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The rapid advancement and exploration of open-hardware RISC-V platforms are driving significant changes in sectors like autonomous vehicles, smart-city infrastructure, and medical devices. OpenTitan stands out as a groundbreaking open-source RISC-V design with a comprehensive security toolkit as a standalone system-on-chip (SoC). OpenTitan includes Earl Grey, a fully implemented and silicon-proven SoC, and Darjeeling, announced but not yet fully implemented. Earl Grey targets standalone SoC implementations, while Darjeeling is for integrable implementations. The literature lacks a silicon-ready embedded implementation of an open-source Root of Trust, despite lowRISC's efforts on Darjeeling. We address the limitations of existing implementations by optimizing data transfer latency between memory and cryptographic accelerators to prevent under-utilization and ensure efficient task acceleration. Our contributions include a comprehensive methodology for integrating custom extensions and IPs into the Earl Grey architecture, architectural enhancements for system-level integration, support for varied boot modes, and improved data movement across the platform. These advancements facilitate deploying OpenTitan in broader SoCs, even without specific technology-dependent IPs, providing a deployment-ready research vehicle for the community. We integrated the extended Earl Grey architecture into a reference architecture in a 22nm FDX technology node, benchmarking the enhanced architecture's performance. The results show significant improvements in cryptographic processing speed, achieving up to 2.7x speedup for SHA-256/HMAC and 1.6x for AES accelerators compared to the baseline Earl Grey architecture.

The race towards performance increase and computing power has led to chips with heterogeneous and complex designs, integrating an ever-growing number of cores on the same monolithic chip or chiplet silicon die. Higher integration density, compounded with the slowdown of technology-driven power reduction, implies that power and thermal management become increasingly relevant. Unfortunately, existing research lacks a detailed analysis and modeling of thermal, power, and electrical coupling effects and how they have to be jointly considered to perform dynamic control of complex and heterogeneous Multi-Processor System on Chips (MPSoCs). To close the gap, in this work, we first provide a detailed thermal and power model targeting a modern High Performance Computing (HPC) MPSoC. We consider real-world coupling effects such as actuators' non-idealities and the exponential relation between the dissipated power, the temperature state, and the voltage level in a single processing element. We analyze how these factors affect the control algorithm behavior and the type of challenges that they pose. Based on the analysis, we propose a thermal capping strategy inspired by Fuzzy control theory to replace the state-of-the-art PID controller, as well as a root-finding iterative method to optimally choose the shared voltage value among cores grouped in the same voltage domain. We evaluate the proposed controller with model-in-the-loop and hardware-in-the-loop co-simulations. We show an improvement over state-of-the-art methods of up to 5x the maximum exceeded temperature while providing an average of 3.56% faster application execution runtime across all the evaluation scenarios., Comment: Paper in Review

RISC-V open-source systems are emerging in deployment scenarios where safety and security are critical. OpenTitan is an open-source silicon root-of-trust designed to be deployed in a wide range of systems, from high-end to deeply embedded secure environments. Despite the availability of various cryptographic hardware accelerators that make OpenTitan suitable for offloading cryptographic workloads from the main processor, there has been no accurate and quantitative establishment of the benefits derived from using OpenTitan as a secure accelerator. This paper addresses this gap by thoroughly analysing strengths and inefficiencies when offloading cryptographic workloads to OpenTitan. The focus is on three key IPs - HMAC, AES, and OpenTitan Big Number accelerator (OTBN) - which can accelerate four security workloads: Secure Hash Functions, Message Authentication Codes, Symmetric cryptography, and Asymmetric cryptography. For every workload, we develop a bare-metal driver for the OpenTitan accelerator and analyze its efficiency when computation is offloaded from a RISC-V application core within a System-on-Chip designed for secure Cyber-Physical Systems applications. Finally, we assess it against a software implementation on the application core. The characterization was conducted on a cycle-accurate RTL simulator of the System-on-Chip (SoC). Our study demonstrates that OpenTitan significantly outperforms software implementations, with speedups ranging from 4.3x to 12.5x. However, there is potential for even greater gains as the current OpenTitan utilizes a fraction of the accelerator bandwidths, which ranges from 16% to 61%, depending on the memory being accessed and the accelerator used. Our results open the way to the optimization of OpenTitan-based secure platforms, providing design guidelines to unlock the full potential of its accelerators in secure applications., Comment: 8 pages, 2 figures, accepted at CF'24 conference, pre camera-ready version

Modern RISC-V platforms control and monitor security-critical systems such as industrial controllers and autonomous vehicles. While these platforms feature a Root-of-Trust (RoT) to store authentication secrets and enable secure boot technologies, they often lack Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) enforcement and are vulnerable to cyber-attacks which divert the control flow of an application to trigger malicious behaviours. Recent techniques to enforce CFI in RISC-V systems include ISA modifications or custom hardware IPs, all requiring ad-hoc binary toolchains or design of CFI primitives in hardware. This paper proposes TitanCFI, a novel approach to enforce CFI in the RoT. TitanCFI modifies the commit stage of the protected core to stream control flow instructions to the RoT and it integrates the CFI enforcement policy in the RoT firmware. Our approach enables maximum reuse of the hardware resource present in the System-on-Chip (SoC), and it avoids the design of custom IPs and the modification of the compilation toolchain, while exploiting the RoT tamper-proof storage and cryptographic accelerators to secure CFI metadata. We implemented the proposed architecture on a modern RISC-V SoC along with a return address protection policy in the RoT, and benchmarked area and runtime overhead. Experimental results show that TitanCFI achieves overhead comparable to SoA hardware CFI solutions for most benchmarks, with lower area overhead, resulting in 1% of additional area occupation., Comment: 6 pages, 1 figure, accepted at DATE'24 conference, pre camera-ready version