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The attention literature distinguishes two general mechanisms by which attention can benefit performance: gain (or resource) models and orienting (or switching) models. In gain models, processing efficiency is a function of a spatial distribution of capacity or resources; in orienting models, an attentional spotlight must be aligned with the stimulus location, and processing efficiency is a function of when this occurs. Although they involve different processing mechanisms, these models are difficult to distinguish empirically. We compared performance with abrupt-onset and no-onset Gabor patch stimuli in a cued detection task in which we obtained distributions of reaction time (RT) and accuracy as a function of stimulus contrast. In comparison to abrupt-onset stimuli, RTs to miscued no-onset stimuli were increased and accuracy was reduced. Modeling the data with the integrated system model of Philip L. Smith and Roger Ratcliff (2009) provided evidence for reallocation of processing resources during the course of a trial, consistent with an orienting account. Our results support a view of attention in which processing efficiency depends on a dynamic spatiotemporal distribution of resources that has both gain and orienting properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The remember-know procedure is widely used to investigate recollection and familiarity in recognition memory, but almost all of the results obtained with that procedure can be readily accommodated by a unidimensional model based on signal-detection theory. The unidimensional model holds that remember judgments reflect strong memories (associated with high confidence, high accuracy, and fast reaction times), whereas know judgments reflect weaker memories (associated with lower confidence, lower accuracy, and slower reaction times). Although this is invariably true on average, a new 2-dimensional account (the continuous dual-process model) suggests that remember judgments made with low confi- dence should be associated with lower old-new accuracy but higher source accuracy than know judgments made with high confidence. We tested this prediction-and found evidence to support it-using a modified remember-know procedure in which participants were first asked to indicate a degree of recollection-based or familiarity-based confidence for each word presented on a recognition test and were then asked to recollect the color (red or blue) and screen location (top or bottom) associated with the word at study. For familiarity-based decisions, old-new accuracy increased with old-new confidence, but source accuracy did not (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of familiarity). For recollection-based decisions, both old-new accuracy and source accuracy increased with old-new confidence (suggesting that stronger old-new memory was supported by higher degrees of recollection). These findings suggest that recollection and familiarity are continuous processes and that participants can indicate which process mainly contributed to their recognition decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Signal detection theory (SDT) makes the frequently challenged assumption that decision criteria have no variance. An extended model, the Law of Categorical Judgment, relaxes this assumption. The long accepted equation for the law, however, is flawed: It can generate negative probabilities. The correct equation, the Law of Categorical Judgment (Corrected), is derived; the SDT rating model is a special case. An example shows how to invert the Law of Categorical Judgment (Corrected) numerically, thereby extracting estimates of signal and criterion density parameters and their confidence limits from rating data. The SDT rating model predicts linear z-transformed operating characteristics (zROCs), whereas the new equation can produce nonlinear zROCs. For single-criterion experiments (e.g., yes/no, two-alternative forced choice), however, the corrected law yields identical d' values and linear zROCs whether criterion variance is nonzero or zero. Performance differences observed in such experiments can always be attributed equally well to altered perceptual sensitivity or to modified criterion variance. The Law of Categorical Judgment (Corrected) offers to resolve this ambiguity through rating experiments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A tacit but fundamental assumption of the theory of signal detection is that criterion placement is a noise-free process. This article challenges that assumption on theoretical and empirical grounds and presents the noisy decision theory of signal detection (ND-TSD). Generalized equations for the isosensitivity function and for measures of discrimination incorporating criterion variability are derived, and the model's relationship with extant models of decision making in discrimination tasks is examined. An experiment evaluating recognition memory for ensembles of word stimuli revealed that criterion noise is not trivial in magnitude and contributes substantially to variance in the slope of the isosensitivity function. The authors discuss how ND-TSD can help explain a number of current and historical puzzles in recognition memory, including the inconsistent relationship between manipulations of learning and the isosensitivity function's slope, the lack of invariance of the slope with manipulations of bias or payoffs, the effects of aging on the decision-making process in recognition, and the nature of responding in remember-know decision tasks. ND-TSD poses novel, theoretically meaningful constraints on theories of recognition and decision making more generally, and provides a mechanism for rapprochement between theories of decision making that employ deterministic response rules and those that postulate probabilistic response rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the issue of whether the remember-know (RK) task is best explained by a single-process or a dual-process model. All single-process models propose that remember and know responses reflect different levels of a single strength-of-evidence dimension. Thus, across conditions in which response criteria are held constant, these models predict that the RK task is unidimensional. Many dual-process models propose that remember and know responses reflect two qualitatively distinct processes underlying recognition memory, often characterized as recollection and familiarity. These models predict that the RK task is bidimensional. Using data from 37 studies, the author conducted a state-trace analysis to determine the dimensionality of the RK task. In those studies, non-memory-related differences between conditions were eliminated via decision criteria constrained to be constant across all levels of the independent variables. The results reveal little or no evidence of bidimensionality and lend additional support to the unequal-variance signal detection model. Other arguments supporting a bidimensional interpretation are examined, and the author concludes there is insufficient evidence for the RK task to be used to identify qualitatively different memory components. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dual-process signal-detection (DPSD) model assumes that recognition memory is based on recollection of qualitative information or on a signal-detection-based familiarity process. The model has proven useful for understanding results from a wide range of memory research, including behavioral, neuropsychological, electrophysiological, and neuroimaging studies. However, a number of concerns have been raised about the model over the years, and it has been suggested that an unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) model that incorporates separate recollection and familiarity processes (J. 1. Wixted, 2007) may provide an equally good, or even better, account of the data. In this article, the authors show that the results of studies that differentiate these models support the predictions of the DPSD model and indicate that recognition does not reflect the summing of 2 signal-detection processes, as the new UVSD model assumes. In addition, the assumptions of the DPSD model are clarified in order to address some of the common misconceptions about the model. Although important challenges remain, hybrid models such as this provide a more useful framework within which to understand human memory than do pure signal-detection models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

