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Most students of political opinions would concur that it is "a rather disillusioning experience" to push "beyond the expression of narrow and superficial attitudes in the mass public to the cognitive texture which underlies these attitudes."' Despite rising educational levels and dramatic increases in the quantity and quality of political news, the mass public still has little factual knowledge about politics. Many political analysts believe that the mass public ought to know more than it does to perform its political functions properly, particularly in voting for the presidency.2 They measure citizen performance against the ideal citizen model of normative democratic theory. According to that theory, the ideal citizen informs himself fully about political issues and then decides rationally

The Republican mayor of New York City, John Lindsay, becomes a Democrat. Two ambitious young Republicans in the House of Representatives, Ogden Reid of New York and Donald Riegle of Michigan, do likewise. A former Democratic governor and prospective presidential candidate, John Connally, becomes a Republican. Another former Democratic governor, Mills Godwin of Virginia, leaves his party and accepts the Republican nomination for that same office. Meanwhile, two states of the once-solid Democratic South, Tennessee and Virginia, elect a majority of Republicans in their delegations to the House of Representatives. And four states of the former Republican heartland of the upper Midwest-South Dakota, Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin-send to the Senate eight Democrats and not a single Republican. What does it all mean? Political scientists and journalists have been speculating for a decade that a major realignment of the American two-party system may be taking place. Every presidential election during that period

MORE THAN A HUNDRED YEARS AGO the angry abolitionist, William Lloyd Garrison, complained that "The Republican party has only a geographical aversion to slavery .... It is a complexional party, exclusively for white men, not for all men, white or black." Another famous abolitionist, Frederick Douglass, made a similar observation about the nature of the early Republican party. "The cry of Free Men," Douglass lamented, "was raised not for the extension of liberty to the black man, but for the protection of the liberty of the white."1 Most, if not all, abolitionists accepted these contemporary estimates of Republican racism.2 In recent years many historians have also accepted these views of the antebellum Republican party. They argue that opposition to the geographical expansion of the black race largely explains Republican opposition to the spread of slavery; in opposing slavery's extension, Republicans actually sought to preserve the privileges of free white men. For example, in his widely read essay, "Abraham

The geographic pattern of support for George McGovern in the face of his decisive defeat in the 1972 presidential election reveals a striking association with the social groups most disaffected from the Nixon Administration. A mixture of Blacks, Spanish-speaking Americans, Indians, laborers in primary production activities, campus reformers, and most Massachusetts voters stand out on the map of counties for McGovern.

A psychological theory which suggests that a person's attitude toward any object is a function of his beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs is presented. Thus, in the political arena, a person should like or dislike a given candidate because (a) he believes the candidate has certain personal characteristics, is affiliated with certain reference groups, or is for or against various issues; and (b) evaluated these characteristics, groups, and issues positively or negatively. Evidence from a local survey in the 1964 presidential election supports this theory and its application to voting behavior. In addition, the data clearly indicate that voters do take partisan stands on some issues, do clearly discriminate between the candidates vis-a-vis certain issues, and do change their beliefs during the course of a campaign. These data suggest that a new protrait of the American voter is overdue.

THE RULES OF POLITICS, as its students and practitioners are well aware, are seldom neutral. Throughout our history, the electoral college, which largely constitutes the "rules of the game" for presidential elections has been an object of frequent and recurring controversy.1 A major task confronting political scientists and one which is relevant to the debate over the merits of the electoral college, is to explore further its biasing effects on our presidential election system. Who is helped by the electoral college? Who is hurt? Some research along these lines has already been done.2 Most

If there are times when the ability to read critically comes into keen focus, it would seem that election years are rightly among them. For during political campaigns not only is there no shortage of material to be evaluated, but there is a plethora of information responsible citizens must peruse in their process of determining intelligent voting preferences. The 1972 presidential election campaign was waged on striking issues such as income distribution, Vietnam, tax reform, Pentagon spending, corruption in government, and most of us would probably agree that candidate positions were unblurred and substantially different. Even though these differences were real and apparent enough, careful analysis of newspaper and magazine articles were necessary because slanted reporting was rampant, one of the most obvious being the propaganda labelling technique. "Tricky Dick" and "One thousand per cent McGovern" are two vivid examples of the labelling tactics. Seemingly, many people are inclined to accept labels rather than make a voting choice based on a study

The relationship of social class to partisan choice in the United States has declined during the postwar years. Through an analysis of presidential election surveys conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan from 1948 through 1968, it is demonstrated that this decline is largely a result of generational change. Strong relationships between class and partisan choice persist among older voters, but among younger voters these relationships are weak. A time-series cohort analysis provides considerable support for an historically based generational explanation for age-group differences and permits examination of one process through which partisan realignments may occur.

