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International audience; This article presents the adaptation and the validation of a short self-report questionnaire assessing repetitive thinking, the Mini Cambridge-Exeter Repetitive Thought Scale (Mini-CERTS). This 16 item scale evaluates two dimensions of repetitive thinking: “concrete, experiential thinking” (CET) and “abstract, analytical thinking” (AAT) that may have constructive and unconstructive consequences. A large sample of adult volunteers (n = 247) filled in the Mini-CERTS. Subsamples also responded to depression, anxiety and general symptomatology questionnaires as well as to a concurrent measure, the Ruminative Response Scale. Confirmatory factor analysis ascertained the two-dimension structure of the questionnaire. Correlational analyses evidenced differentiated patterns of relation between CET and AAT and anxiety, depression and general symptomatology scales. AAT was correlated to the brooding scale of the RRS but there was no relation between CET and both scales of the RRS. Preliminary data suggest that the Mini-CERTS is sensitive to clinical status and treatment. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved)

Rumination has been robustly implicated in the onset and maintenance of depression. However, despite empirically well-supported theories of the consequences of trait rumination (response styles theory; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991), and of the processes underlying state episodes of goal-oriented repetitive thought (control theory; Martin & Tesser, 1989, 1996), the relationship between these theories remains unresolved. Further, less theoretical and clinical attention has been paid to the maintenance and treatment of trait depressive rumination. We propose that conceptualizing rumination as a mental habit (Hertel, 2004) helps to address these issues. Elaborating on this account, we propose a framework linking the response styles and control theories via a theoretical approach to the relationship between habits and goals (Wood & Neal, 2007). In this model, with repetition in the same context, episodes of self-focused repetitive thought triggered by goal discrepancies can become habitual, through a process of automatic association between the behavioral response (i.e., repetitive thinking) and any context that occurs repeatedly with performance of the behavior (e.g., physical location, mood), and in which the repetitive thought is contingent on the stimulus context. When the contingent response involves a passive focus on negative content and abstract construal, the habit of depressive rumination is acquired. Such habitual rumination is cued by context independent of goals and is resistant to change. This habit framework has clear treatment implications and generates novel testable predictions.

In this reply to the comment of McVay and Kane (2010), I consider their argument concerning how Watkins's (2008) elaborated control theory informs their perspective on the role of executive control in mind wandering. I argue that although in a number of places the elaborated control theory is consistent with the perspective of McVay and Kane that mind wandering represents a failure of executive control, their account makes a number of claims that are not articulated in the elaborated control theory-most notably, the hypothesis that level of construal moderates entry of thoughts into awareness. Moreover, the relevant literature suggests that the relationship between level of construal and executive control may be more complex, and may be determined by multiple factors beyond those proposed in this executive-control failure account of mind wandering. Finally, the implications of this model of mind wandering for understanding repetitive thought in general are considered, and it is proposed that examining level of executive control as a further moderating variable within elaborated control theory may be of value.

A tendency toward abstract and overgeneral processing is a cognitive bias hypothesized to causally contribute to symptoms of depression. This hypothesis predicts that training dysphoric individuals to become more concrete and specific in their thinking would reduce depressive symptoms. To test this prediction, 60 participants with dysphoria were randomly allocated either to (a) concreteness training; (b) bogus concreteness training, matched with concreteness training for treatment rationale, experimenter contact, and treatment duration but without active engagement in concrete thinking; (c) a waiting-list, no training control. Concreteness training resulted in significantly greater decreases in depressive symptoms and significantly greater increases in concrete thinking than the waiting-list and the bogus training control, and significantly greater decreases in rumination than the waiting-list control. These findings suggest that concreteness training has potential as a guided self-help intervention for mild-to-moderate depressive symptoms.

Three studies are reported showing that emotional responses to stress can be modified by systematic prior practice in adopting particular processing modes. Participants were induced to think about positive and negative scenarios in a mode either characteristic of or inconsistent with the abstract-evaluative mind-set observed in depressive rumination, via explicit instructions (Experiments 1 and 2) and via implicit induction of interpretative biases (Experiment 3), before being exposed to a failure experience. In all three studies, participants trained into the mode antithetical to depressive rumination demonstrated less emotional reactivity following failure than participants trained into the mode consistent with depressive rumination. These findings provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that processing mode modifies emotional reactivity and support the processing-mode theory of rumination.

The author reviews research showing that repetitive thought (RT) can have constructive or unconstructive consequences. The main unconstructive consequences of RT are (a) depression, (b) anxiety, and (c) difficulties in physical health. The main constructive consequences of RT are (a) recovery from upsetting and traumatic events, (b) adaptive preparation and anticipatory planning, (c) recovery from depression, and (d) uptake of health-promoting behaviors. Several potential principles accounting for these distinct consequences of RT are identified within this review: (a) the valence of thought content, (b) the intrapersonal and situational context in which RT occurs, and (c) the level of construal (abstract vs. concrete processing) adopted during RT. Of the existing models of RT, it is proposed that an elaborated version of the control theory account provides the best theoretical framework to account for its distinct

It has been widely established that depressed mood states and clinical depression, as well as a range of other psychiatric disorders, are associated with a relative difficulty in accessing specific autobiographical information in response to emotion-related cue words on an Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; J. M. G. Williams and K. Broadbent, 1986). In 8 studies the authors examined the extent to which this relationship is a function of impaired executive control associated with these mood states and clinical disorders. Studies 1-4 demonstrated that performance on the AMT is associated with performance on measures of executive control, independent of depressed mood. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that executive control (as measured by verbal fluency) mediated the relationship between both depressed mood and a clinical diagnosis of eating disorder and AMT performance. Using a stratified sample in Study 5, the authors confirmed the positive association between depressed mood and impaired performance on the AMT. Studies 6-8 involved experimental manipulations of the parameters of the AMT designed to further indicate that reduced executive control is to a significant extent driving the relationship between depressed mood and AMT performance. The potential role of executive control in accounting for other aspects of the AMT literature is discussed.