J. T. Wixted (2007) argued that nearly every recent study that was designed to differentially test the unequal-variance signal-detection (UVSD) and dual-process signal-detection (DPSD) models has yielded findings that strongly support the UVSD model. C. M. Parks and A. P. Yonelinas (2007) did not address these studies in detail and instead focused mainly on issues that are tangential to the debate (e.g., measurement issues and neuroimaging). What few responses they did offer to the more relevant model-comparison studies did not effectively address the difficulties they posed for the DPSD model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Numeric values of psychological measures often have an arbitrary character before research has grounded their meanings, thereby providing what S. J. Messick (1995) called consequential validity (part of which H. Blanton and J. Jaccard, 2006, this issue, now identify as metric meaningfulness). Some measures are predisposed by their design to acquire meanings easily, an example being the sensitivity measure of signal detection theory. Others are less well prepared, illustrated by most self-report measures of self-esteem. Counter to Blanton and Jaccard's characterization, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has properties that predispose it to acquire consequential validity rapidly. With the IAT as the subject of over 250 publications since 1998, there is now much evidence for its consequential validity. The IAT has attracted more scholarly criticism than have other measures designed for similar purposes. The authors speculate as to why the IAT is an attractive target. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors explored the temporal mechanism of attention deficit in children with attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In rapid serial visual presentation tasks in which two targets (T1 and T2) were presented in close temporal proximity among distractors, participants tried to identify T1 and detect T2 in one (dual-task) experiment and only to detect T2 in a second control (single-task) experiment. The sensitivity of T2 detection was analyzed using signal detection theory. The attentional blink-the impairment in T2 detection following the identification of T1 -- was increased in magnitude and protracted in the patients. Moreover, some ADHD children appeared to have a blink largely normal in magnitude but temporally displaced toward a later time. The authors hypothesize that a slower closing of the attention gate may mediate this specific attention impairment in ADHD children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Letters and words are better identified when there are fewer available choices. How do readers use choice-set restrictions? By analyzing new experimental data and previously reported data, the author shows that Bayes theorem-based models overestimate readers' use of choice-set restrictions. This result is discordant with choice-similarity models such as R. D. Luce's (1963a) similarity choice model, G. Keren and S. Baggen's (1981) letter recognition model, and D. W. Massaro and G. C. Oden's (1979) fuzzy logical model of perception. Other models posit that choice restrictions affect accuracy only by improving guessing (e.g., J. L. McClelland & D. E. Rumelhart's, 1981, interactive activation model). It is shown that these models underestimate readers' use of choice-set restrictions. Restriction of choice set does improve perception of letters and words, but not optimally. Decision models that may be able to explain this phenomenon are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the demonstration of robust stimulus-driven, attentional processes in selective frequency listening in signal-detection experiments. Detection of signal tones; Frequency of an uninformative cue tone; Implications for models of auditory attention.

This study examined 2-point discrimination performance in 1 st-degree biological relatives (n = 39) of individuals with schizophrenia and normal adult control participants (n = 30) recruited from the community. They completed an objective 2-point discrimination task, adapted for use with a signal detection approach to permit separation of discriminability (i.e., sensitivity, d') from response bias/ criterion (or motivation, lnbeta). Relatives revealed poorer performance on the d' index compared with controls. The 2 groups did not differ on lnbeta, suggesting a genuine difference in sensitivity but not response bias. The sensitivity deficit might reflect decreased spatial acuity and/or impaired intensity cue processing of tactile stimuli. Poor performance on the d' index was most closely associated with 2 schizotypic features, namely "odd beliefs/magical thinking." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Describes the use of signal detection methods to develop an algorithm useful in distinguishing those at risk for late smoking relapse from those likely to maintain abstinence. Problems associated in preventing cigarette smoking; Association of greater weight gain with less relapse at follow-up; Decrease in depression symptoms.

When researchers use the term mind wandering for task-unrelated thoughts in signal detection tasks, we may fall into the trap of believing that spontaneous thoughts are task unrelated in a deeper sense. Similar negative connotations are attached to common terms like cognitive failures, resting state, rumination, distraction, attentional failures, absent-mindedness, repetitiveness, mind lapses, going AWOL in the brain, cortical idling, and the like. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that mathematicians and scientists often engage in spontaneous repetitive thoughts and that the results of those thoughts are by no means maladaptive. Yet that seems to be implied by the standard use of common terms in the research literature. As humans, we know that spontaneous ideation goes on during all of our waking hours, during dreams and even in slow-wave sleep. It is unlikely that such a great allocation of mental resources has no useful adaptive function. This view of the spontaneous stream is consistent with the perspective of global workspace theory on conscious contents, which suggests that conscious events are not like unconscious cognitive representations. Rather, conscious events trigger widespread adaptive changes in the brain, far beyond their cortical origins. The brain evidence for such "global broadcasting" triggered by conscious (but not matched unconscious) events throughout the cortex is now quite compelling. Spontaneous conscious thoughts, even if they appear to arbitrary, irrelevant, unwanted, or intrusive, may still play an important adaptive role in life-relevant problem solving and learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]