Search

The carbon emissions of global healthcare activities make up 4%-5% of total world emissions, with the majority coming from industrialised countries. The solution to healthcare carbon reduction in these countries, ostensibly, would be preventive healthcare, which is less resource intensive than corrective healthcare in itself and, as a double benefit, reduces carbon by preventing diseases which may require higher healthcare carbon to treat. This leads to a paradox: preventive healthcare is designed to give humans longer, healthier lives. But, by extending life spans, the carbon emissions of a person increase both over a lifetime and in the medical industry overall. At the same time, the need for higher carbon end-of-life care does not disappear, particularly in resource intensive countries. This article will first identify sources of healthcare carbon, focusing on the industrialised world, and explain various efforts towards healthcare carbon reduction, which include preventive healthcare. Second, it will develop the 'paradox of prevention'-that preventive healthcare may save healthcare carbon by proximally reducing the need for medical treatments, but also, paradoxically, result in more healthcare carbon both in an individual's life and in the medical industry. The third section will offer ethical principles for approaching the paradox of prevention. The conclusion will emphasise the need for institutional approaches to healthcare carbon reduction in the industrialised world, which will relieve some of the tensions of healthcare industry decarbonisation and individual healthcare carbon use., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In his paper 'Ethical problems with kindness in healthcare', Jesudason sets out an interesting examination of the concept of kindness, arguing that it poses significant ethical challenges due to its discretionary nature. I suggest that kindness, a concept difficult to define, may still have a role to play in healthcare. Different treatments of kindness show us that it need not be discretionary, and that kind care can be provided to all. Finally, curiosity may also have a role to play in medicine to help promote inclusiveness., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Background: Informal mHealth is widely used by community health nurses in Ghana to extend healthcare delivery services to clients who otherwise might have been excluded from formal health systems or would experience significant barriers in their quest to access formal health services. The nurses use their private mobile phones or devices to make calls to their clients, health volunteers, colleagues or superiors. These phone calls are also reciprocal in nature. Besides, the parties exchange or share other health data and information through text messages, pictures, videos or voice clips. There are some ethical dimensions that are inherent in these practices that ought to be critically scrutinised by bioethicists., Objective: The author has argued in this paper that informal mHealth at large scale adoption in Ghana is associated with some bioethical challenges., Methods: This essay was largely based on an analysis of an empirical study published by Hampshire et al in 2021 on the use of informal mHealth methods in Ghana., Results: Widespread adoption of Informal mHealth in Ghana is associated with privacy invasion of both the nurses and their clients, breaches confidentiality of the parties, discredits the validity of informed consent processes and may predispose the nurses to some other significant aggregated harms., Conclusion: The author affirms his partial support for a formalised adoption process of informal mHealth in Ghana but has reiterated that the current ethical challenges associated with informal mHealth in Ghana cannot escape all the debilitating bioethical challenges, even if it is formalised., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Green bioethics is an area of research and scholarship that examines the impact of healthcare practices and policies on the environment and emphasises environmental values, such as ecological sustainability and stewardship. Some green bioethicists have argued that healthcare providers should inform patients about the environmental impacts of treatments and advocate for options that minimise adverse impacts. While disclosure of information pertaining to the environmental impacts of treatments could facilitate autonomous decision-making and strengthen the patient-provider relationship in situations where patients have clearly expressed environmental concerns, it may have the opposite effect in other situations if makes patients feel like they are being judged or manipulated. We argue, therefore, that there is not a generalisable duty to disclose environmental impact information to all patients during the consent process. Providers who practice green bioethics should focus on advocating for system-level changes in healthcare financing, organisation and delivery and use discretion when bringing up environmental concerns in their encounters with patients., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

The role and importance of solidarity for effective health provision is the subject of lengthy and heated debate which has been thrown into even sharper relief by the COVID-19 pandemic. In various ways, and by various authorities we have all been asked, even instructed, to engage in solidarity with one another in order to collectively respond to the current crisis. Under normal circumstances, individuals can engage in solidarity with their compatriots in the context of public health provision in a number of ways, including paying taxes which fund welfare state initiatives, and avoiding others when ill. While there has been significant engagement in solidarity worldwide, there have also been high profile examples of refusals and failures to engage in solidarity, both by individual agents, and governments. In this paper I examine the consequence of these failures with reference to the actions of the current British government, which has failed to deliver an effective response to the crisis. This failure has effectively devolved responsibility for responding to the crisis to people who are simultaneously more vulnerable to infection, and less able to do anything about it. I argue that such responses represent mismanagement of a public health crisis, and a rejection of important democratic and egalitarian norms and values., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

