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This study investigates the impact of institutional quality and banking competition on shadow economy for 127 economies for the period of 2005–2017. It further explores if institutional quality/competition shapes the relationship differently between banking competition/institutional quality and shadow economy. This paper uses the system GMM estimator to tackle potential omitted variable bias, endogeneity, and simultaneity issues. The findings suggest that overall, greater competition among banks and stricter institutions in the country reduce the size of shadow economy. Furthermore, impact of competition on shadow economy is even stronger in countries with weak institutions and the impact of institutional quality is greater in lower competitive environment. Only severe competition matters for shadow economy in case of developed countries. To sum up the novel findings of this research, competition and institutions complement each other in reducing the size of shadow economy. These findings are robust to different econometric estimators. The findings carry vital policy implications for the governments and regulators to play their part in reducing the shadow economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Labor informality and the formalization of employment have already been widely discussed. However, the problem remains on the public and government agendas at both the national and subnational levels. Objective: The objective is to assess the design of the public policy instruments that the government of Nuevo León has implemented (2015-2021) for the formalization of employment. The target population of the instruments are the Micro, Small and Medium enterprises of the state of Nuevo León. Method and technique: Firstly, a documentary research in secondary sources was carried out. Subsequently, semi-structured interviews were conducted with officials in charge of the public policy instruments for the formalization of employment. The people interviewed were: the Director of Support and Development for Small and Medium Enterprises of the Government of the State of Nuevo León; the Coordinator of the Service Center for Small and Medium Enterprises of the Government of the State of Nuevo León; the head of the State Commission for Regulatory Improvement of the Government of the State of Nuevo León; the Coordinator for the Promotion of the Impulsa Nuevo León Program; the Director of Planning and Public Policies of the Government of the State of Nuevo León; and the Director of the Economic Development Commission of the Nuevo León Council. To systematize the opinions of the interviewees, the ATLAS.ti computer program was used and the categories created are presented in Table 2. Finally, the ideology of the actors involved was contrasted with three key precepts of neoliberalism that were identified. Results: 1. The Government of Nuevo León does not have information about the number of jobs generated by the companies that receive government financial support. 2. The planning of public policy instruments is carried out, mainly, by the private sector. 3. The business chambers of Small and Medium Enterprises are the ones that are mainly involved. 4. Financial support is granted after companies go to the government to request it and there is no research and development. 5. Financial support is mainly concentrated in the formal Micro, Small and Medium-sized enterprises, but there is no updated registry. 6. Monitoring is carried out as long as the companies continue to attend to the offices of the government of Nuevo León. Conclusions: It is concluded that it is necessary to redesign the public policy instruments under the leadership of the government of Nuevo León and to link, specifically, the target population of the programs with the forms of state intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a new concept, entrepreneurial political activity based on corporate political activity to understand when an entrepreneur, representing both the firm and the individual simultaneously, will engage in political activity. The case of petty traders in Kumasi, Ghana generates grounded theory of entrepreneurial political activity. Faced with an existential threat, informal entrepreneurs had to decide whether to try to influence government policy by engaging in political activity. Findings from over 200 interviews demonstrated entrepreneurs carefully considered the state's willingness to allow for the extra-legal economic activity in the informal economy to continue, and if they had trust in the leadership of the collective action before engaging in political action. Policy saliency motivating action was determined by growth orientation and dependency on the venture for household survival, both driven by the entrepreneur's social role in the social system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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