URING the early stages of the 1968 presidential election campaign, spokesmen for many national news media suggested that the facility with which supporters of George Wallace were able to get enough petition signatures to have his name placed on the ballot in state after state was a reflection of broadly based popular enthusiasm, especially in the North.' However, evidence from earlier social science research indicates that an individual who signs a petition need not be particularly committed to its stated purpose.2 The questions to which we intend to address ourselves are, first, how committed to Wallace's presidential aspirations were the people who signed a petition ostensibly on his behalf? Second, to what extent were these individuals representative, demographically and politically, of the general electorate in the same community? Our evidence is based on questionnaires we mailed, in October 1968, to systematically drawn samples of registered voters and of individuals in a mediumsized western city who signed a petition to have Wallace's name listed on the ballot.3 Approximately 800 people completed and returned these instruments.4

(1969). The porch and the stump: Campaign strategies in the 1920 presidential election. Quarterly Journal of Speech: Vol. 55, No. 3, pp. 256-267.

Without much question, the third-party movement of George C. Wallace constituted the most unusual feature of the 1968 presidential election. While this movement failed by a substantial margin in its audacious attempt to throw the presidential contest into the House of Representatives, in any other terms it was a striking success. It represented the first noteworthy intrusion on a two-party election in twenty years. The Wallace ticket drew a larger proportion of the popular vote than any third presidential slate since 1924, and a greater proportion of electoral votes than any such movement for more than a century, back to the curiously divided election of 1860. Indeed, the spectre of an electoral college stalemate loomed sufficiently large that serious efforts at reform have since taken root.At the same time, the Wallace candidacy was but one more dramatic addition to an unusually crowded rostrum of contenders, who throughout the spring season of primary elections were entering and leaving the lists under circumstances that ranged from the comic through the astonishing to the starkly tragic. Six months before the nominating conventions, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been the expected 1968 protagonists, with some greater degree of uncertainty, as usual, within the ranks of the party out of power. The nominating process for the Republicans followed the most-probable script rather closely, with the only excitement being provided by the spectacle of Governors Romney and Rockefeller proceeding as through revolving doors in an ineffectual set of moves aimed at providing a Republican alternative to the Nixon candidacy. Where things were supposed to be most routine on the Democratic side, however, surprises were legion, including the early enthusiasm for Eugene McCarthy, President Johnson's shocking announcement that he would not run, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in the flush of his first electoral successes, and the dark turmoil in and around the Chicago nominating convention, with new figures like Senators George McGovern and Edward Kennedy coming into focus as challengers to the heir apparent, Vice President Hubert Humphrey.

ONE OF THE MOST critical issues in Argentina's recent political history concerns the source of popular support for Juan Per6n. His followers ardently maintain that El Lfder won devotion from "the common people;" detractors insist that he hoodwinked and exploited gullible illiterates. Historical and sociological interpretations have emphasized Peron's connection with "the urban working class" and "displaced migrants," but these observations raise as many questions as they answer.' What sort of urban community, working class, or migration? How about other social sectors? What happened in the rural areas? Voting returns from the 1946 presidential election offer one promising means for attacking such problems. It was this election, of course, which marked the beginning of Peron's decade-long dictatorship. Starting his climb to national prominence in 1943, Peron launched his "impossible candidacy" in late 1945 and overcame the combined opposition of all former national political parties-plus the indiscreet resistance of the U.S. State Department-to win a solid 54 percent majority. Most commentaries upon this extraordinary achievement have derived from eyewitness accounts, partisan state* The author is Associate Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, and would like to thank the Graduate School at Wisconsin for helping to fund this research. David R. Olson provided expert assistance in the computer programming; Michael Leavitt and James R. Taylor gave valuable advice on the presentation of the data. 1. Recent analyses include Gino Germani, Politica y sociedad en una e'poca de transici5n: de la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires, 1963), Ch. 9; Samuel Baily, Labor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, N. J., 1967); Peter G. Snow, "The Class Basis of Argentine Political Parties," American Political Science Review, 63:1 (March 1969), 163-67; Peter H. Smith, "Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Peron," Political Science Quarterly, 84:1 (March 1969), 30-49. For some conflicting views on the general question of Peron's popularity see Joseph R. Barager (ed.), Why Pero'n Came to Power: The Background to Peronism in Argentina (New York, 1968).\An important new study, based on a survey taken in 1965, is Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leader and Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina (Cambridge and London, 1971), esp. Chs. 4 and 5.

