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T he most pervasive themes that marked world reaction to the first manned landing on the moon on July 20, 1969, related to its meaning for man as man. The United States itself deliberately chose this emphasis, as witness the plaque left behind, "We came in peace for all mankind"; Neil Armstrong's "one small step for a man, one giant leap for mankind"; and the dramatic high point of President Nixon's earth to moon exchange, "For one priceless moment in the whole history of man, all the people of this earth are truly one." But no amount of suggestion by the United States can possibly explain the universality and the evident wholeheartedness of the thought that man generally-as distinct from men of one nation, or of one political alignment, or one social system-had achieved a historic triumph and one that must change his future condition and his future international relationships. Perhaps the best way to understand is to take a look at what others around the world actually said. The "success of America" is a "success for every living man" asserted the Swahili-language Ngurumo of Dar as Salaam.1 Elsewhere in Africa: Rabat's al-A nbaa noted simply, "In Morocco we watched this adventure ... and we were proud of ourselves and what the human mind had achieved." Freetown's Daily Mail saw the landing as "the most striking event in human history." Fraternite-Matin of

This raises a fundamental question about the management, in its largest sense, of the U.S. space program and the other activities undertaken in response to the Sputnik experience. Has the whole operation represented but another highly successful one-shot exercise in crisis management, or has it represented incorporation into American society of a new way to organize, systematically and purposefully, the development and use of scientific and technological resources to the furtherance of national goals? It is too early to discern the answer to this question. But how it is answered will heavily weight any final appraisal of the comparative results of the U.S. and Soviet space programs.

During the next decade, the United States will be facing new global problems unimaginable a few years ago. In attempting to foresee these problems, there are two uncertain factors: (1) the extent of domestic problems' effects on our international role and (2) the extent of isolationist trends engendered by the waning "devil" theory of communism and by the frustrations resulting from the Vietnam war. The realities of the 1970's should include: a continued bipolar world; attempts by the two superpowers to alter international power relationships; greater co-operation between them in areas where neither has an overriding interest; further narrowing of the gap between the superpowers and the secondary powers; greater influence of China in Asia, counterbalanced by her internal struggles and the influence of Japan and India; gravitation of the regional alliances toward politico-economic rather than military objectives; proliferation of nuclear weapons, increasing world instability; widening of the gap between the developed and less-developed nations, with resultant tensions and population problems; increased multilateral aid, accompanied by self-help; and intensified trade and balance-of-payments difficulties. Great change, with potential dangers, will be the keynote of the next decade, but change and opportunity go hand-in-hand. Bold, effective leadership will be needed to deal with the challenges of the 1970's.—Ed.