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This paper focuses on two puzzles: (1) why the territorial disputes in East Asia persist and what issues prevent a mutually agreeable resolution; and (2) why and how they are contained within certain limits despite constant exchange of territorial hostilities. I argue that in East Asia the territorial dispute cycle is the product of expected salience and asymmetry of economic interdependence as much as (or more than) the function of enduring rivalry, regional geo-strategic conditions, and domestic power politics. In the two case studies of Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokto/Takeshima, I examine the extent to which these disputes are affected by different levels of expectations of future interdependence in terms of salience and asymmetry. In both cases, the negative impact of expected asymmetry has offset the positive influence of expected salience in the dispute initiation and escalation stages. In the dispute de-escalation stage, however, the positive impact of expected salience has invariably outweighed the negative impact of expected asymmetry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although in the long term, democratization is expected to exert pacifying effects on international relations, scholars have argued that conflict is more likely during democratic transitions. They argue that politicians in democratizing states are more likely to make jingoistic appeals, and coalitions of political, business, and/or military leaders are likely to form and to ?logroll? for military buildups and other destabilizing policies. This proposition has great significance for East Asia, which faces two potential political transitions: the democratization of China, and Korean unification. This paper tests a theory of democratization and conflict in the cases of three previous East Asian political transitions: Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. I test not only for the occurrence of conflict, but also for the presence of the predicted mechanisms through which conflict occurs (nationalistic appeals and logrolling). I find that although there is some evidence of nationalistic posturing that is consistent with the theory?s predictions, for the most part, evidence from these cases does not support the theory. Leaders did not make jingoistic appeals; they were more likely to preach stability. Furthermore, I find that the public, the military, and the business community do have substantial influence over policy makers, but do not find that these groups advocated military buildups or offensive military strategies. This study casts doubt on the relevance of the ?democratization and war? thesis for future East Asian political transitions; it finds support for theories in the liberal school of international relations, including the beneficial effects of democratization, policies of engagement, and economic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]