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IT is a trite observation in the context of international humanitarian law that the universal remedy for the non-implementation of the existing law is to make more law. Jurists are, however, fully aware of this wide lacuna of implementation in the normative structure which we have come to call international humanitarian law. They realise that the deficiency is serious, and that unless it is remedied much of the attempt to construct a system of international humanitarian law will be dissipated, and worse, may even bring that body of law into disrepute and neglect. When one considers the system of supervising the implementation of the Geneva (Red Cross) Conventions, 1949,' by a Protecting Power, or the resort to penal processes for grave violations of those conventions, or the use of reprisals as a mechanism of law enforcement, the picture, as reflected in State practice since 1945, is not encouraging. The classical system under which a Protecting Power supervises the application of the law of armed conflicts has virtually disintegrated and shows no signs of resuscitation. Admittedly, a majority of armed conflicts in the post-1945 era have been of a non-international character in which the Protecting Power system has no place under the existing law. However, even in admittedly international conflicts the system has not been invoked. In the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962-63, the Chinese People's Republic used the fact that diplomatic relations had not been severed as a ground for denying the resort to the Protecting Power system. It is not generally appreciated that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are virtually inoperative without the active role and participation of the Protecting Power system. At the same time, the conventions purport to make no change in the classical system of establishing Protecting Powers and the manner of their operation. This system rests

The word “neuter” comes from the Latin ne-uter, which means, neither the one, nor the other. Neutrality is an essentially neutral notion. It qualifies above all the abstention of someone who remains outside a conflict who does not openly express an opinion of either side.In international law, neutrality is the opposite of belligerency. It is the position adopted, in relation to two Powers at war, by a State not taking part in the struggle. The status of neutrality regulated by juridical rules and in particular by the Hague Conventions involves rights and duties. In short, it implies refraining from taking part officially, either directly or indirectly, in hostilities. In the first place, therefore, it is a concept of an essentially military character. However, as a result of a recent evolution in events and thought, some people tend to think that neutrality should also have effect in the economic sphere, in view of its importance today in the war potential of countries.

In our previous issue, we reported on the opening meeting on 24 May 1971 of the Conference of Government Experts, convened in Geneva by the ICRC, and at the same time we gave the texts of the opening speeches which revealed how important the meeting was. The Conference finished on 11 June and we now quote below the message of the President of the ICRC at the closing session, as well as three papers delivered outlining the work of the Conference.

Il y a 300 ans cette année, naissait le grand juriste hollandais Cornelius van Bynkershoek, auteur de divers traités de droit public et international. Il convient, à juste titre, de rappeler le souvenir de celui qu'une cour américaine appelait encore, en 1812, un «juriste de grande reputation». La Croix-Rouge, qui assume aujourd'hui la part créatrice la plus importante peut-être dans le domaine du droit international humanitaire, dont d'ailleurs elle precède, ne doit pas oublier que l'une de ses principales sources réside dans la doctrine du droit international, ou droit des nations, telle qu'elle a été enseignée par les auteurs des temps anciens, fondateurs du droit international. A cet égard, chacun se souviendra du nom de Hugo Grotius, tandis que celui de van Bynkershoek semble totalement inconnu. Il peut y avoir une raison à cela, mais avant de l'évoquer, voyons qui était van Bynkershoek.

This paper raises the question as to whether the United Nations peacekeeping forces could be awarded a civilian status during the armed conflict in which they are deployed; which is important for the determination of prohibition of attacks against them. The paper is based on the premise that distinction between civilians and combatants is crucial under international humanitarian law. In doing so, this paper briefly analyses the nature of UN peacekeeping operations and the qualification of the UN forces’ members as civilians or combatants. It also delves into the emerging category of UN robust peacekeeping operations to ascertain whether its personnel would be treated as civilians or combatants in the context of an international armed conflict.

In its circular No. 478 of 15 April 1970, the International Committee of the Red Cross had the honour to inform you of its work since the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross with a view to the reaffirmation and development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts, consistent with several resolutions adopted by that conference.

The XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross, meeting at Istanbul in September 1969, devoted its Resolution XIII to the reaffirmation and development of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts. That resolution, the text of which is appended hereto, assigns to the International Committee of the Red Cross some heavy tasks, in particular that of drawing up proposals in that field for submission to governments.

The article presents a theoretical analysis of the tools for guaranteeing and securing the right to health in armed conflicts. It has been determined that in the system of international legal regulation of medical care, international humanitarian law and IPHR are complementary legal systems. The approach to the right to health in armed conflict from the point of view of the MLSP is based on the principles of non-discrimination and equality, as well as on the right to affordable, acceptable and quality medical care. Two factors: on the one hand, raising awareness of the obligation to respect the rights to protect medical personnel and the right to receive safe and timely medical care, and, on the other, to accountability, to better fulfill these obligations, can be an effective way to improve the health situation staff and patients during armed conflict. This is a sound basis for the implementation of several recommendations of the XXXI International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent to disseminate and better disseminate knowledge of the obligations arising from international humanitarian law and the ICCPR. The delineation of the spheres of regulation of international humanitarian law and the IPPL in the context of armed conflict has been studied. It is concluded that international humanitarian law is more subject to regulation in armed conflicts, whereas the ICCL, with a constantly broader scope both in peacetime and in armed conflicts, has a lesser degree of legal detail, that is, more international humanitarian law. regulates those human rights and freedoms that arise in it only with the occurrence of a legal fact - the beginning and / or end of an armed conflict. The basic international legal acts that regulate the observance of the right to health during armed conflict are analyzed and their interrelation is examined. It is determined that the responsibility for observing the right to health and medical care rests with the States Parties to the United Nations General Assembly and the World Health Assembly and is distributed in proportion to the economic and social development of the countries: if the conflict extends beyond one country, economically developed countries should assist developing countries. Possible restrictions on human rights aimed at preventing the spread of infectious diseases for reasons of national security or public order are outlined. It is determined that the opportunity to receive medical care for all those who need it, in the conditions of armed conflict, is a guarantee of the exercise of the rights of medical personnel working in the conflict zone.

The International Committee of the Red Cross had the honour of providing you, by Circular 483 of September 1971, with a report on the work of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts which was held in Geneva from 24 May to 12 June 1971. The same Circular informed you of the second session of that Conference which would be open to all States expressly party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and that, in order to closely associate National Societies with this work, the International Committee had decided to invite representatives of those societies to attend as observers.

Uncertainty and its problems The debate concerning the law, ethics and policy of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) remains at an early stage, but one of the consistent emergent themes is that of uncertainty. Uncertainty presents itself as a problem in several different registers: first, there is the conceptual uncertainty surrounding how to define and debate the nature of autonomy in AWS. Contributions to this volume from roboticists, sociologists of science and philosophers of science demonstrate that within and without the field of computer science, no stable consensus exists concerning the meaning of autonomy or of autonomy in weapons systems. Indeed, a review of definitions invoked during a recent expert meeting convened by states parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons shows substantially different definitions in use among military experts, computer scientists and international humanitarian lawyers. At stake in the debate over definitions are regulatory preoccupations and negotiating postures over a potential pre-emptive ban. A weapons system capable of identifying, tracking and firing on a target without human intervention, and in a manner consistent with the humanitarian law obligations of precaution, proportionality and distinction, is a fantastic ideal type. Defining AWS in such a way truncates the regulatory issues to a simple question of whether such a system is somehow inconsistent with human dignity – a question about which states, ethicists and lawyers can be expected to reasonably disagree. However, the definition formulated in this manner also begs important legal questions in respect of the design, development and deployment of AWS. Defining autonomous weapons in terms of this pure type reduces almost all questions of legality to questions of technological capacity, to which a humanitarian lawyer's response can only be: ‘If what the programmers and engineers claim is true, then … ’ The temporally prior question of whether international law generally, and international humanitarian law (IHL) in particular, prescribes any standards or processes that should be applied to the design, testing, verification and authorization of the use of AWS is not addressed. Yet these ex ante considerations are urgently in need of legal analysis and may prove to generate deeper legal problems.

