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To understand the patron we need to understand his competitor, the group mobilizer. Data from western India reveal that the activities of these two types of political entrepreneur are closely interconnected. The argument shows that exclusive concentration on the patron-client dyad overlooks the crucial supportive and alternative alliances which the actors must also manipulate. The mutual feedback between entrepreneurship and social change can be understood if we consider the effects of patronage and mobilization on groups and network alliances.

‘The rural proletariat’ has been employed as a sociological category to describe Caribbean populations for nearly 25 years, but confusion about such populations persists. Proletarianisation, the definition of rural proletariats, and the Marxist conception of consciousness, as applicable to such groups, are discussed in the following paper. The Cuban case is described to exemplify the European bias of some analysts, and the difficulties created by an uncritical transfer of western conceptions of class and of class consciousness to a colonial agrarian situation. A special effort is made to conceptualise the rural proletariat in terms of its relationships to the peasantry, and of the ‘concealment’ of landless workers in peasant communities.

The 10 papers included in this volume are grouped under three headings: (1) agrarian framework for development; (2) occupations and professions in the context of development; and (3) politics and development. Apart from the papers by Shigemochi Hirashima of Japan, B. Parham of Iran, and S. U. Kodikara of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), the remaining seven papers are prepared by the research staff of the Asian Research Center and the Institute.

The Setting Ethiopia is the oldest independent African nation and one of Africa's most underdeveloped countries. This ancient kingdom contains some of the most mountainous and physically diverse terrain in the world, and over 2,000 years of dynamic history as well as geographical and cultural isolation rest heavily on her. Today, covering an area of 1,221,900 square kilometers,1 with an estimated population of 24,000,000 people, Ethiopia is one of the larger and more populous developing countries in Africa. More than 85 percent of the Ethiopian people derive their livelihood from agriculture; in turn, the economy is to a great extent dependent on agrarian production.2 In comparison with other developing nations, the economy has been based predominantly on subsistence production, and the growth of towns and development of urbanized economic orientations have been very retarded. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that economic growth came to the country, and although changes have occurred, they have been small and confined mostly to a few isolated areas. Economic development has begun to take place in Ethiopia, but it is the development of a dramatic dualism: this historic Christian empire

Improved techniques of production have been an important part of the history of agricultural change in all modern economies. The search for policies to bring about the rapid introduction of improved techniques of production in traditional or less developed agricultural sectors has been a central focus of development agencies for the past two decades. It has proven to be a very difficult task, however, to develop policies which actually achieve the transfer of new techniques. The record of success in development efforts towards this end in agriculture has been, on the whole, rather poor.

This paper examines the optimal characteristics of an agrarian growth model in which two production activities are distinguished, viz., one producing the usual agricultural (consumption) goods F, and the other consisting of labor-using Z-activities directed toward substitute consumption for industrial goods and augmentation of agricultural capital. Certain restrictive assumptions on the form of the utility function are made which reflect in part the nature of the three types of consumption goods being distinguished. Optimum conditions are derived using classical calculus of variations, yielding additional variables in the form of shadow prices. Non-negativity of gross investment is shown to be the only relevant boundary constraint and is accordingly taken into account in the analysis. The phase diagram involving the capital-labor ratio and the shadow price of Z-goods indicates that the unique stationary point is a saddle-point. Some segment of the two stable branches then represents the interior solution to the infinite horizon problem; if the initial capital-labor ratio is ≪ sufficiently high ≫, the optimal path will entail zero gross investment in the initial phase. Where the period of optimization is finite, different patterns of optimum capital accumulation and valuation will emerge, depending on the initial and terminal values of the capital-labor ratio. Two cases are illustrated, the optimal path in each being shown to exhibit the turnpike property. It follows that optimal growth may be achieved by directly controlling the rate of capital accumulation or by having the planning authority set the shadow price of Z-goods. Other means of optimization are in fact available, e.g., controlling imports of industrial consumption goods. That one policy instrument is sufficient to attain the single objective is consistent with the well-known proposition in the theory of economic policy.

