701. Leakage Quantification of Cryptographic Operations
- Author
-
Debmalya Biswas, Michael Wibmer, and Florian Kerschbaum
- Subjects
Protocol (science) ,Cryptographic primitive ,Computer science ,business.industry ,Distributed computing ,Cryptography ,Context (language use) ,0102 computer and information sciences ,02 engineering and technology ,Cryptographic protocol ,01 natural sciences ,Range (mathematics) ,010201 computation theory & mathematics ,020204 information systems ,0202 electrical engineering, electronic engineering, information engineering ,Supply chain network ,business ,Leakage (electronics) - Abstract
Perfectly secure protocols are often too inefficient performance wise to be used in a practical setting. On the other hand, an insecure (but faster) protocol might be deemed secure for a particular setting. Recent research has thus focused on precise leakage quantification of a security protocol. In this context, we first give precise leakage quantification of a basic cryptographic primitive, that of multiplicative hiding. We then show how the approach can be extended to compute worst case leakage bounds of arbitrary compositions of cryptographic operations. The composition results make our bounds applicable to a wide range of general security protocols.
- Published
- 2010
- Full Text
- View/download PDF