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We propose that self-essentialist reasoning is a foundational mechanism of the similarity-attraction effect. Our argument is that similarity breeds attraction in two steps: (a) people categorize someone with a shared attribute as a person like me based on the self-essentialist belief that one's attributes are caused by an underlying essence and (b) then apply their essence (and the other attributes it causes) to the similar individual to infer agreement about the world in general (i.e., a generalized shared reality). We tested this model in four experimental studies (N = 2,290) using both individual difference and moderation-of-process approaches. We found that individual differences in self-essentialist beliefs amplified the effect of similarity on perceived generalized shared reality and attraction across both meaningful (Study 1) and minimal (Study 2) dimensions of similarity. We next found that manipulating (i.e., interrupting) the two crucial steps of the self-essentialist reasoning process-that is, by severing the connection between a similar attribute and one's essence (Study 3) and deterring people from applying their essence to form an impression of a similar other (Study 4)-attenuated the effect of similarity on attraction. We discuss the implications for research on the self, similarity-attraction, and intergroup phenomena. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Throughout American history, formal laws and social norms have discouraged interracial romantic relationships. Interracial relationships blur the boundaries between racial groups, challenging the essentialized racial categories that define Whiteness as an exclusive, high status identity. Whites, who are the most resistant to interracial marriage of any racial group, have used their dominant position in American society to enforce norms against interracial relationships. Despite the importance of racial homogamy to White identity and status, we argue that gender roles make violating norms against intimate intergroup contact more costly for women than men, leading to Whites' greater resistance to interracial relationships involving White women. In a representative American sample using a natural quasi-experiment, as well as 3 follow-up lab experiments, we find that White women face differential social penalties for intimate intergroup contact-being perceived as gender deviant and low status within the group. By contrast, having a racial out-group partner did not influence status perceptions of men or Black women. Status perceptions of both individuals in the couple predicted attitudes toward the couple as a unit, leading to greater prejudice toward interracial relationships involving White women than White men. This research demonstrates the existence of a gendered double standard for intimate intergroup contact among Whites, revealing that gender norms play a critical role in the maintenance of American racial boundaries. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

[Correction Notice: An Erratum for this article was reported in Vol 119(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2021-01144-001). In the article, in the Independent variables subsection of Experiment 6, the second paragraph is duplicated here in error. The correct location appears as the fourth paragraph of this subsection. All versions of this article have been corrected.] Invisibility makes privilege powerful. Especially when it remains unexposed, privilege perpetuates inequity by giving unearned advantages to certain groups over others. However, recent social movements (e.g., Occupy) attempt to expose class-based privilege, threatening its invisibility. Across 8 experiments, we show that beneficiaries of class privilege respond to such exposure by increasing their claims of personal hardships and hard work, to cover privilege in a veneer of meritocracy. Experiments 1a-c show that when people are provided evidence of their own class privilege, they claim to have suffered more personal life hardships. Experiment 2 suggests that these claims are driven in part by threats to self-regard. Experiment 3 finds that such self-defense is motivated specifically by a desire to attribute positive outcomes to the self (i.e., sense of personal merit). When given the chance to first bolster their sense of personal merit, those benefitting from privilege no longer claim hardships in response to evidence of privilege. Experiments 4 and 5 further suggest self-concerns are at play: only self-relevant privilege evokes defensive responses, and self-affirmation reduces hardship claims more than does system-affirmation. Finally, Experiment 6 suggests that people claim hardships because they believe these imply personal merit on their part. Preventing the privileged from claiming hardship leads them to claim increased effort in the workplace and to increase effort on a difficult task. Overall, results suggest that even when those benefitting from class privileges are confronted with evidence of their "invisible knapsack," ideologies of personal merit help them cover the privileges of class once again. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

This article finds that, when faced with racial inequity framed as White advantage, Whites' desire to think well of their racial group increases their support for policies perceived to harm Whites. Across 4 studies, the article provides evidence that (a) relative to minority disadvantage, White advantage increases Whites' support for policies perceived to reduce their group's economic opportunities, but does not increase support for policies perceived to increase minority opportunities; and (b) the effect of White advantage on Whites' esteem for their ingroup drives the effect of inequity frame on support for policies perceived to reduce Whites' opportunities.

Research indicates that, among women and ethnic minorities, perceived inequality reduces the association between self-esteem and academic outcomes. The present studies demonstrate that the perception of social inequality does not always induce subordinate-group disengagement. Rather, inequality framed as dominant-group advantage allows subordinate groups to remain engaged and causes dominant groups to disengage. Experiments 1-3 demonstrate that academic inequality framed in terms of ingroup disadvantage causes Black, Latino, and female students to disengage, but inequality framed in terms of White or male advantage does not. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate the same effect for Whites and men--inequality framed in terms of the ingroup (i.e., advantage) causes disengagement, but inequality framed as outgroup disadvantage does not., ((c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved).)

