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As a form of intragroup conflict, religious schism must not necessarily be a consequence of disagreements over religious beliefs and practices nor should the dissenting body necessarily show inclination toward religious puritanism and holiness. It is possible that disputes in a religious body may concern problems which are often considered outside the domain of religion or at most on its periphery. This proposition is consonant with the fact that religion is intricately interwoven with other institutions. Therefore, as a society or a group shifts its interests or experiences significant structural changes, all institutions, including religion, come under strains. In a predominantly immigrant minority group whose religion serves as the primary source of its identification, the different segments may come to perceive the functions of their church differently, in accordance with their life objectives which reflect their differential life experiences. The dissenting group may try to rearrange the functions of the church by giving to its immediate temporal goals. The magnitude of a religious cleavage can be measured by objective and subjective criteria. The subjective criteria on which this study of the schism in the Serbian Orthodox Church in America is based include the respondents and the explanation of motives which they impute to certain segments of the ethnic group for taking one side or another in the church controversy. Since a great number of respondents belong to either segment of the ethnic group they then explain their own reasons for preference in the church controversy. While these opinions disclose the kind of perception of motives of one faction by the other they also are indicative of their latent intentions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been an unfortunate misalliance of terms whereby "secular" is taken for a direct equivalent of "profane." Possibly it arose because "sacred" is used in sociology with two distinct meanings, each of which is cast as an opposite of one of the terms. Yet Durkheim's dichotomy of "sacred" and "profane" cannot be equated with Becker's dichotomy of "sacred" and "secular." In Becker "sacred" refers to a legitimation of practice through tradition or flat, "secular" to a more rational legitimation due to a need for change. Unfortunately, the meaning of Durkheim's terms is less clear-cut. But, with him, "sacred" has to do with the holy, and "profane," least explicit of the four terms, with the violation of the holy. There is, again, a colloquial use of "secularization" which takes it to mean an exemption of part of life from religious surveillance. This emancipated area of life has its own standards and sovereignty, and a society having the two kinds of standards in segregated spheres is said to be "secularized." Then religion may be influenced by "secular" standards to be "secularized" and denatured. Yinger charges Herberg and Berger with compounding and confounding colloquial meanings like this in their use of "secularization." The looseness in the colloquial use of "secular" suggests that it might be better avoided in sociological discussion. In what follows I shall draw distinctions in terms of Durkheim's and Becker's dichotomies. However, to obviate confusion I shall render Becker's dichotomy closed-secular, reserving "sacred" for sacred-profane. But the sacred-profane dichotomy needs fuller elaboration, and the notion of the sacred advanced here is really an extension of Durkheim's use. it is one which lies close to Eliade's use and has certain parallels with Simmel's idea of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The grouping together of Holiness and Pentecostal religion for purposes of sociological analysis is not justified. Despite the common theological base and forms of anti-worldliness which they share, Pentecostalism and Holiness religion are distinguishable from one another in terms of the types of religious experience they emphasize. Considerable differences are found in the extent to which their doctrines are distinctive, their organizations exclusive, their meetings inspirational, and their following from the lowest social strata. These differences suggest a greater tendency for Pentecostalism than for Holiness movements to generate sects. The differences are attributed primarily to the highly subjective and invisible nature of Holiness religious experience which has few implications for separatism and enables many Holiness movements to remain interdenominational. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The true mystic is one who seeks to reconstitute the fragmented elements of experience, not to arrive at a conceptual synthesis, but to replace normal consciousness with spiritual chaos. In this state the mystic is able to renew himself by regression to an undifferentiated state of consciousness, in which there is no longer self or "other." It is only by regression to the most archaic levels of religious feeling that one can penetrate the disguises of God, experiencing him as reality, and not as mythical hero or benign father-figure. In this sense, mysticism is different from the attitude of ritual devotion, which stubbornly refuses to repudiate its Adamic nature. The mystic dares to cast off his ego, and along with it, the Adamic nature. The mystic dares to cast off his ego, and along with it, the expectations of others. In this way he replaces the tyranny of the self and of others by the absolute freedom of his surrender to holiness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author explains how ecumenism became the test case of religious faith. He asserts that being ecumenical allows one to practice unity, holiness and apostolicity while expressing peace. With regard to the deficit of peace, he cites faith, love and hope as its important prerequisites. He also stresses the irrelevance of a Christianity that not only lacks credibility but also fails to relate to the increasing need of peace of mankind.

Emile Durkheim has as nobody else brought together power and holiness as pre-requisites for each other. Power was holiness, and holiness was power. Power should here be understood as the ability to act collectively or on the behalf of the collective. Power comes—and not only for Durkheim- from out of the collective. The collective is, however, for Durkheim, holy, all imperative anduncompromising, unapproachable and incorruptible. The holy, "le sacré", is thus always of social origin and can only be explained sociologically. Durkheim may well call the holy for a religious category, but the religious phenomena are in themselves products direct from collective feelings, phenomena, through which the collective expresses itself in holiness and thereby continually celebrates and strengthens itself.

The article presents a play adaptation of the book "Story of Liberty."