Enclosure riots were a prominent manifestation of social tension in England in the 1530's and 1540's. Although enclosures of land for pasturage and tillage had been undertaken since the beginning of English agriculture and did not usually cause social conflict, the rapid increase in population of the sixteenth century pressed hard on the available supply of land. The necessity of increasing the food supply speeded up the process of enclosure. The supplies of corn and meat could not be increased significantly without the year-round use of enclosed and consolidated plots of land, which was inconsistent with communal access to common and waste land and the stubble remaining after the harvest on arable lands. Other causes of friction in agrarian society included the greater fluidity in the land market resulting from the dissolution of the monasteries together with revolutionary methods of exploiting the land. The social relationships existing among great landlords, small holders and tenants could not remain unaffected.The main purpose of this essay is to analyze the early Tudor enclosure riot as a primitive or pre-political form of social protest. This will necessitate: (1) describing the forms and extent of violence employed; (2) distinguishing between those riots that accompany the Pilgrimage of Grace and the rebellions of 1548-49 and those riots that occur outside of the years of rebellion; and (3) modifying the assumption that the typical enclosure riot was perpetrated by an exasperated peasantry venting their rage upon the hedges and ditches of a commercially-minded, grasping gentry.

The author discusses the investigations on prehistoric agrarian landscape recently started on the island of Gotland. Main attention is focused on traces of deserted (fossilised) fields. Systematic reconnaissance in 1972–73 all over the island has brought forth a quite new material with ‘Celtic fields’ of a very great size and regional extent. The reconnaissance and regional mapping are mainly carried out by aerial photography. Through the field work, which started in 1973 at Uggarde‐Vinarve in Rone parish, it has been possible to demonstrate a continuous field system to a total extent of about 130 hectares (325 acres). This field pattern is superimposed by a new agrarian landscape structure with building remains and stone wall fencing systems as the dominating features. The two stratigraphically separated structures of agrarian landscape put into an agrarian economic context indicate a development from extensive farming with long fallow periods to intensive farming with established land‐use (arable, meado...

(1974). A note on the modelling of a Bulgarian agro‐industrial complex with special reference to appropriate objectives. Oxford Agrarian Studies: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 124-132.

The following Part II of this paper is devoted to the diversity of peasant economies, focusing on the typical patterns of change included under the umbrella term of ‘modernisation’. It reviews in these terms the aspects of the peasant economy outlined in Part I. The final Part III turns to agrarian policies and the impact of state intervention on peasant economies. It discusses the aims of such interventions i.e. land reform and the major programmes of reconstruction and transition in peasant economies today: ‘betting on the strong’, collectivisation, and the transformation of the peasant into a ‘modern’ farmer.

Bihar, in the northeast of India, is one of the largest (population 56.4 million), most overcrowded and impoverished states of that country. The famine of 1966-67 which centered on Bihar and result...

(1974). Re‐examination of the issues involved in the farm settlement scheme of the Western state of Nigeria, Oxford Agrarian Studies: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 79-88.

Analysing the actual processes and patterns of agrarian change following land reforms in India and Pakistan the author shows how radical land reform ideology without a radical land‐reform programme has dual consequences — beneficial for the emerging dynamic landlord or intermediate classes and agonising and unsettling for the rural poor. The latter are deprived of the elements of paternalism and security existing even within the old exploitative system without the provision of a new framework of security. These dual consquences have been reinforced further by recent technological changes and the impetus to commercialism from these changes. The forced shift from secure to insecure, feudalistic to commercial, tenancy or the decline of tenancy resulting from eviction of tenants and resort to self‐cultivation by landlords coupled with growing economic differentiation between rich and poor peasants denote new and more naked sources of social tension and conflict than the old. They herald especially in India a ...

We know that agrarian festivals, supported by the commune and the Orthodox Church, played a large role in the family, social, and work culture of the prerevolutionary countryside. (1) The tradition of observing calendrical religious festivals was preserved until collectivization.

Western and Soviet scholars have generally maintained different interpretations of the period between 1905 and 1917 in Russia, describing it respectively as a time of amelioration or of immiseration for the masses. Both groups, however, have stressed the progress of capitalism in prerevolutionary Russia. Despite standard references to the agrarian problem, most of the attention given to socioeconomic development in this period has focused on industrialization and the urban sector. Yet 87 percent of the population was rural when revolution broke out in 1905, and 85 percent still rural when it erupted again in 1917.During the interrevolutionary period the imperial government adopted a program that was intended to provide a take-off base for agriculture. Prime Minister Stolypin’s policy was aimed at the replacement of the archaic communal structure by a new order of individualized peasant landholdings that would give scope to personal initiative and technological innovation.