One prominent view in recent literature on resource allocation is Persad, Emanuel and Wertheimer's complete lives framework for the rationing of lifesaving healthcare interventions (CLF). CLF states that we should prioritise the needs of individuals who have had less opportunity to experience the events that characterise a complete life. Persad et al argue that their system is the product of a successful process of reflective equilibrium-a philosophical methodology whereby theories, principles and considered judgements are balanced with each other and revised until we achieve an acceptable coherence between our various beliefs. Yet I argue that many of the principles and intuitions underpinning CLF conflict with each other, and that Persad et al have failed to achieve an acceptable coherence between them. I focus on three tensions in particular: the conflict between the youngest first principle and Persad et al 's investment refinement; the conflict between current medical need and a concern for lifetime equality; and the tension between adopting an objective measure of complete lives and accommodating for differences in life narratives., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Healthcare policies developed during the COVID-19 pandemic to safeguard community health have the potential to disadvantage women in three areas. First, protocols for deferral of elective surgery may assign a lower priority to important reproductive outcomes. Second, policies regarding the prevention and treatment of COVID-19 may not capture the complexity of the considerations related to pregnancy. Third, policies formulated to reduce infectious exposure inadvertently may increase disparities in maternal health outcomes and rates of violence towards women. In this commentary, we outline these challenges unique to women's healthcare in a pandemic, provide preliminary recommendations and identify areas for further exploration and refinement of policy., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2021. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

To practise 'fairly and justly' a clinician must balance the needs of both the many and the few: the individual patient in front of them, and the many unseen patients in the waiting room, and in the county. They must consider the immediate clinical needs of those in the present, and how their actions will impact on future patients. The good medical practice guidance 'Make the care of your patient your first concern' provides no guidance on how doctors should act when they care for multiple patients with conflicting needs. Moreover, conflicting needs extend far past simply those between different patients. At an organisational level, financial obligations must be balanced with clinical ones; the system must support those who work within it in a variety of roles; and, finally, in order for a healthcare service to be sustainable, the demands of current and future generations must be balanced.The central problem, we propose, is that there is no shared philosophical framework on which the provision of care or the development of health policy is based, nor is there a practical, fair and transparent process to ensure that the service is equipped to deal justly with new challenges as they emerge. Many philosophers have grappled with constructing a set of principles which would lead to a 'good' society which is just to different users; prominent among them is Rawls.Four important principles can be derived using a Rawlsian approach: equity of access, distributive justice, sustainability and openness. However, Rawls' approach is sometimes considered too abstract to be applied readily to policymaking; it does not provide clear guidance for how individuals working within existing institutions can enact the principles of justice. We therefore combine the principles derived from Rawls with Scanlonian contractualism: by demanding that decisions are made in a way which cannot be 'reasonably rejected' by different stakeholders (including 'trustees' for those who cannot represent themselves), we ensure that conflicting needs are considered robustly.We demonstrate how embedding this framework would ensure just policies and fair practice. We illustrate this by using examples of how it would help prevent injustice among different socioeconomic groups, prevent intergenerational injustice and prevent injustice in a crisis, for example, as we respond to new challenges such as COVID-19.Attempts to help individual doctors practise fairly and justly throughout their professional lives are best focused at an institutional or systemic level. We propose a practical framework: combining Scanlonian contractualism with a Rawlsian approach. Adopting this framework would equip the workforce and population to contribute to fair policymaking, and would ultimately result in a healthcare system whose practice and policies-at their core-were just., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Background: Humanitarian crises and emergencies, events often marked by high mortality, have until recently excluded palliative care-a specialty focusing on supporting people with serious or terminal illness or those nearing death. In the COVID-19 pandemic, palliative care has received unprecedented levels of societal attention. Unfortunately, this has not been enough to prevent patients dying alone, relatives not being able to say goodbye and palliative care being used instead of intensive care due to resource limitations. Yet global guidance was available. In 2018, the WHO released a guide on ' Integrating palliative care and symptom relief into the response to humanitarian emergencies and crises'-the first guidance on the topic by an international body., Aims: This paper argues that while a landmark document, the WHO guide took a narrowly clinical bioethics perspective and missed crucial moral dilemmas. We argue for adding a population-level bioethics lens, which draws forth complex moral dilemmas arising from the fact that groups having differential innate and acquired resources in the context of social and historical determinants of health. We discuss dilemmas concerning: limitations of material and human resources; patient prioritisation; euthanasia; and legacy inequalities, discrimination and power imbalances., Implications: In parts of the world where opportunity for preparation still exists, and as countries emerge from COVID-19, planners must consider care for the dying. Immediate steps to support better resolutions to ethical dilemmas of the provision of palliative care in humanitarian and emergency contexts will require honest debate; concerted research effort; and international, national and local ethical guidance., Competing Interests: Competing interests: MP reports that she is a Steering Group member of Palliative Care in Humanitarian Aid Situations and Emergencies network. RC reports that she is a member of the Palliative Care in Humanitarian Aid Situations and Emergencies network., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

