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A persistent problem in psychological operations effects analysis has been the lack of systematic, reliable indicators and data collection methods which could be used with regard to PSYOP directed to denied areas. This report critically examines the present state of effects analysis with regard to denied areas. It also addresses problems related to the clear statement of PSYOP objectives and develops a series of concepts and approaches which may be applied to effects analysis.

The theory of multidimensional scaling is explained and the operation of a multidimensional scaling program (KYST) is examined under different input data forms and program control constraints. Using data collected from economists on the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, individual and aggregate configurations of their perceptions of economic subjects are obtained through multidimensional scaling of pairwise comparison data and are interpreted. A theory of non-interpretable dimensions is developed, and an application of multidimensional scaling as a technique for performance evaluation is suggested.

The dynamics of social change are of prime concern for many social scientists. However, in the desire to understand the broad characteristics and societal impact of revolutionary movements, we often neglect the study of the human element involved in them. Those ideologists who write revolutionary dogma or those who report the history of great revolutions speak of the masses as if they were a living being. But what of the individuals that make up the mass? What are the wants and aspirations that lead individuals to join, to remain in, or to leave these underground movements? How are law-abiding citizens tempted to the dangerous life of the underground? And once committed, what influences them to stay? What rules of behavior and decision enable them to survive such a hazardous existence? To understand the individual, his reasons, his behavior, and the pressures that society places upon him is at the heart of the problem of social change. The battleground of insurgency has been described as the hearts and minds of men. There the understanding of the human element is basic to understanding the dynamics of social change. The information synthesized in this report is but an initial step in the attempt to understand the motivation and behavior of those in underground and insurgent movements., Department of Army pamphlet no. 550-104.

Ramon Magsaysay, former mechanic, soldier, military governor, congressman, Secretary of national defense, and President of the Philippines, was successful against the Hukbalahap insurgency when two Presidents before him had failed. The evidence of this study supports the hypothesis that this leader used a unique psychological operations plan, based mainly on promise, which resulted in the 'defeat' of the Hukbalahap.

The report presents an overview of the first four months of activity on Task QUIZ. It includes a survey of potential problems in the areas of interrogation and resistance, a working conceptualization of the interrogation process, and the informal results of a number of pilot studies originating from the conceptualization.

Table of Contents include River Patrol Force (Delta River Patrol Group, Rung Sat Special Zone Operations, GAME WARDEN, Operation DECKHOUSE V); Coastal Surveillance Force; U.S. Naval Support Activity, Danang; U.S. Naval Support Activity, Saigon; THIRD Naval Construction Brigade; Salvage Operations; Communications; Organization and Command; Military Civic Action and Psychological Operations; Naval Advisory Group.

The objective of this study is to develop experimentally a method for collecting and analyzing data on culturally specific thought patterns and verbal behavior in order to achieve more efficient and persuasive intercultural communication. Intercultural communications and psychological operations require culturally specific audience information. The frame of reference of the audience, as determined by its culture, must be uppermost in the mind of the communicator if truly efficient communication is to be achieved. Accordingly, social science techniques are required which can provide culturally specific information. Experimental tasks were designed to yield data on the cultural frame of reference with special regard to its basic elements: the verbal cognitive units, their meaning content and value components, and their characteristic interrelationships. The method developed in these experiments will be referred to as Associative Group Analysis. It is based on the use of free association tasks adjustable to topics of operational interest.

This monthly history of the U.S. Naval Force, Vietnam for January 1969 covers SEA LORDS, BARRIER REEF and GIANT SLINGSHOT. Narrative and statistics are presented as analysis of this riverine warfare. A Coastal Surveillance Force Summary covering MARKET TIME, A River Patrol Force. Summary giving GAME WARDEN Statistics, a Riverine Assault Force Summary, USN Statistical Summary, Naval Advisory, Group History, VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary, Psychological and Civic Action Operation and USN Civic Action Statistical Summary are included.

Historical coverage includes: Operation SEA LORDS Summary, Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary by Campaign, Coastal Surveillance Force Summary, River Patrol Force Summary, Riverine Assault Force Summary, USN Statistical Summary, Naval Advisory Group Summary, VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary, Psychological and Civic Action Summary, USN Civic Action Statistical Summary.

