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This article aims to discuss the impact of the energy crisis exacerbated by the Russo-Ukrainian war on the general macroeconomic performance and income distribution of the Eurozone. We consider the restrictive monetary policies induced by the return of inflation, their declared and implicit objectives, and the contradictory consequences for the economic system. We analyse the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy, and discuss the long-term consequences of sanctions and political strategies on the de-dollarisation of global markets.

Nell’evoluzione giuridica e istituzionale dell’Unione Europea un ruolo importante è stato svolto dall’ordoliberalismo. Una delle ‘battaglie’ per cui l’ordoliberalismo è conosciuto è quella sui principi della politica monetaria e dell’organizzazione istituzionale della banca centrale. Al fine di comprendere il ‘pensiero’ ordoliberale, tale tema è utile, innanzitutto, per apprezzare le basi storiche e teoriche dell’ordoliberalismo. Inoltre, tale tema è utile per illustrare la specifica influenza che l’ordoliberalismo ha svolto (indirettamente) a livello dell’Unione. La prima parte dell’articolo approfondisce il tema dell’indipendenza della banca centrale e della finalità della politica monetaria in Germania (dalla Reichsbank alla Bundesbank), La seconda parte affronta il tema dell’indipendenza della banca centrale e dell’obiettivo della politica monetaria nell’Unione Europea, indagando se e in quale modo l’ordoliberalismo abbia svolto in questo un’influenza. In the legal and institutional evolution of the European Union a particularly important role has been played by ordoliberalism. One of the ‘battles’ for which ordoliberalism is known is that of the basic principles of monetary policy and of the institutional set up of central banks. In order to better understand the ordoliberal ‘thought’, this subject can usefully be used to appreciate the historical and theoretical bases of ordoliberalism. Secondly, this subject can be useful to illustrate the influence that the ordoliberalism has played at the EU. The first part of this article aims to investigate the issue of central banks independence and the goal of monetary policy in Germany (from Reichsbank to Bundesbank). In the second part, the issue of central bank independence and the objective of monetary policy in the EU will be addressed, trying to understand if and in which way ordoliberalism has played its influence. JEL codes: B52; E52; E58; N13; N14; O52

The Italian jobs crisis consists of a high percentage of non-working labour force, matched with a high percentage of discouraged, long-term unemployed and inactive population. Not only a sharp deregulation of the job market is groundless, but even a hypothetic return to expansionary fiscal policy would be insufficient in order to solve such structural problems. Starting from the literature dealing with the “Italian decline”, this article demonstrates that the current problems of the Italian labour market are strictly connected to both (post-crisis) fiscal adjustment and pre-existing features of the industrial branch.

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This article nests the explanations of the euro crisis in terms of economic, political and institutional causes within the diverging fundamentals vs. self-fulfilling expectations debate. It argues that explanations based on fundamental divergences refer to a subset of economic variables only, while those based on self-fulfilling expectations refer to political and institutional variables. However, since there is no reason not to include the latter among the fundamental variables of an economy, there is no need to refer to negative self-fulfilling expectations as an explanation for the crisis. In the paper, the role played by political and institutional variables, namely federal and monetary solidarity, is formalized in a simple model of diverging fundamentals that goes beyond the consideration of economic variables only. JEL Classification: E58, E65, F36, F45, G01