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Background Germany has been identified as one of a few high-income countries that opposed a strong Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), the WHO's first global public health treaty. This paper examines whether the tobacco industry had influenced the German position on the FCTC. Methods Analysis of previously confidential tobacco industry documents. Results The tobacco industry has identified Germany as a key target within its global strategy against the FCTC. Building on an already supportive base, the industry appears to have successfully lobbied the German government, influencing Germany's position and argumentation on key aspects of the FCTC. It then used Germany in its efforts to weaken the FCTC. The evidence suggests that the industry enjoyed success in undermining the Federal Health Ministry's position and using Germany to limit the European Union negotiating mandate. The tactics used by the tobacco industry included the creation of controversy between the financial, trade and other ministries on one side and the health ministry on the other side, the use of business associations and other front groups to lobby on the industry's behalf and securing industry access to the FCTC negotiations via the International Standardization Organization. Conclusion The evidence suggests that Germany played a major role in the tobacco industry's efforts to undermine the FCTC. Germany's position consistently served to protect industry interests and was used to influence and constrain other countries. Germany thus contributed significantly to attempts to weaken an international treaty and, in doing so, failed in its responsibility to advance global health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background Following a legal agreement with the European Union (EU), Philip Morris International (PMI) commissions a yearly report (‘Project Star’, PS) on the European illicit cigarette trade from KPMG, the global accountancy firm. Methods Review of PS 2010 report. Comparison with data from independent sources including a 2010 pan-European survey (N=18 056). Findings Within PS, data covering all 27 EU countries are entered into a model. While the model itself seems appropriate, concerns are identified with the methodologies underlying the data inputs and thus their quality: there is little transparency over methodologies; interview data underestimate legal non-domestic product partly by failing to account for legal cross-border sales; illicit cigarette estimates rely on tobacco industry empty pack surveys which may overestimate illicit; and there is an over-reliance on data supplied by PMI with inadequate external validation. Thus, PMI sales data are validated using PMI smoking prevalence estimates, yet PMI is unable to provide sales (shipment) data for the Greek islands and its prevalence estimates differ grossly from independent data. Consequently, comparisons with independent data suggest PS will tend to overestimate illicit cigarette levels particularly where cross-border shopping is frequent (Austria, Finland, France) and in Western compared with Eastern European countries. The model also provides data on the nature of the illicit cigarette market independent of seizure data suggesting that almost a quarter of the illicit cigarette market in 2010 comprised PMI’s own brands compared with just 5% counterfeited PMI brands; a finding hidden in PMI’s public representation of the data. Conclusions PS overestimates illicit cigarette levels in some European countries and suggests PMI’s supply chain control is inadequate. Its publication serves the interests of PMI over those of the EU and its member states. PS requires greater transparency, external scrutiny and use of independent data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective To analyze trends in excise taxes, real price and the affordability of cigarettes in Europe, and to examine the impact of EU wide tax policies on new member states. Design We use a sample of 37 European countries with data from 2004 to 2010. 27 countries are EU member states of which 12 joined in 2004 or 2007 (new members), while 10 non-EU countries are included as a comparison. Data is sourced from the European Commission and the Economist Intelligence Unit. Results The excise tax burden increased in all new member states between 2004 and 2010 while remaining relatively unchanged in existing member states. In 2010, the excise tax burden was higher in new (mean 63.8%) than in existing member states (mean 59.4%). Although cigarettes were significant cheaper in new member states the difference in affordability was narrower between the two groups. Excise taxes and prices rose aggressively in new member states while the increases in existing member states were smaller. While cigarettes became less affordable in most EU member states there was little difference between new and existing member states. The average annual percentage change in per-capita cigarette consumption was negative in all existing member states and in 9 of 12 new member states between 2004 and 2010, indicating declining per-capita cigarette consumption. Conclusions Joining the EU results in significant increases in excise taxes and prices, and declines in affordability. Additionally, the structure of taxes, specifically the high excise tax floor resulted in higher taxes and prices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]