Following the battle of Plei Me (19 October 1965-29 October 1965), the 1st Airborne Cavalry took all the area west of that camp to the Cambodian border as its primary objective area, with the broad mission objective to maintain contact. Initially, elements of the 1st Air Cavalry were committed at 1600 hours on 24 October at Plei Me. The Plei Me relief operation was terminated 1600 hours, 29 October, and Operation Long Reach was instituted at 0515 hours on 1 November, although contact between friendly and enemy forces was maintained during this break. Long Reach, a search and destroy operation involving four companies of the 1st Air Cavalry, took place between Plei Me and the Chu Phong Mountain region. In this operation, a prelude to Silver Bayonet but greatly scaled down in size, 85 tactical air sorties were employed in support, expending GP, frags, incendijel, and WP bombs in addition to 20 mm and 2.75-inch rockets. Final figures showed that the Viet Cong (VC) had lost 216 KIA/KBA, with an estimated 610 additional bodies carried off, and 107 VC suspects captured. Friendly losses were 55 KIA and 194 wounded in action. The operation lasted until 9 November 1965. Operation Silver Bayonet commenced 0800 hours, 9 November, coincident with the termination of Long Reach. Under the plan, the 1st Air Cavalry's 3rd Brigade was committed to sweeping the area from a point about seven kilometers west of Plei Me to the border. This comprised an area roughly 20 x 25 nautical miles centered 30 nautical miles southeast of Pleiku. The action during the following three weeks demonstrated convincingly the value of applied tactical airpower on the ground situation., Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U.S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

The CHECO report "Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in SVN," 16 September 1968, traced the early history, evolution, and expansion of psychological operations (psyops) in Southeast Asia (SEA). The report discussed the PSYOPS process required by the war in Vietnam with its peculiar problems and target groups. It explained the role of both the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in their airborne support of the program. A major portion of the report considered the in-country strategy and campaigns such as Chieu Hoi and Elephant Walk. Discussion of out-country PSYOPS concentrated on PSYOPS programs in support of the interdiction campaign in Laos and PSYOPS missions over North Vietnam. The study included an appraisal of the resource capabilities and effectiveness of the airborne aspects of PSYOPS. This report is an update and expansion of the subjects discussed in the previous report. The previous report provided necessary background material, history, and a detailed analysis of airborne dissemination techniques not included in this report. This report should be read in conjunction with the previous evaluation because of the difference in focus and emphasis between the two. Little attention has been given to those aspects of airborne PSYOPS which remained essentially as they were in 1968. This report emphasizes the changes which took place between June 1968 and May 1971 and examines facets of airborne support of PSYOPS which were not previously discussed. While the previous report considered USAF and VNAF support, this report broadens the scope and considers a variety of different airborne assets in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. Recent campaigns and changes in the total Southeast Asia picture with redeployment of U.S. forces and increased Vietnamization were also considered because of the impact these events had on airborne psychological operations., Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U.S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

This study summarizes the U.S. Air Force and Vietnamese Air Force's. activities and achievements in Psychological Operations in Southeast Asia, primarily from 1965 to July 1968. Activities covered in "Psychological Operations support national and local programs, principally by means of leaflet drops and loudspeaker broadcasts in airborne operations. Strategy and campaigns include in-country operations in the Corps Tactical Zones and out-country areas. An analytical appraisal is provided of resource capabilities and effectiveness of operations, with recommendations illustrating how Psychological Operations may be used to greater advantage., Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U.S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

This report discusses Operation FIELD GOAL, a psychological operation against North Vietnam from July 1972 to the cease-fire in January 1973, with primary focus on the problems encountered in supporting leaflet drops. Some evaluation of the effect on the enemy is also included. Two previous CHECO reports deal with the history of psychological warfare activities in Southeast Asia. The first, Psychological Operations by USAF/VNAF in SVN, 16 September 1968, traces tie early history, evolution, and expansion of psychological operations in Southeast Asia. The report discusses specific in-country programs such as CHIEU HOI and ELEPHANT WALK and also deals with psychological warfare in support of the interdiction campaign in Laos and missions over North Vietnam. The second report, Psychological Operations Air Support in SEA, June 1968-May 1971, updates and expands subjects discussed in the first report and concentrates on the changes that occurred in psychological operations between June 1968 and May 1971. The report also deals with the redeployment of 2 U.S. forces and Vietnamization of the war effort. Since this report primarily discusses a specific operation (Operation FIELD GOAL), the two previous CHECO reports on psychological operations are recommended reading for background information on (1) the problems of support for these missions in Southeast Asia and (2) the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of such operations., Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U.S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