The recent presidential elections in Germany aroused world-wide interest in spite of the strictly limited constitutional powers of the president. For the first time the German voters were privileged to select the chief executive of the state. The question whether they would turn to some one in sympathy with the pre-war regime or would select an adherent of the Weimar republican constitution was one the answer to which might have important bearings on European politics. Moreover, the personalities of the candidates, especially in the second election, were such as to add to the interest which both Germany's friends and foes felt in the outcome.

HE POLITICAL ROLE of Negro citizens in northern industrial cities has been described and discussed in numerous reports and commentaries on Negro political behavior, particularly in reference to presidential and gubernatorial elections.' In presidential elections, for example, the best available data indicate that Negro voters have been supporting the Democratic party since 1936, by contrast to a history of strong allegiance to the Republican party in the seventeen elections from Reconstruction through 1932.2 Moreover, it is evident that the northward migration of southern Negroes, plus the accelerated migration to California,3 has served to enlarge the numerical force of the Negro body politic. In the single decade from 1940 to 1950, for example, Negro migrants accounted for more than 50 per cent of the increase in potential Negro voters in various northern cities (Table I). In several outstanding cases, Negro migrants accounted for no less than 80 per cent of the increment.4 As a consequence of such increments, Negro voters in northern and western industrial cities have achieved a balance-of-power position in local, state and national elections." On the national level, this position was notably effective in contributing to Mr. Truman's dramatic victory in the presidential election of 1948. When one recalls that his victory would not have been possible without the electoral votes of California, Illinois, and Ohio, and that he managed to

The waning days of October 1956 marked the start of what President Dwight David Eisenhower referred to in his memoirs as "the most crowded and demanding three weeks of my entire Presidency." The presidential election was entering its final most hectic stage a severe drought was menacing agriculture in the Southwest the Suez War was raging and threatening to cut off vital oil supplies to Western Europe and the President’s chief foreign policy advisor Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had been taken to Walter Reed Army Hospital to undergo a serious emergency operation for cancer of the intestine. Finally to further compound this domestic uncertainty and foreign turmoil American policymakers were confronted with the Russian suppression of a revolution which had erupted in the Soviet Eastern European satellite of Hungary. Despite some hawkish saber-rattling in the American press and in the Congress the United States says Eisenhower "could do nothing" to aid the rebels because of the danger of a war with the Soviet Union. However the President felt that it was imperative for the United States to help "in every way possible" those refugees fleeing from "the criminal action of the Soviets." (excerpt)

THE attitude of America toward Catholicism does not seem to have undergone any change as a result of the presidential election. It continues to be that of tolerance touched with friendliness. This attitude does not imply that America is fully reconciled to Catholicism; much less that she is enamored of Rome; but only that she is willingly according to Catholics her characteristic hospitality. Having publicly repudiated anti-Catholic prejudice, America has adopted "friendly tolerance" as a working basis in dealing with Catholicism, pending a more thorough understanding of it.