In this paper, we argue that there are important ethical questions about healthcare improvement which are underexplored. We start by drawing on two existing literatures: first, the prevailing, primarily governance-oriented, application of ethics to healthcare 'quality improvement' (QI), and second, the application of QI to healthcare ethics. We show that these are insufficient for ethical analysis of healthcare improvement. In pursuit of a broader agenda for an ethics of healthcare improvement, we note that QI and ethics can, in some respects, be treated as closely related concerns and not simply as externally related agendas. To support our argument, we explore the gap between 'quality' and 'ethics' discourses and ask about the possible differences between 'good quality healthcare' and 'good healthcare'. We suggest that the word 'quality' both adds to and subtracts from the idea of 'good healthcare', and in particular that the technicist inflection of quality discourses needs to be set in the context of broader conceptualisations of healthcare improvement. We introduce the distinction between quality as a measurable property and quality as an evaluative judgement, suggesting that a core, but neglected, question for an ethics of healthcare improvement is striking the balance between these two conceptions of quality., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Mobile health (mHealth) is rapidly being implemented and changing our ways of doing, understanding and organising healthcare. mHealth includes wearable devices as well as apps that track fitness, offer wellness programmes or provide tools to manage chronic conditions. According to industry and policy makers, these systems offer efficient and cost-effective solutions for disease prevention and self-management. While this development raises many ethically relevant questions, so far mHealth has received only little attention in medical ethics. This paper provides an overview of bioethical issues raised by mHealth and aims to draw scholarly attention to the ethical significance of its promises and challenges. We show that the overly positive promises of mHealth need to be nuanced and their desirability critically assessed. Finally, we offer suggestions to bioethicists to engage with this emerging trend in healthcare to develop mHealth to its best potential in a morally sound way., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2018. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

As the demand for healthcare rises, so does the need for priority setting in healthcare. In this paper, I consider a prominent priority-setting principle: proportional shortfall. My purpose is to argue that proportional shortfall, as a principle, should not be adopted. My key criticism is that proportional shortfall fails to consider past health.Proportional shortfall is justified as it supposedly balances concern for prospective health while still accounting for lifetime health, even though past health is deemed irrelevant. Accounting for this lifetime perspective means that the principle may indirectly consider past health by accounting for how far an individual is from achieving a complete, healthy life. I argue that proportional shortfall does not account for this lifetime perspective as it fails to incorporate the fair innings argument as originally claimed, undermining its purported justification.I go on to demonstrate that the case for ignoring past health is weak, and argue that past health is at least sometimes relevant for priority-setting decisions. Specifically, when an individual's past health has a direct impact on current or future health, and when one individual has enjoyed significantly more healthy life years than another.Finally, I demonstrate that by ignoring past illnesses, even those entirely unrelated to their current illness, proportional shortfall can lead to instances of double jeopardy, a highly problematic implication. These arguments give us reason to reject proportional shortfall., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

Some screening tests for donor blood that are used by blood services to prevent transfusion-transmission of infectious diseases offer relatively few health benefits for the resources spent on them. Can good ethical arguments be provided for employing these tests nonetheless? This paper discusses-and ultimately rejects-three such arguments. According to the 'rule of rescue' argument, general standards for cost-effectiveness in healthcare may be ignored when rescuing identifiable individuals. The argument fails in this context, however, because we cannot identify beforehand who will benefit from additional blood screening tests. On the 'imposed risk' argument, general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply when healthcare interventions impose risks on patients. This argument ignores the fact that imposing risks on patients is inevitable in healthcare and that these risks can be countered only within reasonable limits. Finally, the 'manufacturing standard' argument premises that general cost-effectiveness standards do not apply to procedures preventing the contamination of manufactured medical products. We contend that while this argument seems reasonable insofar as commercially manufactured medical products are concerned, publicly funded blood screening tests should respect the standards for general healthcare. We conclude that these particular arguments are unpersuasive, and we offer directions to advance the debate., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Background: Few studies have been conducted to assess the quality of orientation practices for ethics advisory committees that conduct ethics consultation. This survey study focused on several Harvard teaching hospitals, exploring orientation quality and committee members' self-evaluation in the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH) ethics consultation competencies., Methods: We conducted a survey study that involved 116 members and 16 chairs of ethics advisory committees, respectively (52% and 62.5% response rates). Predictor variables included professional demographics, duration on committees and level of training. Outcome variables included familiarity with and preparedness in the ASBH competencies and satisfaction with orientations. We hypothesised that responses would be associated with both the aforementioned predictors and whether or not participants had encountered the ASBH competencies in training., Results: A majority of respondents found their orientation curricula to be helpful (62%), although a significant portion of respondents did not receive any orientation (24%) or were unsatisfied with their orientation (14%). Familiarity with ASBH competencies was a statistically significant predictor of respondents' self-evaluation in particular categories (54% had heard of the competencies). Standard educational materials were reported as offered during orientation, such as readings (50%) and case studies (41%); different medium resources were less evidenced such as videos on ethics consultation (19%)., Conclusions: Institutions should re-evaluate orientation practices for ethics committee members that perform ethics consultation. Integrating ASBH competencies and useful methods into a resourceful pedagogy will help improve both member satisfaction with orientation and preparation in consultation., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

