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Restraint is regularly used in somatic healthcare settings, and countries have chosen different paths to regulate restraint in somatic healthcare. One overarching problem when regulating restraint is to ensure that patients with reduced decision-making capacity receive the care they need and at the same time ensure that patients with a sufficient degree of decision-making capacity are not forced into care that they do not want. Here, arguments of justice, trust in the healthcare system, minimising harm and respecting autonomy are contrasted with different national regulations. We conclude that a regulation that incorporates an assessment of patients' decision-making capacity and considers the patient's best interests is preferable, in contrast to regulations based on psychiatric diagnoses or regulations where there are no legal possibilities to exercise restraint at all in somatic care., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Objectives: The aim of this study was to discuss end-of-life care in the context of Rawls' and Daniels' philosophy of justice. The study is based on an empirical survey of Swedish physicians who were asked whether they would want the option of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) for themselves (hereafter called own preferences), what are their attitudes towards PAS in general and whether they were prepared to prescribe PAS drugs to eligible patients. The question is to what extent the physicians' answers are impartial and consistent in a Rawlsian sense., Methods: The underlying indicator was the physicians' own preferences. Kappa score inter-rater agreement was measured between that response and that same physician's general attitude towards allowing PAS and preparedness to prescribe PAS drugs. The coherence of provided comments and arguments were analysed using content analysis., Results: Palliative care physicians are the least willing to offer PAS, and surgeons and psychiatrist the most willing. There is a discrepancy between physicians' general attitudes about allowing PAS, their own wishes to be offered PAS at the end of life and the concrete action of prescribing PAS drugs. Arguments given for not prescribing PAS by those in favour of PAS are seemingly but not truly inconsistent., Conclusions: Those supporting PAS provided impartial and consistent arguments for their stances in a Rawlsian sense, while those against PAS provided partial arguments. Two specialties, psychiatrists and palliative care physicians, were coherent in their reasoning about PAS for themselves and their willingness to prescribe the needed drugs., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

Intensive research is carried out to develop a disease-modifying drug for Alzheimer's disease (AD). The development of drug candidates that reduce Aß or tau in the brain seems particularly promising. However, these drugs target people at risk for AD, who must be identified before they have any, or only moderate, symptoms associated with the disease. There are different strategies that may be used to identify these individuals (eg, population screening, cascade screening, etc). Each of these strategies raises different ethical challenges. In this paper, we analyse these challenges in relation to the risk stratification for AD necessary for using these drugs. We conclude that the new drugs must generate large health benefits for people at risk of developing AD to justify the ethical costs associated with current risk stratification methods, benefits much larger than current drug candidates have. This conclusion raises a new set of ethical questions that should be further discussed., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In a recent extended essay, philosopher Daniel Hausman goes a long way towards dismissing severity as a morally relevant attribute in the context of priority setting in healthcare. In this response, we argue that although Hausman certainly points to real problems with how severity is often interpreted and operationalised within the priority setting context, the conclusion that severity does not contain plausible ethical content is too hasty. Rather than abandonment, our proposal is to take severity seriously by carefully mapping the possibly multiple underlying accounts to well-established ethical theories, in a way that is both morally defensible and aligned with the term's colloquial uses., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Many countries, Sweden among them, lack professional guidelines and established procedures for responding to young females requesting virginity certificates or hymen restoration due to honour-related threats. The purpose of the present survey study was to further examine the attitudes of the Swedish healthcare professionals concerned towards young females requesting virginity certificates or hymen restorations. The study indicates that a small majority of Swedish general practitioners and gynaecologists would accommodate these patients, at least given certain circumstances. But a large minority of physicians would under no circumstances help the young females, regardless of speciality, years of practice within medicine, gender, or experience of the phenomenon. Their responses are similar to other areas where it has been claimed that society should adopt a zero tolerance policy against certain phenomena, for instance drug policy, where it has also been argued that society should never act in ways that express support for the practice in question. However, this argument is questionable. A more pragmatic approach would also allow for follow-ups and evaluation of virginity certificates and hymen restorations, as is demonstrated by the Dutch policy. Hence, there are some obvious advantages to this pragmatic approach compared to the restrictive one espoused by a large minority of Swedish physicians and Swedish policy-makers in this area., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Aims: The aim of this study was to examine if it is plausible to interpret the appearance of shame in a Swedish healthcare setting as a reaction to having one's honour wronged., Methods: Using a questionnaire, we studied answers from a sample of long-term sick-listed patients who had experienced negative encounters (n=1628) and of these 64% also felt wronged. We used feeling wronged to examine emotional reactions such as feeling ashamed and made the assumption that feeling shame could be associated with having one's honour wronged. In statistical analyses relative risks (RRs) were computed, adjusting for age, sex, disease-labelling, educational levels, as well as their 95% CI., Results: Approximately half of those who had been wronged stated that they also felt shame and of those who felt shame, 93% (CI 91 to 95) felt that they had been wronged. The RR was 4.5 (CI 3.0 to 6.8) for shame when wronged. This can be compared with the other emotional reactions where the RRs were between 1.1 (CI 0.9 to 1.3)-1.4 (CI 1.2 to 1.7). We found no association between country of birth and feeling shame after having experienced negative encounters., Conclusions: We found that the RR of feeling shame when wronged was significantly higher compared with other feelings. Along with theoretical considerations, and the specific types of negative encounters associated with shame, the results indicate that our research hypothesis might be plausible. We think that the results deserve to be used as point of departure for future research.