Ras Alula played a significant role in the political history of northern Ethiopia during the period between the Egyptian invasion in 1875 and the Italian defeat at Adwa in 1896. Alula became well-known in Ethiopia and Europe for his role in shaping his country's relations with its African neighbours and with European powers. But his role in the internal history of Ethiopia was no less significant. This son of a peasant managed to avoid the restricted local agrarian social ladder by becoming the best general of the Tigrean emperor Yohannes IV (1872–89). As the ‘king's man’, Alula's power was based on his position in the court and on the province (Eritrea) over which he was appointed. But the leading Tigrean families rejected him. When Yohannes died and Eritrea was lost to the Italians, Alula became the most powerful champion of Tigrean independence from the new Shoan emperor, Menilek II. A Tigrean court seemed to be his only opportunity to maintain his position of a ‘king's man’, without which he would have to return to the local agrarian social ladder. After four years of resistance to the new Shoan hegemony, Alula submitted to Menilek and was rewarded with the long-desired position of ‘the king's man’. His recognition of Menilek may be regarded as a fatal blow to Tigrean independence.

This article is an attempt to locate the social basis of the Mau Mau movement in the White Highlands. It is argued that the Mau Mau revolt was an outcome of a prolonged agrarian struggle between Kikuyu squatters and European settlers. In this agrarian struggle, the leading role was assumed by Kikuyu artisans and petty traders. This leadership provided the Mau Mau movement with the type of organisation and strategy that could unite the Kikuyu peasantry.

CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON ARGENTINE DEVELOPMENT As a whole, this issue endeavors to ascertain the varied political roles played by agrarian and industrial classes, fractions of these classes, and their external allies and enemies, in present-day Argentina. The various essays that constitute this number attempt to illuminate in one way or another the political predicament of a modernized but dependent society: its persistent swing between authoritarianism and disorder. Somewhat more specifically, they seek to clarify the meaning of Peronism in the context of Argentine history and society. This is a difficult task, given the disparate perspectives that have been deployed to deal with the phenomenon, since its inception in the forties, when liberal interpreters saw it as fascism tout court, through the fifties and sixties, when Seymour M. Lipset baptized it a "fascism of the left," to the seventies, when people inside and outside the movement thought they had discovered in Peronism a force for liberation that

The economics of marketing systems seems a likely subject for anthropological research, particularly for students of agrarian (peasant) economies and societies. As Mintz stated some time ago (92), marketing systems are major arenas of economic decision making, as well as mechanisms of social articulation in "peasant" societies. Yet by and large anthropologists do not tackle markets as systemic phenomena. They either produce ethnographies of individual mar­ ketplaces and their settings, e.g. Dewey (31), Fox (41), Sinha (116), Waterbury ( 142), and many of the contributors to Markets in Africa ( 1 5); or they debate certain aspects of peasant market exchange, e.g. Belshaw (7), Nash (98), Beals (3, 5), Cook (28), Swetnam (133). In both kinds of studies marketing is usually described from a peasant or peasant-community perspective. The assumption seems to be that the economic problems of concern are common to all levels of analysis and thus universal and general. But as Samuelson points out (III), this is a Type 1 error or the fallacy of composition-what is true of a part is not necessarily true of the whole. In the case of market studies, this flawed assumption results in unusually parochial problem orientations such that the general dynamics of market (and economic) organization are not treated. To make the problems and concerns of economic anthropology productive and of general interest, we must examine such things as marketing systems (and economic systems) as well as "peasant" markets (and "peasant" economies). Skinner's study of marketing and social structure in rural China (l18) stands as a notable exception to anthropological parochialism in market studies. The system perspective provided by central-place theory allowed Skinner to move beyond particular events of market behavior to a general model of market process. This perspective also allowed him to view peasant market behavior in its proper

Clout, H. D. 1974. Agricultural plot consolidation in the Auvergne region of Central France. Norsk geografisk Tidsskr. 28, 181–194. Plot consolidation has made great progress in the Paris Basin and has accentuated the agricultural contrast between northern innovation and southern backwardness. The Auvergne contains a wide range of agrarian structures, with environmental conditions being most favourable for farming in the lowland Limagnes. Detailed examination of Puy-de-Dome departement shows that most of the Limagnes have been consolidated, but little has been done in the uplands, which require other forms of structural change, including enlargement and re-afforestation. Plot consolidation is not a revolutionizing process since it cannot change land ownership, which is the ultimate constraint on its success.

