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A distinction has recently been drawn between surface distortions and deep distortions in false memory, where the former are conventional errors of commission and the latter are illogical relations among multiple memories of items. The deep distortions that have been studied to date are violations of the logical rules that govern incompatibility relations, such as additivity and countable additivity. Because that work is confined to laboratory word-list tasks, it is subject to the ecological validity criticism that memory for everyday facts may not exhibit such phenomena. We report evidence that memory for everyday facts displays the same deep distortions as laboratory tasks. We developed a version of the conjoint-recognition paradigm that measures memory for incompatible general knowledge facts, similar to those found on the quiz program Jeopardy! In experiments with university participants, four deep distortions were detected (violations of the additivity, countable additivity, universal set, and compensation rules), with participants consistently remembering more than what is logically possible. The distortions were more robust than in laboratory experiments, and memories of incompatible facts (e.g., Jupiter and Saturn cannot both be the largest planet in the solar system) did not suppress each other. These patterns were replicated in subsequent experiments with older and more diverse participant samples. Consistent with the notion that deep distortions are by-products of gist memory, conjoint-recognition modeling analyses revealed that memory for everyday facts was even more reliant on gist than memory for word lists, and that verbatim memory was near-floor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conjoint-recognition model (CRM) implements fuzzy-trace theory's opponent process conception of false memory. Within the family of measurement models that separate the memory effects of recollection and familiarity, CRM is the only one that accomplishes this for false as well as true memory. We assembled a corpus of 537 sets of conjoint-recognition data, with estimates of CRM's parameters plus goodness-of-fit statistics being available for all the data sets. This corpus was used to conduct a meta-analysis of CRM's underlying process assumptions by pitting two theoretical interpretations of the model against each other: (a) the original interpretation, which assumes that its retrieval parameters tap a single recollection process (verbatim retrieval) and a single familiarity process (gist retrieval), and (b) the dual-recollection interpretation, which assumes that its parameters also tap a second recollection process (context retrieval). The two interpretations generate a series of differential predictions that fall into three groups--namely, predictions about invariant relations among parameters, about the structure of CRM's parameter space, and about the location of individual parameters within the space. When these predictions were evaluated with the corpus, the results converged on the dual-recollection interpretation. The results also resolved a long-standing uncertainty about whether the familiarity process for true memory is semantically or perceptually driven. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary theories of decision-making are compared with respect to their predictions about the judgments that are hypothesized to underlie risky choice framing effects. Specifically, we compare predictions of psychophysical models, such as prospect theory, to the cognitive representational approach of fuzzy-trace theory in which the presence or absence of zero is key to framing effects. Three experiments implemented a high-power design in which many framing problems were administered to participants, who rated the attractiveness of either the certain or risky options. Experiments also varied whether truncation manipulations were within-subjects or between-subjects and whether both options were present. Violations of both strong and weak rationality were clearly observed in attractiveness ratings of options. However, truncation effects showed that these violations were conditional on the form of the decision problem. Truncation effects that involved adding or subtracting zero--that should not matter in almost all decision theories--showed that such rationality violations were attenuated when zero was deleted, but were amplified when zero was emphasized, per predictions of fuzzy-trace theory. This is the first such demonstration using attractiveness ratings of certain and risky options. Ratings also revealed that framing effects are inherently comparative: The attractiveness of a given option is a function of zero versus nonzero contrasts both within and between options. Indeed, we observed a losing-nothing-is-better effect that violates attribute framing and prospect theory such that a probability of losing nothing was rated as substantially better than a probability of gaining nothing, in accord with fuzzy-trace theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fuzzy-trace theory posits independent verbatim and gist memory processes, a distinction that has implications for such applied topics as eyewitness testimony. This distinction between precise, literal verbatim memory and meaning-based, intuitive gist accounts for memory paradoxes including dissociations between true and false memory, false memories outlasting true memories, and developmental increases in false memory. We provide an overview of fuzzy-trace theory, and, using mathematical modeling, also present results demonstrating