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Although the writer would not necessarily agree with Elliot (1969) that the most serious bottleneck to agricultural development in Zambia is seasonal, short-term credit, long-term credit and infrastructural capital, it is nevertheless clear that a comprehensive and adequate agricultural credit service has yet to be provided. In the provision of this the commercial banks have a role and one that can be justified from the point of view of all parties concerned. One commercial bank has demonstrated what can be done through maintaining a reasonably consistent policy. The cause of more rapid rural development can only be enhanced by a more general adoption of such a policy in close co-operation with Government.

THE SOCIAL and economic implications of personal borrowing and a renewed interest in consumerism have brought attention to many aspects of consumer finance. The cost behavior of small-loan operations is one of the major factors in the evaluation of regulations for the small-loan industry. The purpose of this paper is to present the results of an empirical investigation of the cost structure of consumer finance company loan branches and to discuss the results in the context of regulations on the licensing of small-loan operations and rate regulations. The scale economies issue and the loan size-cost relationship are of particular interest in this discussion. The present results are compared with previous research on the cost of small-loan operations of consumer finance companies and an attempt is made to clarify some apparent conflicts in the analysis of the scale economies issue. Present results are compared also with cost studies of commercial bank instalment loan departments. Because of the similarity of the operations in the two cases, the results are expected to be basically similar with respect to the scale economies issue.

COMMERCIAL BANKS which are members of the Federal Reserve System are required to hold reserves in the form of deposits in their district Reserve Bank. With respect to demand liabilities, these minimum reserves are calculated as a percentage of "net" demand deposits held in the commercial bank by its customers. Net demand deposits equal gross deposits minus the sum of cash items in process of collection and balances held in domestic commercial banks. In brief, the demand deposits against which reserves must be held are total demand deposits less "due from." Under the present system of calculating required reserves, the decisions of banks to change the form in which they keep the bulk of their cash assets, i.e., as between reserves and interbank deposits, affect the total excess reserves of the banking system and thus the total volume of deposits that a given cash holding of the system would support.' Consider a reserve city bank (RC) which holds deposits of a correspondent bank, say a country bank (CB). Assume that CB has a 10 per cent required reserve ratio; RC has a 20 per cent ratio. Now, CB transfers a $100 deposit from RC to its Federal Reserve bank.

Would uniform reserve requirements for all deposit institutions significantly increase the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve policy and end adverse discrimination against commercial bank deposits? This article says it's not likely and shows why.

Empirical economic analysis requires precise definitions of the variables under study. This has been clearly brought out in the recent discussions regarding the relative abilities of autonomous expenditures and money in predicting income or consumption (see Friedman and Meiselman 1963, 1965; Hester 1964; Ando and Modigliani 1965; and DePrano and Mayer 1965). One of the by-products of the discussion was that the definitions of the variables used are important, and to a certain extent the results may be biased in favor of or against a particular theory by the manner in which the relevant variables are defined. In these studies, a great deal of attention was focused on the concepts of autonomous and induced expenditures, and relatively little was done (except by Friedman and Meiselman 1963) to solve the long-standing problem of the definition of money. It is, therefore, not surprising that in empirical research economists use a "narrow" (currency outside banks, plus demand deposits adjusted) as well as a "broad" (currency outside banks, plus all commercial bank deposits) definition of money. In recent years, arguments have been put forward by Gurley and Shaw (1956, 1960), and others inspired by their work, to further broaden the definition of money by including in it liabilities of nonbank financial intermediaries. Gurley and Shaw maintain that the liabilities of the nonbank financial intermediaries are close substitutes for money, and that the rapid growth of these liabilities in recent decades has had the effect of reducing the demand for money. On the other hand, Professor Friedman (1959) and his associates (Friedman and Meiselman 1963; and Friedman and Schwartz 1963) prefer the "broad" definition of money, and, on the basis of historical evidence, show that only commercial