SummaryThe homesteading system instituted in the Philippines in 1903 was intended to stimulate economic development through increased agricultural output from previously unoccupied lands and also to relieve agrarian problems in densely settled parts of the country. A case study shows that while early homesteaders did significantly improve their conditions, the intense demand for land rapidly led to the development of squatting and tenancy. Average farm sizes are declining but there are simultaneously indications of a trend towards concentration of land ownership, which accords with experience in other peasant economies.During the intense concern for economic development over the past 25 or so years, many governments have expressed their faith in the development of new agricultural land as at least a partial answer to a wide range of economic and social problems. These problems include regionally dense populations with inadequate farm sizes, inequitable systems of holding and renting land, inefficient methods of production and marketing, lack of capital and difficulties of capital formation, and low yields from land that is losing fertility through constant cropping. Frequently, ignorance, poverty or the agrarian structure inhibits the adoption of measures for improvement.Those countries with significant areas of little used land resources have tended to rely on developing these resources as an answer to agrarian problems rather than attempting to tackle defects in the whole structure. Since the structure is not changed, it is not surprising that in due course the firmly institutionalised problems of the older areas gradually established themselves in areas of new settlement too. This is essentially what Boeke referred to as “static expansion”. More recently, Mellor has pointed out, “Expanding the land area at constant productivity and incomes is not economic development in the usual sense — it is only a holding action in the face of a growing population”. Even with rising productivity such as associated with the Green Revolution, there is considerable evidence to suggest the continuation, if not exacerbation, of agrarian problems.By examining in detail a case study of colonisation in the Philippines, this paper will show that even if productivity and incomes in a new area are initially high, the operation of customary economic and social processes is likely to ensure the recreation of traditional problems. Such a conclusion is nothing new. It has been repeated depressingly often not only in recent decades but also of course throughout history.

here are great difficulties involved in studying the social structure of society because of its extraordinary complexity (which is explained by the varied nature of Bangladesh's economic system) and because of a lack of reliable sources, inasmuch as no general census of the population has been taken in East Bengal since 1961. Bangladesh is an agrarian country; up to 90% of the population lives in the rural area, and is involved in various spheres of agricultural production, which provides over 55% of the gross national product.' The peasants in Bangladesh constitute more than 70% of the total self-employed population of the country, and are the largest detachment of laborers. A large portion of them (not less than 18%-oabout 1.4 million families) are landless agricultural workers. As for the landowners, predominant among them are poor peasants with an allotment of up to 2.5 acres (51% of all the property owners), as a rule engaged in subsistence or semi-subsistence farming, and often not having even draught animals. Almost half of the poor peasants (over 1.5 million families) have parcels of land of less than one acre, and are actually agricultural workers with an allotment. By Bangladesh standards, peasants with a plot of land ranging from 2.5 to 12 acres (46% -of the property owners) usually belong to the category of peasants of average means. The majority of them (26%o of all the peasant landowners), however, have allotments of less than 5 acres; this means that few of the average peasants can engage in profitable farming and become, or have the possibility of becoming, farmers of the capitalistic type. The overwhelming part of the rural workers in Bangladesh are thus landless farm laborers or owners of small or extremely small pieces of property for whom various forms of sharecropping continue to this day to be the basic form of land tenure. The majority of them are in this case engaged in subsistence or semi-subsistence farming ,of the noncapitalistic type (the aim of which is the production of use values, not expanded capitalist reproduction). It is also characteristic of the modern East Bengal village to have masses of "superfluous people" who cannot find, under the present system of agrarian

The paper surveys Romania's social development in the 20th century through the eyes of two generations -- born in 1900 and in 1930. Through statistical analysis the paper reveals the gradual transformation of the agrarian Romania with predominance of rural economy during the first quarter of this century into an agro-industrial Romania in the second quarter of the century extended up to 1960 with an improving correlation of agriculture and industry (heavy and most essential consumer goods). Important aspects studied here included comparative consumption patterns, and rural conditions in the Romania of 1920-1940 and 1950-1970 and social effects of the First and Second World Wars as well as revolution. Finally, it throws some light on Romania's trends of development towards the year 2000 and its impact on the 1930 cohorts.