This Chapter analyzes the current discourse on the legality of autonomous weapons (‘killer robots’) under international law, and seeks to offer a novel prism through which to discuss the challenges that such systems pose: namely, we advance the view that modern warfare is an exercise of executive power by states against individuals and should thus be subject to basic notions of administrative law, chiefly the obligation to exercise proper administrative discretion. When autonomous weapons are deployed, state power is exercised against individuals through a computerized proxy. When the power to make ‘decisions’ that affect basic rights is transferred to computer systems such as autonomous weapons, the duty to exercise proper administrative discretion is compromised. Chiefly, this is because at least in the foreseeable future, such machines would be incapable of exercising ‘true’ administrative discretion. This problem is especially acute when autonomous weapons are deployed in asymmetric settings, where civilians are put at risk, but also, arguably, when deployed against enemy combatants.

Introduction The international debate around autonomous weapons systems (AWS) has addressed the potential ethical, legal and strategic implications of advancing autonomy, and analysis has offered myriad potential concerns and conceivable benefits. Many consider autonomy in selecting and engaging targets to be potentially revolutionary, yet AWS developments are nascent, and the debates are, in many respects and necessarily, heavily circumscribed by the uncertainty of future developments. In particular, legal assessments as to whether AWS might be used in compliance with the conduct of hostilities rules in international humanitarian law (IHL) are at present largely predicated upon a forecast of future facts, including about the sophistication of weapon technologies, likely capacities and circumstances of use, as well as the projected effectiveness of state control over any use. To conclusively assess legal compliance, detailed information about the AWS as developed or used would be required. However, to date, only minimal attention has been paid to transparency in the AWS context. What kinds of AWS information (if any) should governments share, with whom and on what basis? How will the international community know if autonomy is developed in critical functions and, if AWS are deployed, if they are used in compliance with international law? How might autonomy developments be monitored to enable fact-based legal analysis? Or, if autonomous targeting is prohibited or specifically regulated, how might compliance best be assured? Will existing institutions, norms or requirements for transparency be adequate? These crucial questions have not yet been debated. This chapter explores the challenge of fact-based legal assessments for autonomous systems, and proposes that the international community begin to focus directly and systematically on transparency around AWS development and use. As a step towards deepening an international AWS transparency dialogue, this chapter offers a broad framework for disentangling distinct categories of transparency information, relationships and rationales. Given the lack of an existing well-defined transparency architecture for weapons development and the use of lethal force, transparency discussions should not wait until AWS substantive debates further mature or for the international community to settle on a response to the substantive concerns raised. Rather, transparency should be analysed alongside ongoing legal, ethical and strategic debates. Without attending to transparency, states risk developing autonomy in an environment that lacks information-sharing norms designed to advance lawful weapon use and development, democratic legitimacy and states’ strategic and security interests.

As Falk notes, the International Criminal Court represents an idealistic mentality, optimistic about the possibility of reforming the international system in order to prevent certain behaviour by establishing an international authority capable of punishment and deterrence. Growing support for the International Criminal Court can be directly related to the growth of legal regimes committed to the protection of human rights, and to the growth of international humanitarian law, which presupposes a conception of the individual as the bearer of rights and obligations, as well as an interest in protecting the individual from gross violations of human rights. Now that the International Criminal Court has received sufficient ratifications from Member States of the United Nations, it exists as a legal entity with jurisdiction over international crimes and a mandate to hold perpetrators of human rights abuses accountable for their actions. As such, the Court can be seen as a declaration that certain behaviour will not be tolerated by the international community, and that individuals will be held accountable for violating these standards. (author's abstract)

This paper contends that the uncertain status of employees of privatemilitary security companies (PMSCs) in international humanitarian law (IHL) created an accountability gap. A brief history of PMSCs discusses the trends that led to the emergence of these companies and the war on terror as the main contributor to their multiplication. An analysis of the status of PMSC employees by using the instruments of IHL indicates that they have no “set” status. Whether they are civilians or combatants depends on the tasks they undertake and their relationship with the state. Furthermore, the analysis of the Nisoor Square shooting in Baghdad in September 2007 demonstrates that the uncertain status of PMSC employees creates an accountability gap, and breaches of IHL can go unpunished. Moreover, this paper contended that states that hire PMSCs can implement measures so that PMSC employees may be held accountable for wrongdoing.

