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• Accurate elicitation of beliefs requires incentivization for truthful reports. • Beliefs about COVID-19 interact with risk management efforts. • We elicit beliefs about COVID-19 prevalence and mortality over a 6-month period. • Beliefs on The Street differ markedly from epidemiological models of the virus. Subjective belief elicitation about uncertain events has a long lineage in the economics and statistics literatures. Recent developments in the experimental elicitation and statistical estimation of subjective belief distributions allow inferences about whether these beliefs are biased relative to expert opinion, and the confidence with which they are held. Beliefs about COVID-19 prevalence and mortality interact with risk management efforts, so it is important to understand relationships between these beliefs and publicly disseminated statistics, particularly those based on evolving epidemiological models. The pandemic provides a unique setting over which to bracket the range of possible COVID-19 prevalence and mortality outcomes given the proliferation of estimates from epidemiological models. We rely on the epidemiological model produced by the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation together with the set of epidemiological models summarised by FiveThirtyEight to bound prevalence and mortality outcomes for one-month, and December 1, 2020 time horizons. We develop a new method to partition these bounds into intervals, and ask subjects to place bets on these intervals, thereby revealing their beliefs. The intervals are constructed such that if beliefs are consistent with epidemiological models, subjects are best off betting the same amount on every interval. We use an incentivised experiment to elicit beliefs about COVID-19 prevalence and mortality from 598 students at Georgia State University, using six temporally-spaced waves between May and November 2020. We find that beliefs differ markedly from epidemiological models, which has implications for public health communication about the risks posed by the virus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Socio-emotional and motivational skills are routinely measured using self-reports in large-scale educational assessments. Measures exploiting test-takers' behaviour during the completion of questionnaires or cognitive tests are increasingly used as alternatives to self-reports in the economics of education literature. We compute behavioural measures of socio-emotional and motivational skills using data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). We find that these measures capture important aspects of students' academic profiles: some are importantly associated with contemporaneous performance and educational attainment and most measures have a high degree of stability over time. However, these measures are only limitedly correlated among themselves and have low correlations with self-report measures of the same constructs. This is likely a reflection of the fact that behavioural measures are representations of the test taker current 'state', rather than descriptions of the participant view of their own 'trait' like the self-report measures. Moreover, the low correlation across measures suggests that they capture different behavioural responses to the test-taking situation. These differences are still limitedly understood because the measures are constructed ex-post using collateral information collected during the administration of assessments rather than developed ex ante in line with theoretical models of human cognition and affect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Homelessness is part of the lives of many people. But almost no one is homeless for all or most of his or her life. The median shelter homeless spell is well under a month, and even “chronic homelessness” officially entails spells of a year or so. I model homelessness as part of people’s lives in a dynamic stochastic framework in continuous time. I can explain many empirical regularities with a parsimonious model: for instance, why the last addresses of homeless people are concentrated in a few low-rent neighborhoods, why homeless entries are hard to predict, why recidivism is common and past homelessness is a good predictor of future homelessness, why some groups recidivate more often than others, why the hazard rate for shelter exit is single-peaked, why effective homelessness prevention programs do not alter the average length of homeless spells. I also examine policy. The optimal homelessness prevention program is Pigouvian and starkly simple. With an optimal prevention program in place, optimal shelter quality maximizes a simple and intuitive expression, and insurance programs always raise social welfare. Most of the previous economics literature about homelessness has been static, but most literature about homelessness outside economics has been dynamic. This paper tries to bring the two strands of literature closer together. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: In the contract-theoretic literature, there is a vital debate about whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up problem, in particular when renegotiation cannot be prevented. Ultimately, this question has to be answered empirically. As a first step, we have conducted a laboratory experiment with 960 participants. We consider investments that directly benefit the non-investing party. While according to standard theory, contracting would be useless if renegotiation cannot be ruled out, we find that option contracts significantly improve investment incentives compared to a no-contract treatment. This finding might be attributed to recent idea that contracts can serve as reference points. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We study the management of ecosystems in which interacting state variables that are affected by management decisions diffuse in space. We study pattern formation first in a setting where economic agents maximize myopic profits and ignore spillovers onto agents at other sites, and second in the context of a social planner who internalizes these spillovers. We compare patterns under these two institutions and study how the differences in the patterns generated by these two institutions impact the design of regulatory schemes to internalize the externalities. At the same time we introduce new methods based on Fourier series type decompositions that enable us to turn an intractable infinite dimensional optimal control problem into a countable number of finite dimensional optimal control problems. As far as we know these methods are new to the economics literature. Our theory is applied to the management and regulation of a semi-arid system. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: This paper examines endogenous institutional change in a class of dynamic political games. The political aggregation rules used at date t+1 are instrumental choices under rules at date t. Effectively, rules are “players” who can strategically delegate future policy-making authority to different rules. A political rule is stable if it selects itself. A reform occurs when an alternative rule is selected. The stability of a political rule is shown to depend on whether its choices are dynamically consistent. For instance, simple majority rules can be shown to be dynamically consistent in many common environments where wealth-weighted voting rules are not. The result extends to political rules that incorporate private activities such as extra-legal protests, threats, or private investment. The approach is one way of understanding various explanations of institutional change proposed in the literature. A parametric model of public goods provision gives an illustration. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: We analyze trade between a perfectly informed price setting party (seller) and an imperfectly informed price taker (buyer). Differently from most of the literature, we focus on the case in which, under full information, it would be inefficient to trade goods of sufficiently poor quality. We show that the unique equilibrium surviving D1 is characterized by market breakdown, although trade would be mutually beneficial in some state of nature. This occurs independently of the precision of the information available to the buyer. The model thus implies that signaling through prices may exacerbate the effect of adverse selection rather than mitigate it. Under D1, the seller would always benefit from committing to prices that do not reveal her information. We develop this intuition by analyzing the strategic advantages of price rigidities. We show that price rigidities help restore trade and could even enhance effectiveness of prices as signals of quality. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

We study the evolution of an economy where agents who are heterogeneous with respect to risk attitudes can either earn a certain income or enter a risky rent-seeking contest. We assume that agents behave rationally given their preferences, but that the population distribution of preferences evolves over time in response to material payoffs. We show that, in particular, initial distributions with full support converge to stationary states where all types are still present. Although rents are perfectly dissipated in material terms at a steady state, efficiency is greater than if everybody had been risk neutral, since risk lovers specialize in rent seeking. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

The backward induction (or subgame-perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game is shown to be the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]