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The subject matter of our discussion today is entitled “Written or Unwritten Constitutions”—but the real issue before us is the supremacy of the legislature. A written constitution is normally thought and spoken of as a curb upon the supremacy of the legislature; and a constitution under which the legislature is supreme, is normally called “unwritten”. I shall not presume to advise you in Israel as to whether you should give yourselves a written constitution: all I can venture to do is to give you some personal reflections from my own experience, as one who has lived his life and administered the law under an unwritten constitution.So far as constitutional law deals with the structure of government—how laws are to be made, how they are to be put into effect, how disputes as to rights and obligations under the law are to be decided—it may or may not, in a unicameral legislature, be advisable to require that amendments of what I may call the structure of the constitution should be by a particular majority. Opinions on this may be divided, and I am not going to take any stand. What I should like to give some reflections upon is the proposal that there should be a “basic law” setting out the fundamental human rights and liberties, and what the status of that law should be.

AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE IN WHICH DOMESTIC POLICY PROVIDED the major issues for party debate in West Germany, the determination of the Brandt government on taking office to engage itself in activities designed to ‘normalize’ relations with the Eastern Bloc has had notable effects on the West German parties. The political climate has altered; partisanship has been intensified; the Basic Law has been tested in novel circumstances; and the governing coalition and the apprentice opposition have both faced trials and tensions in terms of their party base.The new Ostpolitik has had its effects on the political climate in terms of the first use of the constructive vote of no confidence, the erosion of the coalition majority, the pressures for a premature general election; but the short-term and longer-term effects on the West German parties are likely to be of greater significance. This article seeks to assess the significance of the Ostpolitik for the government and opposition parties. For, whatever the benefits or disadvantages which the Ostpolitik may bring to the Federal Republic in intrinsic terms, it is already clear that it has modified considerably the pre-1969 pattern of party politics.

Among the constitutional devices sometimes recommended as remedies for the ills of present society, federalism has come to play a consistent, if not a major, role. A rapid glance at the balance sheet of Western European intrastate federalism over the last three decades might therefore be of some usefulness.The uncertainty over the continued existence of federal states is shown by the difficulty in defining their distinguishing features. Assertions in constitutional documents do not help much, as they are political assertions rather than guiding principles of interpretation. Some constitutions have even tried to square the circle. Thus, the Spanish Constitution of 1931 in the same breath called Spain an “integral state” and defined it as consisting of provinces as well as regions formed according to the “principle of autonomy.” The Bonn Basic Law of 1949 dodges the issue elegantly by affirming in its preamble that it is the German people in the eleven states who have enacted the basic law.

Many proposals relating to debt limit provisions in state's basic law presented to the constitutional convention now meeting in Albany.

The Abyssinian farming communities of the three highland provinces of Eritrea (Ḥamasên, 'Akele Gûzay, and Serawê) may be said always to have had two agencies of government: on one hand, the institutions of village society, and, on the other hand, the central government of Ethiopia, known in Eritrea as the mengiśti and comprising the military organization of the Solomonid monarch—the Nigûśe Negeśt—and the quasi-feudal establishments of his provincial governors and of the Coptic Church. To the latter of these agencies, in constitutional theory, there succeeded the Italian monarchy when the Eritrean Colony was proclaimed on 1 January 1890. Even before that date the scope of the mengiśti in Eritrean affairs had never been well defined, but had been modified or intensified as political conditions changed in the Empire generally. Thus when highland Eritrea was governed by a Bahre Negȧśê, before the Somali and Turkish invasions of the sixteenth century, the Nigûś and his nomadic Court were probably an appreciable factor in village government. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries scarcely any functions of imperial government can be traced in Eritrea, and the villages, in the words of the contemporary Abyssinologue Job Ludolf, ‘Regi Habessinorum quidem parent, sed sibimet Rectores præficiunt, ac suis legibus in modum alicuius parvæ Reipublicæ utuntur.’ During the nineteenth century political authority—which may be summarized as power to exact tribute (the strict etymological implication of mengiśti), to requisition and re-allocate land, and to beat the war-drum (kitet)–passed into the hands of mesafinti, chiefs of local peasant origin who claimed a dubious imperial sanction for the authority they had won by their arms. This phase culminated in the unsuccessful attempts of John IV (1870-89), himself a mesfin from the Tigray, partially to reorganize Eritrean village society on a feudal basis that would enable him to reassert the lapsing imperial authority. The only code of laws known in Ethiopia was the Fitha Negeśt, or Canons of the Kings, culled from Scripture, from ancient canons of the Church, and from early Byzantine statutes by a Syrian compilator of the fifth century and translated into Ethiopic in the fifteenth. The Fitha Negeśt stood until the twentieth century as the basic law of the Empire beside the Law of Moses, and was no less inept in village affairs for being highly revered by the Abyssinians.

