not only presents empirical results for the U.S. economy, but expands the analysis to include other major economies. We find that only in the Euro area and in the U.K. energy price shocks are associated with a material increase in core consumer prices. This helps explain the somewhat more persistent response of headline inflation in these countries than in the U.S. or Canada. Inflation is even less sensitive to energy price shocks in Japan. We document that energy price shocks played a more important role in explaining headline inflation in the Euro area in 2021 and 2022 than in the U.S. This does not mean that energy price shocks have de-anchored inflation expectations, however. While suitable data on long-run inflation expectations are scant, neither for the U.S. nor the U.K. is there evidence that energy price shocks have materially changed long-run inflation expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper makes two straightforward points that we argue are central to understanding the literature and debate surrounding the stability of the Phillips curve. First, the endogeneity of monetary policy implies that aggregate data are largely uninformative as to the existence of a stable relationship between unemployment and future inflation. Second, if the NAIRU model is assumed to be true, regional data can be used to identify the structural relationship between unemployment and future inflation. We find that a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a roughly 0.3 percentage point decline in inflation over the next year. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statistical agencies track rental expenditures for use in the national accounts and in consumer price indexes (CPIs). As such, statistical agencies should include late payment fees and nonpayment in rent. In the US context, late payment fees are excluded from the CPI. Ostensibly, nonpayment of rent is included in the US CPI; but its treatment is deficient, and we demonstrate that small variations in nonpayment could lead to large swings in shelter inflation, and might have played a role in the 2009 measured shelter inflation collapse. They didn't: while the national nonpayment incidence is 2-3 percent, in the 1 million plus rent observations in BLS rent microdata from 2000-2016, no nonpayment is recorded. A back-of-theenvelope calculation suggests that, assuming nonpayment undermeasurement continued after 2016, CPI shelter inflation may have been overestimated by about 1 percentage point per month (annualized) in 2020. Late fees and nonpayment are difficult to measure in real time. We offer implementation suggestions that are consistent with CPI procedures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]