Populism in Wisconsin differed markedly from Populism in the western and southern states. It arose not out of agrarian distress but from socialist-oriented labor union radicalism. The leaders of the Wisconsin People's party came primarily from the ranks of union labor, and despite the efforts to forge a farmer-worker coalition, the party's programs were geared more to the industrial laborer than the tiller of the soil. Although the most important Populist leaders were not socialists, they were favorable to several aspects of socialism, especially public ownership of utilities. The party's electoral base, particularly in the year of its peak support, did not come from disgruntled and alienated farmers but from urban workers suffering from the effects of the Depression of 1893. Furthermore, both city wards and rural towns where the People's party did well in the 18gos tended to give disproportionate support to socialist candidates in the years prior to World War I. The past two decades have witnessed among scholars a spirited and often acrimonious debate regarding Populism in general, which has frequentlv focused on the nature of the movement's radicalism.' The major

Racial discord, political violence, and agrarian unrest are integral to the history of the American South from the close of the Civil War through the end of the nineteenth century. The economy of the region had undergone traumatic changes during the war, not the least of which were the destruction of large amounts of physical capital and the transition of the black agricultural labor force from slavery to freedom. The disruption of production during the war was followed by attempts to reorganize agriculture through a variety of institutional arrangements, including wage labor, cash renting, and widespread use of the sharecropping form of land tenure. Many of the legal and cultural manifestations of the racial prejudice which has long outlived chattel slavery made their appearance during these years. Both contemporary observers and modern historians have recognized possible connections between the economic conditions and the political or institutional developments of the period, yet certain basic characteristics of the post-bellum southern economy have never been adequately determined. Consequently, the influence of economic forces in southern society and political life has remained obscure.

The beginning student of German economic history, should he happen to read more than one text, may be pardoned a certain sense of confusion. General texts agree that Germany became an industrial power, but there remains a remarkable uncertainty as to when this occurred. “During the period from 1870 to 1914 Germany was transformed from a predominantly agrarian to a predominantly industrial state,” asserts Koppel Pinson. He explicitly dismisses the 1850's as a “prelude,” but Ralph Flenley insists that “the real ‘foundation time’ came earlier, most markedly in the fifties….Not the railways alone but the whole economic framework of modern Germany arose during the periodbefore1870.” In a recent short synthesis of German economic history, Knut Borchardt warns that “experts still disagree” over the beginning date of the “foreward leap.”

The point has been made that millenarian movements flourish in a relatively isolated agrarian milieu. I have argued that the relationships between this milieu and disaster make millenarianism a predominantly rural form of unrest, ill-suited to the polyglot character of city life. If that is true, an obvious corollary should be that millenarian movements are eventually destined to disappear. As urban, industrial indeed, as some would have it, postindustrial society expands, such archaisms as chiliastic sects are bound to constitute early casualties. E.J. Hobsbawm and others argue that the apparent upthrust of such groups in recent times represents only the dying paroxysms of agrarian society. The city, which as recently as the turn of the century had been overwhelmingly a Western social form, very rapidly diffused into the non-Western world. "In 1900 . .. there were fourteen cities with a population of one million or more, and of these six ... were in Europe, three in Asia, three in North America, and two in South America. By 1960, when the total had risen to sixty-nine, the distribution had changed radically. No less than twenty-six (i.e. more than thirty-seven per cent) were in Asia."1 Examples might be multiplied, but the major point should be clear enough: a major transformation has steadily reduced the size and importance of the reservoirs from which millenarian movements have traditionally drawn their adherents.

In 1901 C.H.W. Johns published an interesting group of texts from the archives of the Neo-Assyrian kings at Nineveh, under the title of 'An Assyrian Doomsday Book or liber censualis of the district round Harran, in the seventh century B.C.'. In contrast to some of his later work, Johns' copy of the texts was remarkably good, and with the edition he gave a full discussion of the evidence provided by the group of texts in differing spheres. No doubt partly because this edition was so thorough, the Doomsday Book has received little attention from scholars since then, apart from passing references. Only quite recently, with the quickening interest in Neo-Assyrian studies, have serious attempts been made once more to investigate these texts (they constitute an important part of the evidence in Dr. J. Zablocka's discussion of the agrarian conditions of the Neo-Assyrian empire, and are discussed also in G. van Driel, Bi.Or. XXVII 3/4 (1970) 175; V.A. Jakobson, in I.M. Diakonoff (ed.) Ancient Mesopotamia 277-295; and in a forthcoming book by the reviewer 'Taxation and Conscription in the Assyrian Empire' Rome 1974). However, in none of these cases has a complete re-examination of the texts been attempted, and this is what the book under review has done; in addition, the author has included 'Schedules' from the Niniveh archives, which have never been properly edited before.