THE APPEARANCE of the book Le Difi amgricain by Jean-Jacques ServanSchreiber, the editor of the Paris newsweekly L'Exprdss, has provoked discussions in French intellectual and political circles which can perhaps now be called the new French preoccupation. The book itself is not strikingly original. Nevertheless it is a constructive as well as an important book, for it outlines issues which others have expressed in rather incomplete fashion. Furthermore, it represents a focal point of the issues upon which the "new" Frenchmen of the coming generation of leaders are likely to concentrate. Lately, it has become the conversation topic in public discussions among the intellectual and political elites. The book has become the subject of debate between two of the most promising young political leaders who are likely to play important roles in post de Gaulle France. These are the leaders of the noncommunist leftist Fe'ddration, M. Frangois Mittenrand, a former presidential candidate who ran against de Gaulle during the December 1965 presidential election (and who received, on the second ballot, 45.50 percent of the vote cast, against de Gaulle's 54.49 percent'), and M. Val~ry Giscard d'Estaing, former Minister of Finance, an independent "neo-moddre" and member of the majority. The debate was broadcast on the Europe No. I radio.2 The discussion went even as far as the President of the Republic at the Elysde Palace, during a press conference, which in the rituals of Gaullism, was a solemn occasion. Here, where the General usually explained what he thought to be the present state of the world and what he intended to do, he dealt only with those questions he wished to answer and ignored all others. When asked whether he has read Le Difi amiricain and what he thought of it, he replied curtly and understandably, "Ici, on ne fait pas de publicit6 litt~raire,"3 and proceeded on with his oracular pronouncements. What is significant about the book is that it has summed up the new set of challenges facing the country, challenges which appear to be regarded as genuine and serious by a large part of the influential groups in France. With varying degrees of acceptance by the French public, books about challenges and defeats and about the weaknesses of French society have appeared with almost every crisis which the society has faced. In a country preoccupied by the notion and fear of defeat, they have played important roles in her history. Since the Dreyfus affair and up to the Gaullist period, discussions have had a tendency to take extremist and polemic tones. But attempts to analyze contemporary conditions as well as to give warnings

The 1944 campaign was the second presidential election in which the ceilings of the Hatch Act were operative, and the first campaign in which contributions from labor organizations were prohibited. It furnishes convincing evidence of the ineffectiveness of these limitations and of the imperative need for complete revision of existing regulations of campaign funds.The financing of the 1944 campaign was subjected to close study by special committees of both the House and Senate, and their hearings and reports supplement at many important points the reports required by the Corrupt Practices Act. The most controversial issues of the campaign centered about the Political Action Committee of the CIO, and this organization was subjected to close study by both committees. The House committee, headed by Representative Clinton P. Anderson (now Secretary of Agriculture), also stressed the increasing importance and questionable practices of non-party “opinion moulders,” but did not attempt to summarize the total expenditures of the campaign. Senator Green's committee, in addition to studying certain party committees and independent organizations in detail, made a great effort to compile complete data on receipts and expenditures affecting the presidential campaign, and its report makes available what is probably the most complete and accurate over-all picture of the financing of a presidential election ever recorded. The notable recommendations of this committee will be discussed later.

URING the 1960 presidential election, pre-election and post-election questionaires were sent to a random sample of teachers at the three Washington state colleges.' From a total of 135 names taken from official listings of all the faculties, 114 individuals, or 84.4 per cent, responded to both questionnaires. This sampling represents a modest effort to gather information regarding the political beliefs and voting behavior of college faculty, with primary attention devoted to (a) the extent of formal identification with political parties; (b) the extent of political participation; (c) the bases for choosing presidential candidates; and (d) the comparative behavior of Independents and Party Identifiers. For present purposes, an evaluation of the results of the survey has been subdivided under the following headings: Political Participation; Choosing the Presidential Candidate; Independents and the Party Faithful; The Pattern of PostElection Results; and Conclusions.

One of the reasons for paying attention to the results of American mid-term elections is the hope that they will tell us something about the standing of the President's party with the electorate. But the electoral verdict is notoriously hard to interpret. Since the President is not himself standing for re-election, the verdict has to be inferred from the results of House and Senate races in which the national mood of the electorate may be obscured by local and temporary factors. This will be especially true in Senate races, with only some 33 seats at risk; but even in House elections, with some 435 seats at risk, a grave problem arises when one comes to compare the results with those of the preceding Presidential election. In every mid-term election since that of 1934, the party of the President, whether it be Republican or Democratic, has lost some of the seats it had won at the previous Presidential election. The net loss has been as low as four seats in 1962 and as high as seventy-one seats in 1938, but it has always occurred. Some loss to the President's party is considered to be ‘normal’ at mid term, and it is only to the extent that the actual loss diverges from the normal loss that implications can be drawn to the President's standing with the electorate.

