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Expressing our innermost thoughts and feelings is critical to the development of intimacy (Reis & Shaver, 1988), but also risks negative evaluation and rejection. Past research suggests that people with high self-esteem are more expressive and self-disclosing because they trust that others care for them and will not reject them (Gaucher et al., 2012). However, feeling good about oneself may not always be enough; disclosure may also depend on how we feel about other people. Drawing on the principles of risk regulation theory (Murray et al., 2006), we propose that agreeableness-a trait that refers to the positivity of interpersonal motivations and behaviors-is a key determinant of trust in a partner's caring and responsiveness, and may work in conjunction with self-esteem to predict disclosure. We examined this possibility by exploring how both self-esteem and agreeableness predict a particularly risky and intimate form of self-disclosure, the disclosure of emotional distress. In 6 studies using correlational, partner-report, and experimental methods, we demonstrate that self-esteem and agreeableness interact to predict disclosure: People who are high in both self-esteem and agreeableness show higher emotional disclosure. We also found evidence that trust mediates this effect. People high in self-esteem and agreeableness are most self-revealing, it seems, because they are especially trusting of their partners' caring. Self-esteem and agreeableness were particularly important for the disclosure of vulnerable emotions (i.e., sadness; Study 5) and disclosures that were especially risky (Study 6). These findings illustrate how dispositional variables can work together to explain behavior in close relationships. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2017 APA, all rights reserved).)

Partner responsiveness-the degree to which partners respond with caring, understanding, and validation to one another's disclosures (Reis, Clark, & Holmes, 2004; Reis & Shaver, 1988)--has been heralded as a "core, defining construct" in relationship science (Reis, 2007, p. 28). Yet little is known about the determinants of responsiveness in ongoing relationships. The present research elucidates one such set of processes, focusing in particular on responsiveness to negative disclosures. We predicted that the degree to which a partner behaves responsively to negative disclosures depends on the partner's perception of the discloser's typical expressive tendencies. Results of 5 studies employing both correlational and experimental methods supported the hypothesis that partners are less responsive to negative disclosures made by disclosers whom they perceive to have high negativity baselines-that is, to express negativity frequently--than to identical (Studies 1-4) or equally negative (Study 5) disclosures made by disclosers with lower negativity baselines. We also examined 2 routes through which negativity baselines might affect partner responsiveness: by shaping listener appraisals of the discloser's need for support and by making disengagement from those interactions seem justifiable to listeners. These findings fill an important gap in the responsiveness literature and highlight the utility of considering person-context factors in emotion interpretation and responsiveness processes.

It can be challenging for support providers to facilitate effective social support interactions even when they have the best intentions. In the current article, we examine some reasons for this difficulty, with a focus on support recipients' self-esteem as a crucial variable. We predicted that recipients' receptiveness to support would be influenced by both support strategy and recipient self-esteem and that receptiveness in turn would impact providers' perceived caregiving efficacy and relationship quality. Study 1 (hypothetical scenarios), Study 2 (confederate interaction), and Study 3 (reports of recently received support) showed that individuals with low self-esteem (LSEs) are less receptive than are individuals with high self-esteem (HSEs) to support that positively reframes their experience but are equally receptive to support that validates their negative feelings. In Study 4, providers demonstrated some knowledge that positive reframing would be less helpful to LSEs than to HSEs but indicated equal intention to give such support. Study 5 showed that, in a real interaction, friends were indeed equally likely to offer positive reframing to both LSEs and HSEs but were less likely to offer validation to LSEs. LSEs were less accepting of such support, and in turn providers felt worse about the interaction, about themselves, and about their friendship more broadly. Study 6 confirmed that recipients' receptivity to support directly influenced providers' experience of a support interaction as well as their self- and relationship evaluations. The findings illustrate how well-meaning support attempts that do not match recipients' particular preferences may be detrimental to both members of the dyad.