Emergence as a little discussed bioecological phenomenon in infectious pathology, the most important in the current period, its actual significance, nature, causes in general terms and in relation to the situation in the Russian Federation is considered. In this context, the main provisions, problems and non-trivial phenomena in the epizootology of emergent infections, economically and socially important for the country, are presented - African swine fever, rabies, foot and mouth disease, avian flu, nodular dermatitis and anthrax. Most emergent infections of domestic animals and humans are of zoogenic origin. These are mainly (more than 70%) diseases of the wild animals - ungulates, carnivores, primates, rodents, birds, bats, representatives of other mammals and non-mammal groups, the causative agents of which come from natural zoonotic pools. It is obvious that the achievements of human civilization over the past decades are the driving forces for the emergence and spread of emergent diseases although indirect, but decisive. The most demonstrative evidence of this conclusion is an infection associated with bats. The movement of people, tourism and trade, hydropower, agrarian expansion, deforestation, amelioration, unrestrained humanization and urbanization of territories, with unpredictable consequences, perturb the prevailing relations between representatives of the animal world and the environment. One of the subjective elements of the phenomenon is the large-scale traffic of wild animals from biological invasions, artificial introduction into new territories and trade in living goods. At the same time, the emerging problems of protecting animals and humans from new highly dangerous, transboundary and other infections are difficult to solve from a social and mental point of view - they compromise the overall socio-economic, scientific and technological progress, focusing on its negative aspects and internal conflict with at least the well-being and consistency of the environment.

CHINA'S INNER STRUGGLE is essentially a search for new forms of life. When China was opened by force, over one hundred years ago, and brought into the orbit of the Western world and its economic systems, she was forced into a transformation which has not yet been completed. In order to survive, China had to aim at becoming a modern national state with a newly integrated economy. This transformation was impossible without a fundamental change of Chinese society. The old agrarian country is beginning to industrialize. The ancient universal empire has been replaced by a republic; Western ideas of democracy and of Marxism have destroyed the old unity of Confucian political thinking. And, like the Western world, China is in the midst of an ideological crisis. In addition to her agrarian and economic problems, China will have to solve this crisis in order to find a new balance of her social forces.

Economic development in the industrial nations of the North was led by an always advancing technology. The society adjusted by increments to advances, and an ideology of free enterprise developed congruently. In the industrial revolution, the Latin-American countries were an agrarian and mineral hinterland. Now that industrialization, as such, is pressing on them, they cannot adapt rapidly to the influx of complex technology. They must reconstruct certain aspects of their society before the technology can operate at all. This means that social inventions must precede the technological. Strong governments must take this responsibility, since they are the only agents that operate with legitimate authority throughout the nation state. To date in Latin America, only Mexico seems to have initiated the major steps that may permit it to move from a nation of secondary development patterns to primary development.

A recent study of Detroit blue-collar workers reveals that workmen born in agrarian regions express a higher degree of working-class consciousness than those reared in industrial settings. This finding runs a contrary to Marx's hypothesis on the sources of class consciousness, but is consistent with evidence gathered by several social scientists. Following G. D. H. Cole and A. Ulam, our interpretation of this militance among "the uprooted" stresses the jarring effects of industrialization. To further buttress this argument, data presented indicate that uprooted workmen reared in settings least likely to provide them with intellectual tools usable in the urban environment are the ones most likely to express militance.

In this little book, the second in a series of Agrarian Development Studies, issued by the Economics Department of Wye College, the author draws upon four years' experience with the consultants to the Water and Power Development Authority in West Pakistan to review the main technical and economic factors to be considered in planning irrigation development. The first chapter describes, in general terms, some of the basic relation¬ships between crop growth and water and drainage conditions. The author warns that in arid areas water tends to be regarded as a unique resource. Assigning supreme priorities to single resources can be very damaging to economic development since mere technical feasibility is regarded as justifying irrigation projects, regardless of whether they are economically justified.

By the spring of 1966, it was abundantly clear in New Delhi that the Third Five Year Plan was a failure. Over the five year period (1961–66), the rate of increase in national income was less than half the projected level. Per capita income showed no increase at all. At the same time, prices for all commodities rose by over one half. The price index for foodgrains climbed by more than 56 per cent. By 1966, food shortages were so severe that some thirty million persons in major cities and towns were placed under statutory rationing. Another two hundred million—over one-third the population—were brought under partial rationing schemes. Even so, the general price index rose by another 38 per cent in 1967. Once again, foodgrains took the lead with a price increase of 44 per cent.

After World War II, governments carried out agrarian reforms in Eastern Europe. This measure resulted in a radical change in the distribution of land ownership. Later a policy of collectivization and formation of state farms followed. Agricultural production has stagnated and fallen behind the planned mark and needs of the population. Conditions concerning production, marketing, and income reduce incentive for greater production and for the mar keting of larger amounts of production. Agriculture has played a subservient role to the rapid development of industry, and generally represents the least successful sector of Communist economic policy.