O\t VER two decades ago the well-informed scholar Waldemar Gurian noted that those intimately acquainted with all aspects of German Catholic life knew that "the Catholic elements opposed to the Weimar constitution and to the Catholic Center party's alliance with the Social Democrats were much more powerful" than was commonly realized.' Probably the most reliable index to their numbers and influence is the distribution of the Catholic vote in the presidential election of April 1925, which witnessed the victory of the Protestant monarchist Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg over the democratic candidate, former Chancellor Wilhelm Marx, the leader of the Catholic Center party. Lacking common views on the constitution, Hindenburg's Catholic supporters hoped to exploit his victory for the disruption of the working relationship between the Center and the Social Democrats which was so important for the viability of German democracy in the twenties. This study will attempt to provide conclusions defining the extent of the Catholic contribution to Hindenburg's election and the connection, if any, between that contribution and the Center's orientation after April 1925. There is no doubt that a substantial number of Bavarian Catholics voted for

A recent survey by Broadcasting of television programming personnel indicates that professionals in the broadcasting field agree with the general public in holding that the Kennedy‐Nixon debates during the late presidential election campaign were among the most exciting programs ever presented on television. We know that the audiences to these “great debates” were among the largest ever recorded, but sheer numbers do not tell us why audiences paid attention to these debates in the first place, much less the potential and actual effects of these programs. The following article is one of a number being prepared by the members of the Communications Research Center at Michigan State University, covering a great many facets of political behavior in the 1960 campaign and election. The author of the following article, Dr. Lionel C. Barrow, Jr., is Assistant Professor in the Communications Research Center.

The politics of peace dominated 1968 in South Vietnam. Peace as a thoroughly abstract concept was favored by all factions. The circumstances of peace, however, constituted another facet entirely. For peace could mean potentially a freedom of movement, a freedom from brutal physical annihilation, and national independence. But, depending upon numerous contingencies, it could mean many other things to specific groups constituting a large majority of the Southern population. Fears ranged from loss of political power to the possibility of genocide. Tonkinese domination was vehemently opposed. Communist domination was unacceptable to the nationalists, the Catholics, the sects, the military, and to the host of Buddhist groups as well. National Liberation Front (NLF) aspirations called for a certain type of peace, primarily one in which at the least its adherents would not face annihilation and at the most would involve participation in political power under conditions auspicious for fairly immediate full assumption of power. Both the nationalists and the NLF felt their futures rested too much on a force beyond their control, namely, external support. Saigon feared an American betrayal, but perhaps no less than the N'LF feared a betrayal by Hanoi. The nationalists had survived one withdrawal by a Western power. Southern Communist and other insurgent forces had experienced Tonkinese politics of expediency at their expense-in 1946 when Ho agreed to a French southern presence, after 1950 when the DRV leadership effectively wrote off Cochinchina to a role limited to insurgents' survival in order to devote attention farther north, and in 1954 when the Viet Minh agreed to partition. While neither Saigon nor the NLF initiated peace moves, both were compelled to devote their energies to responding to the peace politics receiving increasing emphasis in Washington and Hanoi. In the United States, public opinion, increasingly potent criticisms in the Senate, and a presidential election developed a phase of peace politics against which Saigon's varying attempts at sabotage were futile. President Johnson's March 31 announcement of a bombing halt north of the 20th Parallel (actually the 19th Parallel) and his dramatic decision not to seek reelection in effect decided the issue. The politics of peace, not the politics of war, were to prevail. Agonizing as the politics of details would be, the agenda had been set. Hanoi's role in peace politics was evident before this point, but it too had to struggle through the agonies of the stages of this agenda. Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in Hanoi and Mai Van Bo in Paris