A. Extracts from industrial agreements, 97. — I. Working hours, 97; II. Extra pay, 98; III. Childrens' and married men's allowance. 98; IV. Continued pay in case of illness, 98; V. Holidays, 99; VI. Other benefits obtained, 99; VII. Old age pensions, 100; VIII. Voluntary provisions made by the undertakings, 101. — B. Extracts from legislative provisions, 101. — I. Industrial regulations, 101; 2. Basic Law of the German Federal Republic, 101; 3. Regulation on working hours, 101; 4. Law regulating pay for public holidays, 102; 5. Law against unfair dismissal, 102; 6. Law on protection of working mothers, 103; 7. Law on employment of the seriously disabled, 103; 8. Law on period of notice for office staff, 104; 9. Law on child labour and on working hours for young people (law on protection of voting people), 104; 10. Law on industrial agreements. 105: 11 . Law on repatriates (Heimkehrer), 105; 12. Law on children's allowances and the creation of Family Compensation Funds (Law on children's allowances), 105. — C. Survey of legal status of officials in collective economy undertakings, 106.; — D. Right of employees to a say in management, 108.

PRIOR to the communist Chinese take-over of Tibet in 1959, the body of law, or custom, by which anti-social behavior was controlled among the Tibetans, was an amalgam system, compounded of three different kinds of law: canon law, royal law, and the law of tradition or custom. Tibetan thinking is quite clear as to the origins of the first two: canon law originated in the "word of the Buddha"2 and royal law came into being by the "pronouncement of the ruler"-king or whatever else he was called. There is more uncertainty, however, as to the origin of the law of tradition, but it is described as "the pattern manner of the Tibetans," and defined as "country law" or "epic law." There are reasonably definite dates for the appearance of canon law and royal law in Tibet. The basic ethic of Buddhism and the rules of conduct for the monks became known when Buddhism was officially introduced in the seventh century, although it was about two centuries before it was firmly established as the religion of the Tibetans. This religious code and this system of ethics were known to the rulers of that time, the so-called "kings of religion" of the nascent and expanding Tibetan empire, and they exerted a marked influence on the formulation of royal law: codified as the Thirteen Pronouncements (Tharchin 1956:217-234); traditionally ascribed to "Srong bTSan sGam Po the King of Religion"; and venerated since the time of the kings as the basic law of the land. There are, however, no dates for the origin of "the pattern manner of the Tibetans" or "epic law" but long prior to the time of the "kings of religion," or the coming of Buddhism, it was the system by which anti-social behavior was controlled. As exemplified in the violence-charged episodes of the epics of the land-notably those of the Gesar cycle (David-Neel 1931; Stein 1956)-its earliest form was the law of reprisal. Two aspects, one of concept and one resulting from application, marked this primal law of reprisal. It was based on the concept that antisocial behavior, in its varied manifestations, consisted of offenses against individuals and families, and not crimes against society as a corporate whole or against any abstract legal code. Whenever it was applied, moreover, it effected reversal of the roles of victim and aggressor. In counter reprisal, these basic roles were again reversed and reversal might continue, throughout much action and counter action, until the labels of aggressor and victim belonged with equal validity to both parties. Reprisal, characterized by retaliation in kind, took many forms. In homicide it became the blood feud with its chain-reaction killings; in cases of theft it resulted in the seizure by force of wealth in convenient form as a substitute for restitution, or the taking and holding of hostages as a way of exerting pressure to extract full restitution with additional and appropriate tokens of apology; in instances of personal assault it took the form of violent action-the matching

Industrial development in India is primarily the responsibility of the Centre, but a federal systcm of government permits and requires the States to play a significant role also. The most important factor in this study is that only the Centre has enough financial resources and skilled personnel to implement large-scale industrial plans. Yet India is committed to a federal system and the constitution requires division of respon? sibility between the Centre and the States. The Seventh Schedule of the constitution lists Union, State and concurrent powers separately, but only those powers covering industry are pertinent here. Jurisdiction over industry is assigned to the States, except for two important items. The Union List gives ihe Centre jurisdiction over industries (1) declared by Parliament to be necessary for defense or war and (2) "the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest."1 The second exception is a key one and has provided the authority for Parlia? ment to pass the Industries Development and Regulation Act of 1951, the basic law governing most of the subsequent steps taken by the Centre. The constitution also assigns to States authority over the production, supply and distribution of goods, but this, too, has a significant exception. The Concurrent List assigns jurisdiction to the Union over the produc? tion, supply and distribution of goods in those cases where control by the Centre is deemed to be expedient in the public interest.2 This is a broad statement which may include control by the Centre over foodstuffs, including oils, cattle fodder, raw cotton and raw jute, and over labor5 price control and factory regulations. A consultant in public administration to the Indian government has pointed out that the Seventh Schedule confines India more rigidly than is apparent in any other important federal nation.3 He contends that the Centre is severely handicapped in carrying out development programs because the constitution assigns most powers and revenues to the States.4 This position is an accurate one, particularly in that it warns that the Centre may find itself short of constitutional authority to expand social welfare programs in the future.5 At present, however, the Centre dominates industrial projects and will do so as long as the States must abdicate their constitutional responsibilities because of lack of resources. A prime example of how the Union makes the most use of its constitutional authority was the passage of the Industries Development and Regulation

The method of complementary energy is a general method of structural mechanics. The basic law was stated by F. Engesser in a paper in 1889. He extended Castigliano’s law of least work to apply beyo...

