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Objective A system of price-cap regulation has previously been suggested to address the market failure inherent to the tobacco industry. This would benefit public health directly (eg, by making it extremely difficult for the industry to sell cut-price cigarettes, or use price as a marketing strategy) and indirectly (eg, by reducing the available money the industry has for spending on marketing and lobbying). This paper explores the feasibility of applying such a scheme in the UK. Methods The impact of price-capping is modelled using optimistic and conservative scenarios, each with different assumptions, and using 2009 and 2010 profit data for the major companies selling tobacco in the UK. The models are used to calculate by how much would profit be reduced through the imposition of price caps, and thus, how much revenue could be raised in additional taxes, assuming the end price the consumer pays does not change. Results Tobacco companies enjoy massive profit margins, up to 67%, in the UK. The optimistic scenario suggests a potential increase in UK tobacco tax revenue of £585.7 million in 2010 (£548.4 million in 2009), while the conservative model suggests an increase in revenue of £433.6 million in 2010 (£399.2 million in 2009). This would be approximately enough to fund, twice over, UK-wide antitobacco smuggling measures, and smoking cessation services in England, including the associated pharmacotherapies, to help people stop smoking. Conclusions Applying a system of price-cap regulation in the UK would raise around £500 million per annum (US$750 million). This is likely to be an underestimate because of cautious assumptions used in the model. These significant financial benefits, in addition to the public health benefits that would be generated, suggest this is a policy that should be given serious consideration. INSET: The price cap scheme and the benefits it would bring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainstream economic theory outlines four main causes of market failure and it is already well established that two of these (information failure and externalities) exist in a tobacco market. A third cause of market failure, market power, is also a serious problem in many tobacco markets. Market power--combined with unintended and often overlooked consequences of tobacco tax policies, notably that gradual increases in specific taxes may allow the industry to disguise significant price increases--has, at least in high income countries, given cigarette manufacturers considerable pricing power and profits. This paper examines ways this market failure could be addressed and proposes as a solution a system of price cap regulation wherein a cap is placed on the pre-tax cigarette manufacturers' price but not on the retail price that consumers face. Well established in the utilities industry, price cap regulation would set a maximum price that cigarette companies can charge for their product based on an assessment of the genuine costs each firm faces in its operations and an assumption about the efficiency savings it would be expected to make. Such a system would achieve three main benefits. First, it would address the problem of market failure and excess profits while simultaneously allowing current tobacco control policies, including tax and price increases, to expand--thus tax increases would remain a central tenet of tobacco control policies and retail prices could continue to increase. Second, it would increase government revenue by transferring the excess profits from the industry to the government purse. Third, it would bring numerous public health benefits. In addition to addressing market power, while simultaneously allowing tobacco control policies to expand, it could offer a means of preventing downtrading to cheaper products and controlling unwanted industry practices such as cigarette smuggling, price fixing and marketing to the young. The paper outlines in some detail how such a system might be developed in the UK, while briefly exploring how it could be applied elsewhere, including in markets with state monopolies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) submitted evidence to the 2012 UK Consultation on standardised packaging (SP) to argue the policy will have detrimental economic impacts and increase illicit tobacco trade. Methods A content analysis of the four TTC submissions to the consultation assessed the relevance and quality of evidence TTCs cited to support their arguments. Investigative research was used to determine whether the cited evidence was industry connected. Fisher's exact tests were used to compare the relevance and quality of industry-connected and independent from the industry evidence. The extent to which TTCs disclosed financial conflicts of interest (COI) when citing evidence was examined. Results We obtained 74 pieces of TTC-cited evidence. The quality of the evidence was poor. TTCs cited no independent, peer-reviewed evidence that supported their arguments. Nearly half of the evidence was industry-connected (47%, 35/74). None of this industry-connected evidence was published in peer-reviewed journals (0/35) and 66% (23/35) of it was opinion only. Industry-connected evidence was of significantly poorer quality than independent evidence ( p<0.001). COIs were not disclosed by TTCs in 91% (32/35) of cases. Conclusions In the absence of peer-reviewed research to support their arguments, TTCs relied on evidence they commissioned and the opinions of TTC-connected third-parties. Such connections were not disclosed by TTCs when citing this evidence and were time consuming to uncover. In line with Article 5.3 of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and broader transparency initiatives, TTCs should be required to disclose their funding of all third-parties and any COIs when citing evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction The prominence of socioeconomic and ethnic disparities in tobacco use has led to increased policy attention on smoking inequalities in many countries. In 2008 the UK Department of Health held a consultation on the future of tobacco control, including a focus on reducing socioeconomic inequalities in smoking, to which tobacco companies made written submissions. These organisations have historically opposed regulation, favouring a depiction of smoking that emphasises individual choice and downplays broader influences such as industry activities. Methods We undertook thematic analysis of submissions from tobacco manufacturers and allied organisations, with particular focus on industry engagement with health inequalities. Results Alongside well-established arguments (including defence of individual liberty and challenges to scientific evidence), industry actors adopted and misrepresented the language of health inequalities and the social determinants of health in order to oppose specific tobacco control interventions including tobacco taxation, denormalisation of smoking and cessation support. While industry submissions generally opposed state regulation of the tobacco market, tobacco companies argued for increased government investment in harm reduction products and in countering illicit trade. Conclusions Tobacco companies co-opted and misrepresented a social determinants model of health to argue against government regulation of the tobacco market. By drawing on this model, tobacco companies are misappropriating a powerful public health discourse in an attempt to create a false dichotomy between reducing inequalities and regulating of the tobacco market. Such tactics highlight the need for ongoing monitoring of industry attempts to undermine tobacco control policy, particularly with reference to harm reduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BACKGROUND: Tobacco displays at the point of sale (PoS) are an important means for the tobacco industry to communicate with consumers. With regulations prohibiting PoS displays recently having come into force in Ireland, passed into law in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and some Australian states, and being considered in New Zealand, Finland and Brazil, this is an increasingly important issue. This study explores the nature of displays, the extent to which they are tobacco industry funded, and the relation between the tobacco companies and retailers. METHODS: Three areas were chosen to gain a snapshot of PoS displays in England. Over 100 retailers were visited, with interviews taking place on site. Information was gathered on the type and size of tobacco display, who was paying for the display, requirements and incentives, and visits by industry representatives. RESULTS: The majority of retailers had gantries provided by tobacco companies. A minority of these were fitted with automated dispensers called retail vending machines. Attractive lighting and colour were often used to highlight particular products. Most retailers were being visited by industry representatives who checked displays. Some retailers also reported incentives offered to them for displaying products. CONCLUSIONS: The results suggest that the tobacco industry presence and control in the retail environment is significant. Tobacco companies overwhelmingly provided tobacco gantries in the shops surveyed and influenced displays through a combination of requirements and incentives. The extensive involvement of tobacco companies in providing and monitoring retail displays suggests the importance of implementing policies to end this form of advertising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses outcomes of national public health advertising campaigns supported by Public Health England (PHE). Topics explored include the involvement of advertising agency Freuds in several British public health marketing campaigns, remarks from PHE marketing director Sheila Mitchell regarding the selection of corporate marketing agencies that would handle said campaigns, and the effectiveness of the Dry January campaign introduced by national charity Alcohol Concern.

