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The problems of war termination in the post World War II period and the advent of the nuclear age are addressed from the point of view that most conflict will be in the nature of non-nuclear limited war. Yet the nuclear influence will ever be present and the threat of escalation to nuclear war will act as a catalyst to quicken termination. The emergence of a non winner-loser concept is discussed, and the need for an institutionalized approach to conflict termination is shown. The Korean War and the Yom Kippur War are compared to contrast the problems of war termination where super power interests are involved. The provision for a solution to the underlying issues that precipitate each conflict is seen as the only real basis for permanent termination.

The author concludes that with regard to the negotiation of a general settlement, the threat of Soviet sabotage or veto appears limited by inadequate control over client behavior and by concern for global objectives of equal or greater weight than Middle Eastern stakes. If the present controversy between Egypt, Syria, and the PLO develops into a serious split, Soviet cooperation will most likely be withheld, if only because Moscow lacks the degree of influence and trust among its principal clients required for a role which could jeopardize the Soviet position in the region. With respect to the Soviet role in the implementation of a settlement, this paper argues (1) Soviet participation in a guarantee to Israel would be both incredible and dangerous; (2) A Soviet guarantee to the Arab side complementing an American guarantee to Israel would, under conditions of continued Arab-Israeli conflict, be a prescription for maintaining if not sharpening Soviet-American tensions in the Middle East; and (3) A multilateral or UN guarantee would ease the second problem only at the cost of destroying the usefulness of the guarantee.

Current methods and techniques used by industry program managers to manage commercial and defense systems projects were evaluated to determine possible recommendations for industry and the military departments. Data was obtained from a questionnaire and by personal interview: Little difference between administrative technique used for commercial and defense systems program was found. Surprisingly, commercial projects seem to make greater use of networking techniques such as critical path or PERT, indicating that defense programs and projects may need to reconsider the use of the techniques. Also, earned value or cost/schedule control system criteria is widely used for cost control on both commercial and defense systems projects. The study indicated that the need for program manager influence in negotiations with customers and in the control of the subcontract and quality aspects of projects may require further evaluation. Client or customer satisfaction was found to have greater emphasis in commercial than in defense programs. There is, apparently, greater freedom of the commercial project manager -- an area for possible improvement in the management of defense programs by both industry and the military.

The report describes research efforts to develop and apply quantitative indicators to national security problems. The report consists of two volumes. Volume I, the Executive Summary, is a non-technical review of the research accomplishments with special emphasis on their potential, immediate applications within the defense and intelligence communities. Volume II, the Technical Report, summarizes the specific results of the fiscal 1975 research effort. Volume III contains appendices to the Technical Report. Procedures and rationale for new indicators and methodologies for manipulation are described. These indicators and methodologies are then applied to research questions concerning the national security behavior of Japan and the results are reported and evaluated., See also Volume 2, ADA015203.

The report develops and demonstrates various means of using quantitative indicator technology in analyzing and predicting future international trends. Three generic types of indicators were created to enhance the analysts abilities to estimate future international interaction trends: international, internal, and economic. Issue content, intensity of participation, behavioral tone, and other types of indicators were used. Two innovative methodologies were devised to help the policy analyst: Event patterning for decision analysis which combines usually and statistically the attributes of interactive tone, intensity, and time; and power strategy impact analysis, involving aspects of power strategies in statistical analyses of interactive tone over time. The results were a number of techniques of potential use to the analyst of international behavior., See also Volume 2, ADA015203.

There are four elements in decision making: the set of possible alternatives, the criteria for good decisions, the possible outcomes of each possible alternative in terms of the criteria and the preference for the outcomes in terms of the criteria. These four elements grow and vary with the time. The decision process stops when one or several alternatives are found to be optimal, satisfactory and the benefit of further search cannot justify the cost or pain of further search for information. This observation of decision dynamics makes it possible to capture the essence of complicated dynamic multicriteria decision making. It also supplies a framework to study the fascinating and mysterious concepts of persuasion and negotiation. Effective rules for persuasion and negotiation are discussed with examples. It is pointed out that the present for negotiation is quite different from that of classical game theory. In this setting, realistic negotiation or bargaining processes can be incorporated.

