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Parks are inequitably distributed in many U.S. cities, and policies and planning initiatives around the country have sought to rectify these inequities. In this study, we examined whether one such initiative, a policy change in development fees for parks in Los Angeles (CA), achieved its equity goals. Specifically, the changed Park Fees Ordinance loosened the distance requirements between developments where fees are collected and parks where fees can be invested to create opportunities to spend funds in disadvantaged neighborhoods with little development. We examined whether disadvantaged communities received more park fees after the policy change in 2017. We found no significant equity gains based on socioeconomic status, some gains for non-Hispanic Black people, but some losses for Latinx people. We attribute these findings to a lack of equity criteria in the policy, political pressures, capital renovations to address deferred maintenance, and geographic limitations in where funds can be spent. We also found that Los Angeles seemed to have taken advantage of the increased geographic flexibility in the changed policy, although a lack of data linking fee-generating developments to fee-receiving parks limited the certainty of this finding. Park fees are not a panacea to advance park equity. Yet park fee policies could include measurable equity criteria to help direct some funds to disadvantaged park-poor communities while leaving some funds to the discretion of elected officials. Also, cities should have transparent data about the generation and distribution of park fees. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United States continues to grow and urbanize, local governments have tried to manage this growth to mitigate the external impacts that new developments can cause. One method by which state and local governments seek to control growth within their borders is by imposing conditions on the issuance of building permits--otherwise known as exactions. Exactions, however, face federal constitutional limits under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which applies to state and local governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted exactions in certain situations by requiring that, prior to imposing the exaction, the government make an individualized determination that the condition has an "essential nexus" and is "roughly proportionate" to the foreseen harm from the development. The Nollan/Dolan test is primarily grounded in a fear of government overreach and coercion of property owners. The courts agree that the Nollan/Dolan test applies when a government agency, such as a zoning board, imposes an exaction on a discretionary and ad hoc basis. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not yet determined whether exactions that are generally imposed on property owners through a legislative action, such as an ordinance, must comply with the Nollan/Dolan test. On the one hand, a legislatively imposed exaction is like a typical land use regulation, to which the Court has granted broad deference. But on the other hand, such exactions still carry the risk of government overreach by unfairly targeting a small, politically unpopular group: developers. This Note evaluates the debate over whether the Nollan/Dolan test should apply to legislatively imposed exactions and ultimately concludes that it should not. Legislatively imposed exactions are fundamentally different from administrative exactions because of their greater democratic legitimacy. Indeed, courts already recognize and are hardening this line between legislative and administrative actions, as evidenced by the nondelegation doctrine. Thus, the Nollan/Dolan test should not apply to legislatively imposed exactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, the author discusses the issue of stategraft or the illegal use by governments of their regulatory power to raise money from the politically powerless and poor citizens by examining the U.S. Supreme Court case Sheetz v. County of El Dorado and the concept of stategraft by Professor Bernadette Atuahene. Other topics include whether constitutional rules that are used in ad hoc development exactions can also be applied to legislated exactions.