With the conquest of Islamic lands by European powers arose the question whether those persons who had been entitled to levy the land rents from the peasants on the eve of the conquest are now to be regarded as proprietors of the respective estates, or as having only temporary right of lease, which may be revoked by the government (especially in the case of the so-called Khardj lands). This administrative question, which was for the most part answered in practice to the benefit of the landholders,' made the juridic classification of lands in the Islamic world the favorite topic of those orientalists who took interest in the agrarian problems. Though in reality the agrarian relations in Islamic lands were not always founded on the Islamic law,2 this law became the main object of investigation. The principal theories were those of (a) Hammer-Purgstall,3 according to whom there were three main classes of lands: (1) cUshri lands, which were distributed at the time of the Moslem conquest among the conquerors as their property (mulk); (2) Khardji lands, left to their non-Moslem owners as their property, with no other distinction from the former than heavier taxation; and (3) the state domains, denoted in Turkey as ard-i-mamlakat, which were employed as military fiefs. This classification, based by Hammer-Purgstall on the authority of Ottoman writers, the Mufti Abfi Sucfld (the counselor of Sulaymdn the Magnificent) and Muhammad-Chalabi, was accepted by W. Padel,4 but a more 1 So in British India by the Permanent Settlement of 1793; in French Egypt by decree (arrdtt) of 30 Fructidor, Year VI (1798); in Algeria (this action of the French administration was severely criticized by Dr. Worms in Journal asiatique, XIV (3d ser.; 1842), 22526); in Russian Turkestan by Rules of 1886. 2 See my article on the feudal system of the Mamlfiks in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, I (1937), 97-107. Only Waqfs and allodial lands (amlak) were administered in the Mamlfik state more or less according to the Islamic law, and therefore the documents relating to them were designated as makatib sharciyya (Ibn Iy~s, V, 189, 11. 16-20; p. 219, 1. 12; Ibn al-Ji~in, p. 38, 1. 3). 3 Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches (2d ed.; 1834), II, 341. More fully in his Des osmanischen Reichs Staat8verfassung und Staat8verwaltung. 4 Das Grundeigentum in der Tirkei nach der neuern Gesetzgebung (Jahrbuch der intern. Vereinig. fiir vergl. Rechtsw. und Volkswirtschaftslehre, Vols. VI-VII, Abt. I [1903]). Cf. W. Padel and L. Steeg, De la legislation fonciare ottomane (Paris, 1904). The opinion that Kharaji lands are the property of their holders was expressed also by Belin in Journal asiatique, 1861, pp. 414 ff. 50

The object of the present paper is to call attention to a class of documents which seem hitherto to have escaped much notice from economic historians, but which, it is thought, may throw light on the agrarian transitions which took place in England during the sixteenth century. The documents in question date from the reign of Elizabeth, and are termed by their compilers Libri supervisionis, or surveys. An examination of their contents shows that the name is justly applied; for they are not merely rentals or terriers, such as landowners in all ages have frequently compiled as evidence of the value or extent of their estates, but elaborate topographical descriptions, furlong by furlong, and strip by strip, of complete villages, extending sometimes in length to a hundred pages of manuscript. Herein lies their interest ; for, as the surveys are not confined to particular estates or particular manors, but make the complete circuit of the villages, giving the abuttals and compass bearings of the various parcels of land, only patience and ingenuity are required to compile a tolerably accurate map of each village as it was at the date of the surveyor's visit; and Elizabethan maps are not of such every day occurrence as to render their recovery a matter of indifference. Of course in some cases owing either to ignorance of the size and shape of the wastes, or to the complete obliteration of old landmarks by parliamentary enclosures, it may be difficult to compile a map ; but even in these cases the surveys themselves cannot fail to be illuminating, containing as they do a detailed statement of the arrangements of each village such as can nowhere else be obtained.