The article discusses research which investigated how pharmaceutical industry-sponsored statin trials influence serum low density lipoprotein (LDL) cholesterol reduction results. Topics explored include the tendency of some clinical trials to express preference for the sponsor's product, the use of randomised controlled trial results in comparing effectiveness of statins, and the lack of evidence that suggests bias in industry sponsorship.

Objectives To analyse the tobacco industry’s use of international trade agreements to oppose policies to strengthen health warning labels (HWLs). Design A review of tobacco industry documents, tobacco control legislation and international treaties. Results During the early 1990s, the tobacco industry became increasingly alarmed about the advancement of HWLs on cigarettes packages. In response, it requested legal opinions from British American Tobacco’s law firms in Australia and England, Britain’s Department of Trade and Industry and the World Intellectual Property Organisation on the legality of restricting and prohibiting the use of their trademarks, as embodied in cigarette packages. The consistent legal advice, privately submitted to the companies, was that international treaties do not shield trademark owners from government limitations (including prohibition) on the use of their trademarks. Despite receiving this legal advice, the companies publicly argued that requiring large HWLs compromised their trademark rights under international treaties. The companies successfully used these arguments as part of their successful effort to deter Canadian and Australian governments from enacting laws requiring the plan packaging of cigarettes, which helped delay large graphic HWLs, including ‘plain’ packaging, for over a decade. Conclusions Governments should not be intimidated by tobacco company threats and unsubstantiated claims, and carefully craft HWL laws to withstand the inevitable tobacco industry lawsuits with the knowledge that the companies’ own lawyers as well as authoritative bodies have told the companies that the rights they claim do not exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "Bias Related to Funding Source in Statin Trials," by L. Bero in the October 3, 2014 issue.

The article discusses how health groups were surprised after Great Britain-based Australian lobbyist Lynton Crosby was knighted by the British government in the 2016 New Year's Day honors and was named Great Britain Australian of the Year for being an inspirational role model.

The article discusses the accusation made by the union Unite on November 18, 2014 against 71 Members of the Parliament (MPs) in the Great Britain's coalition government, claiming their supposed links to private healthcare interests. Topics mentioned include Unite's so-called sell-off of the National Health Service (NHS), the worth of contracts awarded to just 15 private companies since the passage of the Health and Social Care Act in 2012, and the names of some of the officials in the list.