This article explores how self-esteem and executive resources interact to determine responses to motivational conflict. One correlational and 3 experimental studies investigated the hypothesis that high and low self-esteem people undertake different self-regulatory strategies in "risky" situations that afford opportunity to pursue competing goals and that carrying out these strategies requires executive resources. When such resources are available, high self-esteem people respond to risk by prioritizing and pursuing approach goals, whereas low self-esteem people prioritize avoidance goals. However, self-esteem does not influence responses to risk when executive resources are impaired. In these studies, risk was operationalized by exposing participants to a relationship threat (Studies 1 and 2), by using participants' self-reported marital conflict (Study 3), and by threatening academic competence (Study 4). Executive resources were operationalized as cognitive load (Studies 1 and 2), working memory capacity (Study 3), and resource depletion (Study 4). When executive resources were ample, high self-esteem people responded to interpersonal risk by making more positive relationship evaluations (Studies 1, 2, and 3) and making more risky social comparisons following a personal failure (Study 4) than did low self-esteem people. Self-esteem did not predict participants' responses when executive resources were impaired or when risk was absent. The regulatory function of self-esteem may be more resource-dependent than has been previously theorized.

The authors draw on sociometer theory (e.g., Leary, 2004) and self-verification theory (e.g., Swann, 1997) to propose an expanded model of the regulatory function of self-esteem. The model suggests that people not only possess an acceptance signaling system that indicates whether relational value is high or low but also possess an epistemic signaling system that indicates whether social feedback is consistent or inconsistent with chronic perceived relational value (i.e., global self-esteem). One correlational study and 5 experiments, with diverse operationalizations of social feedback, demonstrated that the epistemic signaling system responds to self-esteem consistent or inconsistent relational-value feedback with increases or deceases in epistemic certainty. Moreover, Studies 3-6 demonstrated that the acceptance and epistemic signaling systems respond uniquely to social feedback. Finally, Studies 5 and 6 provide evidence that the epistemic signaling system is part of a broader self-regulatory system: Self-esteem inconsistent feedback caused cognitive efforts to decrease the discrepancy between self-views and feedback and caused depleted self-regulatory capacity on a subsequent self-control task., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved.)

Why are people with low self-esteem (LSE) less motivated than people with high self-esteem (HSE) to improve sad moods? The present research examined whether feelings of personal deservingness contribute to this difference. Four experiments with undergraduate participants involved a sad mood induction, a manipulation of personal deservingness, or both. Results suggested that (a) LSEs feel less deserving of positive outcomes and of positive moods than do HSEs, (b) feelings of personal deservingness can vary with the situation, and be lowered through reminders of social rejection and personal flaws, and (c) feeling relatively undeserving dampens LSEs', but not HSEs', motivation to repair sad moods. These results have implications for the emotion regulation, self-esteem, and social justice literatures.

The authors draw upon social, personality, and health psychology to propose and test a self-and-social-bonds model of health. The model contends that lower self-esteem predicts health problems and that poor-quality social bonds explain this association. In Study 1, lower self-esteem prospectively predicted reports of health problems 2 months later, and this association was explained by subjective reports of poor social bonds. Study 2 replicated the results of Study 1 but used a longitudinal design with 6 waves of data collection, assessed self-reports of concrete health-related behaviors (i.e., number of visits to the doctor and classes missed due to illness), and measured both subjective and objective indicators of quality of social bonds (i.e., interpersonal stress and number of friends). In addition, Study 2 showed that poor-quality social bonds predicted acute drops in self-esteem over time, which in turn predicted acute decreases in quality of social bonds and, consequently, acute increases in health problems. In both studies, alternative explanations to the model were tested.

The authors draw on sociometer theory to propose that self-esteem is attuned to traits that garner others' acceptance, and the traits that garner acceptance depend on one's social role. Attunement of self-esteem refers to the linkage, or connection, between self-esteem and specific traits, which may be observed most clearly in the association between self-esteem and specific self-evaluations. In most roles, appearance and popularity determine acceptance, so self-esteem is most attuned to those traits. At the same time, interdependent social roles emphasize the value of communal qualities, so occupants of those roles have self-esteem that is more attuned to communal qualities than is the general norm. To avoid the biases of people's personal theories, the authors assessed attunement of self-esteem to particular traits indirectly via the correlation between self-esteem and self-ratings, cognitive accessibility measures, and an experiment involving social decision making. As hypothesized, self-esteem was generally more attuned to appearances than to communal qualities, but interdependent social roles predicted heightened attunement of self-esteem to qualities like kindness and understanding., ((c) 2007 APA, all rights reserved.)

