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The article examines the politics of judicial retirement in Canada and Great Britain. It formulates a theory of judicial retirement for judges sitting on the courts of last resort in the countries. It estimates models of judicial retirement that incorporates personal, institutional and political factors to analyze the determinants of judicial retirements for judges appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, and the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords.

The question of who wins and loses in appellate courts may be the most important question we seek to answer as judicial scholars. In fact, "Who gets what?" has traditionally been viewed as the central question in the study of politics generally. Therefore, understanding who wins in the courts is an essential component of a full appreciation of "the authoritative allocation of values" in society (Easton 1953). In this paper we examine the relationship between the status of litigants, especially the comparison of repeat player "haves" (RP) to one-shotters (OS) who are usually "have-nots," and their rates of success in top appellate courts in the common law world. A number of prior studies employing what is generally referred to as "party capability theory" have examined how the resources and litigation experience of litigants affect their chances for success. Using data from the highest courts of appeals across six countries we explore winners and losers in a comparative context. The results indicate that there is greater variation in who wins and who loses than party capability theory would suggest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article identifies a broader definition of party capability theory by examining changes within the Australian High Court since 1970. The study is premised on an article written by Marc Galanter which hypothesized there would be differential success rates in litigation among parties who came from the "haves" as opposed to the "have-nots."

The article presents a study which examined the influence of presidential rhetoric on the political environment in which American federal judges operate. A dataset of all presidential references to judges from 1789 through 1993 is utilized to ascertain judicial behavior. The study provides a frequency count of the number of statements about judges and a model on the influence of presidential rhetoric over the collective ideology of the U.S. Supreme Court.

Are state supreme court judges influenced by the contingent attitudinal model, similar to their federal colleagues? Stated another way, do these judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge Level State Supreme Court Database, we analyze the votes of individual judges in 1995 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. Our results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues. These results suggest a theoretically important way of thinking about judicial behavior. Rather than conceptualizing the legal model and the attitudinal model as competitors, the empirical evidence suggests that legal influences and ideological influences also work in tandem in among state supreme courts. These judges are influenced by the contingent attitudinal model and, occasionally, the traditional tension exists and statutory language constrains the judges from voting ideologically. However, in other instances these two influences operate in a more dynamic and interdependent manner and we observe statutory language facilitating the expression of ideological voting among the judges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines whether political control of the U.S. Supreme Court is possible and, if so, whether judicial independence is simply a myth. It attempts to provide evidence that both the president and U.S. Congress have the capacity to control or at least influence the court. It argues that with regard to both civil rights and specific economic legislation, Congress has the ability not only to constrain justices, but also to further promote judicial decisions that align with their policy preferences.

Presents a study which examined the struggle between the legislative and judicial branches from a different perspective by focusing specifically on attempts by U.S. Congress to constrain the behavior of federal judges. Overview of previous research on legislative-judicial interactions; Analysis of principal agent relationships in political science; Research design and methodology used; Impact of statutory constraint and individual ideology on appointment of judges.

Does the hierarchical relationship between the district courts and the courts of appeals influence decision-making at the trial level? Stated another way, are district court judges constrained by the appeals courts, according to the tenets of principal agency theory? Do these judges anticipate responses by appellate panels and condition their decisions based on these expectations? Using an original dataset of foreign policy cases from 1946-2000 and incorporating a strategic choice statistical framework to analyze a formal model, I discover that the District Courts are not constrained by the anticipated responses of the Appeals Courts. Whether one examines District Courts in isolation from other tribunals or within a hierarchical structure, conclusions regarding ideological voting remain consistent: Democratic judges are more likely to rule in favor of civil liberties than their Republican colleagues. Thus, the hierarchical structure of the federal judiciary does not appear to be a significant constraint to the District Courts as it seemingly is for the Courts of Appeals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contributes to the literature on U.S. foreign policy and judicial decision making by focusing on the role of the federal appellate courts since World War II. Specifically, the paper addresses the question whether appeals court judges are defenders of civil liberties or champions of national security. Using an original dataset of 300 cases randomly selected from 1946-2000 in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, I test whether specific institutional characteristics, legal challenges or case issues significantly affect whether appellate judges rule in favor of federal government interests or civil liberties claims. The empirical results indicate that for a majority of cases appellate judges support the interests of the federal government to the detriment of civil liberties. However, certain institutional characteristics will induce the courts of appeals to curtail federal interests. If Democratic judges dominate an appellate panel or if the lower courts ruled in favor of civil liberties, then the appeals courts will render decisions against the interests of the federal government. However, if judges must resolve a threshold issue or contend with a national security defense then the ruling will most likely favor federal interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the constitutional role of the president in the process of selecting Supreme Court justices is limited to the initial selection of nominees, he does not simply select a nominee and then throw the candidate to the wolves of the Senate to be nurtured or devoured at their whim. Existing research looks at the impact of the ideological distance between a president (or his nominee) and the Senate on the president's strategic selection of whom to nominate, as well as on his decision to "go public" to defend his nominees. However this research fails to capture the nuances of the process. We argue that both the president and the Senate consider a legal and an ideological dimension when evaluating Supreme Court nominees, and that strategic presidents utilize rhetoric to shift Senate consideration of their nominee away from the more controversial dimension and toward the less controversial dimension. To analyze presidential rhetoric during the confirmation process we utilize an original dataset coding seven types of presidential statements about Supreme Court nominees between 1965 and 2005. We find strong evidence that presidents behave in strategic fashion determining both when and how they should "go public" in defense of their nominee based upon the political climate in the Senate. Additionally, we find that presidential rhetoric can impact the outcome of the final Senate confirmation vote, but that this impact is conditional upon both the political climate in the Senate and the types of statements that the president makes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]