The Long Road Home is a companion work to the recently published book on the prisoner of war experience in Southeast Asia-Honor Bound by Stuart I. Rochester and Frederick Kiley. The two books were prepared at the request of former Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr. Some of the early research and drafts of a few chapters are the contribution of Wilber W Hoare, Jr., and Ernest H. Giusti, former JCS historians who helped initiate the project. Davis carried forward the research and writing to completion over a period of many years and is entitled to the fullest credit for production of the final text and documentation. This history of Washington's role in shaping prisoner of war policy during the Vietnam War reveals the difficult, often emotional, and vexing nature of a problem that engaged the attention of the highest officials of the U.S. government, including the president. It examines frictions and disagreements between the State and Defense Departments and within Defense itself as a sometimes conflicted organization struggled to cope with an imposing array of policy issues: efforts to ameliorate the brutal conditions to which the American captives were subjected; relations with families of prisoners in captivity; the proper mix of quiet diplomacy and aggressive publicity; and planning for the prisoners' return. At a pivotal juncture the Department of Defense exerted a major influence on overall policy through its insistence in 1969 that the government "Go Public" with information about the plight of prisoners held by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. There is evidence that this powerful campaign contributed to the gradual improvement in the treatment of the prisoners and to their safe return in 1973. The detailed account of negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam makes clear how important in all U.S. calculations was securing the release of the prisoners.

The issues reflected in this paper deal primarily with the controversy in U.S.-Panamanian relations during the past decade, negotiations to resolve the situations, value of the canal to the United States, and the role of the military during this period and in the future. After the incidents of 1964, the United States sought to revise its canal policy and remold its relationship with Panama along lines geared towards present day international politics. It seems negotiations are now going ahead in earnest, and within a short period of time a satisfactory conclusion should result, thereby bringing a mutually-agreeable resolution to an issue which has remained a source of contention and a major obstruction to amicable relations between two nations.

The Panama Canal is a perennial source of misunderstanding and disagreement between the United States and the Republic of Panama, and indeed between the U.S. and much of Latin America. Since the Panama riots of 1964, the U.S. and Panama have engaged in a seemingly fruitless effort to establish new understandings regarding the canal. At the moment it appears that they are no nearer to cooperation regarding the status and administration of the Canal than they were in 1964, and are probably farther from agreement than they have been at any time since 1903. This essay includes a history on the treaties and background of the Canal, the political problems, its economic significance and its strategic military importance. It is this author's opinion that United States presence in the Canal Zone is most important and that we cannot relinquish control of this area.

Under the hypothesis that the United States will renegotiate its treaties with the Republic of Panama, the purpose of this essay is to determine a new military role for the Armed Forces in the Canal Zone should this occur during the 1975-1985 time frame. In this conceptual review, possible threats and preventive measures were examined. Factors such as the capabilities of the Russian maritime forces in this hemisphere and the means available to the US Armed Forces in a time of crisis were studied. Recommendations are made concerning US interests and their interrelationships with our national objectives in this area should the hypothesis become a reality.

The report discusses the potential significance for United States- China relations of a better understanding of Chinese Communist patterns of strategy and negotiation. These patterns are clarified by considering strategic maneuvering in relation to interaction and influence generally, and by viewing Chinese Communist behavior against the background of Chinese models of cooperative and antagonistic relationships. Major strategic themes discerned include avoidance of clinches, keeping the initiative, and utilization of contradictory opposites. Chinese negotiation emphasizes either assumptions of harmony, or struggle between adversaries; the premises of Western diplomacy clash with both.

The research is centered on Chinese Communist political and cultural themes, with some comparative examination of non-Communist Chinese and Soviet Communist materials.

