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Unemployment insurance for workers who sequentially sample job opportunities in the United States is studied. Simple policies are seen as ideal for workers who have constant absolute risk aversion. Distinct policy roles such as provision of unemployment subsidies are also highlighted.

A simple model that determines both how the job finding probability varies with unemployment duration and how it varies with aggregate economic conditions is presented. The model treats unemployed workers as waiting for labor market to improve rather than searching for job opportunities.

The mismatch between unemployed workers' skills and location and job vacancies' location and requirements, which results in the coexistence of job vacancies and unemployment, is investigated. Findings reveal that business cycle frequencies affect the relationship between unemployment and vacancies. A mismatch model of vacancies, unemployment, and labor market transitions is presented.

The interpretation of the research work of Daron Acemoglu, the winner of the John Bates Clark medal in 2005, in the field of economics is presented.

A survey of the literature on the search-theoretic models of the labor market is discussed. The various modeling choices concerning wage determination and the meeting process, including the recent models of directed search are discussed.

An econometric model of labor markets is presented for examining the influence of unemployment on vacancies and vice versa.