Philosophers and bioethicists are typically sceptical about invocations of dignity in ethical debates. Many believe that dignity is essentially devoid of meaning: either a mere rhetorical gesture used in the absence of good argument or a faddish term for existing values like autonomy and respect. On the other hand, the patient experience of dignity is a substantial area of research in healthcare fields like nursing and palliative care. In this paper, it is argued that philosophers have much to learn from the concrete patient experiences described in healthcare literature. Dignity is conferred on people when they are treated as having equal status, something the sick and frail are often denied in healthcare settings. The importance of equal status as a unique value has been forcefully argued and widely recognised in political philosophy in the last 15 years. This paper brings medical ethics up to date with philosophical discussion about the value of equal status by developing an equal status conception of dignity., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2018. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

This paper argues against incorporating assessments of individual responsibility into healthcare policies by expanding an existing argument and offering a rebuttal to an argument in favour of such policies. First, it is argued that what primarily underlies discussions surrounding personal responsibility and healthcare is not causal responsibility, moral responsibility or culpability, as one might expect, but biases towards particular highly stigmatised behaviours. A challenge is posed for proponents of taking personal responsibility into account within health policy to either expand the debate to also include socially accepted behaviours or to provide an alternative explanation of the narrowly focused discussion. Second, a critical response is offered to arguments that claim that policies based on personal responsibility would lead to several positive outcomes including healthy behaviour change, better health outcomes and decreases in healthcare spending. It is argued that using individual responsibility as a basis for resource allocation in healthcare is unlikely to motivate positive behaviour changes, and is likely to increase inequality which may lead to worse health outcomes overall. Finally, the case of West Virginia's Medicaid reform is examined, which raises a worry that policies focused on personal responsibility have the potential to lead to increases in medical spending overall., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Background: Doctors sometimes encounter parents who object to prescribed treatment for their children, and request suboptimal substitutes be administered instead (suboptimal being defined as less effective and/or more expensive). Previous studies have focused on parental refusal of treatment and when this should be permitted, but the ethics of requests for suboptimal treatment has not been explored., Methods: The paper consists of two parts: an empirical analysis and an ethical analysis. We performed an online survey with a sample of the general public to assess respondents' thresholds for acceptable harm and expense resulting from parental choice, and the role that religion played in their judgement. We also identified and applied existing ethical frameworks to the case described in the survey to compare theoretical and empirical results., Results: Two hundred and forty-two Mechanical Turk workers took our survey and there were 178 valid responses (73.6%). Respondents' agreement to provide treatment decreased as the risk or cost of the requested substitute increased (p<0.001). More than 50% of participants were prepared to provide treatment that would involve a small absolute increased risk of death for the child (<5%) and a cost increase of US$<500, respectively. Religiously motivated requests were significantly more likely to be allowed (p<0.001). Existing ethical frameworks largely yielded ambiguous results for the case. There were clear inconsistencies between the theoretical and empirical results., Conclusion: Drawing on both survey results and ethical analysis, we propose a potential model and thresholds for deciding about the permissibility of suboptimal treatment requests., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Article author(s) (or their employer(s) unless otherwise stated in the text of the article) 2017. All rights reserved. No commercial use is permitted unless otherwise expressly granted.)

