1. FOX: Coverage-guided Fuzzing as Online Stochastic Control
- Author
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She, Dongdong, Storek, Adam, Xie, Yuchong, Kweon, Seoyoung, Srivastava, Prashast, and Jana, Suman
- Subjects
Computer Science - Cryptography and Security - Abstract
Fuzzing is an effective technique for discovering software vulnerabilities by generating random test inputs and executing them against the target program. However, fuzzing large and complex programs remains challenging due to difficulties in uncovering deeply hidden vulnerabilities. This paper addresses the limitations of existing coverage-guided fuzzers, focusing on the scheduler and mutator components. Existing schedulers suffer from information sparsity and the inability to handle fine-grained feedback metrics. The mutators are agnostic of target program branches, leading to wasted computation and slower coverage exploration. To overcome these issues, we propose an end-to-end online stochastic control formulation for coverage-guided fuzzing. Our approach incorporates a novel scheduler and custom mutator that can adapt to branch logic, maximizing aggregate edge coverage achieved over multiple stages. The scheduler utilizes fine-grained branch distance measures to identify frontier branches, where new coverage is likely to be achieved. The mutator leverages branch distance information to perform efficient and targeted seed mutations, leading to robust progress with minimal overhead. We present FOX, a proof-of-concept implementation of our control-theoretic approach, and compare it to industry-standard coverage-guided fuzzers. 6 CPU-years of extensive evaluations on the FuzzBench dataset and complex real-world programs (a total of 38 test programs) demonstrate that FOX outperforms existing state-of-the-art fuzzers, achieving average coverage improvements up to 26.45% in real-world standalone programs and 6.59% in FuzzBench programs over the state-of-the-art AFL++. In addition, it uncovers 20 unique bugs in popular real-world applications including eight that are previously unknown, showcasing real-world security impact., Comment: To Appear in Proceedings of the 2024 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '24)
- Published
- 2024