Law can be viewed as a network of small group interaction. Basic characteristics of legal systems govern the interaction and permeate each individual small group. The rule structure within a small group forms a kind of behavioral constitution containing provisions on fundamental policies, internal and external relations, sanctions to be imposed for breach of rules, and so on. The use of a legal frame of reference in small group analysis expands the scope of inquiry and may furnish insights into current social problems. The constitution of a particular experimental group, confined for about three months in a penthouse on the Berkeley campus, is presented as illustration.

One of the most important rights won by the working population of our country is the right to free education, confirmed in the country's basic law, the Soviet Constitution. For the fifty years of existence of the Soviet power, utilization of this right has helped millions of citizens of the USSR to gain elementary, secondary, and higher education, to become skilled experts in various branches of the national economy, and in the realms of science, technology, and the arts. The Soviet government expends enormous sums each year for the needs of public education. And it is no accident that increasing attention has been given recently to the economics of public education.

T is rather difficult to analyze a typical zoning ordinance and by such analysis suggest a working program which might fit the needs of any city. Various state enabling acts set up specific requirements for zoning procedure; city charters frequently outline in detail zoning requirements; and inasmuch as the scope of the police power as enunciated by the decisions of the respective courts of last resort in the several states vary somewhat, each city must of necessity provide the refinements of its zoning procedure only after a careful analysis of basic law, charter provisions, general laws, and court decisions governing its own legislative body. These laws and decisions give, in the main, the limitations governing the legal rights of the city. The city must mold its zoning ordinance accordingly, to fit its requirements as nearly as may be.

The new German Constitution, the Basic Law for the German Federal Republic of May 23, 1949, provides in Article 92 that the highest judicial power shall be vested in a Federal Constitutional Court. Although the Bonn Basic Law thus created a new institution, it is an institution with a precedent in the former Weımar Constitution of 1919. In accordance with the latter, the Constitutional Tribunal (Staatsgerichtshof) had jurisdiction over constitutional controversies within any Land which had no tribunal of its own for the adjustment of such controversies, as well as over controversies, other than civil law matters, among the various Laender or between the Reich and one of the Laender. And the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), as the highest authority, could establish finally whether disputed Land statutes were compatible with the federal Constitution.The Basic Law, however, grants the new Federal Constitutional Court considerably wider jurisdiction than that accorded either to the Constitutional Tribunal or to the Supreme Court under the Weimar Constitution. The Federal Constitutional Court must, above all, arbitrate both disputes which may arise among the constitutional organs of the Republic, the so-called “federal constitutional” cases, and the so-called “conflicting rules” (Normenkollisionen) cases—the latter designating disputes involving the compatibility of the written federal law or Land law with the Basic Law, as well as the compatibility of the Land law with the federal law.

Referring to “domestic jurisdiction” as used in the League Covenant, Professor J. L. Brierly characterized it as “a new catchword,” capable of proving as great a hindrance to the orderly development of international law as “sovereignty” and “state equality” had been in the past, and about which “little seems to be known except its extreme sanctity.” Since these words were written, the Covenant of the League of Nations has been replaced by the Charter of the United Nations as the basic law of the organization of the world community. The concept of a reserved domestic jurisdiction is still with us. In fact, Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter gives it a broader definition and a wider range of application than did Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant. What is the meaning of the domestic jurisdiction principle as set forth in the Charter? What effect has it had in practice on the working and development of the United Nations?

by V. Crabbe.The author describes the changes brought about by the increase of Trade Unionism in the legal regime of the Belgian Civil Service.Before World War I, political parties had already intervened in favour of civil servants being authorised to join Trade Unions. However, the basic Law of 1898 regarding Trade Unions did not apply to State officials. In 1925 when the Railways, for several reasons, were re-organised as a « Societe nationale », Trade Unions were authorised to collaborate, through a « mixed « commission, in the preparation of a statute for railwaymen.In 1937, which was a period of important administrative reform, « personnel committees » were organised within the several ministerial departments and entrusted with giving advice on matters relating to the organisation of the Civil Service and the improvement of working conditions. In addition, a statute, applicable to civil servants employed within ministerial departments, was prepared by way of a decree-Law. The implementation of these ...

The topic of party finance is a subject about which not a word appears in any of the official reports and party conference records issued by the Christian Democratic Union in the course of the decade during which it has become established as West Germany's governing party. Like their colleagues in most middle class parties the world over, the leaders of the CDU apparently believe that silence is golden when it comes to answering Socialist taunts on this score. They are content to let the Socialists remain the only German party to publish reasonably full accounts of their sources of income, which, as the SPD does not fail to point out when attacking the "hidden masters" of the government parties, are predominantly derived from membership dues.' The parties of the "Bonn coalition," on the other hand, have been extremely distrustful of both publicity and legislation affecting this sector. In 1952 the first Adenanuer cabinet felt called upon to reject a draft Parties Law prepared by officials in the Interior Ministry, and since then the government has presented no bill to translate the Basic Law's Article 21, which regulates the parties' position, into the required legislation.2 Thus the constitutional provision that "parties must give public reckoning over the sources of their means" remains in practice a dead letter. Not that the sources of the non-Socialist parties' funds are really kept successfully secret, for every politically informed German knows roughly how the system works. But party officials still believe it best not to acknowledge their sources publicly. "The German Michel just wouldn't understand about those things," as a CDU functionary put it. Lacking official information, political scientists writing about the German party system have restricted themselves to informed guesses, or to gestures of resignation. Kirchheimer hazards at least some analysis when he writes that for conservative mass parties as a rule, "the insufficient amounts of membership dues income make possible at most the financing of their organization, but do