verbatim and gist memory in true and false recognition of narrative sentences and inferences. Results supported fuzzy-trace theory's dual-process view of memory: verbatim memory was relied on to reject meaning-consistent, but unpresented, sentences (via recollection rejection). However, verbatim memory was often not retrieved, and gist memory supported acceptance of these sentences (via similarity judgment and phantom recollection). Thus, mathematical models of words can be extended to explain memory for complex stimuli, such as narratives, the kind of memory interrogated in law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Fuzzy-trace theory distinguishes verbatim (literal, exact) from gist (meaningful) representations, predicting that reliance on gist increases with experience and expertise. Thus, many judgment-and-decision-making biases increase with development, such that cognition is colored by context in ways that violate logical coherence and probability theories. Nevertheless, this increase in gist-based intuition is adaptive: Gist is stable, less sensitive to interference, and easier to manipulate. Moreover, gist captures the functionally significant essence of information, supporting healthier and more robust decision processes. We describe how fuzzy-trace theory accounts for judgment-and-decision making phenomena, predicting the paradoxical arc of these processes with the development of experience and expertise. We present data linking gist memory processes to gist processing in decision making and provide illustrations of gist reliance in medicine, public health, and intelligence analysis. We report the first evidence of a predicted link between false memory and framing biases in risky choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors investigated the effects of valence and arousal on memory using a dual-process model that quantifies recollective and nonrecollective components of recall without relying on metacognitive judgments to separate them. The results showed that valenced words increased reconstruction (a component of nonrecollective retrieval) relative to neutral words. In addition, the authors found that positive valence increased recollective retrieval in comparison to negative valence, whereas negative valence increased nonrecollective retrieval relative to positive valence. The latter effect, however, depended on arousal: It was reliable only when arousal was high. The present findings supported the notion that emotional valence is a conceptual gist because it affected nonrecollective retrieval and because subjects' recall protocols were clustered by valence. The results challenge the hypothesis that valence affects only recollection, and they clarify previous inconsistent findings about the effects of emotion on memory accuracy and brain activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A developmental reversal in false memory is the counterintuitive phenomenon of higher levels of false memory in older children, adolescents, and adults than in younger children. The ability of verbatim memory to suppress this age trend in false memory was evaluated using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Seven and 11-year-old children studied DRM lists either in a standard condition (whole words) that normally produces high levels of false memory or in an alternative condition that should enhance verbatim memory (word fragments). Half the children took 1 recognition test, and the other half took 3 recognition tests. In the single-test condition, the typical age difference in false memory was found for the word condition (higher false memory for 11-year-olds than for 7-year-olds), but in the word fragment condition false memory was lower in the older children. In the word condition, false memory increased over successive recognition tests. Our findings are consistent with 2 principles of fuzzy-trace theory's explanation of false memories: (a) reliance on verbatim rather than gist memory causes such errors to decline with age, and (b) repeated testing increases reliance on gist memory in older children and adults who spontaneously connect meaning across events. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: Although the ε4 allele of the apolipoprotein E (APOE) genotype is a known risk factor for Alzheimer's dementia (AD), prior findings on whether it is also a risk factor for mild cognitive impairment (MCI) have been inconsistent. We tested two contrasting explanations: (a) an ε4-AD specificity hypothesis, and (b) a measurement insensitivity hypothesis., Method: The frequency of the ε4 allele was investigated in older adults (mean age > 70) with various types of cognitive impairment (including MCI) and various types of dementia (including AD) with the aging, demographics, and memory study (ADAMS) of the National Institute on Aging's Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The ADAMS controls sources of Type I and Type II error that are posited in the ε4-AD specificity hypothesis and the measurement insensitivity hypothesis, and it is the only nationally representative data set on aging and cognitive impairment., Results: ε4 was a reliable predictor of MCI, with a frequency of 32% in MCI subjects versus 20% in healthy control subjects. This link was specific to MCI because ε4 was not a risk factor for other forms of cognitive impairment without dementia., Conclusions: The results support the measurement insensitivity hypothesis rather than the ε4-AD specificity hypothesis and are consistent with recent research showing modest reductions in cognitive performance among normal functioning ε4 carriers.