By way of a case story, two common presuppositions in the academic debate on conscientious objection in healthcare are challenged. First, the debate typically presupposes a sharp division between conscience-based refusals based on personal core moral beliefs and refusals based on professional (eg, medical) reasons. Only the former might involve the moral gravity to warrant accommodation. The case story challenges this division, and it is argued that just as much might sometimes be at stake morally in refusals based on professional reasons. The objector's moral integrity might be equally threatened in objections based on professional reasons as in objections based on personal beliefs. Second, the literature on conscientious objection typically presupposes that conflicts of conscience pertain to well-circumscribed and typical situations which can be identified as controversial without attention to individualising features of the concrete situation. However, the case shows that conflicts of conscience can sometimes be more particular, born from concrete features of the actual situation, and difficult, if not impossible, to predict before they arise. Guidelines should be updated to address such 'situation-based' conscientious refusals explicitly., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Patient autonomy-with an emphasis on informed consent and the right to refuse treatment-is a cornerstone of modern bioethics. Within discussions about patient autonomy, feminist bioethicists have argued for a relational approach to autonomy. Under a relational framework, we must look beyond the individual moment of choice to include the role relationships and specific contexts can play in supporting or undermining autonomy. Given the day-to-day interactions they have with patients, nurses play a significant role in helping patients understand the nature of their illnesses and make truly informed decisions. However, the skills of expert nurses also support patient autonomy in more subtle ways. Specifically, nurses develop skills of attunement that help them to find subtle ways to support patient autonomy. However, in order to effectively do this, nurses need institutions that support their professional autonomy. In this paper, I look at the ways nurses have been inhibited in their professional autonomy both as a profession and as individual practitioners. I argue that turning our attention to institutions and the role they play in supporting or undermining nurses' autonomy can help promote nurses' professional autonomy and thereby enhance patient autonomy., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

To say health is 'special' is to say that it has a moral significance that differentiates it from other goods (cars, say or radios) and, as a matter of justice, warrants distributing it separately. In this essay, I critique a new justification for the specialness thesis about healthcare (STHC) recently put forth by Engster. I argue that, regrettably, Engster's justification of STHC ultimately fails and fails on much the same grounds as have previous justifications of STHC. However, I also argue that Engster's argument still adds something valuable to the debate around STHC insofar as it reminds us that the moral significance of healthcare may be wider than simply its effect on the incidence of disability and disease: one further reason we may think healthcare is morally significant is because it concerns the treatment and care of those who are already unwell., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis (CFS/ME) remains a controversial illness category. This paper surveys the state of knowledge and attitudes about this illness and proposes that epistemic concerns about the testimonial credibility of patients can be articulated using Miranda Fricker's concept of epistemic injustice. While there is consensus within mainstream medical guidelines that there is no known cause of CFS/ME, there is continued debate about how best to conceive of CFS/ME, including disagreement about how to interpret clinical studies of treatments. Against this background, robust qualitative and quantitative research from a range of countries has found that many doctors (and medical students) display uncertainty about whether CFS/ME is real, which may result in delays in diagnosis and treatment for patients. Strikingly, qualitative research evinces that patients with CFS/ME often experience suspicion by healthcare professionals, and many patients vocally oppose the effectiveness, and the conceptualisation, of their illness as psychologically treatable. We address the intersection of these issues and healthcare ethics, and claim that this state of affairs can be explained as a case of epistemic injustice (2007). We find evidence that healthcare consultations are fora where patients with CFS/ME may be particularly vulnerable to epistemic injustice. We argue that the (often unintentional) marginalisation of many patients is a professional failure that may lead to further ethical and practical consequences both for progressive research into CFS/ME, and for ethical care and delivery of current treatments among individuals suffering from this debilitating illness., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

High-value care (HVC) is en vogue, but the ethics of physicians' roles in the growing number of HVC recommendations demands further attention. In this brief report, we argue that, from the standpoint of individual physicians' primary commitments and duties to individual patients, not all HVC is ethically equal. Our analysis suggests that the ethical case for HVC may be both stronger and weaker than is ordinarily supposed. In some cases, HVC is not merely a 'good thing to do' but is actually ethically obligatory. In others, it is merely permissible-or even ethically suspect. More importantly, we suggest further that understanding HVC as ethically 'obligatory, permissible, or suspect' has implications for the design and implementation of strategies that promote HVC. For example, it questions the use of adherence to certain HVC recommendations as a physician performance metric, which may already be occurring in some contexts. Properly construed, ethics does not threaten HVC but can instead help shape HVC in ways that preserve the fundamental values of the medical profession., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared.