In the discussion on the determination of prices under socialism the basic attention of its participants normally is concentrated on defining the principles of determining prices which most completely take into account the demands of the law of value. But some economists ignore, in our opinion, two rather important circumstances. First, the law of value under socialism does not operate in isolation, but in the system of economic laws of socialist society. If one considers that under capitalism the law of value is modified according to the basic law of that order, into the law of prices of production, and then at the stage of imperialism into the law of monopoly prices, so much more is its modification unavoidable under conditions of socialism when it ceases to be the regulator of production and is subjected to the operation of the basic economic law of socialism and the law of planned, proportional development of the national economy. Secondly, all the participants of discussion admit that under socialism...

West Germany today is ruled by a constitutional regime in which a strongly led democratic majority party has carried the predominant, indeed, increasingly almost the sole, responsibility of running the national government. Yet the “basic law” of the country embodies a federal system of institutions and checks and balances which were in great measure designed specifically to hamper the exercise of power by just such a politically powerful national government. The inclusion in the Constitution, under German federalist and Allied pressure, of a number of institutional devices, especially that of the “Bundesrat” rather than the “Senate” form of upper House, was rather openly intended to introduce restraints on the power of national party leaderships by allowing the leaders of the Laender governments a direct voice and, on many matters, a potential veto in the formulation of national policies. The creation of a second chamber with members drawn from, and exclusively responsible to, the Land cabinets was pretty clearly an attempt to institutionalize political diversity. It was expected that as the party makeup of the several Laender governments would often differ from the coalition pattern of the Federal government, and that as each Land government would have to cast its indivisible Bundesrat votes with regard both to its regional interests and to its particular party composition, the resultant configuration of power in the upper chamber would differ considerably from that in the Bundestag.

IN the Basic Law' for the Federal Republic of Germany the significance of the "basic rights" for the relationship between the State and private citizens-a matter of controversy under the Weimar Constitution-is beyond dispute. They are binding upon the State; they must be recognised by the legislature, the executive and the judiciary.2 The meaning of the basic rights (it would be more accurate to speak of basic-rights clauses) 3 as regards relations between private persons, however, has been the subject of lively debate by German legal scholars, and the courts have taken sides in some remarkable decisions.

1HE DECISION HANDED DOWN BY the new Gennan Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, on October 23, 1951,1 exercised for the first time the power to set aside federal legislation given to that court by the Basic Law. The establishment of the Constitutional Court, provided for in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, by the Law on the Constitutional Court of March 12, 1951,2 completed a constitutional evolution which had its beginnings in the Weimar period. The institution of judicial review has, for the first time, become a part of the scheme of German public law and is now an integral element in the constitutional structure under which the Federal Republic of Germany hopes to develop and preserve a free and democratic society. The establishment of the Constitutional Court thus marks the completion of one constitutional evolution, and its first decision the beginning of another-for the future of judicial review in Germany will depend, in a large measure, upon the skill and insight with which the Constitutional Court discharges its task. The decision of October 23, 1951 as the initial step in this second evolution is of special interest. Before discussing the decision, it is necessary to sketch, first, the constitutional evolution which the establishment of the Constitutional Court completed, and second, the political background of article 1183 of the Basic Law and of the two federal laws, en

THE bill of rights in the present Constitution of Pennsylvania is an article which contains twenty-six sections. The sections make interesting reading. They start out with a general declaration about natural rights of mankind, pass to more definite sections forbidding attainder, quartering of troops without the consent of the owner, and the granting of titles of nobility or hereditary distinction, and declare against the prohibition of emigration from the State. This last provision is a puzzling one. It comes down to us from the constitution of 1776, and has remained, with few changes, ever since. Why, one may ask, should any one want to emigrate from Penn's Woods? And why, if somebody might conceivably have such a queer desire, did colonial constitution-makers think his gratification of it so important as to write it into the basic law? One may have a guess, but he may not have a judicial answer, for no restless Daniel Boone ever seems to have had occasion to appeal for constitutional protection against a legislature seeking to restrain him from roaming beyond the borders of the State whenever his fancy prompted him so to do.

The basic law on measures regarding public nuisances in Japan was enacted in March 1967. In this act, public nuisance included air pollution, water contamination, noise, vibration, offensive odors and ground subsidence. According to this act, the government is obligated to establish environmental standards with regard to air pollution, water contamination and noise. The standard for Sulphur Oxides was established by the government in 1969. Standards and procedures leading to establishment of this standard were examined by the author and found unsatisfactory for the protection of the people's health. The reasons can be stated as follows:1. Initially, the technical committee on Environmental Standards submitted recommendations on threshold values of sulphur concentration index.0.05ppm for one hour value averaged 24 hours.0.1ppm for one hour value (One hour value means the average concentration of each sample made hourly by sampling of the air).These threshold values were derived from the epidemiological research and were determined to be the minimum requirement for the protection of the people's health.2. The committee of Living Environment, that is the advisory committee of the Welfare Minister, established the Standard for Sulphur Oxides. This was done under the pressure of private enterprises and this standard was found to be inconsistent with the recommendations.3. The author et al found that the limiting values of the Standard expressed by percentile were discrepant after being statistically researched on the data of Osaka and Amagasaki cities.4. It is the author's suggestion that scientific circles shall establish criterion and standards for each kind of pollution independently of governmental authorities.