On June 17, 1967, Secretary Robert S. McNamara directed that a Task Force be formed to study the history of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II to the present. Mr. McNamara's guidance was simply to do studies that were "encyclopedic and objective." With six full-time professionals assigned to the Task Force, we were to complete our work in three months. A year and a half later, and with the involvement of six times six professionals, we are finally done to the tune of thirty-seven studies and fifteen collections of documents contained in forty-three volumes. In the beginning, Mr. McNamara gave the Task Force full access to OSD files, and the Task Force received access to CIA materials, and some use of State Department cables and memoranda. We had no access to White House files. Our guidance prohibited personal interviews with any of the principal participants. The result was not so much a documentary history, as a history based solely on documents--checked and rechecked with ant-like diligence. Pieces of paper, formidable and suggestive by themselves, could have meant much or nothing. Perhaps this document was never sent anywhere, and perhaps that one, though commented upon, was irrelevant. Without the memories of people to tell us, we were certain to make mistakes. Yet, using those memories might have been misleading as well. This approach to research was bound to lead to distortions, and distortions we are sure abound in these studies. To bring the documents to life, to fill in gaps, and just to see what the "outside world" was thinking, we turned to newspapers, periodicals, and books. We never used these sources to supplant the classified documents, but only to supplement them.

This monograph describes the background, progress, and results of negotiations for the acquisition of airfields in Latin America for use by the Army Air Forces before and during the Second World War. Included in the study are the negotiations conducted by representatives of the Panama Canal Department and the Caribbean Defense Command in Panama and at other outlying sites in the Latin American area. Also included are the negotiations carried out by officials of Pan American Airways in conjunction with the establishment and improvement of airfields under the Airport Development Program. The study concludes with a treatment of the discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom and colonial officials in regard to the acquisition of air base sites in the British Caribbean Dependencies under the Destroyers-Bases Agreement., Air Force Historical Study no. 63.

Arms control and disarmament studies and negotiations continue in the face of the limited conflict and Cold War setting of today. It is recognized that superior U.S. nuclear power has successfully prevented a World War III and that the survivable nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to balance the scales of world power. However, the threat created by the progress of France and, more particularly, Red China in the development of independent nuclear capabilities, coupled with the continued mistrust between the United States and the USSR, makes reduction of the opposing nuclear umbrellas unacceptable to either power. A further consideration of the treaty commitments of the United States, coupled with several U.S. presidential doctrines of assistance to free peoples, reveals that the United States cannot enter into a plan of even conventional military force disarmament with the USSR. There is a need for a world policeman, and until the United Nations develops such a capability, the United States must continue to play the part to ensure its national security., Replaces ADE750484.

Since the close of World War II, the concept of aggression has assumed an increasing role in the exercising of the Communist world's foreign policies and objectives. Aggression can take many forms and avoids specific definition. It is the purpose of this essay to investigate some basic fundamentals of the Soviet strategy of aggression to better understand its role in the international arena. A review of Leninism indicates that there is good reason to believe that it is the basis for the Soviet concept of aggression. Lenin's philosophies toward war, negotiations, the principle of association, peaceful coexistence, and national liberation movements are still valid and practiced in modern times. In applying Leninism to an analysis of Soviet strategy, it is important to realize that the world situation of today differs from that existing at the time Lenin developed his theories and concepts. Although the Soviet-stated attitudes toward peaceful coexistence and national liberation movements appear to support the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the implementation of these attitudes indicates the contrary. Under the guise of peaceful coexistence and support of the right to self-determination, the Soviets plan to continue furthering their national objective to spread communism throughout the world., Replaces ADE750531.

THIS TECHNICAL APPENDIX summarizes the major theoretical articles bearing on the theory of performance contracting. No general, definitive statement of that theory has been found, but most of the major elements of the theory are presented. Two especially pertinent contributions are reviewed: "A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship," an article by H. A. Simon, and Optimal Rewards in Incentive Systems, a Ph.D. dissertation by C. N. Yowell, Jr. These analyses could provide a foundation for a fully articulated theory of performance contracting. All the other articles reviewed are concerned with the theory of incentives for cost reduction. This theory, usually discussed in the context of the Federal Government and defense contractors, is simply a specialization of the general theory of incentives, and several of its assumptions are so restrictive that they severely limit its application to most performance contracting situations.