The Swedish solution to the legal handling of professional conscientious refusal in healthcare is described. No legal right to conscientious refusal for any profession or class of professional tasks exists in Sweden, regardless of the religious or moral background of the objection. The background of this can be found in strong convictions about the importance of public service provision and related civic duties, and ideals about rule of law, equality and non-discrimination. Employee's requests to change work tasks are handled on a case-by-case basis within the frames of labour law, ensuring full voluntariness, and also employer's privilege regarding the organisation and direction of work, and duties of public institutions to provide services. Two complicating aspects of this solution related to the inclusion of 'alternative medical' service providers in a national health service, and professional insistence on conscientious refusal rights to accept legalised assisted dying are discussed. The latter is found to undermine the pragmatic reasons behind recent attempts by prolife groups to challenge the Swedish solution related to legal abortion in courts., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programmes in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case with incentive programmes that aim to restrict access to essential healthcare services. Such programmes undermine solidarity. Yet, most people's lives are objectively worse, in one respect, in non-solidary societies, because solidarity contributes both instrumentally and directly to individuals' well-being. Because solidarity is non-excludable, undermining it will deprive both the prudent and the imprudent citizens of its goods. Thereby, undermining solidarity can make prudent citizens worse off than they would have otherwise been, out of no fault or choice of their own, but rather as a result of somebody else's imprudent choice. This goes against the spirit of luck egalitarianism. Therefore (luck egalitarian) justice can require us to save the imprudent and avoid conditionality in access to essential healthcare services., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

This article develops a civic republican approach to medical ethics. It outlines civic republican concerns about the domination that arises from subjection to an arbitrary power of interference, while suggesting republican remedies to such domination in healthcare. These include proposals for greater review, challenge and pre-authorisation of medical power. It extends this analysis by providing a civic republican account of assistive arbitrary power, showing how it can create similar problems within both formal and informal relationships of care, and offering strategies for tackling it. Two important objections to civic republican medical ethics-that it overvalues independence and political participation in healthcare-are also considered and rebutted., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

The welfarist account of enhancement and disability holds enhanced and disabled states on a spectrum: the former are biological or psychological states that increase the chances of a person leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances, while the latter decrease those chances. Here, I focus on a particular issue raised by this account: what should we count as part of an individual's relevant set of circumstances when thinking about enhanced and disabled states? Specifically, is social prejudice relevant to an individual's circumstances in regards to how disabled or enhanced they are? For instance, if an individual is discriminated against on the basis of their skin colour, and this leads to a reduction in their well-being, the welfarist account suggests that their skin colour is a disability. To avoid such a seeming mislabel, Savulescu and Kahane have argued for excluding social prejudice from counting as a relevant circumstance to their welfarist definition of disability. I argue, however, that this exclusion of social prejudice is unsatisfactory and incompatible with the goals of this account., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

Since 2000, 11 human uterine transplantation procedures (UTx) have been performed across Europe and Asia. Five of these have, to date, resulted in pregnancy and four live births have now been recorded. The most significant obstacles to the availability of UTx are presently scientific and technical, relating to the safety and efficacy of the procedure itself. However, if and when such obstacles are overcome, the most likely barriers to its availability will be social and financial in nature, relating in particular to the ability and willingness of patients, insurers or the state to pay. Thus, publicly funded healthcare systems such as the UK's National Health Service (NHS) will eventually have to decide whether UTx should be funded. With this in mind, we seek to provide an answer to the question of whether there exist any compelling reasons for the state not to fund UTx. The paper proceeds as follows. It assumes, at least for the sake of argument, that UTx will become sufficiently safe and cost-effective to be a candidate for funding and then asks, given that, what objections to funding there might be. Three main arguments are considered and ultimately rejected as providing insufficient reason to withhold funding for UTx. The first two are broad in their scope and offer an opportunity to reflect on wider issues about funding for infertility treatment in general. The third is narrower in scope and could, in certain forms, apply to UTx but not other assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs). The first argument suggests that UTx should not be publicly funded because doing so would be inconsistent with governments' obligations to prevent climate change and environmental pollution. The second claims that UTx does not treat a disorder and is not medically necessary. Finally, the third asserts that funding for UTx should be denied because of the availability of alternatives such as adoption and surrogacy., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

Around the world, the population is ageing in ways that pose new challenges for healthcare providers. To date these have mostly been formulated in terms of challenges created by increasing costs, and the focus has been squarely on life-prolonging treatments. However, this focus ignores the ways in which many older people require life-enhancing treatments to counteract the effects of physical and mental decline. This paper argues that in doing so it misses important aspects of what justice requires when it comes to older people., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

The recent wave of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) in Western Africa and efforts to control the disease where the health system requires strengthening raises a number of ethical challenges for healthcare workers practicing in these countries. We discuss the implications of weak health systems for controlling EVD and limitations of the ethical obligation to provide care for patients with EVD using Nigeria as a case study. We highlight the right of healthcare workers to protection that should be obligatorily provided by the government. Where the national government cannot meet this obligation, healthcare workers only have a moral and not a professional obligation to provide care to patients with EVD. The national government also has an obligation to adequately compensate healthcare workers that become infected in the course of duty. Institutionalisation of policies that protect healthcare workers are required for effective control of the spread of highly contagious diseases like EVD in a timely manner., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

