Executive processes necessary for flexibly switching between different tasks were studied using a set switching paradigm that requires participants to rapidly switch between different tasks across consecutive trials. Switch cost reflects poorer performance for task- switch trials than for consecutive same-task trials. Significant switch cost was observed even with considerable preparation time before a task- switch, an effect known as residual switch cost. This study tested the hypothesis that one process underlying residual switch cost is inhibition of the previous task-set. We used semantic categorization tasks to compare switch cost between alternating task series (ABA) and nonalternating series (ABC) in order to test the generality of a task- set inhibition effect previously observed with perceptual judgment tasks (Mayr & Keele, in press). The results yielded significant switch cost only for alternating tasks, in both response times and errors resulting from performance of the wrong task. Thus, resolving inhibition associated with previously abandoned task-sets may be the main process underlying residual switch costs, suggesting that task-set inhibition is an important executive control process. Executive control processes that underlie voluntary direction of cognitive resources to some specific goal are not well understood. Much is known about how our minds work to do specific tasks such as process language (e.g., Pinker, 1994), arithmetic (e.g., Ashcraft, 1992), music (e.g., Schmuckler, 1997; Steinke, Cuddy, & Holden, 1997), or to control motor movements such as throwing to a target (e.g., Castiello, 1996; MacKenzie & Marteniuk, 1985). But how we effect decisions to use our minds to process language instead of music at a particular moment is still largely a mystery. Executive processes theoretically function to select and coordinate the operation of multiple processes for any given task, including relevant perception, memory, and motor control processes. Until recently, most of what we knew about executive control was learned by studying those who can no longer use these processes efficiently, especially those with brain damage to frontal cortices (Damasio, 1994; Pollux, Wester, & De Haan, 1995; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997; Shallice, 1988; Spatt & Goldenberg, 1993). One reason for the apparent neglect of executive control in the cognitive literature is the difficulty of designing methods to isolate executive control processes. In any task, the behaviour that is emitted is always a combination of the task-specific processes and executive control processes (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), making behavioural measurement of executive control difficult. Recently, however, two methods have been developed to study executive processing. Baddeley and his colleagues use dual task paradigms to determine which cognitive skills involve executive processes (Baddeley, 1996; Baddeley, Emslie, Kolodny, & Duncan, 1998; Baddeley & Wilson, 1988), and hypothesize that executive control is needed for tasks that require frequent switches between retrieval plans (e.g., category fluency and random number generation). A second method, set switching, directly examines switching between tasks (Allport et al., 1994; Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In a set-switching study, participants perform two or more different tasks within a series of trials, and performance on trials that involve switching between tasks is compared to that for trials without a switch. For example, Allport et al. (1994) had participants switch between naming the ink colour and reading the word for Stroop colour-word stimuli. Set- switching studies indicate a robust cost for switching tasks, presumably reflecting the time necessary for executive control processes to operate. However, switch cost is not observed if the to-be-performed tasks are uniquely cued by stimulus type within the experimental context. …