THIS paper is an attempt to compare the main reconstruction issues before modern industrialized Western society and the predominantly agrarian areas of the Middle East. A considerable amount of generalization is inevitable, but so long as this is recognized, it will do no harm. The Middle East has become part of the international society of nations, but it still bears the marks of a regime and civilization of its own with many national, political and cultural features in common. Whereas the political integration of Middle Eastern countries within the framework of modern international relations has recently been almost completely realized, their economic life still functions at a very different level and on a different pattern. For this reason, economic reconstruction has a different meaning in the Western world and in the Middle East. The outbreak of the Second World War afforded a temporary solution of the central social and economic problem of Western society, namely, periodical mass unemployment. The fear that this solution may be only temporary has made the demand for a fundamentally new economic and social policy, for a planned reconstruction of society, the central issue in postwar thinking and planning. The emotional reactions produced among the nations by the war have provided a' particularly powerful impetus to hopes that a new order may be achieved, and that the anticipated difficulties may be surmounted. Hence the ideas behind the programmes of reconstruction in the countries of the West derive from their economic and social conditions, where the entire sense of realities is overshadowed by the threatening and paralysing phenomenon of individual insecurity; the arguments and demands embodied in the programmes clearly reflect this origin. The real aim of reconstruction is thus the restoration of individual security through the limitation and control of those hybrid forces which have led Western society to its highest achievements of civilization and technical skill but which, when unchecked, can also bring it to the verge of the abyss. II

Italy is essentially an agricultural country, although not without important industries. Within the relatively small area of the country a wide diversity of soil, elevation, rainfall, and temperature prevails. Social and economic conditions likewise vary greatly from place to place. Because of these widely varied physical, social, and economic conditions, the agriculture of Italy covers a range as wide as that covered by the agriculture of Europe. The kingdom as a whole, including the large islands of Sicily and Sardinia, has an area of 119,000 square miles and a population of more than 41 million inhabitants (one-fifth smaller in area than the state of California, with a population more than seven times as large). In population Italy ranks third of all continental European countries, being surpassed only by Russia and Germany. Although the climate is in general favorable to the production of many agricultural commodities, the land is swampy in many regions of the country. Thus, from the time of the Romans to our present day, Italy has suffered from malaria on account of the swamps of the Po River Valley, the Roman countryside, the province of Venetia, and most of southern Italy. In order to grasp fully the meaning of the present Italian agricultural situation, it is necessary to have in mind one of the main problems of Italy's economic life, i.e. its excess of population. Toward the end of the nineteenth century (1884), at the beginning of the twentieth (1903), and again a decade ago (1919-1922), Italy was shaken by very serious agrarian revolts. The fundamental economic cause of these movements was the excess of population. The great number of its inhabitants which, in the field of foreign policy, makes the pride and strength of Italy, arouses in the social life of the country some serious and difficult problems. A soil of limited area has to support a population which in less than fifty years (1881-1929) has increased from 28 to 41 million people. Moreover, southern Italy, which contributes very largely to this increase of population, is exclusively agricultural. There are no important industries in that part of the country to utilize the unemployed hands. There comes a time

ECONOMIC DETERMINISM is so widely identified with Marxian socialism that it is seldom remembered now that there are, or have been, other varieties. It is, however, possible to interpret social phenomena by way of agricultural economics and agricultural history. Not nearly so well known as his American contemporary, Henry George, the Italian writer, Achille Loria was equally concerned with the construction of a system of agrarian determinism. This paper proposes to summarize his general theory, as developed in the available English translations.

U URBAN development in China appears to be almost as old as China itself. This may appear anomalous in view of the fact that modern China is overwhelmingly rural and agrarian in character with at least three quarters of its population engaged in agriculture and dwelling in rural hamlets and villages. The beginnings of town building and urban life in China appear to coincide with the Bronze Age and are associated with the second, or Shang, Dynasty. Sometime during the second millennium B.C. there developed among the bronze-using groups in North China the habit of living in clustered settlements composed of rectangular timbered houses forming quandrangular towns defended by ramparts of tamped earth. The Bronze Age civilization did not immediately replace the earlier Neolithic culture in North China, for there was a long period during which the former was restricted to a small warlike, aristocratic, ruling class occupying a number of small, scattered, autonomous city states which existed like islands in a sea of Neolithic barbarism.1 These town dwellers were the rulers, fighters, landlords and priests all in one. Shang society thus consisted of two very contrasting groups, one urban and the other rural.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, when Mexico was beginning a slowly drawn-out process of industrialization and urbanization, the seemingly quiet countryside was experiencing agrarian unrest of proportions unprecedented in the nation's history. Trapped between increasing population on diminishedejidalandpueblolandholdings and ever-growing estates and demands of large property owners, Mexicancampesinosin three states—eastern Morelos, southeastern Mexico, and northwestern Puebla— sought relief by means of insurrection. Because these agrarian uprisings during the last third of the nineteenth century were a prelude to similar and more famous occurrences during the fateful epoch 1910-1917, their causes, nature, and significance are essential for understanding an important aspect of the Mexican Revolution.