Commercial bank investments in marketable issues of the federal government were reduced from $84.7 to $55.0 billion, or by 35.1 per cent, between February 28, 1946, when the peak in holdings was reached, and December 31, 1948.1 This reduction in investment holdings has evoked numerous analytical treatments of concomitant changes in portfolio structure. In such analyses, changes in the term structure of the portfolios have usually been given greatest emphasis.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THIS ARTICLE is to examine the impact of monetary policy on commercial bank demand deposits. More specifically, we will examine (a) the time lag involved between changes in unborrowed bank reserves and subsequent changes in demand deposits, and (b) the magnitude of the eventual deposit multiplier. The lagged response. of banks to changes in reserves is but one among many time lags that occur between the formulation of monetary policy and its ultimate impact on the economy. In examining the time that it takes for the full effect of changes in reserves to be reflected in the level of demand deposits, we are thus focusing attention only on the first link in the chain of reactions that follow upon the execution of a given monetary policy. A fixed relationship between bank reserves and deposits is regarded as a key factor in the implementation of monetary policy, since only under such conditions are the monetary authorities able to determine with some precision the effect of their actions at the time of making their decisions. This relationship has been the subject of many studies in the past; the more recent among them are those of George Horwich, Robert Black, Ira Scott, and James Meigs.1 In general, these authors found a close relationship between changes in bank reserves and changes in deposits (or earning assets), though they also noted a lag in the response. The purpose of this article is to examine this relationship using data for the period 1954-1963.

ECONOMIC historians have not provided a satisfactory discussion of the banking collapse of 1933. There are two reasons for their disinterest. First, while state systems contributed 80 percent of the commercial bank failures during the crisis year, banking statistics from state authorities are erratic, difficult to consolidate, and in some cases simply not available. Second, there already exists a set of generalizations based upon contemporary accounts which provides plausible answers to most of the obvious questions.' The purpose of the following article is to explore the usefulness of these generalizations by applying them to 1932-1933 failure patterns in Iowa, and to suggest further research activities which need to be undertaken in order to construct a more powerful analysis. By 1930 the United States had already experienced a decade of unusually high bank suspension rates. Between 1920 and 1930 the annual incidence of failure per one hundred active banks did not fall below 1.2; this compared with an average record of 0.4 suspensions per hundred from 1900 to 1920.2 While the geographical distribution of bank failures shifted markedly during the 1920's, the West North Central states maintained-during this decade and during the years from 1930 to 1933-a level of failure which consistently exceeded the national average. The West North Central average annual suspension rate was 3.2 per hundred banks during 1921-1929 and 10.6 per hundred banks over the period 1930-1933.

THIS STUDY ANALYZES the differential effects of management (management effects) and other selected variables on commercial bank profitability and the operating relationships through which these effects are transmitted and relative profitability determined. Management effects are the results of differences in bank management objectives, policies, decisions, and actions reflected in differences in bank operating relationships, including profitability. The operating relationships reflect (1) overall profitability and gross revenue;(2) funds-use measures (asset-management measures, including "returns" on the uses); (3) funds-source measures (deposit and capital measures, including "costs" of the sources); and (4) expense measures. The other variables tested for significance include total deposit size (size effects), regional geographic location (district effects), and changes in -the general environment (time effects). Size effects are the results of differences in bank size, represented by total deposits. District effects are the results of differences in regional location, represented by Federal Reserve districts. Time effects are the results of differences in the general economic environment, represented by changes over time. Note what the purpose of this study is not. It is not to determine the actual determinants of a given level of profitability. Nor is its purpose to generalize how the overall level of bank profitability performance can be improved. The study tests whether management and other selected variables are significant influences on relative profitability and, if so, on the operating relationships through which these influences are transmitted. Statistically, the study tests hypotheses that there are significant differences in member bank profitability arising from differences in management and other specified variables. If the hypotheses are accepted, and they are, the next hypotheses state that these variables significantly affected operating relationships which help explain the profitability differences.

THE INFLATIONARY PRESSURES which have been present in the British economy since late 1954 have stimulated considerable discussion in the financial and economic literature of the appropriate techniques necessary to reduce these pressures.' Of particular interest to the American student of monetary policy has been the attention devoted to mandatory prescription of commercial bank liquid-asset-deposit ratios-the "secondary liquidity rule"-as a possible deflationary device. The purpose of this paper is (a) to investigate the behavior of the liquid-asset ratios of British banks since the end of World War II and (b) to analyze the possible efficacy of prescribed liquidity ratios as a weapon of monetary policy. In order to provide the reader unfamiliar with British bank practices with the necessary background, the first section of this paper is devoted to a brief presentation of the liquidity conventions of commercial banks in the United Kingdom and some discussion of the origins of the liquidassets-deposits ratio.

