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This article shows that the impact of coinsurance varies across medical services in a systematic fashion depending upon the time price of the service. There is little firm information in the economics literature on demand elasticities for medical care. If anything, there is a consensus that demand elasticities are large. In 1967, a 25% coinsurance rate for out- patient physician services was introduced for a large group of individuals in Palo Alto. Before that, the coinsurance rate had been zero. Observations on 2567 individuals were obtained during the first full year before the coinsurance (1966) and the first full year after the coinsurance (1968). The data shows that home visit expenditures decreased much more than office visits; the computed arc elasticity for such expenditures was 0.37. Since time costs are essentially zero for home visits, the higher elasticity of demand for home visits is strong evidence supporting our theory of time-price and money-price responsiveness. There are also Canadian data available on utilization of physician services, but these cannot properly be used to derive an elasticity of demand. Unlike the Palo Alto case, where the insured constituted a small fraction (16%) of the medical group's practice, in Canada the insurance coverage of entire regions was changed.

This article comments on the article "Minimum Premium Health Plans: Insured Non-Insurance," by Robert D. Eilers, featured in the March 1969 issue of the "Journal of Risk and Insurance." Under the Mini-Met plan, the cash flow and the financial position of both the insurer and the employer are the same. Furthermore, the risk undertaken both by the employer and by the insurer is the same under the arrangement and the conventional group insurance plan. The author argues that under the circumstances, it is difficult to understand how one can be considered insurance and hence subject to premium tax, and the other non-insurance and free of premium tax.

The article discusses a speech by Dr. Walter Bogs on "Health Insurance for Retirees" and what differentiates those pensioned benefit recipients from others. Bogs sketched the history of German health insurance through its statutory reform in 1956 and the controversy over current employees' paying premiums to support the retired population's health care partly from pension insurance.

The article discusses the disbursements and premiums in German health insurance for pensioners. The author presents sample calculations that purport to show the system is financially sustainable if the ratio of gainfully employed contributors to the insurance fund compared to pensioned benefit recipients does not fall below 2:1.

The article discusses the circumstances under which health insurance premiums are not mandatory, namely when employment is occasional in nature or in instances in which regular monthly earnings are below a certain level. The author finds the legal phrase "otherwise not gainfully employed" unclear in meaning. A further confusion about the time limits on employee assistance is described and exemplified.

The article discusses a report by the Verband der Rentenversicherungstraeger (VDF - Association of Pension Insurance Carriers) that announces more favorable non-deficit benefit financing for 1970 based on expectations of a 17% rise in premiums. Statistical projections of future ratios of premium-paying workers to pension entitlement recipients are presented.

The article discusses in detail the clauses in German law pertaining to health insurance eligibility for pensioners and surviving dependents. Regulations dealing with the amount of insurance premiums and duration of social insurance enrollment to qualify for health and pension entitlements are presented.

The article discusses the advice tendered by the Social Policy Committee of the Bundestag on the Change in Financing Law as a precursor to the success of the medium-term financial planning effort by the German government. Provisions involve raising social security premiums and certain health insurance premiums.