This article discusses the relationship between legal, legal aid and legal assistance. The lack of a clear distinction between the term "legal assistence" and the terms "legal aid" and "legal" has led, in our observations, to the conclusions of individual authors and entire institutions that Ukraine's law enshrines in fact a triple system legal aid. Studies have shown that the legislator distinguishes between "legal aid" and "legal" (or legal) assistance, depending on the subject of assistance. Positive trends in the replacement of legal aid terminology with professional legal aid have been identified and shown. At he article notes that the development and establishment of independent professional legal assistance continues in the future. A large number of reforms and changes, especially at the constitutional level, on the one hand, contribute to improving and improving the development of the institution of professional legal assistance, and on the other hand, there are many contradictions and inconsistencies in this regard, because the introduction of new terms is always a supporter for its introduction and against it. Legal aid is the most successful term and should be interpreted as a multidimensional legal practice aimed at ensuring the rule of law and the realization of the rights of each person who enters into a specific legal relationship, the content of which is the implementation of legally defined means, including legal advice and clarification of the rights and procedures for their implementation, assistance in the preparation and filing of applications, petitions, complaints and other legal documents, initiation and participation in procedural actions and proper recording of their course and results, assessment of the adherence, validity and admissibility of evidence, analysis of the legality of legal decisions, taking measures to remedy infringed cases. to, damages caused offense. It also includes some of the problems that need to be addressed by further consolidating professional legal assistance in other regulations to ensure their compliance with the Basic Law of Ukraine.

Four features of domestic quarantines arc discussed—(1) The legal aspect involves consideration of an adequate basic law, a well organized and capable staff, and an emergency fund to meet sudden cases. (2) The quarantine should be given close attention by the scientist from the viewpoint of the administration. (3) In quarantine methods emphasis is placed on the need for extensive and intensive surveys at the outset, and for emergency research to provide a basis for a permanent policy. Stress is also laid on the need of well planned methods and adequate machinery and the importance of fairness and strictness in enforcement. The official in charge of enforcement should be a man of high ability. (4) The public judges quarantines on the fairness and reasonableness of the enforcement rather than on the severity of the restrictions. Quarantine measures are more easily enforced in populations with a high average intelligence and a well developed sense of public duty. After one successful quarantine experience in a district a second is accepted with less reluctance.

OUT OF THE confusion brought about by the attempts of partisans of conflict ideologies to control the education of the masses there is gradually developing a system of education that is peculiarly adapt ed to the needs of the emerging nation that is neither Spanish nor In dian, Communist nor Capitalist, Catholic nor Protestant, but Mexican. During the first four hundred years of Mexico's history after the Span ish conquest only spasmodic attempts were made to bring education to more than a small minority of the people. The great cry of the Revolution was for education for the downtrodden and the opportunity for everyone to achieve the place in society to which his capabilities entitled him without the handicaps of ignorance, poverty or prejudice. In the thirty years since the establishment of the Ministry of Public Education in 1921 many mistakes have been made, many injustices have been committed and many lives have been sacrificed in the strug gle for the control of the training of the minds of the people. But dur ing this same period many educators have shown noble, selfless devo tion to the high ideals of equal social, economic and educational op portunities for all, carried on with a missionary fervor. Within thirty years Mexico has assumed a place of leadership in the world in the techniques of bringing education to the underprivileged. In recognition of this, Jaime Torres Bodet, Mexico's Minister of Public Education from 1943 to 1946 who achieved striking success in his fight against illiteracy, was chosen to direct the activities of UNESCO and thus apply on a world-wide scale the same principles that had accomplished so much for Mexico in such a short time. The framers of the Constitution of 1917 recognized the need for guarantees of education to be incorporated in the basic law of the land. Articles 3, 27, and 123, with their subsequent amendments, provide the framework for the nationalized system of Mexican education. All education, with the exception of the universities which were declared autonomous and certain institutions which are operated by other national agencies, comes under the direction of the Ministry of Education which constructs curricula, establishes administrative pr procedures and requirements for admission, promotion, and graduation. The estates and municipalities, however, retain much local control over education. Whenever possible, the local communities are ex

Device not as successful as constitutional convention but educates citizens to need of remodeling basic law.

On May 8, 1949—the fourth anniversary of unconditional surrender—the Parliamentary Council adopted at Bonn the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. This date was chosen intentionally to remind the German people that this provisional constitution is a way-station on the road out of the chaos which the collapsing Hitler regime left behind it. Any consideration of this Basic Law should start from the fact that the charter is not the creation of a free people, and that it will have to function within limits, both territorial and functional, which severely handicap its chance of becoming a genuine constitution, securely anchored in the basic convictions of the people. Its limits territorially are imposed by the refusal of the Soviet Union to permit the Germans living in their Zone of Occupation to express themselves freely concerning the charter. This raises the presumption, confirmed by other evidence, that these Germans would, by a considerable majority, accept the Basic Law if given a chance to do so. The charter's functional limits are imposed by the Western Allies, who decreed three basic limitations upon the German people's autonomy and independence: (1) the Occupation Statute, (2) the Ruhr Statute, and (3) the Inter-Allied Security Board. Of these, the Occupation Statute is much the most important, and encompasses the other two by its provisions. This is shown by the fact that the Letter of Approval, issued by the Military Governors on May 12, 1949, notes that acceptance of the constitution is premised upon the understanding that all governmental power in Germany, federal, state, and local, is “subject to the provisions of the Occupation Statute.”