Successes--defined broadly as meeting important standards or receiving positive evaluations--are widely assumed to be enjoyed equally by people with high self-esteem (HSEs) and low self-esteem (LSEs). Three studies examined the contradictory hypothesis that HSEs react more favorably to success than do LSEs and that success brings about certain unfavorable consequences for LSEs. Undergraduate participants reacted to a laboratory-manipulated success (Studies 1 and 2) or imagined highly positive events in the future (Study 3). Self-esteem differences emerged in anxiety, thoughts about the self, and (in Study 3) thoughts about non-self-related aspects of the event. LSEs were more anxious than HSEs after succeeding, success improved HSEs' self-relevant thoughts but not LSEs', and LSEs focused more on success's negative aspects., (((c) 2005 APA, all rights reserved).)

Five studies examined the hypotheses that when people experience positive affect, those low in self-esteem are especially likely to dampen that affect, whereas those high in self-esteem are especially likely to savor it. Undergraduate participants' memories for a positive event (Study 1) and their reported reactions to a success (Study 2) supported the dampening prediction. Results also suggest that dampening was associated with worse mood the day after a success (Study 2), that positive and negative affect regulation are distinct, that self-esteem is associated with affect regulation even when Neuroticism and Extraversion are controlled (Studies 3 and 4), and that self-esteem may be especially important for certain types of positive events and positive affect regulation (Study 5).

This research examined the hypothesis that people with low self-esteem (LSE) are less motivated than people with high self-esteem (HSE) to repair their negative moods. In Study 1, participants completed diaries in response to either a success or a failure in their everyday lives. Participants described what they intended to do next and the reasons behind those plans. After failure, fewer LSE than HSE participants expressed a goal to improve their mood. A follow-up investigation (Study 2) suggested that this difference was not due to a self-esteem difference in knowledge of mood repair strategies. In Study 3, after undergoing a negative mood induction, fewer LSE than HSE participants chose to watch a comedy video, even though both groups believed the comedy video would make them happy. Studies 4 and 5 explored possible reasons why LSE people are less motivated than HSE people to repair their negative moods.

Two models concerning downward comparison are motivational; they predict that when people are unhappy, they make downward comparisons to self-enhance (e.g., Wills, 1981). In contrast, the affect-cognition priming model (Wheeler & Miyake, 1992) predicts that unhappy people make upward comparisons because negative affect makes mood-congruent comparisons more accessible. The authors propose that both motivational and accessibility factors influence social comparisons. A study of undergraduates' self-recorded everyday comparisons supported this view. In addition, results (a) pointed to motivational influences other than self-enhancement and an accessibility influence other than mood-congruent priming, (b) suggested that motivated and unintended comparisons may differ somewhat in their susceptibility to motivational and accessibility influences, and (c) identified challenges to both self-enhancement and priming models.

"Sociotropic" people are supposedly vulnerable to dysphoria after negative interpersonal events, whereas "autonomous" people are supposedly vulnerable to achievement-related failures. The present study examined whether these personality styles are borne out in social comparison processes. For 3 weeks, 27 sociotropic and 35 autonomous undergraduates completed records of their social comparisons. Depressive personality style moderated comparison frequency and the affective consequences of comparisons, especially for dysphoric individuals: Dysphoric respondents were especially likely to make comparisons in domains that were congruent with their personalities, and comparisons in congruent domains were associated with greater mood change than comparisons in other domains, perhaps especially for dysphoric respondents. These results have implications for the literatures on social comparison and on depressive personality styles.