THIS comment questions and supplements some portions of Dean Carson's paper, "The Competition for Savings Deposits."' Carson's framework for discussing bank earnings and the competition for savings is very useful. However, he may have overlooked two major factors, the addition of which would contribute to the value of his analysis and significantly alter his conclusions. One of these factors is the geographic flow of funds to conform with preferences of depositors. Ignoring this, Carson commits a fallacy of composition. He fails to take account of the different consequences for an individual commercial bank and for a banking system that result from a loss of funds to non-bank savings institutions-in particular, to savings-and-loan associations (SLA). Another factor not taken into consideration is the reaction of the monetary authorities to secondary effects of such a shift of funds. These points will be considered in order.

The total book value of all college endowment funds is about $1.8 billion. By way of contrast, commercial banks have $150 billion of assets, life insurance companies $55 billion, mutual savings banks $20 billion, and fire and casualty companies about $10 billion. Thus the commercial banks have over 80 times as much money to handle as colleges, life companies 30 times as much, mutual savings banks 11 times, and fire and casualty companies 5Y2 times as much. Moreover, there are twelve life companies, each of whose assets exceed $1 billion, and there are some sixteen commercial banks of this size. The largest college endowment is only about $200 million, and there are only three others whose funds exceed $100 million. Thus the college investment problem is minute compared with that of our giant neighboring institutions. The rate of growth. of college endowments is much less rapid than the growth of banks and insurance companies. In the ten years ended in 1946 college endowments rose about one-third in amount, whereas commercial bank assets nearly tripled, life company assets doubled, mutual savings bank assets rose 60 per cent, and fire and casualty insurance company assets gained nearly 80 per cent. The $3.5 billion annual increase in assets of the life companies is twice as great in dollars as the aggregate of all investments now held by colleges. Therefore, there is not as much heat on the managers of college funds to find an outlet for new money as there is for insurance companies and banks, and, not having to rely on the supply of new investment media, colleges have been more free -in policy decisions. The college problem is rather one on how best to invest existing funds; the relatively small accretions from year to year are not much cause for concern.

Summary In 1967 the first comprehensive work on Greek neo‐classical architecture appeared. It is the result of the foresight and initiative of the Commercial Bank of Greece in preserving in photographic records all neo‐classical buildings in Greece. Thanks to the eminent knowledge of Dr. John Travlos this inventory has been carried out with great care and circumspection. Like other European cities Athens undergoes a rapid change in townplanning where old, now historical buildings are being pulled down. Therefore, no efforts have been spared to make a complete record of these. The special significance and curiously selfevident position of neoclassical buildings of Greece are an integral part of its modern history as it developed after the end of the War of Independence in 1833. They reflect a late phase of European neo‐classical architecture formed at the beginning of the century when Greece fought for national independence and strived to be reunited with Europe. This goes back to the fifty years that lie ...

The current enthusiasm for corporate mergers shows no signs of abating, and banks are certain to continue to play a larger role in this trend. With this prospect ahead, banks are placing merger assistance activities on an organized basis, and some have even established separate merger and acquisition departments staffed with specialists. For the commercial bank with corporate customers, merger or acquisition can mean the loss or gain of substantial business in loan and deposit activity. What should be the banks' role? One of the basic offerings of a bank with a full line of services consists of matching potential buyers and sellers. Another is the evaluation of the company to be acquired. The author provides some case histories to illustrate his points.

This note describes a model for inflow-stock-outflow time series which are formed as sums of random numbers of subcomponents of randomly determined sizes and are related via a probabilisticly distributed lag. Such time series may be illustrated by population processes in connection with which not only numbers of units are of interest but also the sizes of the units and the sums of the sizes. Such series may also be illustrated by economic phenomena like new loans made, loans outstanding and loans repaid of a commercial bank; new capital investments, capital stock and depreciated capital for a group of firms as well as accessions to the labor force, labor force outstanding, and secessions from the labor force.

Introduction. The problem; definitions, page I.--I. The expansion of a single bank, page 3.--II. The expansion of the aggregate of commercial banks, page 15.--III. Observations on the single-bank and system coefficients, page 26. To Follow in Next Issue IV. The effect of central banking; the ratio of commercial bank credit to gold. --V. Observations on the member-bank system coefficients.--VI. Summary; conclusions.