This presentation postulates that the protections offered by International Humanitarian Law were shaped by and continue to reflect social constructions of vulnerability and victimhood. Specifically, it examines Article 17 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which reads:“The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to conclude local agreements for the removal from besieged or encircled areas, of wounded, sick, infirm, and aged persons, children and maternity cases, and for the passage of ministers of all religions, medical personnel and medical equipment on their way to such areas.”This provision—by listing people who are socially constructed as vulnerable—fails to provide protection for all civilians. Adult men and women are not protected by this article. Empirical research suggests that some of these excluded civilians may be at greater risk when a besieged enclave is captured. Military-aged men are socially constructed as, at least, potential combatants and may be summarily executed by the attacking force. The continued failure to recognize and provide protection based on this reality undermines the fundamental principles of non-discrimination (among non-combatants) and distinction (between combatants and non-combatants) in International Humanitarian Law. Ultimately, this essay argues that non-combatants could be better protected through an assessment of the actual risks faced by individual civilians.

We are responsible for the world of which we are a part, not because it is an arbitrary construction of our choosing but because reality is sedimented out of particular practices that we have a role in shaping and through which we are shaped. Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway [R]esearch and development in automation are advancing from a state of automatic systems requiring human control toward a state of autonomous systems able to make decisions and react without human interaction. DoD will continue to carefully consider the implications of these advancements. US Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap This chapter takes up the question of how we might think about the increasing automation of military systems not as an inevitable ‘advancement’ of which we are the interested observers, but rather as an effect of particular world-making practices in which we need urgently to intervene. We begin from the premise that the foundation of the legality of killing in situations of war is the possibility of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants. At a time when this defining form of situational awareness seems increasingly problematic, military investments in the automation of weapon systems are growing. The trajectory of these investments, moreover, is towards the development and deployment of lethal autonomous weapons – that is, weapon systems in which the identification of targets and the initiation of fire is automated in ways that preclude deliberative human intervention. Challenges to these developments underscore the immorality and illegality of delegating responsibility for the use of force against human targets to machines, and the requirements of international humanitarian law that there be (human) accountability for acts of killing. In these debates, the articulation of differences between humans and machines is key. The aim of this chapter is to strengthen arguments against the increasing automation of weapon systems, by expanding the frame or unit of analysis that informs these debates. We begin by tracing the genealogy of concepts of autonomy within the philosophical traditions that animate artificial intelligence, with a focus on the history of early cybernetics and contemporary approaches to machine learning in behaviour-based robotics.

When the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts was officially opened on 20 February 1974 by the Swiss Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Pierre Graber, much preparatory work had preceded this event. Some of this was recorded in earlier Volumes of this Yearbook. We will first continue this record with a description of the events which took place since the last report (June 1972) and then describe the proceedings of the Diplomatic Conference itself.

When, on 12 August 1949, the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva finished its work, an important part of the law of armed conflict had been “codified and progressively developed” in the light of past experience both of the Second World War and other recent armed conflicts. However, this was a far cry from saying that one could lean back in satisfaction over a job well done; indeed, equally –or perhaps even more– important problems of the law of armed conflict had remained outside the scope of the Conference and, hence, had not found a solution in the four Conventions it had adopted. The Conference had, in fact, been restricted to an examination of the problems concerning protection of war victims rather than those concerning warfare proper; and, although the IVth or Civilians Convention in particular incidentally deals with the power of belligerents to attack enemy territory, the problem of the protection of the civil population against the dangers of modern warfare had remained essentially open.