The discourse on the failings of the National Health System often cites lack of compassion as an important factor. This has resulted in proposals to enact rules which aimed at enforcing compassion in healthcare workers so as to improve the quality of healthcare and avoid future scandals. This paper argues that compassion cannot be enforced by any rule. Moreover, the contractual nature of the current doctor-patient relationship does not foster it. Experience from other service industries shows that attempts to enforce compassion in workers are futile. Rather than improving service, these attempts result in a culture of perfunctoriness and cynicism., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

Speaking of the public response to the deaths of children at the Bristol Royal Infirmary before 2001, the BMJ commented that the NHS would be 'all changed, changed utterly'. Today, two inquiries into the Mid Staffordshire Foundation Trust suggest nothing changed at all. Many patients died as a result of their care and the stories of indifference and neglect there are harrowing. Yet Bristol and Mid Staffordshire are not isolated reports. In 2011, the Health Services Ombudsman reported on the care of elderly and frail patients in the NHS and found a failure to recognise their humanity and individuality and to respond to them with sensitivity, compassion and professionalism. Likewise, the Care Quality Commission and Healthcare Commission received complaints from patients and relatives about the quality of nursing care. These included patients not being fed, patients left in soiled bedding, poor hygiene practices, and general disregard for privacy and dignity. Why is there such tolerance of poor clinical standards? We need a better understanding of the circumstances that can lead to these outcomes and how best to respond to them. We discuss the findings of these and other reports and consider whether attention should be devoted to managing individual behaviour, or focus on the systemic influences which predispose hospital staff to behave in this way. Lastly, we consider whether we should look further afield to cognitive psychology to better understand how clinicians and managers make decisions?, (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/)

Recent developments in professional healthcare pose moral problems that standard bioethics cannot even identify as problems, but that are fully visible when redefined as problems in the ethics of families. Here, we add to the growing body of work that began in the 1990 s by demonstrating the need for a distinctive ethics of families. First, we discuss what 'family' means and why families can matter so deeply to the lives of those within them. Then, we briefly sketch how, according to an ethics of families, responsibilities must be negotiated against the backdrop of family relationships, treatment decisions must be made in the light of these negotiated responsibilities and justice must be served, both between families and society more generally and within families themselves., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Several attempts have been made to apply the choice-sensitive theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, in the context of health and healthcare. This article presents a framework for this discussion by highlighting different normative decisions to be made in such an application, some of the objections to which luck egalitarians must provide answers and some of the practical implications associated with applying such an approach in the real world. It is argued that luck egalitarians should address distributions of health rather than healthcare, endorse an integrationist theory that combines health concerns with general distributive concerns and be pluralist in their approach. It further suggests that choice-sensitive policies need not be the result of applying luck egalitarianism in this context., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Good medical ethics should aim at ensuring that all human beings enjoy the highest attainable standard of health. With the development of medical technology and health services, it became necessary to expand the four basic principles of medical ethics and link them to human rights. Despite the claim of the universality of those ethical principles, their perception and application in healthcare services are inevitably influenced by the religious background of the societies in which those services are provided. This paper highlights the methodology and principles employed by Muslim jurists in deriving rulings in the field of medical ethics, and it explains how ethical principles are interpreted through the lens of Islamic theory. The author explains how, as a Muslim obstetrician-gynaecologist with a special interest in medical ethics, including international consideration of reproductive ethics issues, he attempts to 'practise good medical ethics' by applying internationally accepted ethical principles in various healthcare contexts, in ways that are consistent with Islamic principles, and he identifies the evidence supporting his approach. He argues that healthcare providers have a right to respect for their conscientious convictions regarding both undertaking and not undertaking the delivery of lawful procedures. However, he also argues that withholding evidence-based medical services based on the conscientious objection of the healthcare provider is unethical as patients have the right to be referred to services providing such treatment., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

