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Since the 1990s, glycated haemoglobin (HbA1C) has been the gold standard for monitoring glycaemic control in people diagnosed as having either type 1 diabetes mellitus (T1DM) or type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM). Discussions are underway about diagnosing diabetes mellitus on the basis of HbA1C titres and using HbA1C tests to screen for T2DM. These discussions have focused on the relative benefits for individual patients, with some attention directed towards reduced costs to healthcare systems and benefits to society. We argue that there are strong ethical reasons for adopting HbA1C-based diagnosis and T2DM screening that have not yet been articulated. The rationale includes the differential impact of HbA1C-based diabetic testing on disadvantaged groups, and what we are beginning to learn about HbA1C vis-à-vis population health. Although it is arguable that screening must primarily benefit the individual, using HbA1C to diagnose and screen for T2DM may promote a more just distribution of health resources and lead to advances in investigating, monitoring and tackling the social determinants of health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: There is a growing concern about artificial intelligence (AI) applications in healthcare that can disadvantage already under-represented and marginalised groups (eg, based on gender or race)., Objectives: Our objectives are to canvas the range of strategies stakeholders endorse in attempting to mitigate algorithmic bias, and to consider the ethical question of responsibility for algorithmic bias., Methodology: The study involves in-depth, semistructured interviews with healthcare workers, screening programme managers, consumer health representatives, regulators, data scientists and developers., Results: Findings reveal considerable divergent views on three key issues. First, views on whether bias is a problem in healthcare AI varied, with most participants agreeing bias is a problem (which we call the bias-critical view), a small number believing the opposite (the bias-denial view), and some arguing that the benefits of AI outweigh any harms or wrongs arising from the bias problem (the bias-apologist view). Second, there was a disagreement on the strategies to mitigate bias, and who is responsible for such strategies. Finally, there were divergent views on whether to include or exclude sociocultural identifiers (eg, race, ethnicity or gender-diverse identities) in the development of AI as a way to mitigate bias., Conclusion/significance: Based on the views of participants, we set out responses that stakeholders might pursue, including greater interdisciplinary collaboration, tailored stakeholder engagement activities, empirical studies to understand algorithmic bias and strategies to modify dominant approaches in AI development such as the use of participatory methods, and increased diversity and inclusion in research teams and research participant recruitment and selection., Competing Interests: Competing interests: NH and SC received a grant from the Australian National Breast Cancer Foundation, a non-government organisation, to validate existing AI models on data from Australian breast cancer screening programs. NH has active research collaborations without financial arrangements with Therapixel, a developer of healthcare AI. The rest of the authors have no conflicts of interest., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2023. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

We thank Zohar Lederman and Benjamin Capps for engaging with our paper on One Health (OH) and ethical frameworks, however we want to take issue with them on three points. First, they appear to misunderstand the distinction we appeal to between ethical theory and ethical frameworks, and so misinterpret what we are trying to achieve in our paper. Second, in spite of what they seem to imply, we agree that an OH approach can obscure differences in values, and that to progress the field there needs to be recognition of competing values and their implications for OH. Finally, we are puzzled by their interest in pursuing a deliberative process, as this seems at odds with other positions they take in their paper, and also opens up many questions that need to be addressed., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Emerging infectious diseases (EIDs) remain a significant and dynamic threat to the health of individuals and the well-being of communities across the globe. Over the last decade, in response to these threats, increasing scientific consensus has mobilised in support of a One Health (OH) approach so that OH is now widely regarded as the most effective way of addressing EID outbreaks and risks. Given the scientific focus on OH, there is growing interest in the philosophical and ethical dimensions of this approach, and a nascent OH literature is developing in the humanities. One of the key issues raised in this literature concerns ethical frameworks and whether OH merits the development of its very own ethical framework. In this paper, we argue that although the OH approach does not demand a new ethical framework (and that advocates of OH can coherently adhere to this approach while deploying existing ethical frameworks), an OH approach does furnish the theoretical resources to support a novel ethical framework, and there are benefits to developing one that may be lost in its absence. We begin by briefly explaining what an OH approach to the threats posed by EIDs entails before outlining two different ways of construing ethical frameworks. We then show that although on one account of ethical frameworks there is no need for OH to generate its own, there may be advantages for its advocates in doing so., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2019. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)

Tuberculosis (TB) remains a leading cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide, and the burdens of this disease continue to track prior disadvantage. In order to galvanise a coordinated global response, WHO has recently launched the End TB Campaign that aims to eliminate TB by 2050. Key to this is the introduction of population screening programmes in low-burden settings to identify and treat people who have latent TB infection (LTBI). The defining features of LTBI are: that it is not an active disease but confers an increased risk of disease; the socially disadvantaged are those most in danger and uncertainty persists as to who will be harmed or benefitted from screening-led prophylactic interventions. Systematic screening programmes that include surveillance, case-finding and treatment of asymptomatic individuals inevitably redistribute the risk of harms and the potential for benefits within a population. The extent to which those targeted within such programmes should be exposed to higher levels of risk in the pursuit of individual or community benefits requires careful consideration prior to implementation. As currently construed, it remains unclear who stands to benefit most from how LTBI screening in high-income countries is being organised, and whose health is being prioritised: members of disadvantaged groups or the broader community. Unless the aims of LTBI screening programmes in these settings are made transparent and their prioritisation ethically justified, there is a significant danger that such a targeted intervention will further disadvantage those who have the least capacity to bear the burdens of TB elimination., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)

Overdiagnosis is an emerging problem in health policy and practice: we address its definition and ethical implications. We argue that the definition of overdiagnosis should be expressed at the level of populations. Consider a condition prevalent in a population, customarily labelled with diagnosis A. We propose that overdiagnosis is occurring in respect of that condition in that population when (1) the condition is being identified and labelled with diagnosis A in that population (consequent interventions may also be offered); (2) this identification and labelling would be accepted as correct in a relevant professional community; but (3) the resulting label and/or intervention carries an unfavourable balance between benefits and harms. We identify challenges in determining and weighting relevant harms, then propose three central ethical considerations in overdiagnosis: the extent of harm done, whether harm is avoidable and whether the primary goal of the actor/s concerned is to benefit themselves or the patient, citizen or society. This distinguishes predatory (avoidable, self-benefiting), misdirected (avoidable, other-benefiting) and tragic (unavoidable, other-benefiting) overdiagnosis; the degree of harm moderates the justifiability of each type. We end with four normative challenges: (1) methods for adjudicating between professional standards and identifying relevant harms and benefits should be procedurally just; (2) individuals, organisations and states are differently responsible for addressing overdiagnosis; (3) overdiagnosis is a matter for distributive justice: the burdens of both overdiagnosis and its prevention could fall on the least-well-off; and (4) communicating about overdiagnosis risks harming those unaware that they may have been overdiagnosed. These challenges will need to be addressed as the field develops., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (Published by the BMJ Publishing Group Limited. For permission to use (where not already granted under a licence) please go to http://www.bmj.com/company/products-services/rights-and-licensing/.)