Ever since it first raised the standard of revolt in Japanese-occupied French Indochina, the Viet-Minh régime has devoted an inordinate amount of time and attention to problems of local government and administration. The emphasis was just as apparent in its first Basic Law of 1945 as in the latest organic act of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which went into effect in 1960, and in the manifold supplementary statutes promulgated in the interim to implement the constitutional provisions. This obvious concern on the part of Ho Chi Minh's leadership with the instrumentalities of local rule may be explained by reference to two different, though closely related, sets of considerations.

THE establishment of the state of Israel in a part of Palestine was the result among other factors of a rare sequence of favorable constellations in world power. The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after World War I opened the country to large-scale Jewish immigration. Political growth and consolidation of Jewish power was facilitated by the legal machinery of the Mandate and the military protection of the Mandatory Power. The decline of British control in Asia and her partial withdrawal after World War II gave the newly grown Jewish population an opportunity to assert its independence and attain statehood. Outside the boundaries of the state of Israel a similar process of dissolution and new formation of political forces in the Middle East had taken place from Egypt to India. Political power as organized by and embodied in states approaches the causeeffect relation near enough to permit representation and classification according to logical pattern and recurring tendencies. An analysis of the rise and fall of Poland, for instance, in the last two centuries would clearly bring out the power constellation of her neighbors as constituting a basic law of her existence. Poland flourished only when her three more powerful eighbors quarreled. It is therefore quite legitimate to ask whether there exist also in the case of Palestine certain trends of power the analysis and study of which may add to our understanding of past and present events in that country. Palestine is not an area in which political independence thrives, a fact due to geographical factors which will have to be assessed by way of an introduction to the historical part. Together with Syria, Palestine forms a narrow isthmus of fertile soil which separates the no-man's land of the vast Arabian Desert in the east from the no-man's land of the Mediterranean Sea in the west and which links the Nile Valley and the inhabitable western fringe of Arabia with the centers of cultivation in western Asia. In the form of a two-pronged highroad, one branch running along the maritime plain in the west and the other on the eastern range in Transjordan,l the coun1 Referred to in the Bible as "king's highway" (Num. 20:17); see also G. A. Smith, The Historical Geography of the Holy Land (1931), p. 48.

Education in West Germany was very ably discussed not long ago by Alina M. Lindegren under the headline "Germany Revisited".' Dr. Lindegren had visited Germany in 1935 and again rather extensively in 1955. She gave information in her report on changes in constitutional provisions for education given in the Bonn "Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany," changes in control of education, efforts to widen educational opportunities, social studies in German schools, developments in elementary teacher training, some changes in the institutions of higher education, growing interest in educational research, foreign and international education, and other relevant topics. She also dealt in some detail with the Hochschule fiir Internationale Pidagogische Forschung (Institute for International Educational Research) at Frankfurt/Main, established as an Independent Foundation under Public Law by the Land of Hesse in cooperation with the city of Frankfurt and the Education Office of the former US

Small group chosen by Legislature, Governor, and Courts tackles problem of bringing state's constitution up to date; will submit its report to General Assembly in 1945.

Most writing on local government in The Netherlands is highly legalistic; only in recent years, for the most part in periodicals, have materials of any other type begun to appear. The best brief summaries in English may be found in an article by P. J. Oud, "The Burgomaster in Holland" (Public Administration, Summer, 1953, pp. 103-116), the coverage of which is broader than the title implies, and a mimeographed publication of the Union of Netherlands Municipalities, The Position of the Municipalities in the Netherlands within the General Structure of the State (Den Haag, 1953). An English translation of the constitution of The Netherlands is in process. The only comprehensive history, which carries the story up to the time of the depression of the 1930's, is D. Kooiman, De Nederlandse Gemeente in de Negentiende en Twintigste Eeuw (Alphen a/d Rijn, Samson, 1932). A. Buriks, Inleiding tot het Gemeenterecht (2 vols., Alphen a/d Rijn, Samson, 1955), a recent textbook on municipal law, has a good introductory chapter on the history of local government. Although now rather out. of date, the most thorough treatment is De Nederlandse Gemeente (3 vols., Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1921-23), by the distinguished authority, G. A. van Poelje, who later published a valuable series of essays on municipal law and administration, Korte Opstellen over Gemeenterecht en Gemeentebeleid (2 vols., Alphen a/d Rijn, Samson, 1934). One of the most highly regarded commentaries on municipal law is J. Oppenheim and C. W. van der Pot, Het Nederlandse Gemeenterecht (Haarlem, Bohn, 1928-supplement 1932). Other useful general works on this subject include J. W. A. C. van Loenen, De Gemeentewet en haar Toepassing (Alphen a/d Rijn, Samson, 1934-supplement 1938), A. Zadel and F. A. Helmstrijd, Beknopt Leerboek voor het Gemeenterecht (Alphen a/d Rijn, Samson, 1957), a clear and relatively simple treatment, and P. J. Oud, Handboek voor het Nederlands Gemeenterecht (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1956), an excellent detailed guide to municipal law and practice written by the distinguished former burgomaster of Rotterdam, currently leader of the Liberal Party in the Dutch parliament and president of the International Union of Local Authorities. Two handbooks on the constitutional and political structure of The Netherlands contain sections on local government: R. Kranenburg, Het Nederlandse Staatsrecht (Haarlem, Tjeenk Willink, 1951), and C. W. van der Pot, Handboek van het Nederlandse Staatsrecht (Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1957). The basic law concerning local government is still the Municipal Act of 1851.