This paper argues that the four prima facie principles-beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and justice-afford a good and widely acceptable basis for 'doing good medical ethics'. It confronts objections that the approach is simplistic, incompatible with a virtue-based approach to medicine, that it requires respect for autonomy always to have priority when the principles clash at the expense of clinical obligations to benefit patients and global justice. It agrees that the approach does not provide universalisable methods either for resolving such moral dilemmas arising from conflict between the principles or their derivatives, or universalisable methods for resolving disagreements about the scope of these principles-long acknowledged lacunae but arguably to be found, in practice, with all other approaches to medical ethics. The value of the approach, when properly understood, is to provide a universalisable though prima facie set of moral commitments which all doctors can accept, a basic moral language and a basic moral analytic framework. These can underpin an intercultural 'moral mission statement' for the goals and practice of medicine., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Healthcare decision-making has traditionally focused on individual autonomy, but there is now a change occurring in which the involvement of families is gaining prominence. This appears to stem from an increasing emphasis on relational aspects of autonomy which recognises the individual's connectedness to their family, and also state reliance upon families to share the burdens and costs of caring for elderly and disabled dependents. Such a reorientation calls for similar legal emphasis on patient autonomy as understood in relational terms, and one that offers more adequate conceptions of independence, confidentiality and decision-making authority in the light of this change. This paper outlines how two common law jurisdictions, New Zealand and Singapore, have accommodated, or are responding to, these changes., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Clinical ethics support mechanisms in healthcare are increasing but little is known about the specific developments in elderly care. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic literature review on the characteristics of existing ethics support mechanisms in institutional elderly care. A review was performed in three electronic databases (Pubmed, CINAHL/PsycINFO, Ethxweb). Sixty papers were included in the review. The ethics support mechanisms are classified in four categories: 'institutional bodies' (ethics committee and consultation team); 'frameworks' (analytical tools to assist care professionals); 'educational programmes and moral case deliberation'; and 'written documents and policies'. For each category the goals, methods and ways of organising are described. Ethics support often serves several goals and can be targeted at various levels: case, professional or organisation. Over the past decades a number of changes have taken place in the development of ethics support in elderly care. Considering the goals, ethics support has become more outreaching and proactive, aiming to qualify professionals to integrate ethics in daily care processes. The approaches in clinical ethics support have become more diverse, more focused on everyday ethical issues and better adapted to the concrete learning style of the nursing staff. Ethics support has become less centrally organised and more connected to local contexts and primary process within the organisation., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://group.bmj.com/group/rights-licensing/permissions.)

Imperfect efficiency in healthcare delivery is sometimes given as a justification for refusing to ration or even discuss how to pursue fair rationing. This paper aims to clarify the relationship between inefficiency and rationing, and the conditions under which bedside rationing can be justified despite coexisting inefficiency. This paper first clarifies several assumptions that underlie the classification of a clinical practice as being inefficient. We then suggest that rationing is difficult to justify in circumstances where the rationing agent is or should be aware of and contributes to clinical inefficiency. We further explain the different ethical implications of this suggestion for rationing decisions made by clinicians. We argue that rationing is more legitimate when sufficient efforts are undertaken to decrease inefficiency in parallel with efforts to pursue unavoidable but fair rationing. While the qualifier 'sufficient' is crucial here, we explain why 'sufficient efforts' should be translated into 'benchmarks of efficiency' that address specific healthcare activities where clinical inefficiency can be decreased. Referring to recent consensus papers, we consider some examples of specific clinical situations where improving clinical inefficiency has been recommended and consider how benchmarks for efficiency might apply. These benchmarks should state explicitly how much inefficiency shall be reduced in a reasonable time range and why these efforts are 'sufficient'. Possible strategies for adherence to benchmarks are offered to address the possibility of non-compliance.

Does biomedical enhancement challenge justice in health care? This paper argues that health care justice based on the concept of normal functioning is inadequate if enhancements are widespread. Two different interpretations of normal functioning are distinguished: the "species typical" vs. the "normal cooperator" account, showing that each version of the theory fails to account for certain egalitarian intuitions about help and assistance owed to people with health needs, where enhancements are widespread.

A rising number of patients require continuing or palliative services and this means that they will need to transition from one model of healthcare delivery to another. If it is generally recognised that patient vulnerability to inadequate services increases when the setting in which patient receives care changes, it is usually taken to be the result of poor coordination of services or personnel. Recognising that an integrated system is essential to adequate access, the point that I put forward in this paper is that the centrality of acute care services affects the way in which chronic and palliative services are structured and, consequently, their availability. I argue that the problem originates in the manner in which some of the foundational concepts of the acute care model are imported into the other models of care delivery. In order to make this case, I review the three main models of healthcare service delivery by focusing my analysis along three axes: the goal of the care model; the predominant understanding of autonomy implicit in the model; and, the main actors in the care relationship. By examining how the various concepts translate from one model to the next, I discuss what I identify to be one of the main conceptual obstacles to less problematic transitioning, the notion of autonomy and the corresponding view of the patient as an isolated agent.