The authors propose that the content of certain sociopolitical ideologies can be shaped by individuals in ways that satisfy their social motivations. This notion was tested in the context of color-blind ideology. Color blindness, when construed as a principle of distributive justice, is an egalitarian stance concerned with reducing discrepancies between groups' outcomes; as a principle of procedural justice, however, color blindness can function as a legitimizing ideology that entrenches existing inequalities. In Study 1, White people high in antiegalitarian sentiment were found to shift their construal of color blindness from a distributive to a procedural principle when exposed to intergroup threat. In Studies 2, 3A, and 3B, the authors used manipulations and a measure of threat to show that antiegalitarian White people endorse color blindness to legitimize the racial status quo. In Study 3B, participants' endorsement of color-blind ideology was mediated by increases in their preference for equal treatment (i.e., procedural justice) as a response to threat. In the Discussion section, the authors examine implications of the present perspective for understanding the manner in which individuals compete over the meaning of crucial ideologies., ((c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved.)

The present experiments suggest that the desire to benefit the in-group drives dominant-group members' policy preferences, independent of concern for out-groups' outcomes. In Experiment 1, the effect of a manipulation of affirmative action procedures on policy support was mediated by how Whites expected the policy to affect fellow Whites, but not by the expected effect on minorities. In Experiments 2 and 3, when focused on losses for the White in-group, Whites' racial identity was negatively related to support for affirmative action. However, when focused on gains for the Black out-group or when participants were told that Whites were not affected by the policy, racial identity did not predict attitudes toward the policy. In Experiments 2 and 3, perceived fairness mediated these effects., (Copyright 2006 APA, all rights reserved.)

This research examines self-stereotyping in the context of multiple social identities and shows that self-stereotyping is a function of stereotyped expectancies held in particular relationships. Participants reported how others evaluated their math and verbal ability and how they viewed their own ability when their gender or ethnicity was salient. Asian American women (Experiment 1) and European Americans (Experiment 2) exhibited knowledge of stereotyped social expectancies and corresponding self-stereotyping associated with their more salient identity. African Americans (Experiment 3) exhibited some knowledge of stereotyped social expectancies but no corresponding self-stereotyping. Correlational evidence and a 4th experiment suggest that self-stereotyping is mediated by the degree to which close others are perceived to endorse stereotypes as applicable to the self.

Consistent with the affiliative social tuning hypothesis, this study showed that the desire to get along with another person shifted participants' automatic attitudes toward the ostensible attitudes of that person. In Experiment 1, the automatic racial attitudes of women but not men emulated those of an experimenter displaying race-egalitarian attitudes or attitudes neutral with respect to race. Mediational analysis revealed that the gender difference in social tuning was mediated by liking for the experimenter. In Experiment 2, the likability of the experimenter was manipulated. Individuals who interacted with a likable experimenter exhibited social tuning more so than did those who interacted with a rude experimenter. These findings suggest that affiliative motives may elicit malleability of automatic attitudes independent of manipulations of social group exemplars.

Two studies examined unconscious racial stereotypes of decision makers in the juvenile justice system. Police officers (Experiment 1) and juvenile probation officers (Experiment 2) were subliminally exposed to words related to the category Black or to words neutral with respect to race. In a presumably unrelated task, officers read 2 vignettes about a hypothetical adolescent who allegedly committed either a property crime (shoplifting from a convenience store) or an interpersonal crime (assaulting a peer). The race of the offender was left unstated and the scenarios were ambiguous about the causes of the crime. Respondents rated the hypothetical offender on a number of traits (e.g., hostility and immaturity) and made judgments about culpability, expected recidivism, and deserved punishment. They also completed a self-report measure of conscious attitudes about race. As hypothesized, officers in the racial prime condition reported more negative trait ratings, greater culpability, and expected recidivism, and they endorsed harsher punishment than did officers in the neutral condition. The effects of the racial primes were not moderated by consciously held attitudes about African Americans. The implications of the findings for racial disparity in the juvenile justice system and for changing unconscious stereotypes were discussed.

Although most research on the control of automatic prejudice has focused on the efficacy of deliberate attempts to suppress or correct for stereotyping, the reported experiments tested the hypothesis that automatic racial prejudice is subject to common social influence. In experiments involving actual interethnic contact, both tacit and expressed social influence reduced the expression of automatic prejudice, as assessed by two different measures of automatic attitudes. Moreover, the automatic social tuning effect depended on participant ethnicity. European Americans (but not Asian Americans) exhibited less automatic prejudice in the presence of a Black experimenter than a White experimenter (Experiments 2 and 4), although both groups exhibited reduced automatic prejudice when instructed to avoid prejudice (Experiment 3). Results are consistent with shared reality theory, which postulates that social regulation is central to social cognition.