Sixty-six graduate business students were assigned to represent union or company according to their attitudes about industrial relations. After receiving information about a strike which had started, each S participated in joint study, unilateral study or strategy groups, then bargained with an S representing the other side who had the same prior group experience. Negotiators with study group experience needed six simulated days or less, on the average, to reach agreement. Strategy planners averaged 32.6 simulated days in negotiations, experiencing many deadlocks. In comparison to unilateral study, bilateral study primarily affected agreement about the importance of issues but not the ease of negotiations. Longer strikes produced settlements more costly to the company, but closer to the rate prevailing in comparable firms. Task-oriented negotiators reach agreements closer to this going rate.

This study paper examines interfacing relationships of the government engineer in three selected areas of the procurement process. In the areas of solicitation, negotiation and litigation the roles and motivations of both functions are examined in the light of the weapon system acquisition process. The proposition is set forth that proper understanding of certain considerations in these interface areas by both functional groups can contribute to higher quality procurement thus enhancing program success. The proposition is supported by illustrating the need for certain cooperative actions and highlighting the results if accomplished. (Author)

This study reviews the naval arms limitations conferences and proposals since the Hague Conference of 1899 and points out the pitfalls which can result from being too willing to negotiate in search of accommodation or peace without due regard for both political and strategic factors. This study also looks at the newly emerging multipolar world and how the Nixon Doctrine has affected these new power centers and created a need for armaments rather than reductions in armaments. The perceived need for security by these emergent powers has led them to turn to the sea and acquire sizable navies throughout the world to protect their national interests and sea lines of communication. This naval build-up could very well trigger a naval arms race and lead to naval arms limitations negotiations, at least regionally. Lastly, this study discusses historic and geographic factors which have caused the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to build large navies. The study further compares the probable aims of these two powers in possible future naval limitations negotations from the standpoint the needs of a land power versus a sea power.

Attention was placed on cost growths as related to the acquisition of weapons systems by the military services. Uncertainties exist relative to program costs, delivery dates, and product reliability. The purpose of this study is to construct a model which will assist in coping with uncertainties affecting cost. Research and development procurement is unique. A goal is purchased, not a hardware item. Vague specifications may cause contract costing problems. The weapons acquisition process encompasses concept formulation, contract definition, engineering development, and production and operation. As a scientific concept traverses the continuum from concept formulation to production, uncertainties are reduced. For this study, uncertainty cannot be distinguished from risk. Uncertainty may be classified as either anticipated for unanticipated. Each of these is classified as either exogenous or endogenous. Uncertainty is the absence of information, which may be though of as a commodity. In this capacity, information may be described and measured. Information gleaned from the internal and external environments will permit the reduction of uncertainty. The military services have attempted to cope with uncertainty by the use of incentives and contractual arrangements. The relationship between the entropy, information, uncertainty, and cost parameters enables a conceptual cost model to be developed. Entropy is a measure of information in a system. The term refers to magnitude and not meaning. Informational efficacy relates to the meaning of a message. One result of the model is the derived requirement for a total economic cost approach to weapons acquisition.

The author gives a fully documented, detailed account of the Conference.

This report is from an unsigned article in DieWoche (The Week), and deals with terrorists negotiating in Switzerland, specifically the French Red Hand and the Algerian FLN., Trans. of unsigned article in Die Woche (The Week)(Germany) n11 p1-5, 13 Mar 60.

The study conducted in exploration into the awareness and agreement among procurement personnel regarding strategy and tactics employed in Air Force contract negotiations. The proposition concerning agreement among upper and lower level managers with ragard to strategy was supported statistically, but not practically. A higher level of agreement was indicated, however, among upper level managers than lower level managers. Additional research is recommended into the impact which managers of other functional areas interfacing with procurement managers have on the strategic issues bearing on contract negotiations. (Modified author abstract)

The report presents a method of determining the construction contract performance times for military construction projects. This method is based on information that is regularly reported as feedback during the execution of a construction contract for military construction, Army projects. By organizing the data from the manpower-utilization feedback reports, a model is formulated and mathematically derived. An example of data reduction is presented, and the results of applying the methodology to these projects are reported. A proposal of implementation of the methodology in U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' district offices is presented. (Author)

The prime objective of the thesis was to determine the effect of simulation on negotiated outcomes in DoD procurement. The objective was separated into three sub-objectives: To compile a raw data base composed of results obtained from negotiations; To draw general conclusions based upon the data obtained; and, To apply the results obtained after testing the data to the contract negotiation procedures and policies as they exist today. A secondary objective was to measure the effects personal background variables may have on negotiation outcomes.