Adenauer and Schumacher — It was during the spring and summer of 1948 that Adenauer emerged clearly and uncontestably as the single most dominant CDU leader of the three western zones. His preeminence in the British zone had been evident since 1946; now the Russians’ removal of Kaiser had removed his single serious rival from a position of zonal power. At the same time the course of developments which transformed the zonal boundaries into an “Iron Curtain” indirectly helped to solidify Adenauer’s position. The introduction of separate German currencies, the beginning of the Berlin blockade, Western talks which led to the formation of NATO and the start of the constitutional talks in Bonn — all of which occurred in the summer of 1948 — made the argument of those who wanted to prevent the CDU from opting for anything but an “all-German solution” appear futile and unrealistic. It was apparent that Germans could not prevent the political division of their country. Should not at least the three western zones make the best of the freedom, limited partnership and Marshall Plan aid offered by the West? The acceptance of the opportunity to create a West German state meant in turn that the dominant party leaders were made conscious of the need to strengthen cohesion and discipline in their own ranks in preparation for the imminent elections and the formation of a national government.

With the opening declaration of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz—GG) of the Federal Republic that “human dignity is inviolable” (Die Wurde des “Menschen ist unantastbar”—Art. 1,1 GG), the German state is committed 1 to an ideal close to that expressed by the American Declaration of Independence in its recognition of “certain unalienable rights”.

The machinery for the formulation of West German foreign policy is composed of many parts. Its framework is the Basic Law, but more important than the framework are the official and unofficial actors whose interests and aspirations determine the purpose and output of this machinery. As a consequence, this chapter will begin with a discussion of the constitutional framework, which will be followed by inquiries into the influences on the decision making process in foreign policy exerted by political parties, economic interest groups, the foreign service bureaucracy, and public news media.

THE REVOLUTION OF APRIL 1965, and the subsequent landing of United States military forces focused an enormous amount of worldwide attention on the Dominican Republic. The frequently chaotic revolution, which quickly became a civil war, was made still more confusing by reports which at one and the same time referred to one side as the "rebels" or "constitutionalists" and to the other as the loyalists" or "anticonstitutionalists." As the events of Dominican revolt, civil war, and United States intervention became disentangled, however, it became clear that the issue of "the constitution" and "constitutionalism" and the principles and forces of which these terms were symbols were perhaps even more important than any of the personalities or groups involved.

The idea that a known (?) disease like tuberculosis springs from the evolution or rather dissolution of the forces which have to do with our being, that it is an evidence of the variation of the law of harmony to environment, a retrograde movement toward dissolution and death; this idea, I say, of a basic law of degeneracy, which finds its chief expression in this wasting disease, is too profound to be easily grasped, too adverse to our set habits of thought to be easily accepted. Therefore, if I fail to convince the reader in a necessarily curtailed presentation of proof, let me suggest that he simply suspend judgment till the opportunity happily occurs for him to study John Fiske's "Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy," especially the interesting chapters on "Matter, Motion and Force;" "Rhythm;" "Evolution and Dissolution" and "Sources of Terrestrial Energy." Then, I think, he will come to the conclusions

After the defeat of Germany in 1945, the four Allied Powers assumed the supreme authority in Germany. Virtually the whole country was divided into four occupation zones, and Berlin was given a special status; the German territory east of the so-called Oder-Neisse line was placed under Polish or Soviet administration.a German civilian government was first re-established at the local level, and later at the level of the states (Lander).b In 1948, an assembly of delegates of the Lnder of the three Western occupation zones met in Bonn and drafted the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) which is now the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. In reaction to the adoption of the Grundgesetz in 1949, a constitution was also drafted and adopted in the Soviet occupation zone, which entered into force on October 7, 1949, as the first constitution of East Germany, officially the German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, or DDR). The original draft of this Constitution had been intended as the constitution of the whole German nation.' Consequently it recognizes the idea of German unity, and expressly states that there is only one German nationality.2 In 1949, the first purpose of the communist leadership was to bring to a successful conclusion the so-called bourgeois-democratic revolution,3 and it is difficult to find typically com