In May 1968, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, Jr., Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, reported a major push by two North Vietnamese Army divisions in the Central Highlands was smashed by B-52 bombers "before it could get started". These words introduce one of the most dramatically successful Allied operations in the Vietnam conflict. In mid-May 1968, the enemy massed two divisions, the 325th from the Khe Sanh area and the 1st from the Kontum-Pleiku area, to overrun Allied positions in mountainous Kontum Province. This was double the force that was originally engaged around Dak To in the bitter fighting for the strategic hills in that area in November 1967. Based on what General Abrams called "solid intelligence", B-52s were requested for mass strikes, breaking up enemy concentrations and forcing a retreat across the Cambodian border to his sanctuary. In his major effort, the enemy was able to launch but one ground attack and a few attacks by fire against Allied fire support bases. "TRUSCOTT WHITE" details the action required in employing airpower in this significant campaign, and emphasizes B-52 operations and tactical airstrikes. This report shows how ARC LIGHT strikes contributed more significantly to the success of Operation MATHEWS, the Army ground operation within TRUSCOTT WHITE, than to any previous 4th Infantry Division operation., Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.

Partial contents: Air operations; Psychological operations; US redeployments; RVNAF force structure; Current Macy plans., Supplement to Volume 1, ADA955171. Sanitized version of ADC953838.

Contents: List of Charts and Photographs; Operation SEA LORDS summary; Coastal Surveillance Force Summary; River Patrol Force Summary; Mobile Riverine Force Summary; Naval Advisory Group Summary; Psychological Operations and Civic Action Summary; and Accelerated Turnover Program and Training Summary. Additional

Enemy action in the I, II, and III Corps Tactical Zones fluctuated between a low and a moderately low level in December. In the IV Corps Tactical Zone, a moderate number of enemy contacts reflected a degree of activity two to three times that reported in previous months, and was characterized by small unit crossings, mining incidents, and attacks against naval units. Contents: List of Charts, Graphs, and Photographs, Operation Sea Lords Summary: Giant Slingshot Campaign, Operation Ready Deck, Border Interdiction Campaign, Search Turn Campaign, Riverine Strike Group, Song Ong Doc Operation, Market Time Raider Campaign, Naval Statistical Summary, Coastal Surveillance Summary: Operation Market Time, First Coastal Zone, Second Coastal Zone, Third Coastal Zone, Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III, Operation Stable Door, Market Time Assets, River Patrol Force Summary: Clearwater Operations, Game Warden, PBR, UH- 1B and OV-10A Operations, Game Warden SEAL Operations, Operation Wolf Pack, Enemy Mining/Harassment/Attacks on Merchant Shipping, USN Statistical Summary, Naval Advisory Group Summary: Vietnamese Marine Corps, VNMC Operational Control Summary, VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary, Psychological Operations and Civic Action Summary: USN Civic Action Statistical Summary, Accelerated Turnover and Civic Action Summary, Vietnamese Ferro-Cement Swift Boat and Viper, Naval Support Activity, Saigon, Naval Support Activity, Danang, Third Naval Construction Brigade.

History includes: Operation SEA LORDS Summary; Operation SEA LORDS statistical Summary by Campaign; Coastal Surveillance Force Summary; River Patrol Summary; Riverine Assault Force Summary; USN Statistical Summary; Naval Advisory Group Summary; VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary; Psychological and Civic Action Summary; USN Civic Action Statistical Summary and Accelerated Turnover Program and Training Summary.

Contents: List of Charts/Graphs/Photographs, Operation SEA LORDS summary: Barrier Reef Compaign,Tran Hung Dao Campaign, Market Time Raider Campaign, Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary, Operation SEA LORDS statistical Summary, Coastal Surveillance Force Summary; Operation Market Time, Market Time Units, Market Time Statistical Summary, Operation Stable Door; River Patrol Force Summary; Game Warden, PBR, UH-1B, and OV-10 Operations, Game Warden SEAL Operations, Enemy Harassment/Attacks on Merchant Shipping, PCF Operations in Game Warden Areas, Mobile Riverine Force; Operations in Kien Hoa Province, Operations in Long An Province; USN Statistical Summary, Naval Advisory Group Summary-Vietnamese Navy, Vietnamese Marine Corps, VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary, Psyops and Civic Action Summary; USN Civic Action Statistical Summary, Accelerated Turnover Program and Training Summary, Commander U.S. Naval Forces Vietnam/Chief Naval Advisory Group Staff Reorganization, Glossary of Abbreviations.