Previous bargaining experiments manipulating payoff type (real vs. imaginary) and quantity have yielded conflicting results. In general, these studies have failed to distinguish effects at different stages of bargaining and to collect data that permit discrimination among contending explanations. This experiment investigates the effect of real vs. imaginary and $2 vs. $20 payoffs on a large set of pre-negotiation perceptions of the bargaining situation. Results indicate that the two incentive variable effects are less similar than assumed. The quantity variation primarily affects strategic stance; the real-imaginary variation primarily influences the maximizing-difference orientation. Both effects are salient prior to the start of bargaining. (Author)

The method and technique of the Soviet diplomatic negotiation were analyzed from the Roosevelt - Litvinov Agreements - to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, between 1933-1954. Within this time frame, the style and technique with which the diplomats of the Soviet Union presented, considered and disposed of issues were examined, rather than the actual resolution of the issues. A discernible pattern of consistent practice persisted throughout the diplomatic encounters of the Soviet Union between 1933 and 1954. Soviet diplomatic negotiating technique was found to have a firm conceptual basis in both history and ideology. Motivated largely by national self-interest, its direction and control were highly centralized and tightly disciplined. Soviet negotiators demonstrated effective and comprehensive tactics of rhetoric and procedure to secure the goals of national policy. (Author), Report on A Trident Scholor Project.

This study examines Japanese views on major aspects of Japan's security policy debate: (a) The Self-Defense Forces--their legal status, proper level and kind of armament, and the permissibility of their overseas deployment. (b) The proper interpretation and wisdom of the Far East clause as mentioned in the present US-Japan Security Treaty. (c) The nature, actual functioning, and proper implementation of the prior-consultation clause of the treaty. The study also examines the views of the political parties on the broader question of national defense and the motives underlying their expression of these divergent views. Further the study analyzes relevant public opinion polls so as to determine the strengths of the different views among the people. Finally, the report deduces the likely changes in Japanese policy and draws their implications for US planners. (Author)

The suggestion by a mediator of a point of settlement half-way between the positions of two negotiators was found to produce substantial concessions. Concessions were also produced by high, as opposed to low, time pressures; and there were more concessions when the other negotiator had moved rapidly toward agreement than when he had moved slowly. Contrary to the main hypotheses, the effectiveness of mediation was not a function of the degree of time pressure or the rapidity with which the other negotiator had moved. Intervention by a mediator was found to relieve the sense of personal inadequacy that otherwise inheres in making concessions; and this effect was especially prominent under the condition of high time pressure and little movement from the other, which presumably produces conflict about whether or not to make concessions. (Author), Studies of the Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict.

The method by which the final report of the Experts' Conference was achieved -- the delegation of circumscribed problems to select committees -- supports the idea that a deliberately negotiatory approach would be useful in technical as it obviously is in political talks. Postwar technical conferences on arms control between the Communist and Western powers were not purely scientific meetings. The comparison of data did not alway lead to similar conclusions by the scientists of the two sides. The presentation of available facts in a technical forum led to conclusions influenced by political imperatives. Since decisions taken in political negotiations must be based on policy considerations much broader than purely scientific ones, it might help to integrate the technical and political aspects, and to consider the quest for formal arms control agreements as an essentially political or negotiatory activity.

A brief review is presented of work conducted: integration of previously collected data, preparation of new studies, and completion of various technical reports. Evaluation studies of culture assimilators were continued., See also Quarterly rept. dated Oct 68, AD-677 670.