People with high self-esteem (HSEs) respond less negatively to failure than people with low self-esteem (LSEs). This difference may occur because HSEs overcome the natural tendency to focus on negative thoughts after failure, and instead focus on their strengths. In 2 experiments, participants with high and low self-esteem received failure, success, or no feedback. Accessibility of strengths and weaknesses was measured by response latency on an unrelated task. Results confirmed that although strengths were typically more accessible than weaknesses for both groups, the discrepancy was larger for HSEs after failure feedback than after no feedback. This heightened discrepancy appears to result from HSEs recruiting their strengths and suppressing their weaknesses. In contrast, LSEs' weaknesses appeared to become especially accessible after failure. These results have implications for the mood-congruent cognition and self-esteem literatures.

People with low self-esteem (LSE) seem to focus on self-protection; rather than trying to achieve gains for their self-esteem, they try to avoid losses. This research examined, in a social comparison context, the hypothesis that LSEs seek self-enhancement when they have an opportunity that is "safe," that is, carrying little risk of humiliation. Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that LSEs sought the most social comparisons after receiving success feedback, whereas high-self-esteem Ss (HSEs) sought the most comparisons after failure. Further results suggested that LSEs who succeeded were seizing a safe means of self-enhancement and that HSEs who failed were seeking to compensate for the failure. Also supporting this interpretation for LSEs was Experiment 3, in which LSEs who succeeded sought the most comparisons when such comparisons promised to be favorable. All three studies illustrate the value of a new measure of social comparison selection.

Several questions concerning the relation between self-focused attention and depressed mood were examined: (a) Does the association involve global negative affect, rather than sadness per se? (b) is self-focus associated with specific negative affects other than sadness? and (c) does the association occur at the between-subjects or within-subject level? Also hypothesized was that self-focus is associated with coping responses that may perpetuate negative mood. In an idiographic/nomothetic design, 40 male community residents completed daily reports for 30 days. Results suggest that self-focus is linked with global negative mood as well as specific negative affects other than sadness and that the association occurs on a between-persons, rather than a day-to-day within-person, basis. In addition, highly self-focused men reported using passive and ruminative coping styles, which in turn were associated with distressed affect.

Despite growing evidence that depression is linked with self-focused attention, little is known about how depressed individuals become self-focused or, more generally, about what arouses self-focus in everyday life. Two experiments examined the hypothesis that affect itself induces self-focused attention. In Experiment 1, moods were manipulated with an imagination mood-induction procedure. Sad-induction Ss became higher in self-focus than did neutral-induction Ss. Experiment 2 replicated this effect for sad moods by means of a musical mood-induction procedure and different measures of self-focus. However, Experiment 2 failed to support the hypothesis that happy moods induce self-focus. The results have implications for mood-induction research, self-focused attention, and recent models of depression.

We investigated four theoretical perspectives concerning the role of social comparison (Festinger, 1954) in coping with a threatening event in a sample of breast cancer patients. According to the supercoper perspective, personal contact with comparison others is often unavailable to patients, and contact with media "supercopers"--fellow victims presented as adjusting very smoothly--may make patients feel inadequate by comparison. According to the similarity perspective, patients select comparison targets who are similar to themselves because those comparisons should be the most informative. The upward comparison perspective is predictive of comparisons to relatively advantaged or superior individuals. The downward comparison perspective leads to the prediction that under conditions of threat, individuals make comparisons to people who are inferior or less fortunate in order to enhance their self-esteem. We interviewed 78 breast cancer patients, and results of both closed-ended questions and spontaneously offered comparisons yielded a preponderance of downward comparisons. The results point to the value of using naturalistic methods for studying comparisons, and suggest a more active and cognitive role for social comparison than is usually portrayed.

Attributions for cancer and beliefs about control over cancer were examined for their association with adjustment to breast cancer. Although 95% of the respondents made attributions for their cancer, no particular attribution (e.g., stress, diet) was associated with better adjustment. Analyses of attributions of responsibility for the cancer to the self, environment, another person, or chance yielded only a negative relation between adjustment and blaming another person. In contrast, both the belief that one could now control one's cancer and the belief that others (e.g. the physician) could now control the cancer were significantly associated with good adjustment. Of the different types of control, cognitive control was most strongly associated with adjustment, behavior control was less strongly associated with adjustment, and information control and retrospective control were unassociated with adjustment. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.