Contents: OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY: Giant Slingshot Campaign, Border Interdiction Campaign, Search Turn Campaign, Riverine Strike Group, Market Time Raider Campaign, Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary (USN&VNN forces), Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary (Combined results by all friendly forces involved). COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY: First Coastal Zone, Second Coastal Zone, Third Coastal Zone, Operation Market Time, Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III, Operation Stable Door. RIVER PATROL FORCE SUMMARY: Game Warden SEAL Operations, Enemy Harassment/Attack on Merchant Shipping, Task Force Clearwater, USN Statistical Summary, NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY: vietnamese Naval Shipyard, Vietnamese Marine Corps, VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY: USN Civic Action Statistical Summary. ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY.

Historical coverages includes: (1) Operation SEA LORDS Summary, (2) Operation SEA LORDS Statistical Summary by Campaign, (3) Coastal Surveillance Force Summary, (4) River Patrol Force Summary, (5) Riverine Assault Force Summary, (6) USN Statistical Summary, (7) Naval Advisory Group Summary, (8) VNN/VNMC Statistical Summary, (9) Psychological and Civic Action Summary, (10) USN Civic Action Statistical Summary.

The study was undertaken to identify special operations (SO) activities performed by Air Force personnel. This information is needed for management decisions related to attendance, course schedules, and content of training courses for the USAF Special Operations School. Officer and airman job inventories were constructed to include work tasks related to psychological operations, civic actions, counterinsurgency, and unconventional warfare. These inventories were administered to all personnel identified by commands as performing SO activities. Complete returns were obtained from 404 officers and 189 airmen, most of whom reported spending only part time on SO tasks. The study includes an analysis of SO job types and ratings of the extent of need on the job of certain courses and educational topics related to SO.

The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) conducted an evaluation of US Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the period 1 December 1968 to 31 March 1969. The objectives of the ACTIV evaluation were to: Determine the capability of US Army PSYOP units to accomplish their assigned missions under existing organizational concepts. Describe and analyze the tasks performed by US Army PSYOP units in RVN to accomplish their missions. The unit was committed to the development, production, and dissemination of propaganda material for tactical and strategic PSYOP in support of joint and combined counterinsurgency operations.

ORO set out to appraise the performance and psychological reaction of troops undergoing their first experience with the A-Bomb. Analysts were with the troops (before, during, and after the Exercise) observing individual behavior as evidenced by views expressed publicly and privately, by conduct, and by emotional reaction indicated by the polygraph. The men performed adequately and gave no outward signs of fright. Physiological evidence showed there was significant tension. Performance, when A-Bomb is used, of typical troops in combat cannot be predicted from this maneuver. (Author)

The study examined the civil military roles of indigenous armed forces under varying conditions of internal and external threats. The study analyzed political, economic, public service and security roles engaged in by 40 indigenous armed forces in developing countries in four world areas: Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Near East, under normalcy and threat conditions. From the findings, implications for U.S. Army advisory and assistance operations were derived. Given the pervasive interactions among the IAFs and their civilian environments the study attempted to elaborate a theory that views internal conflict as a contest for the control of the mobilization base between the indigenous armed forces and the insurgent.

Contents of this volume include: Pacification and Nation Building, Psychological Operations, Logistics, Research & Development, Special Problems Areas, Contingency Plans and MACJ5 Studies, and Economic and Fiscal Developments. Keywords: Psychological warfare; Enemy reactions; Morale; Discipline; Press; Prisoners of war; Security; Contingency plans; Country Mission Stabilization Program., See also Volume 3, AD-A955 099. Sanitized version of AD-C953 793.

This report contains the following sections: (1) Theoretical Problems of Psychology in the Realization of Class Struggle, (2) How Psychology Can Be Of Service to Socialist Construction, (3) How to Develop Medical Psychology in China, and (4) Industrial Psychology in China., Trans. of Hsinli Hsueh-pao (Acta Psychologica Sinica) (China).

Trans. of Filosofska Mys'l (Bulgaria), v15 n5 p81-93, 1959.