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The U.S. Supreme Court has heard several cases regarding special education. These cases have resulted in decisions that have addressed issues involving special education programming and procedural issues. On March 21, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling in Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools. This decision, which was the most recent special education case heard by the highest court in the United States, involved litigation in special education. In this brief article, we address the Supreme Court's decision in Perez by (a) examining the background of the case, (b) reviewing the decision by the lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, and (c) discussing the implications of the case for special educators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An economic model of news contends that the pressures of limited column space and market competition force media actors to be strategic concerning which notable events receive exhaustive coverage, if any at all. Applying this framework to the Supreme Court can explain why coverage of the Justices' decision-making has historically been sensationalized and reserved for decisions sure to have a pronounced effect on public discourse. However, the emergence of social media as a practical alternative for mass media dissemination raises notable questions, chief among them being whether the economic framework fully extends to this newer medium. In this study, I analyze media coverage of the Court's decisions using Twitter and observe important distinctions among environments for news dissemination. I argue that the apparent reduction in the economic costs associated with coverage dissemination and consumption on social media platforms like Twitter requires viewing Supreme Court news in these environments through an amended theoretical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In examining public evaluations of governing institutions, are job approval and legitimacy related? This question has dominated scholarship on Supreme Court legitimacy for decades. Conventional wisdom suggests that specific support (e.g., job approval) and diffuse support (e.g., legitimacy) are independent. Specific support captures short-term orientations based on policy alignment with the Court. Legitimacy is a long-term perspective reflecting more fundamental support for the Court as a governing institution. We challenge the paradigm that job approval and legitimacy are largely unrelated concepts. Specifically, we employ a variety of statistical techniques and panel data to show that changes in legitimacy are a direct effect of changes in public approval. Salient decisions and Court vacancies directly shape approval and indirectly shape legitimacy through their effects on approval. Longitudinal analysis confirms that changes in job approval precede and predict changes in legitimacy. These results suggest that the Court needs public approval, and its public approval is rooted in outcome-oriented perceptions of its decisions and membership. Further, sustained low levels of approval will eventually erode legitimacy and limit the Court's influence over policy. Thus, like the outwardly political executive and legislative branches, it is important for the Court to build political capital through job approval. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to establish that capital punishment is not rational and cannot be rationalized without suicidally destroying the very ground on which lawful and rational punishment bases itself. It argues that in capital punishment, just as in any lawful punishment, the criminal is both held (humanly) rational and therefore culpable. But, unlike other forms of punishment, in capital punishment, the condemned is at the same time, held as irrational and irredeemable, beyond reform, and therein outside the ambit of rationality and humanity. In this sense a fundamental aporia is reached in rationalizing capital punishment because of the contradiction between the basis of punishment (the human as rational) and its operational logic (the condemned person as beyond reform therein irrational). Expressed another way, the judge proclaims a form of infallibility in their reasoning where the incorrigibility of the judgment is horrifically demonstrated and ironically reflected (and projected) in the incorrigibility of the condemned. This broad argument is pursued in two parts; one part interprets canonical texts such as Hobbes, Hegel and Foucault, while the second part interprets the Supreme Court of India's jurisprudence around the death penalty. While these are very different discourses it will be shown that they share much common ground in their expressing—and negotiating—the fundamental problem as described above. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal defendants can face significant pressures to plead guilty, but wrongful conviction scholarship has largely overlooked the study of guilty pleas. This study content analyzed 139 Australian appellate court judgments in which a guilty plea conviction was overturned, investigating the types of errors involved in these convictions, and the stage of the criminal justice process at which the errors occurred. The findings revealed that errors occurred during the police investigation, pretrial preparations, and formal court procedures, with the most frequent errors involving incorrect or inappropriate charges, inadequate legal representation, and the courts erroneously accepting a guilty plea. The findings raise important implications regarding the adequacy of safeguards to ensure guilty pleas are appropriate or factually and legally accurate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]