Soaring crime rates and law enforcement costs have produced widespread disillusionment and disenchantment with our criminal justice system. Even those who operate its basic institutions, police officers, judges, and correctional officials, are frequent critics of its performance, although they often differ about what is wrong. The mood of the country with regard to crime and law enforcement "is one of frustration and bewilderment."1 This discontent has resulted in the questioning of our basic law enforcement institutions and our basic concepts of justice. While the system as a whole has been subjected to critical re-examination, the evaluation of performance has focused on the police. What we have been asking ourselves and our public officials is, can we stem the rising tide of crime, and if so, what will it cost? The attempt to obtain answers has raised additional questions. With regard to the police, the three critical questions are: (i) what do the police produce, or should they produce, and how can it be measured, (2) are the police producing at minimum cost, and (3) how much police service do we want to buy? As we shall demonstrate, the answers to these questions are a part of the overall answer to the same set of questions posed for the criminal justice system as a whole. A fundamental tenet of this paper is that the activities of the police cannot be measured and evaluated without reference to the totality of criminal justice institutions and to the social environment in which these activities take place. This paper discusses the conceptual and practical difficulties of defining and measuring police output. The first section sketches the overall problem of criminal justice resource allocation as it relates to the measurement of police output. We argue that police services are not a final product, but rather an intermediate product in the overall production of justice or law enforcement. The effectiveness of the police with regard to overall law enforcement depends not only on their own operations but on the operations of the courts, the prosecutor's office, the correctional system, and the other participants in law enforcement. We then introduce the concept of the social cost of crime and demonstrate that the problem of defining justice can be circumvented

To the Editor.— The entire Western world is experiencing a major epidemic of drug abuse. Drug abuse is best defined as the use of drugs in a manner which may be calculated to produce harm. This definition purposefully excludes any elements of basic law or medical practice. In all of recorded history, there always has been drug abuse and a hard core of drug abusers. There is no reason to believe that this will not always be true. The reasons for the current epidemic include the following: (1) The number of drugs and their availability has increased. Improved means of transportation, communication, supply, and purchasing power are compounded by the increased variety of drugs synthesized by modern chemistry laboratories. (2) Our society includes the largest number of anxious, lonely, bored, and purposeless people ever. These settings, with lack of goal commitment, often precede drug abuse. (3) The "pious pushers" of

D uring a number of years of studying and lecturing about the American federal system, I have been dismayed by the virtually total absence of any formalized statement of the principles underlying its inner workings. True, there has been no lack of published work on the subject of American intergovernmental relations on the contrary one feels overwhelmed by its bulk yet, most of the writing has been essentially normative, describing the structure without developing any basic rules about its controlling dynamics. Noting that my concern was shared by a number of public administrators at the local, state, and federal levels of government, and encouraged by a number of successful investigations of related questions,1 I set about the task of formulating some rather easily observable axioms about intergovernmental relations with the hope that a general theory, or at least an approach to such a theory, would emerge. In doing so, I was fully aware of the appalling lack of statistical and other empirical evidence in the field and was quite prepared to treat the results of my investigation as preliminary to more extended research. As is so often the case in scientific inquiry, the outlines of the basic law governing intergovernmental relations evolved more from insight rather than investigation. The development of its corollaries and related principles required the testing of innumerable applications of the law on case histories and hypothetical models. The ultimate truth of the body of doctrine must, of course, await more complete demonstration, but it should be stated that in the work I have concluded thus far, the law has proved immutable, or nearly so. * The system of American intergovernmental relations is traditionally approached by observing how it operates rather than analyzing why it works as it does. Presented here is the first and probably the last attempt to develop some general principles about the federal system cast in terms that the practitioner of public administration can understand, or at least pretend to understand. The concept of "appropriateness" in intergovernmental relations, though simple, is not simple-minded, and perhaps is closer to true principles than more complex analyses of the subject.

(which permit parties to be represented by counsel, as a matter of right), the parties are represented by counsel. In many of the remaining 20 per cent, the amount involved would not have warranted the expense of counsel if the dispute had been litigated at law. Arbitration benefits the lawyer-have no doubt about that. The lawyer's time is saved and his convenience is served by arbitration. There is no time-consuming procedure of attending calendar calls, waiting for the previous case to be finished, picking juries, and preliminary motions and appeals. The fee of the lawyer in arbitrations not only is at a much higher rate for the time actually spent, as opposed to court actions, but generally is as much in dollars and cents. The disposition of an arbitration in a comparatively short time assures the lawyer that the evidence and witnesses will be available, that a debtor will not have the usual lengthy period while a court action is pending to dispose of his assets and prevent collection of the claim, and that the controversy will be disposed of quickly and the lawyer's fee paid. The clause in a contract providing for arbitration of future disputes (or the submission entered into after a dispute has arisen) is the mainspring of arbitration, and from that clause and the procedure outlined in it or supplemented by the basic law or chosen by reference to the rules of an association, chamber of commerce or trade group, there will follow good, bad, or indifferent results. Merely providing for arbitration is not enough. There are pitfalls which must be avoided and experience serves as a guide. Uppermost in the mind of the lawyer, both from the standpoint of his client and himself, is whether his client will be entitled, as a matter of right, to be represented by counsel at the arbitration hearing. Some trade groups limit or effectively prevent such right of representation by counsel in arbitrations conducted under their rules. Before the client signs a contract or submission which provides for arbitration under the rules of a designated tribunal, it is, therefore, necessary to examine its rules. The Rules of the American Arbitration Association and, generally speaking, the rules of chambers of commerce provide that parties are entitled as a