In palliative care there is much debate about which end of life treatment strategies are legitimate and which are not. Some writers argue that there is an important moral dividing-line between palliative sedation and euthanasia, making the first acceptable and the latter not. We have questioned this. In a recent article, Lars Johan Materstvedt has argued that we are wrong on two accounts: first, that we fail to account properly for the moral difference between continuous deep palliative sedation at the end of life and euthanasia, and, second, that we fail to account properly for the difference between permanent loss of consciousness and death. Regarding the first objection, we argue that Materstvedt misses the point: we agree that there is a difference in terms of intentions between continuous deep palliative sedation and euthanasia, but we question whether this conceptual difference makes up for a moral difference. Materstvedt fails to show that it does. Regarding the second objection, we argue that if nothing else is at stake than the value of the patient's life, permanent unconsciousness and death are morally indifferent.

The aim of this pilot study was to develop a realistic clinical case for identifying Knobe's asymmetric effect, ie, the tendency to ascribe intentions to a larger extent when an act is considered wrong, as well as to compare medical students at the beginning and end of their curriculum. A vignette about a critically ill 72-year-old patient in need of an operation was used, with two different outcomes: the patient dies or the patient recovers. Approximately half of the students received the 'recovery case' and half the 'death case'. The questions asked were whether it was right to perform the risky operation and whether the head of the clinic brought about the patient's death/recovery intentionally. Among students in their first term an asymmetry in response pattern was identified. This asymmetry was not found among students in their final term. The difference between term 1 and term 11 students is believed to be due to the socialisation of medical students towards clinical reasoning regarding the moral role of intentions. Although no Knobe effect could be detected among term 11 students, a related adaptation effect was detected, indicating that students at the end of their medical school also tend to adapt their ascription of intentions to their moral evaluation of the act. By using clinically relevant cases a new effect has thus been identified that might be useful when investigating experienced clinicians and their views on intentions. The cases and effect merit further investigation.

Objectives: To explore attitudes and reasoning among Swedish physicians and the general public regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a competent patient's request., Design: A vignette-based postal questionnaire including 1202 randomly selected individuals in the county of Stockholm and 1200 randomly selected Swedish physicians with various specialities. The vignettes described patients requesting withdrawal of their life-sustaining treatment: (1) a 77-year-old woman on dialysis; (2) a 36-year-old man on dialysis; (3) a 34-year-old ventilator-dependent tetraplegic man. Responders were asked to classify the act of terminating treatment and to prioritise arguments for/against., Results: A majority in both groups prioritised arguments in favour of terminating treatment and classified the act as defensible in all vignettes. However, among the general public, 16% classified the act as euthanasia in all vignettes; among physicians this view was most expressed regarding ventilator treatment (26%). Some who classified the act as euthanasia prioritised arguments in favour of terminating treatment: among physicians 18% in vignette 1, 19% in vignette 2 and 34% in vignette 3; among the general public 35% in vignette 1, 20% in vignette 2 and 48% in vignette 3., Conclusion: There is a widespread consensus regarding competent patients' right to abstain from life-sustaining treatment. An association between the hastening of death, caused by the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment and the concept of euthanasia is proposed. The results also suggest that classifying the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment as 'euthanasia' does not necessarily mean that the act is interpreted as ethically unacceptable.

The purpose of the present study was to examine whether or not strong values might influence physicians' estimations of future events. In an empirical study about physicians' attitudes towards physician assisted suicide (PAS) we asked about the physicians' main reasons for being pro, doubtful or contra PAS and also asked them to estimate what would happen with patients' trust if PAS were to be legally accepted in Swedish society. Finally we asked the physicians about their own trust in healthcare in the event of PAS being legally accepted. We found that in contrast to those who were pro PAS and doubtful, the group who were against PAS did not discriminate between their own opinion and their estimation of what they thought might happen with patients' trust in the future. Against the backdrop of the present study, we present a hypothesis maintaining that feeling strongly against controversial medical procedures is associated with being inclined to let one's own beliefs influence our capacity to interpret and estimate empirical results. We think this hypothesis merits closer examination.

Objectives: To investigate empirically the motivations for not consenting to DNA biobanking in a Swedish population-based study and to discuss the implications., Design: Structured questionnaires and semistructured interviews., Setting: A longitudinal epidemiological project (PART) ongoing since 1998 in Stockholm, Sweden. The DNA-collection wave took place during 2006-7., Participants: 903 individuals completed the questionnaire (participation rate 36%) and 23 were interviewed. All individuals had participated in both non-genetic waves of the project, but refused to contribute saliva samples during the DNA-collection wave., Main Outcome Measures: Motivations behind refusing to consent to DNA biobanking, with subsequent focus on participants' explanations regarding this unwillingness., Results: Public refusal to consent to DNA biobanking, as revealed by the questionnaire, was mainly explained by a lack of personal relevance of DNA contribution and feelings of discomfort related to the DNA being used for purposes other than the respective study. Interviews of individuals representing the second motivation, revealed a significant mistrust of DNA biobank studies. The underlying beliefs and attitudes were associated with concerns about integrity, privacy, suspiciousness and insecurity. However, most interviewees were supportive of genetic research per se and interpreted their mistrust in the light of distressing environmental influences., Conclusion: The results suggest a need for guidelines on benefit sharing, as well as trustworthy and stable measures to maintain privacy, as a means for increasing personal relevance and trust among potential participants in genetic research. Measures taken from biobanks seem insufficient in maintaining and increasing trust, suggesting that broader societal measures should be taken.