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Unlike other comparative jurisdictions that may remain silent on the possibility for supreme courts to use comparative law and natural law, the UAE legislator has allowed the Federal Supreme Court to invoke these two sources in its adjudication since the Court was established in 1973. This paper examines the legal framework that supports this permission, especially in light of Decree-Law Number 33-2022, which brought about a revision affecting it. The paper aims to define the space given to comparative law and natural law vis-à-vis UAE positive law. Furthermore, through an empirical approach, this paper examines the Federal Supreme Court case law to analyse the extent of its recourse to comparative law and/or to natural law in constitutional adjudication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between international and domestic law in Indonesia is the subject of prolonged debate caused by the silence of the Indonesian Constitution on the choice between monism and dualism, which affects constitutional adjudication. This article discusses how the Constitutional Court engages with international law in its decisions and how the debate between monism and dualism is affected by it. It argues that the practice of the Court falls neither within the traditional scope of monism nor dualism but tends to be eclectic, which can be termed pragmatic monism. Here, the Court considers an international treaty part of domestic law upon ratification. However, its contents are only applicable if they are consistent with the Constitution, the highest law in the country. Nevertheless, such pragmatism is not without consequences where the consistency of the constitutional system as a whole is compromised for the instrumentality of its individual decisions on societal well-being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The dynamic constitution is one of the fundamental issues in modern constitutional law systems, through the theoretical basis of justification and the presentation of its practical mechanisms, which tries to bring yesterday's constitution together with today's values without changing the existence of the legal-political order and system based on order-oriented values to meet the renewed demands of citizens. Therefore, the main question in this Article is what is meant by the dynamic constitution and the mechanisms of its realization and its place in the constitutional law system of the Islamic Republic of Iran? The findings of this research, with the method of collecting data through a library and descriptive-analytical method and checking legal and official texts and documents, show that the dynamic constitution means the constitution compliance with citizens' demand and this concept is generally possible in four ways: revision, interpretation, unwritten principles and constitutional adjudication. Also, the reflection on the domestic constitutional law indicates that by emphasizing the difficulty of the revision process in the constitution, the lack of application of the hermeneutic interpretation method by the official interpreter and finally the danger of resorting to unwritten principles in fragile democracies, the dynamics of the constitution in the legal order and system of the interior shall be sought in the constitutional adjudication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anayasa Mahkemesi kurulduğu 1962 yılından bu yana, sadece TBMM kararlarını iptal etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda en tartışmalı siyasi konularda da konum alan önemli bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle, Mahkeme’nin rolünü ve diğer siyasi aktörlerle ilişkilerini açıklayan geniş bir literatür oluşmuştur. Bu makalenin iki temel amacı vardır: (i) 1962-1980 yılları arasında Mahkeme ile diğer siyasi aktörler arasındaki ilişkileri analiz etmek ve (ii) bu ilişkinin gelişimini ve doğasını açıklayan alternatif bir teorik çerçeve önermek. Makalede Ran Hirschl'ün Hegemonik Koruma Tezi aracılığıyla Anayasa Mahkemesinin rolünü açıklayan baskın görüş eleştirilecek ve Joel Migdal’ın Toplum-içinde-Devlet yaklaşımına dayanarak alternatif ve daha nüanslı bir açıklama önerilecektir.

This article provides a comparative analysis of how courts have performed judicial review on supermajority rules governing courts' decision-making. Through an empirical approach, covering the cases of the United States, Peru and Poland, the article argues that the supermajority's legal source and the chronology of its establishment may influence the court's ability to review such rules and the case's outcome. Finally, the article addresses the paradox of whether courts must apply the very provision they are tasked to review. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purposive interpretation leads a double life. As a matter of constitutional practice, it forms the doctrine through which courts in Canada and around the world determine the concrete protections that abstract constitutional rights afford. However, as a matter of constitutional theory, purposive interpretation is routinely rejected as either an empty phrase that offers no alternative to established theories of constitutional interpretation or a dangerous doctrine that provides no basis for distinguishing between justified and unjustified interpretations of constitutional rights. This essay formulates a conception of purposive interpretation that is not vulnerable to these objections. The purposive approach to the interpretation of constitutional rights follows from a set of ideas about how legal interpretation differs from interpretation more broadly, how constitutional interpretation differs from interpretation in other legal domains, and how constitutional interpretation constrains both the purposes it attributes to particular provisions and the application of those purposes to particular contexts. My aim is to show that these ideas fit together in a coherent doctrinal whole that is neither empty nor dangerous. Purposive interpretation is not empty because it offers a genuine alternative to the presuppositions and structure of opposing interpretive paradigms. Purposive interpretation is not dangerous because it provides a principled set of resources for distinguishing between justified and unjustified interpretations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The state of law idea formulated in the provisions of Article 1 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is a formulation containing normative statement that is still dubious and seems convincing. Embedding the nature of legality in the context of the idea of the rule of law through the statement that Pancasila is the source of legal norms need to be questioned. The idea of Pancasila is impossible to realize if it does not materialize into a living reality, not a dead one. The possibility if Pancasila is used as sources of law it will expand coercive actions and choices of legal imperatives. Pancasila must be able transforming and making itself relevant in midst of the challenges of social changes. The construction of the idea of a rule of law should not depend on absolute and certainty. It must be able to be created as a discursive space that is truly interpretive and not limitative. Pancasila is existed and recognized in the constitutional adjudication with presuppositions to explain the rationalization of legal reality. It must be carried out at the level of the goal for obtaining and achieving justice. The problem of the paradox of the rule of law idea can be raised through legal interpretations that are able to find a relationship between what should be normative and what is factual. Judges must be able to voice more than what is stated in the law and what is said by the law.