During the past century, national elections in the United States have rarely included a significant showing by a third party. Political parties other than the Republican and the Democratic have usually suffered from limited constituencies, either regionally or in terms o f issues. An extremely interesting phenomenon, therefore, was the presence of a "third" party in 1968. Before the Fall elections, it was believed to have had considerable appeal across the country. George W allace's American Independent Party (or occasionally, American Party or Independent Party) was frequently discussed as having the best opportunity since Theodore Roosevelt's efforts in 1912 of upsetting the political plans of the two larger parties. The general results of the 1968 Presidential Election are known. Although receiving the electoral support of nearly 10 million voters, W allace polled over half of this total in eleven Southern states. Furthermore, the American Independent Party carried only five states, all in the Southeast: Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. The 1968 Wallace-for-Presi- dent effort, therefore, has some appearances of the limited regional appeal typical o f third-party activities in Presidential politics. (1) Less clear than the general results are the characteristics and spatial pattern of elector support. This paper reports briefly upon preliminary research which deals with voter characteristics and the distribution o f voter support for George W allace in 1968. Data have been analyzed by statistical methods for eight states in the Southeast: North and South Carolina, Ten­ nessee, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Although Wallace received many votes in Arkansas, Virginia, Texas, and Kentucky, among other states, data for one o f the variables considered important to the analysis w ere not available for these states. (2 ) Visual examination of the election results is extended to include Virginia and Arkansas. ORGANIZATION AND LIMITATIONS. The analyses presented here have been divided into three sections. First, the county-to-county distribution of Wallace vote is examined. This pattern is the per cent o f votes received by Wallace from the total number cast in each county. Second, an attempt is made to identify some of the significant characteristics o f W allace supporters. This attempt is made through statistical analysis of county population

T WENTY-FIVE years ago the possibility of measuring public opinion with any degree of precision was at least as remote from public consciousness as the atomic bomb. Today public opinion polls are in everyday use by industry, government, and academic institutions. They have become familiar to the general public, and are perhaps accepted too casually. The quantifying of attitudes or opinions has developed certain techniques which have become fairly well standardized in the hands of the foremost practitioners today. These techniques have brought the light of research to bear on problems of industry, government (including psychological warfare), and education; and the result in recent years has been of enormous significance. A good deal of experimentation has been conducted in opinion research methods during the past ten years-the period during which polling has actually risen to prominence; yet the basic techniques remain very much the same as in 1936, when Elmo Roper, George Gallup, and Archibald Crossley correctly predicted the result of the Roosevelt-Landon Presidential election.

Viewing the American Dream as two myths, both essential to the identity and destiny of America, this essay argues that the 1972 presidential election required an endorsement of Nixon who represented a materialistic myth or of McGovern who personified a moralistic myth, that the outcome of this quadrennial ritual signified the way Americans want presently to conceive of themselves and suggests the way the American experiment may be going.

The decision by President Johnson early in 1965 to commit large numbers of American military forces to fight in South Vietnam led many liberal and "leftist-oriented" individuals and groups to reconsider their support for what they had previously considered a "friendly" Administration. In effect, the decision produced a state of "cognitive dissonance" among persons who had supported President Johnson's civil-rights and social-welfare policies and had applauded his opposition to Senator Goldwater's bellicose stand on Vietnam during the 1964 presidential election campaign.'

In Latin America, where elections are usually something less than expressions of the popular will, it is significant that in Chile one of the most decisive political decisions was resolved at the ballot box. Of two-and-a-half million votes cast, Eduardo Frei, the Christian Democratic candidate, received 56%. The Socialist-Communist coalition candidate, Salvador Allende, received 39%, while Julio Duran, the candidate of the former foremost electoral party, the Radical Party, received slightly less than 5 %. With the exception of the usual bribery charges and the emphasizing of the fact that illiterates who compose 25% of the population (and who are mostly lower class) are excluded from voting, even the Communist daily El Siglo editorially commented that Frei won the popular mandate. This was both a personal triumph for Frei and a political vindication for the Christian Democratic Party which began in the late thirties as a split-off from the old traditional Catholic Conservative Party.

The purpose of this article is to explore some ecological dimensions of South Korean electoral behavior as disclosed primarily in the last three presidential elections, with particular emphasis on the presidential election of April 27, 1971. Specifically we propose: first, to present some descriptive voting statistics on the assumption that the Korean election data will constitute a useful addition to the growing data base for comparative analyses of electoral behavior. Second, we will attempt to organize the data with the use of multivariate statistics in order to present a parsimonious descriptive